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Preface
Tom Gunning
A senior film scholar once told me that when attending a conference on a famous Amer-
ican avant-garde filmmaker she asked one of the presenters why he hadn’t mentioned the
influence of Epstein.
The presenter looked confused: “Did you say, ‘Eisenstein’?” he asked.
The films and writings of Jean Epstein still remain one of the best-kept secrets of
film studies, especially outside of France. Hopefully this rich and insightful new
anthology may sound the trumpet blast that starts the walls of isolation tumbling.
While I and a few other film scholars have enjoyed a certain sense of privileged
pleasure in knowing the work of this extraordinary cineaste, I can only find this
persistent neglect puzzling. To my mind Jean Epstein is not only the most original
and the most poetic silent filmmaker in France, surpassing impressive figures like
Abel Gance, Jacques Feyder, Marcel L’Herbier and even Louis Feuillade; I also
consider him one of the finest film theorists of the silent era, worthy to be placed
alongside the Soviet theorists (Eisenstein, Vertov and Kuleshov) and the equal of
the extraordinary German-language cinema theorist, Béla Balázs. I recently
amused another senior scholar when I claimed I thought an English translation
of Epstein’s writings on cinema could revolutionize American film studies. My
interlocutor, who greatly admires Epstein, shook his head and replied, “I wish I
had as high an opinion of American film studies as you do!”
I try not to assume that my own passions are universal, and it may still be some
time before the name of Epstein sounds as familiar as Eisenstein. Nonetheless, I
cannot help but welcome this new anthology of essays and translations as a pos-
sibly transformative contribution to media studies. And I say media studies rather
than simply film studies or film history advisedly. Although Epstein’s place in
film history remains central and complex, I cannot regard him simply as a histori-
cal figure. Epstein entered cinema at its moment of greatest excitement and dis-
covery – a period in which its possibilities seemed boundless and its implications
yet to be theorized. We now are witnessing a moment in which the nature of
moving images and sound, of media in general, is undergoing a similarly radical
transformation – and Epstein’s writings seem to me more relevant than ever. If
Epstein is sometimes dismissed as a visionary (a poet, a mystic who naively sees
cinema as offering an almost millennial promise), it may be that our times de-
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mand, once again, such a penetrating and untrammeled expectation of what our
new media could achieve. It is not simply that Epstein’s proclamations of the
boundless novelty of cinema seem as inspired today as they did in the twenties;
he saw cinema as more than a form of entertainment, a mass medium, or even a
new art form. For Epstein, cinema offered a mechanical brain, a machine eye – a
portal into a new world transformed by technology: a way for human perception
to penetrate into the very life of matter. Epstein’s conviction that cinema would
open onto new domains of knowledge of the world by going beyond the limits of
human consciousness represents more than just the quaint forgotten utopian pre-
diction of a new medium from its first decades. Epstein reminds us of possibili-
ties untapped and speculations unexplored, which emerge as a challenge today as
media technology offers more than a means of subjugating the natural world.
Can new technologies of vision and communication offer a way to rethink man’s
relation to his environment, rather than increased access to the ever-the-same? I
believe Epstein provided a radically different way of looking at the cinema than
that provided by the equally utopian but also instrumental and linguistic model of
the Soviets. Unlike the Soviets or the semioticians of the seventies, Epstein’s view
of the possibilities of cinema surpassed their claims of a new visual language, by
going beyond the linguistic model and seeking out instead a new way of seeing
the world and interacting with it, based in the subconscious and the extension of
our senses into new domains of sensitivity.
Thus I am calling for an approach to Epstein that a new anthology like this
makes possible: a double vision of his work that makes use of materials newly
available and perspectives newly opened. On the one hand, Epstein’s place in
film history remains unique and calls for reevaluation. This actually began a few
decades ago and has been recognized in France, especially since the opening of
new archives of material donated to the Cinémathèque française by Jean’s sister,
Marie Epstein, an important filmmaker in her own right, giving access to unpub-
lished work by Epstein – of which several scholars in this anthology make intense
use. Further, a new sense of the history of silent cinema, as well as new acknowl-
edgement of Epstein’s identity as both gay and Jewish, casts a different light on
the man and the thinker. Epstein’s work (the films and the writings, but the writ-
ing especially, some of it now made available in these new translations) may have
undergone a certain eclipse, but their reemergence comes at a timely moment
when their relevance appears clearer than ever.
First, let me sketch something of Epstein’s unique historical position, but also
indicate why he should not be grasped only as a historical figure. France could be
considered the birthplace of cinema, in spite of subsequent claims made by Holly-
wood and the USA. France’s role in the invention of cinema – first with the work
of Etienne-Jules Marey on cinema’s technical predecessor, chronophotography,
and then the Lumière Brothers in devising an effective camera and projection
system – was surpassed by the role of the Pathé Frères in industrializing the pro-
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duction and distribution of cinema internationally before WWI. However, with
the near suspension of French film production during the war, and the conse-
quent expansion of Hollywood internationally, the presence of French film suf-
fered a drastic reduction on the world market and lost the international domi-
nance Pathé had held before 1913. But in a sense the incredible bond France has
always maintained with the cinema simply transmuted, shifting from industrial
production to intellectual labor. The first widespread and coherent cinema move-
ment, both in writing and filmmaking, the first attempt to articulate the nature of
cinema and offer a theory of cinema’s unique aesthetic, appeared in France
shortly before and after World War I. While the market share of French films
plummeted internationally, a serious intellectual discourse on the seventh art
blossomed, sustained by the role of Paris as the international capital of modern
art, willing to reach out towards this new art of the machine (unlike other artistic
and intellectual centers which scorned film as vulgar). This burgeoning French
film culture was nurtured by a new breed of intellectuals known as cineastes who
founded film journals, created alternate forms for film exhibition in both cine-
clubs and specialized theaters, and fostered close contact among filmmakers,
painters and poets (Apollinaire, Cendrars, Picasso, Léger, Man Ray, Colette, Coc-
teau, Artaud, Breton, were just a few of the Parisian intellectuals who flocked to
the cinema in the teens and twenties and whose work was transformed by this
encounter). The first “movement” in cinema, known (at least in retrospect) as the
Impressionists (indicating only a vague relation to the movement in painting dec-
ades earlier, and possibly stronger relations to the music of Debussy and a defi-
nite debt to the subjective and ephemeral associations of the term) emerged from
these intersecting forces. I have often thought it would be better to refer to this
conjunction of theories and filmmaking as “Symbolist” because of its closer ties
to the allegories and abstraction of the post-impressionist generation and its par-
ticularly strong ties to poetry, but the films did maintain a powerful link to the
painter’s obsession with vision under varying circumstances of light and atmo-
sphere.
Epstein stands at the center of this first cinema movement, whose influence
internationally on the avant-garde ideals of cinema has sometimes been obscured
by the slightly later influence of Expressionism, Dada, Surrealism and Soviet
montage. In many ways in spite of the extraordinary achievements of the French
cinema after the war in the work of Marcel L’Herbier, Germaine Dulac, Abel
Gance, Fernand Léger, Dimitri Kirsanov, Rene Clair, Henri Chomette, Louis Del-
luc, Jean Renoir and others (all touched to varying degrees and for varying lengths
of time by the Impressionist influence), one could claim the true center of the
movement lay in its theoretical discourse. Among the first self-conscious attempts
to define the nature of cinema (and thus its difference from the other arts), the
writings first of Louis Delluc, and then of Epstein and Germaine Dulac (and a
host of other critics of writers, some of them filmmakers who wrote occasionally
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– such as L’Herbier or Kirsanov) sparked an intense debate and polemic about the
nature and possibilities of cinema. The initial term of these debates became photo-
génie, primarily introduced by Delluc, (although, as Katie Kirtland has shown, it
had a long history, especially in art and literature, before the cinema). The term
was debated, its relevance vaunted (and denied) by numerous voices, but its great-
est exponent was Jean Epstein, at least in his early writings. Epstein’s eloquent
invocation of photogénie (and equally staunch refusal to offer a strict and easily
paraphrased definition of the term) expressed his firm faith in cinema’s unique
quality, beyond logic and linguistic specification, his allegiance to the intuitive
and subconscious sources of art and the enigmatic legacy of Symbolist poetry.
As I indicated, Epstein brings the Symbolist/Impressionist tradition in cinema
to a climax in both his films and his writings. This in itself certainly makes him a
crucial figure in film history and aesthetics. In spite of its eclipse by the more
famous avant-garde movements, the influence of this current of cinema was in-
ternational. One can trace its echoes not only in the later avant-garde movements
of the 1920’s – despite their polemics against it. The Surrealists denounced the
Impressionists even as they appropriated aspects of Epstein’s thought; the young
Luis Buñuel apprenticed with the established filmmaker and apparently consid-
ered him an old-fashioned aesthete; yet the visual influence of La Chute de la maison
Usher, on which he worked as an assistant, on Un Chien Andalou is evident, even if
possibly carrying a mocking overtone. But Impressionist echoes also extended to
the experimental cinemas of Latin America (Mario Peixoto’s Brazilian masterpiece
from 1930, Limite), Asia (Impressionist stylistics seem to me to dominate Teino-
suke Kinugasa’s 1926 Page of Madness in spite of more frequent comparisons to The
Cabinet of Dr. Caligari) and the United States (especially evident in Webber and
Watson’s 1933 Lot in Sodom), not to mention the delayed surfacing of a Symbolist
aesthetic in the films of Ingmar Bergman and Andrei Tarkovsky or, as Robert Bird
has persuasively argued, Stan Brakhage. But as rich and in need of further study
as this Impressionist legacy may be, as I indicated earlier, it should not circum-
scribe our understanding of Epstein by confining him to a brief period of film
history rather than recognizing him as a still-vibrant force in thinking through
the intersection of technology and perception in the modern era. Epstein’s value
lies in both embodying and surpassing cinematic Impressionism. Otherwise one
might see Epstein as a slightly out-of-date turn-of-the-century decadent, whose
thought and aesthetics seem caught in the wake of Baudelaire and Poe and whose
sense of modernity lags behind the Surrealists and Constructivists, and whose
theory remains poetic and impressionistic.
To launch a full claim for shaking Epstein out of this narrow frame, while
acknowledging the importance of his Symbolist roots, lies beyond the scope of
this modestly intended preface and my still-limited penetration into the full Ep-
stein archive. I do not think it is wrong, though, to see it as one of the ambitions
of this anthology as a whole, whose authors’ knowledge surpasses my own.
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While the approach and ideas of the authors assembled here differ, nonetheless
they all reflect on Epstein as more than a circumscribed historical figure. The
deep grappling with his work found here constantly affirms the excitement that
his films and ideas still generate. The Epstein excavated in these pages is no
mummy, but a vital gift to the future of media studies.
Noël Carroll has pointed out that the first generation of film theorists were
primarily engaged in a polemic arguing for the value and uniqueness of cinema
as an art form. This often led to a paradox of which these writers were aware to
varying degrees. As a new art form, the cinema strove to define its difference from
the other arts (especially from its closest cognate, theater). Thus, their arguments
often assumed the form that became known as medium specificity. Cinema can
do things other arts can’t: it is luminous; it uses photography, but liberates it
from stillness; it is produced by machines and can be distributed on a mass scale
like an industrial product; it seems to attract even the uneducated; and it can
communicate with limited (or even no) use of language. Conservative critics
posed many of these qualities as limitations to cinema’s ever attaining aesthetic
parity with the traditional arts. Further, in the period before the First World War
0social critics denounced cinema as a vulgar fairground attraction, an example of
mass-produced “trash,” suitable only for the unwashed and uneducated. The re-
sponse of those willing to defend the cinema primarily took the form of striving
to infuse cinema with the values of traditional arts through adaptations of literary
pieces, recreations of famous paintings, or obtaining the participation in film-
making of well-known actors, writers and even composers. Gradually, however, a
modernist backlash emerged, especially during and after the First World War,
celebrating, rather than attempting to eliminate, film’s fairground heritage and
democratic audience, praising its mechanical rhythm, and embracing film’s parti-
cipation in the speedy tempos of modern urban life. The film theory of the late
teens and twenties still wobbles a bit between these positions (an emulation of
the established canons of art still competed with a view of cinema as a model for
modern forms) and occasionally even attempted a synthesis.
The contested term photogénie, which will be discussed frequently in the pages
of this anthology, can be seen as an attempt to define the uniqueness of the cine-
ma, and, as I have indicated, to claim that cinema represented a new mode of
perception and experience. As such, photogénie can be characterized as offering an
argument of medium specificity. Yet at the risk of apparent contradiction, Epstein
seems to locate the unique quality of cinema less in its difference from the other
arts than in its achievement of a specifically modern synthesis and fulfillment of
both the arts and the sciences, even providing new forms of knowledge that
bridge the aesthetic and the epistemological (although perhaps the term “Gnos-
tic” best indicates Epstein’s view of cinema’s new modes of knowing). Epstein’s
pre-cinematic career revolved around the dual centers of scientific research and
modern poetry. His early writings seem inspired by Apollinaire’s proclamation of
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a new poetry that could take its place alongside the new painting of the Cubist
and post-impressionists. Cinema, Epstein might claim, fulfills the aspiration of
new forms of poetry and painting, offering an entirely new way of making art,
which grew out of a modern way of perceiving the world, and perhaps even pro-
vided a passage to this new world. Thus, film’s synthesis of modern art resembled
less a Wagnerian gesamtkunstwerk combining the arts of the past than a technical
art aimed at the expansion and refinement of the senses. As a synthesis, cinema
did not simply combine the various arts, but put them on a new footing, defining
them not as a mode of representing the world, but as a way to penetrate it, even
uncovering a world beyond human experience: exploring the realm of matter, of
the données of consciousness, especially revealing the laws of time amid the dee-
pest layers of motion and matter.
While I make no attempt here to give a synoptic account of Epstein theories, I
do wish to point out how they evade a central dichotomy of traditional film theo-
ry. I have differentiated Epstein’s concept of photogénie and theories of the photo-
graphic image from the syntactically based montage theories of Eisenstein, the
only silent film theorist whose depth of thought could claim, in my opinion, to
surpass Epstein’s. Although postdating the period of Epstein’s foundational writ-
ing, the essays of André Bazin, which date from the forties and fifties, offer a
fascinating relation to Epstein (which merits a profound study). As recent revalua-
tions and research make clear, Bazin stands as the most complex theorist of cine-
ma after the silent era, and his discussion of the ontology of the photographic
image at points recalls aspects of Epstein’s description of photogénie, although
Bazin seems almost to repress any reference to the earlier theorist. But if affinities
exist between them, Bazin’s approach to cinema certainly diverged from Ep-
stein’s. In a classic formulation, Bazin divided filmmakers into two broad camps:
those who put their faith in the image and those who put their faith in reality.
Epstein smashes through this division. For Bazin, those who put their faith in the
image included those filmmakers who believed the essential art of cinema lay in
developing the “expressive” devices of film, whether the montage of the Soviets,
the plastic deformation of set design, composition and lighting practiced by the
Expressionists, or the cinematic tricks beloved by the avant-garde, including the
Impressionists (e.g. superimpositions, split-screens, manipulation of lenses). In
his calls for a new avant-garde Epstein seems to belong firmly to the image camp.
Especially in his early films, he employed most of these devices. However, he also
expressed his suspicion of them and, especially in his Brittany films from the late
twenties, sought to foreground cinema’s interaction with real locations and the
material surfaces of the world. But it would be too simple to see Epstein as gradu-
ally evolving into a Bazinian realist. Even in these later films, with their semi-
documentary modes of location shooting and non-professional actors, we are
hardly anticipating the styles of neo-realism, aspiring to capture reality yet avoid
manipulating it. Epstein’s cinema continues to intervene in the world, to present
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a world transformed rather than familiar. We could say Epstein felt that cinematic
techniques failed if they obscured our contact with reality, but succeeded if they
revealed new layers of the structures of the world, supplementing ordinary human
perception.
I believe Epstein’s third way, between the formalism of foregrounding artistic
devices and the Bazinian faith in the sufficiency of photographic surface and the
preservation of real time (as in the long-take aesthetic which has become nearly a
fetish in current international film festival stylistics), represents not only a ne-
glected and powerful tradition of filmmaking, but also a way of thinking about
film that transcends medium specificity. Within the French film culture of the
twenties the debates over photogénie eventually gave way to a discussion of cinéma
pur, pure cinema, whose definition became as subject to disputes as the earlier
term. Epstein seemed dubious about this even narrower focus on cinema main-
taining a splendid isolation from other influences. Cinema existed within a net-
work of modern arts and exemplified a modern poetry, and film’s relation to the
sciences supplied a vital realm of reference for Epstein. For Epstein, rather than
simply contemplating its own nature, cinema opened onto the universe, both the
human world of memory and emotion and the material world that films could
open to human understanding. Thus, the devices of the cinema served less as
artistic filters placed over the world than scientific lenses revealing new aspects,
like the investigatory tools of laboratory or observatory. Epstein’s fascination with
the technique of slow motion clearly exemplifies this third way in which film
explores previously undiscovered aspects of the world. Marey, the scientist who
arguably made the greatest contribution to the technology of the motion pictures,
had criticized the projected films of the Lumière brothers when they appeared at
the turn-of-the-century, claiming such moving images simply reproduced com-
mon visual experience and did nothing to extend our powers of vision. Marey
designed chronophotography to triumph over the human subjugation to temporal
flow by stilling and capturing the otherwise invisible instant and subjecting it to
observation and analysis. In the early twentieth century scientists recognized cine-
matic slow motion, along with its opposite, time-lapse photography, as providing
major tools for observation and demonstration. Enabling through cinema the ex-
tension and compression of the flow of time respectively, these techniques re-
vealed aspects of the world that human vision could not otherwise see, and yet
they did not distort the world into an aesthetic image. Rather they opened up a
new visual dimension. Epstein’s manipulation of time in cinema revealed a differ-
ent rhythm to the universe, a ballet of matter. Thus, the intuition of Roderick
Usher, the protagonist of Poe’s story, that matter itself may have a sentient and
animate dimension was visualized in Epstein film’s La Chute de la maison Usher
through the use of slow motion. The constant vibration of the material world,
whether the flowing of fabric caught in the breeze or the cascade of dust falling
from a suddenly struck bell does not simply provide a visual metaphor for the
preface 19
haunted house of Usher. Rather, they capture a universal vibration shared by the
soul of things and the structures of the psyche, invoking the senses of both vision
and sound (and even touch) placed before us on the screen. In his penultimate
masterpiece from 1947, Le Tempestaire, Epstein not only used slow motion to dis-
play the currents of ocean surf as he had in his earlier silent films made in Brit-
tany, but innovatively introduced the timbre and resonance of slowed down re-
corded sound, enfolding us as auditors not simply in defamiliarized sonority, but
allowing us to dwell within an extended soundscape filled with the uncanny
echoes of nature.
I believe the future of media studies cannot simply ditch more than a century of
moving images in order to vaunt the digital pleasures of video games. But I also
find embalming the original potential of the moving image that emerged during
the last century into a nostalgic longing for the vanished purity of cinema equally
impoverished. I think Epstein’s third way may serve as a clue to guide us through
this new labyrinth of promises and false turns. Epstein saw cinema as a way of
sharpening and intensifying not only our senses but our complex relation to the
world – cinema serving as a device of exploration more than personal expression.
For Epstein, time did not exist as a static given, but as a malleable dimension:
inescapable perhaps, but also multifaceted when opened up by technology. Le
Tempestaire provides a complex allegory of Epstein’s visionary theory of film. The
heroine, a young Breton girl anxious about the fate of her fisherman lover who
may be lost in the tempest, finds little solace in the radio technology contained in
a lighthouse and consults an old tempest master, a wizard who peers into a glass
ball. This ancient tool of scrying resembles the cinema as vision machine, but
Epstein’s images of the tempest-tossed sea in slow and reverse motion and of
clouds in fast motion scudding across the sky, reveals a powerful choreography
of nature within a post-Einsteinian universe that exceeds the wizard’s vision. The
answer to the girl’s fear does not come through the witch’s ball, which falls to the
floor and smashes. Occult vision does not resolve the narrative enigma, but rather
cinema opens up another dimension of experience that actually cures the girl’s
fear of wind and sea. Epstein’s unconventional rhetoric turns the viewer’s atten-
tion away from the resolution of narrative expectations by overwhelming our con-
cern for the outcome of the storm with an absorption into its awe-inspiring forms
revealed through a new way of seeing and experiencing the world. As in the end-
ing the Book of Job, in which Jehovah sidesteps Job’s moral questions through an
invocation of His sovereignty and the sublime structures of creation, here the
structures of the world revealed through technology make a dangerous world in-
habitable, if still uncanny. For Epstein cinema offered a means of revelation, but
one essentially modern and technological.
The eclipse of Epstein’s work has been pierced before, and this anthology
should be seen as a culmination rather than an entirely new project. Although
submerged, French scholarship has never entirely forgotten Epstein, and against
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Bazin’s silence Edgar Morin, in his crucial work of post-World War II film theory,
Le cinema ou l’homme imaginaire, maintained Epstein’s thought as an essential refer-
ence, while Henri Langlois of the Cinémathèque française undertook the effort to
rediscover and preserve Epstein’s films that will continue to fuel the revival I hope
is now spreading beyond France. The opening of the new Epstein archives has
been greeted by French scholars with new evaluations and publications, such as
Jacques Aumont’s invaluable anthology from 1998, Jean Epstein: cinéaste, poète, phi-
losophe. And in spite of his relative neglect in English-language film studies, an
Epstein revival did emerge in the 1970’s with publications by the British journal
AfterImage and a retrospective at New York City’s Anthology Film Archive (which
introduced me as young graduate student to his work, along with the insightful
advocacy of Annette Michelson). Important subsequent scholarly work followed,
ranging from David Bordwell’s pioneering dissertation on French Impressionism
(1974) to the penetrating dissertation by Stuart Liebman at NYU on Epstein’s early
work (1980). This culminated in Richard Abel’s history of the French cinema of
the Impressionist period, French Cinema: The First Wave 1915-1929, from 1987 (un-
fortunately long out of print) and the invaluable translations Abel made available
in his anthology from 1988, French Film Theory and Criticism: A History/Anthology
1907-1939, a volume whose Epstein pages in my copy are dog-eared and heavily
underscored. I am gratified that essays by some of these pioneering figures are
included here. But it is primarily the work of a new generation of scholars that
has produced this new anthology, and I am proud that I can claim some of them,
including the dedicated and resourceful editors, as my students. The future of
Epstein continues… and in new hands, who, with this volume, are now handing
it on to all of us.
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Introduction
Jean Epstein and the Revolt of Cinema
Sarah Keller
As it sketched its very first aesthetic differentiations with the spectacles of nature, the
cinematograph was choosing between God and Satan, and siding with the latter. Since
whatever moves will transform and replace what has proven to be photogenic, photogé-
nie, as a fundamental rule, clearly dedicated the new art to the service of the forces of
transgression and revolt.1
As filmmaker and theorist, Jean Epstein has observed that the fundamental ener-
gies undergirding cinema are those that valorize both rapt attention (associated
with stillness) and incessant flux (associated with movement), with a strong em-
phasis in his own work upon the latter. One of the cinema’s most conspicuous
tensions, for example, lies in the balance between its still frames and the way,
when they are set into motion, that they revivify whatever these individual shots
depict – a tension between stasis and change. Within his assertions about cinema
as the ultimate negotiator of the state of becoming characterizing existence, we find
a central connection among Epstein’s theory, his films, and the world in which he
conceived the theory and films. Epstein was a vigorous participant within the
modern era of which he was a part and which witnessed the strengthening within
intellectual circles of the idea of movement, change, and constant becoming as a
means for understanding aspects of our experience. Simultaneously, that era it-
self witnessed immense social, technological, and aesthetic changes – changes
that happened broadly and with harrowing rapidity. What better tool for compre-
hending such momentous transitions, Epstein argued, than cinema, born from a
moment (and itself composed of the elements) of massive change?
Before attempting to answer such a question, we might do well to take a step
back: first of all, who was Jean Epstein, this figure lingering on the outskirts of
cinema studies’ horizons, and why should the notion of change – and its atten-
dant figure of transgression that the epigraph above points out – matter to cine-
ma studies as much as it did to Epstein? In the history of cinema, and in the
history of theories about cinema, where does his work fit in?
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Jean Epstein was born in Warsaw, Poland in March 1897 – less than two years
after the first public screening of cinema in Paris. By way of Switzerland for his
boyhood education, Epstein came to France to continue his studies in medicine.
His medical training at the Université de Lyon (from 1917-1920) does find later
reflection in his film practice and theory, but within a short period of time, Ep-
stein turned to the arts as his primary vocational interest, first as a literary critic
and then (and finally) as a cineaste. While he was studying in Lyon, he made the
acquaintance of Louis and Auguste Lumière, founding fathers of cinema who
provided inspiration for him in establishing an arts journal, Le Promenoir. As this
trajectory portends, Epstein’s first foray into cinema came through writing, first
in journals like his own, and then collected in a series of books. In fact, he wrote
three books in quick succession from 1920 to 1922 and published them in short
order through Parisian presses; he then moved to Paris partly through the encour-
agement he received for these works. In their approaches, these three founda-
tional texts vary wildly, and in their content they range from discussions of litera-
ture to more general theories of aesthetics, social-psychology, and cinema.
Epstein completed all three – Poésie d’aujourd’hui: un nouvel état d’intelligence (1921),
Bonjour Cinema (1921), and La Lyrosophie (1922) – by the time he started work on his
first film, a documentary on Louis Pasteur (Pasteur) later in 1922. From these aus-
picious, energetic beginnings until his death in 1953, Epstein was prolific in both
filmmaking and writing about cinema: he completed over forty films and conti-
nually published articles, many of which he revised and collected in books pub-
lished throughout his lifetime.
The writings and films range widely in their style and purpose. Epstein wrote
articles about the parameters of cinema, philosophically inclined treatises, and
books with a more creative bent. His films range from documentaries to feature
films in a variety of styles. Among these are films that are broadly experimental or
commercial, melodramatic or instrumentally subtle, with celebrated actors of the
French cinema or non-actor inhabitants of the rugged islands off the coast of
Brittany. In both the writings and films, he was restlessly engaged in developing
ideas about the purview and potential of cinema, as well as about the character of
the human, scientific, social, and natural worlds. His films are enthusiastically
creative, capitalizing upon stylistic features available to the camera for dramatic
and aesthetic purposes, such as a long, slow track out from a close-up of a wo-
man’s face, posing for a portrait, into an extreme long shot of the art deco apart-
ment of her suitor, providing context for their romance (in Coeur des Gueux, 1936).
And the films and the theory mutually inform each other, so that for instance
Epstein’s interest in the viability of creative uses of sound develops in tandem
with film projects that explore what is possible to do with sound in practice.
Thus Epstein was one of the rare figures of cinema history who conceived his
creative practice parallel to an ambitious program of theorizing and writing.
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As a young man seeking his vocation, he read widely in philosophy and psy-
chology, the natural and physical sciences, poetry and literature, religion, and
many diverse subjects, and eventually drew several of his ideas about the meth-
ods, aesthetics, and purposes of cinema from these sources. Although he did not
initiate the potent idea for which he is most remembered – photogénie – he ex-
panded and elaborated upon it productively, and in Anglophone cinema studies,
he is the source on the matter to which most texts turn.2 Photogénie, which for
Epstein occurs in brief, electrifying flashes, signifies the quality which the filming
of an object confers upon that object, a particularly photographic (with all of its
effects) and cinematic (by dint of its mobile nature) quality that allows us to see
the object in a new light. The concept has a number of implications – some of
them unexpected – for the study of cinema, as we see in several of the essays in
this collection.
However, Epstein’s work goes well beyond his contributions to photogénie.
Other issues that are raised in his work include his contributions to trends in
French avant-garde filmmaking; his descriptions of the modernist condition
which lead him to consider fatigue in relation to social conditions, binding him
to the cultural critics of his time and beyond; and his innovative position on crea-
tive uses for sound after the cinema’s transition from the silent era. One of the
most provocative issues his work raises returns us to our initial question: we see
that the notion of change, which draws its energy from the “forces of transgres-
sion and revolt,” finds a particularly convincing and felicitous outlet in Epstein’s
critical and creative output. Cinema seen from Epstein’s vantage point takes as its
central motivation these transgressive yet ultimately life-affirming qualities of
movement. Revolt may be diabolical, as Epstein’s quotation suggests, but for him
it is also a way of preserving vitality, of showing that cinema possesses a life of its
own, its own intelligence.
Through the observations, obsessions, and arguments developed in his creative
and critical work, Epstein became one of the very first to imagine and attempt to
formulate a comprehensive notion of the cinema. As Richard Abel has noted, in
France through the 1910s, a cohesive theory about the artistic mode of film failed
to materialize.3 However, by the 1920s, the far-reaching implications of the artis-
tic potential inherent in cinema emerged from several corners. Jean Epstein be-
longs at the center of these efforts. In his earliest, most ebullient writings, he
explores the potential of cinema to express constantly shifting modes of being –
truly, modes of becoming. Epstein remains an optimist across his body of writ-
ing, even late in his career and even after being unable to make films for several
years during the Second World War. The ways in which he understands the sub-
versive nature of cinema and its capacity to harbor (positive) transgression devel-
op over time in his critical and creative oeuvre. And from early on, always related
to this foundational idea, Epstein navigates other concerns about the nature and
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purpose of the cinema, questions of great importance as several theories of cine-
ma first develop.
In the present moment, anxieties have emerged about the nature of the cine-
matic medium and its future (or its imminent demise), as well as about the notion
of being human both in a mechanized/digitized environment and across the
realms of perception, intellect, reason, and sense. Accordingly, scholars have re-
turned to earlier moments in cinema’s history, when similar preoccupations
reigned, for guidance on how to rethink cinema’s foundations and its current
status.4 Indeed, the ways in which we have understood the founding questions of
cinema studies appear not so much to be in a crisis moment at present as they are
in crisis again: that crisis comes as part of the cyclical nature of cinema as it
adjusts its parameters in the wake of irrevocable change, which Epstein identified
as cinema’s own central tendency. As a (relatively) new medium, cinema has al-
ways operated in an observable state of flux; its essential nature has proven elu-
sive in part because of shifting contextual and technological terrain. As Epstein
would warn us, setting one’s sights on a moving object requires some flexibility
of mind.
Within this medial environment, now is the perfect time to examine why Ep-
stein’s work is so important to the pre-digital age of cinema, as well as why it
continues to carry great importance whenever we feel compelled to ask, as we
often do: What is cinema? What can it do? And why does it matter? For Epstein,
cinema is revolutionary. It provides an artistic mode for making sense of and,
equally, for transforming the world it observes. Cinema triggers a revolt against
the dullness of the senses and the habits of the mind; it recognizes and generates
ecstatic attention; and it allows a representation of the world that is true to the
nature of that world.
In his theory, more than any other theorist/filmmaker of the inter-war period –
a period of decisive importance for the development of cinema as an art form –
Epstein initiated debates about cinema’s technological, perceptual, and cross-
medial possibilities. He introduced formal innovations and new theoretical ideas,
influencing film practice, criticism, and reception in the 1920s-1940s and well
beyond. This anthology is the first comprehensive study in English of Epstein’s
far-reaching influence, and it arrives as several of the concerns most central to
Epstein’s work are undergoing productive reevaluations, including theories of re-
ception, realism, the aesthetics and ontology of cinema, and the relationship be-
tween cinema and other arts. Epstein ought to be considered a requisite, corner-
stone figure for scholars negotiating these enduring theoretical questions. He
rails against taking the central aspects of cinema for granted – including its posi-
tion as an industry, an art, and an apparatus – making him a necessary figure for
any moment when we need to return to a consideration of the basics.
To demonstrate Epstein’s importance, the present collection provides a pano-
ply of different approaches to Epstein’s work in a series of critical essays by scho-
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lars and filmmakers and also brings together a broad selection of Epstein’s own
written works, much of it translated for the first time into English. We hope that
these efforts will lead in turn to the wider release of a greater portion of Epstein’s
complex, often stunning filmography, a necessary step for restoring his work to
the stature it deserves.
For, up to the present moment, Epstein has been simultaneously an important
and yet neglected figure for Anglophone cinema studies. Students of cinema
know a few seminal translations of his written work very well, and a few films –
including his adaptation of The Fall of the House of Usher (1928) – have found their
way into the canon of film history. Recent work has rekindled Epstein studies in
Europe, including Nicole Brenez and Ralph Eue’s anthology of Epstein’s work
translated into German published as Jean Epstein: Bonjour Cinéma und andere Schrif-
ten zum Kino (2008), Prosper Hillairet’s monograph on Epstein’s Coeur fidèle (2008),
Laura Vichi’s Jean Epstein (2003), and the collection of essays published by the
Cinémathèque française under the direction of Jacques Aumont, Jean Epstein: Ci-
néaste, poète, philosophe (1998).5 However, aside from pioneering work by Richard
Abel and Stuart Liebman in the 1980s and a few notable, recent exceptions, there
has been a relative drought of sustained work on Epstein in the Anglophone
world.6
This collection aims to correct that neglect and to inspire further work on Ep-
stein both as a filmmaker and a theorist of cinema. Epstein is a distinctive pres-
ence in film history and accordingly the essays gathered here provide a provoca-
tive range of accounts for the intricacies of his thought and practice of cinema.
Several issues of central importance to Epstein’s oeuvre are discussed in detail
within these critical essays, which fall into several primary categories of interest
to cinema scholarship. First, Christophe Wall-Romana provides a foundation for
understanding Epstein’s thoughts on photogénie while arguing for an aesthetics of
embodiment in Epstein’s work. As such, he importantly resituates territory cov-
ered by earlier Epstein scholars, introducing Epstein’s unpublished treatise on
homosexuality to realign debates on the body as central to Epstein’s idea of cine-
matic experience. Second, Stuart Liebman, Katie Kirtland, and Jennifer Wild –
from strikingly different angles – address Epstein’s complex notions of aesthetics,
including the coincidence of ideas chez Epstein with the Russian formalists; the
particular, kaleidoscopic subjectivity mobilized in Epstein’s film work; and the
idea of distance in Epstein’s aesthetic filtered through Romanticism, notions of
the sublime, and Epstein’s own intervention in modernity wherein he navigates
ancient, natural powers within contemporary experience.
Moving toward film form and style, essays by Laurent Guido and Ludovic Cor-
tade address cinematic technique in Epstein’s oeuvre, specifically in relation to
his experiments with the temporal realm of cinema, including the implications of
editing and rhythm for notions of cinematic time and modifications of time with-
in a stretch of film (slow motion). Rachel Moore and the filmmaker James Schnei-
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der, from different perspectives, consider the important period of Epstein’s career
when he began making another kind of film altogether, using familiar stylistic
strategies but for radically different ends, among the islands off the coast of Brit-
tany. They examine the impact of that move on his concept of realism and on his
filmmaking practice.
The significance of the cultural realm within Epstein’s work finds expression in
essays by Trond Lundemo, Nicole Brenez, and Érik Bullot, who in diverse ways
consider the relevance of subjective and cultural experience within Epstein’s the-
ories and practice of cinema – through cinema’s mechanistic, intelligent design;
its relation to modernist concerns; and its plasticity (relating again to its depen-
dence upon flux and instability). Finally, at the very end of this collection, Richard
Abel contributes a reminder of several areas in need of attention related to the
Epstein oeuvre, providing an afterword that ties together several of the issues
raised in this volume. All of these strategies and topics suggest that the avenues
of exploration for Epstein’s written and film work readily open up to such wide-
ranging, far-reaching considerations of his cinema within its psycho-social, cul-
tural, technological, and aesthetic domains.
The nature and development of Epstein’s oeuvre deserves the scrutiny and
close readings these essays accomplish so well. To provide an introduction to the
multiplicity of frameworks driving the writing collected in this volume, I will sim-
ply address one issue here that finds expression across Epstein’s oeuvre and in-
fluences many of the concerns taken up in the critical essays, as a way of provid-
ing a thread to follow through them. In Epstein’s earliest writings about cinema,
the importance of a cross-medial aesthetic, especially one using a literary model
as a point of reference, asserts itself. Looking at Epstein’s interest in poetry in
particular reveals both the coruscating quality of his theorizations and his strong
connections with the artistic milieu of Paris, arguably the cultural capital of the
1920s. Such an aesthetic influences Epstein’s subsequent theorizations about and
practices of cinema in significant ways.
In addition to this contextualization of some of the broader concerns raised in
the individual essays, this introduction will also familiarize the reader with Ep-
stein’s remarkable filmography, which because of its broader unavailability to the
public requires some elaboration. It will therefore also provide a sense of how a
handful of Epstein’s preferred cinematic devices – especially the close-up and
superimposition – manifest several of his theoretical concepts within the highly
creative contexts of the films. Along these lines, Epstein’s other enduring con-
cerns, especially how to represent subjectivity or how to represent what he termed
“the real world,” are expressed through cinematic devices such as slow motion,
editing, and sound.
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Epstein’s initiation: poetic cinema
It is essential that Epstein be situated in the context of modernist film and art
movements and production in the 1920s and beyond. Like many of the artists
who came to Paris at that time, Epstein envisioned the world transformed by the
art of the modern age. Moreover, during this period in particular, international art
movements were flourishing, dependent upon artists crossing both national and
medial boundaries. Several movements developed in relation to artists migrating
from country to country, picking up the nuances of differences across movements
or theories and importing them wherever they alighted, and Epstein’s theories
accordingly developed in relation to or reaction against many of these movements
– including Futurism, Dadaism, Surrealism, and what has become known as
French Impressionism.7 Epstein exemplifies a tendency that drew from many cor-
ners to create a centripetal energy whose center was Paris, buzzing with interna-
tional ideas and figures.
At this early point in his vocational exploration, Epstein expressed the para-
meters of his views on cinema at first through his admiration for and understand-
ing of literature and especially poetry. Notes taken even during his stint studying
medicine in Lyon attest to his more artistic interests: circa 1919 his notebooks
abound with reference to his literary reading and provide notes toward a compre-
hensive theory of modern letters.8 Just after arriving in Paris in 1921, he published
his first volume of writing – Poésie d’aujourd’hui: un nouvel état d’intelligence – which
focuses first on literary concerns, but turns at the end to address cinema, in order
to demonstrate affinities between poetic and cinematic strategies.
These affinities register in Epstein’s methods for the writing in Poésie d’aujourd’-
hui as well. Even in the midst of making more theoretical points, the prose begins
to take on poetic qualities: in sections, it resembles line breaks, and the state-
ments are fragmentary, full of metaphors and imagery. In a section on “the aes-
thetics of proximity,” for example, he describes the poverty of literary images in
relation to the immersion of visual ones, and in so doing, employs poetic strate-
gies:
Between the spectacle and the spectator, no barrier.
One doesn’t look at life, one penetrates it.
This penetration allows every intimacy. […]
This is the miracle of real presence,
life made manifest,
opened like a beautiful pomegranate
and stripped of its covering,
easily absorbed,
barbaric. […]
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Compared to the drama of muscles moving in close-up, how paltry a theatrical
performance made of words!9
To describe the phenomenon of the close-up, Epstein layers images and similes,
using figures of speech to take the place of what usually looks like film criticism.
Rather than simply using logical, deductive, argumentative, or strictly analytical
structures (which he also does, often with equal élan), Epstein marshals poetic
devices to make his point.
Later in the same chapter, Epstein describes cinematic devices and the contem-
porary cinematic climate according to principles he sees driving poetry. The colli-
sion of forms creates a network of poetic and cinematic languages in startling,
fresh association:
The poem: a cavalcade of metaphors that rear up. […]
The principle of the visual metaphor is adaptable in dreams and normal
life; on the screen, it is a fixed given.
On screen, a crowd. A car pushes its way slowly through. Ovation. Hats
off. White splashes of hands and handkerchiefs dance above heads. An indis-
putable analogy recalls these lines by Apollinaire:
“When human hands were all in leaf”10
and these others:
“The sky was filled with lakes of light.
And human hands flew up like milk-white birds.”11
Epstein continues this elaborate citational-poetic theorization of imagery and its
dependence on what seems to be a cinematic shorthand for visual imagery (“Ova-
tion. Hats off…”) by now adding language like that of a shooting script:
I immediately imagine a superimposition that emerges from
the fade-in, then jumps into focus and stops abruptly:
dead leaves falling down and swirling, then a flock of birds.
But:
QUICKLY (2 meters)
WITHOUT SYMBOLISM
(the birds should be neither doves nor crows, but simply birds)
Within five years we will write cinematographic poems:
150 meters of film with a string of 100 images that minds will follow.12
The text reads both like a poem (and is a poem at one point: it is, itself, both a
simile and a metaphor for poetic language) and, simultaneously, like directions
for filming such a scene. Of course, Epstein is writing neither a poem nor a
shooting script here; instead, this is his first version of a sporadic film theory/
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literary criticism, and it makes use of the devices of both media – cinema and
poetry – to promote an ambitious formal experiment in theorization. It then com-
ments on its own strategies, remarking that more people will follow the model set
by Epstein within the next five years.
What is it about the relationship between poetry and cinema that is so appeal-
ing and that assists Epstein in his theory? It appears that together, these artistic
media provide paradigms that a more strictly analytical language cannot, just as
Epstein’s film practice looks to models outside of the hegemonic narrative norms
rampant in the popular cinema of his day in order to effect experiments in per-
spective, subjectivity, and an often poetic relationship with mundane realities. He
also seeks flexibility with time and space in the use of poetry, drawing on its
unique tendencies, again in a way that will be pertinent to his film practice.13
Poetic form offers access to the elusive qualities of the cinematic medium, a me-
dium that is paradoxically adept at expressing both ephemerality and perma-
nence, in a constant state of tension and fluctuation. This paradox is something
Epstein explored throughout the full length of his writings on cinema. Poésie
d’aujourd’hui initiates and mobilizes these poetic strategies at a very early stage in
Epstein’s career.
Bonjour Cinéma, published later the same year (1921), is best understood with
reference to discourses more squarely belonging to the discipline of poetry, as
well as to the popular domains of movie fandom – posters, fan magazines, etc. –
all of which Epstein embraced as part of the intoxicatingly intermedial cinephilia
that stimulated his generation.14 Bonjour Cinéma is nearly equal parts prescient film
theory, experimental poetry, illustrations, and textual experimentation (letters
falling down the page, for example15), all bent toward paying homage to cine-
ma.16 Until the present volume, most representations of Epstein’s work do not
include this poetry or these illustrations; as such his investment in poetry and
direct visual equivalents have been undervalued.17 But Bonjour Cinéma – and indeed
Epstein’s film practice which was set to blossom at nearly the same moment (one
year later, and clearly in nascent form here) – must be understood in relation to
these ecstatic, cinephiliac, cross-medial impulses of which this text is a harbin-
ger.
Epstein puts poetry, word play, and the visual (over the verbal) into action even
before one opens the book: the cover depicts the word “Bonjour” with a “C” over-
laid on top of it, out of which a triangular cut of white background (like a ray of
light) emits a tumble of the rest of the letters in the word “cinema.” Aside from its
familiar and merry greeting to cinema (this is after all Epstein’s debut in the cine-
ma, his first full consideration of it as a central topic), the cover also effects si-
multaneity, superimposition, and visual design with simple tools: letters, layer-
ing, and a shifting field of background/foreground made by altering these two
colors. Opening the cover, such play continues in a table of contents that puts
each part of the book in the context of a theatre bill (in English: “This program is
introduction 31
subject to alteration”), with parts for the orchestra and mise-en-scène credited to
Claude Dalbanne, who designed many of the slim volume’s images; even here,
Epstein’s mélange of random text, image, and poetry advances (through the use
of different fonts, sizes of letters, and divisions of chapters strewn across the page
and surrounded by advertisements for other books for cinephiles).
Epstein lays out the parts of the book by introducing multiple strands of ideas
and strategies for expressing them, and then weaves them together into an almost
giddy structure:
1. Textual play: Hayakawa and “Jazzimowa” (a play on Nazimova, one of Ep-
stein’s stars)
2. Poem: “Séances Continuelles”
3. Textual Play: Matinee Idol
4. (Prose) poem: “Le 14me episode,” like script of a typical film scenario: (e.g.,
“Son voisin de cabine lui ressemble et se suicide. Echange de personnalités et
de valises.” [“The man in the ship’s cabin next door, who resembles him,
commits suicide. Exchange of personalities and luggage.”])
5. Poem: “Aller et retour”
6. Textual play: Chas Ray, Chaplin
7. A short statement about photogénie
8. Prose criticism: “Le sens 1bis”
9. Textual play: Douglas Fairbanks
10. Poem: “Écran”
11. Textual play: Los Angeles
12. Poem: not titled
13. 6 pages in fan magazine style (Hayakawa, Nazimova, Charlot, Charles Ray,
Fairbanks)
14. Set of 5 poems: in praise of Hayakawa, Nazimova, Charlot, Charles Ray, Fair-
banks. (N.B.: In the midst of these pages are some images and textual plays,
relating to the subject at hand)
15. Prose criticism: “Grossissement”
16. Textual play: Amérique
17. Prose criticism: “Ciné Mystique”
18. Textual play: Bonsoir, Merci18
This truly eclectic collection of strategies and its arrangement of alternation are
both complex and playful, especially for something that functions as a kind of
film theory. The dizzying shifts of perspectives, the flouting of the conventions of
rational order or thesis-driven exegesis, and the use of illustration alone demon-
strate the creative, poetic inclination of Epstein’s sense of theory and cinema,
which continues in more subtle ways (for instance, through word play and super-
imposition, which allows the layering of ideas and images similar to Bonjour Ciné-
ma’s textual strategies) in his later theory. In addition to this macro-level of com-
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plexity and structural innovation for the whole book’s design, Epstein experi-
ments with the individual components of the text: for instance, one of the poems
comprising Bonjour Cinéma, “Aller et retour,” is meant to be read both forwards
and backwards.19 However, within Epstein’s penchant for play, serious considera-
tion of the salient features of cinema’s expressive capacities develops, and Epstein
finds in this mélange of poetic, popular, cinematic experimentation a dynamic
outlet for understanding what energies and methods undergird these media.
Take, for example, the first poem, in which Epstein includes a description of a
scene in cinematic terms and with cinematic resonances:
In close up
pale sunshine
this face reigns
this enamel mouth stretches out
like a lazy awakening
then turns laughter upside down
up to the edge of the eyes20
The image, a face in close-up, has sunlight cast over it, and summons the concept
of light essential to cinematic projection and/or recording (recalling the cover of
the text as well as lighting effects more generally). Because Epstein has directed
our attention to the minutiae of the movements across a face, the intensity of the
face’s features in motion may unfold. Close-ups are examined in a number of
ways in Bonjour Cinéma: in this example, Epstein lays out the initial image and
uses simile (like a lazy awakening) and synecdoche (enamel standing in for the
teeth and lending the quality and feeling of hard whiteness to the image), as well
as the image’s mobility (the smile spreading from mouth to eyes), to focus upon
the effects of that image. As such, he makes use of poetry’s facility in invoking
associations, even while appearing to treat an image directly.
Other parts of the book treat the same issue from another angle and by other
means. Elsewhere in Bonjour Cinéma we find the more analytically inclined “Mag-
nification” (“Grossissement”) also treating the close-up. Epstein begins it by declar-
ing: “I will never find the way to say how much I love American close-ups. Point
blank. A head suddenly appears on screen and drama, now face to face, seems to
address me personally and swells with an extraordinary intensity.”21 The close-up
is a favored perspective for Epstein (as we’ve seen, the “aesthetics of proximity”
are crucial for Epstein both in poetry and cinema) even before he starts making
films, and it connects to issues having to do with his cinephilia, his cross-medial
impulses, and his sense of cinematic subjectivity and perspective. For example,
describing himself in terms of a spectator’s interaction with a landscape of flow-
ers, he insists on pointing to a specifically embodied sensorial perspective: “I
look, I smell, I feel. Close up, close up, close up.”22
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The mixture of poetic figure and cinematic image continues throughout Bonjour
Cinéma, serving as an intermedial connection between the two forms for an artist
working (however briefly) in both. Excursions into poetry throughout Bonjour Ci-
néma allow for an interplay among Epstein’s film theory, his film work, and the
mandates of the traditions of poetry as refashioned by the modernist poets Ep-
stein knew and/or admired. Epstein draws important conclusions about film art
based on issues poets explore through poetry. For example, he arrives at the no-
tion that one of cinema’s central tenets depends on a poetics of visual images,
with a much richer understanding of what a visual image is (and what it can
accomplish, and how), by having compared it to a verbal image.
Even much later in his writings, Epstein is still reflecting on exactly this issue of
the verbal versus the visual:
Naturally, the style proper to the cinema defines itself in its use of close-ups
and isolation of objects in drifting, incommensurable dimensions. […] Thus
the film is found to be particularly apt at both enriching and setting directly
into motion the memory and visual imagination of spectators, without having
to pass through the operations of crystallization and dissolution of a verbal
intermediary.23
Epstein’s interests in poetry and the visual/verbal image persist through many
years in his writings and films. Certainly there are a number of arguments crucial
to Epstein’s work that draw upon their relationship to these concepts. The idea
that poetry can allow critical exploration as well as access to creative reserves
appealed very much to Epstein and enriched his film practice as well as the devel-
opment of his film theory. Both an initiation to and perhaps a perfect crystalliza-
tion of this interest, Bonjour Cinéma draws attention to the way in which Epstein
literalizes and makes figurative the tropes of image making. The last two pages
resemble a film strip in motion, in that you can see “Merci” at the bottom of the
“Bonsoir” page and “Bonsoir” at the top of the page with “Merci” at the center, as
if being pulled upward by the sprocket holes. Just as the image/words on the
cover of the book – through a set of interrelated, simple graphic devices – invoke
the projector, the final pages similarly cast our look into the spooling projector as
a finale, effected through visual figuration.
Epstein’s film practice
To understand the themes that Epstein developed in his critical work, it will be
helpful to have a sense of the range of his creative work, from which his theories
are drawn and through which they are developed. Although it is impossible in the
context of an introduction to offer a comprehensive account of Epstein’s complex
filmography which so richly deserves plentiful detail, here it will suffice to present
34 sarah keller
the major shifts in his efforts – to give a sense of the preoccupations of the films –
and describe a few salient visual or auditory features of several works that are too
seldom screened.
Epstein’s career as a filmmaker spans almost thirty years and comprises over
three dozen finished films. While he worked in diverse cinematic modes, as we
have seen, several features cohere across his oeuvre. More commercially inclined
feature films like Le Lion des Mogols (1924), which was unfortunately a commercial
disappointment, stand comfortably in the company of more experimental fare like
La Glace à trois faces (1927). Indeed, several enduring concerns for Epstein inform
both kinds of projects: for instance, both of these films embrace the contradiction
of an interest in narrative conventions coupled with visual experimentation
through editing (e.g., Le Lion des Mogols’s opening sequence and La Glace à trois
faces’s closing sequences each utilize fast cuts, but for very different narrative and
thematic purposes).
Epstein’s career offers incisive insights about cinema and the experience of
modernity and demonstrates his efforts to realize in practice concepts that origi-
nate in his theory. Therefore, in his films, the exceedingly abstract concept of
photogénie, as well as several of his other interests including the relationship of
the “real” to the cinematic, finds more concrete articulation in the use of devices
specific to cinema (the close-up, slow motion, superimposition, editing, focus,
lighting, etc.). Epstein ambitiously employs and tests the limits of these devices
that flaunt cinema’s natural flexibility in presenting time and space. For instance,
the consistent confrontation of the character with the camera – breaking the
fourth wall, as it were – in several of Epstein’s films (unlike the classical mode, in
which characters deny the presence of the camera) points to the eruptive power of
cinema which Epstein often sought to bring to the fore.
Epstein often allows cinema’s seams to show, or takes a sequence to a point of
cinematic excess, as we shall see, and thereby calls attention to the process of
picturing the world, emotional states, and intimate environments. Certain se-
quences remove the viewer even further from the anchor of contextualizing space
and put her directly into the realm of the image as synecdoche, as for instance in
the sequence in Coeur Fidèle where Jean is confronted by Marie’s fiancé (Petit Paul)
and several of his roughs. The images betray the shifting emotional terrain: suspi-
cion, readiness, confrontation, aggression, disdain. Here we have the compo-
nents – at first seen in successive isolation, primarily through the most expressive
parts of the body (faces and hands) – of a bar fight. The sequence ends with a
long shot returning us to the context for these several close views, but because the
close-ups occur quickly and in a fluid montage, without any reference to their
larger environment, they place us in the center of the fight on the level of its
emotional impact – angry faces, menacing looks, fists, bottles about to be broken,
one individual against a mini-mob. As René Clair commented in relation to the
film, Coeur Fidèle might be faulted for going “into technical experiments which the
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action does not demand”24: that is, which the narrative does not demand. But, as
Clair also realizes, Epstein’s excess in terms of the function of his camerawork
creates the peculiar drama in this and others of his films. Rather than causal, the
drama is emotional, photographic, and visual.
Visuality is indeed the foundation upon which Epstein’s concept and practice of
cinema rests: photogénie lays bare the nature of the object as photographed; it
helps us to see in a way we haven’t seen before. Famously, in “Le Regard du
verre” (1925),25 Epstein envisions cinema as a spiral staircase lined with mirrors
which, by dint of their sheer objectivity but complicated by their multiplicity, help
one to see what can no longer be seen when simply presented before the naked
eye:
The camera lens…is an eye endowed with nonhuman analytical properties. It
is an eye without prejudices, without morality, free of influences; and it sees in
the face and in human movement traits which we, weighted down by likings
and dislikings, by habits and considerations, can no longer perceive.26
Because it is objective (the lens in French is l’objectif, a fact in which Epstein de-
lights), the camera helps us to lay aside our preconceived notions and to see
anew. Mirrors, cameras, reflections on water and in glass, and similar patterns
are accorded a special place in the Epsteinian mise-en-scène, as a closer look at the
more general course of Epstein’s work on film reveals.
Several critics have distinguished distinct periods in Epstein’s development,
often coinciding with his choices of material, writers, or production companies.
The way this story goes, his oeuvre may be characterized first by a concern with
“the visual and dramatic effects…of movement on the screen”27 (roughly 1922-
1925), then with experimentation in cinema’s spatial and temporal dimensions
(1925-1928). Later, his work turns to the natural world as a backdrop and/or sub-
ject of his films (1928-1936) before, finally, turning to groundbreaking experi-
ments with sound (the 1940s). While this too-tidy and often repeated formulation
falters in that all of these impulses drive most of Epstein’s work across his career,
and in that this division of his concerns places much too much emphasis on
certain better-known films than others,28 it does help us to get a handle on some
of the major movements in his career. Keeping this map in mind may help us to
understand some of the evolution of Epstein’s concerns over the course of a life in
film.
An overview of Epstein’s first films 1922-1928
Epstein’s debut as a filmmaker came after his first written volumes that deal with
cinema, including Bonjour Cinéma. In 1922, Jean Benoît-Levy hired him to make a
documentary for the occasion of the centennial of Louis Pasteur’s birth. After
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completing the film, Epstein was awarded a contract with Pathé Films, where he
made his first fiction films, L’Auberge Rouge and Coeur Fidèle, in 1923.29 Also in 1923,
Epstein made a short documentary film on the eruption of Mount Etna (La Mon-
tagne infidèle, now lost), an experience that eventually fueled his reflections on
cinema in essays collected in Le cinématographe vu de l’Etna (Paris: Les Écrivains
Réunis, 1926). This extraordinarily productive year closed with Epstein’s produc-
tion of La Belle Nivernaise (1923), whose long tracking shots on the Seine proved
influential to Jean Vigo’s 1934 film L’Atalante. The production packet distributed
by Pathé describes the ending of the film as “a fairy tale,” and indeed the broad
strokes of the film’s story situate it in the narrative simplicity of that mode while
allowing Epstein to innovate his film style. The same give-and-take of narrative
and style occurs across all of these films: L’Auberge Rouge’s scenes of fortune read-
ing, diamonds gone missing, and mistaken identities match (in a different regis-
ter) La Belle Nivernaise’s long, spectacular scenes of the river boat, for instance
drifting down the river with no one at the helm toward certain mayhem. For this
last film of 1923, as Epstein put it, “the greatest actor, the most powerful person-
ality that I know most intimately [in that film] is the Seine from Paris to
Rouen.”30 The plasticity of the objects and people Epstein filmed take a central
role in his first efforts at making films.
In 1924, Epstein served briefly as director of La Goutte de Sang, but abandoned it,
reportedly because of difficulty with the Societé des Cinéromans.31 Soon after,
Epstein began his association with Les Films Albatros, a production company
founded by Russian émigrés. His first feature for Albatros was Le Lion des Mogols,
a vehicle for Ivan Mosjoukine, who starred in it and wrote the script.32 Other films
from this remunerative producer-director relationship include L’Affiche (1924) and
Le Double Amour (1925), neither of which should be dismissed out of hand, but
which often are, since they subscribe to more narrative-driven, sentimental sce-
narios (notably they were both written by Epstein’s sister, Marie). Le Double Amour,
for instance, concerns a woman whose lover has a gambling problem, to which
she subjugates her income (and scandalizes the charity whose money she uses to
rescue him), only to be left by him (at the urging of his father). Unbeknownst to
him, however, she bears a son who, twenty years later, becomes an inveterate
gambler as well. Like the films from 1923-1924, the story and the style are con-
flictingly compelling at several points: Double Amour’s long tracking shot down a
row of admirers listening to the heroine sing does add the arguably narrative-
driven character information of her capableness and lovability. However, the bra-
vado of the camera movement, which is in excess of that narrative information,
shows again Epstein’s commitment to subverting the hold of narrative by letting
its margins decenter it.
Bookending Epstein’s (reportedly) only film entirely experimental in design,
Photogénies (1925, lost), are two adaptations of classical texts from theater and
literature, Les Aventures de Robert Macaire and Mauprat.33 The first represents the
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final film Epstein made for Albatros. A serial adventure, it is the longest of Ep-
stein’s films and follows the episodic adventures of the title character. Of Ep-
stein’s films, it seems to be one of the few (the much later Marius et Olive à Paris
[1935] is another34) that takes comedy as one of its primary goals. On the oppo-
site end of the comedy spectrum, but similarly episodic, Mauprat, a costume
drama, lacks almost entirely the vigor described by Epstein about the effects of
cinema on an audience in an interview he gave during the filming (while simulta-
neously driving a Chrysler-Six automobile, on loan to him at that time). The inter-
viewer recounts Epstein’s recollection of a formative experience even prior to Ep-
stein’s own moviegoing:
As a child, I was afraid to go to the cinema. I had heard perfectly reasonable
adults speak strongly about horrific details of the conflagration at the charity
bazaar where, it seemed, a bishop was burned alive. In my premature logic, I
told myself that if a bishop can die at the cinema, all the more reasonable that
I would, since I was surely not so well protected by the will of God; I would cry
and stamp my feet and enter into mad crises of despair when I would see my
parents prepare to go to the cinema: I was never sure they’d return alive.35
This risky cinema-going, coupled with the wild ride in the automobile with Ep-
stein, whom his interviewer described as dangerously distracted, portended a new
wave of filmmaking for Epstein’s career (and simultaneously presaged the death-
wish drive of his protagonist in La Glace à trois faces [1927] made at the crest of that
wave). Despite Mauprat’s conventional and somewhat clunky plotting, it is the
first film of Epstein’s own production company, Les Films Jean Epstein, and
marks the beginning of an important new period for his work.
The creative freedom that resulted from working through his own production
company drew Epstein toward a series of films that proved highly productive for
his sense of the possibilities of cinema: Six et demi, onze (1927), La Glace à trois faces
(1927), and La Chute de la Maison Usher (1928). While Marie Epstein assures his
audience that Epstein’s La Chute de la maison Usher “dominates the whole of the
second period” – a period characterized as revealing the animism of things and
beginning to be more emphatically concerned with the treatment of time (several
slow-motion sequences serve as the centerpiece of that film) – all three are mas-
terpieces of specifically cinematic brio in at least one way, if not several. Since
Usher and La Glace à trois fois have received some important critical attention in
Anglophone cinema studies, while Six et demi, onze remains almost completely
neglected, some exploration of this latter film’s conspicuous charms in thematic
content and stylistic panache is warranted here.
Written by Marie Epstein and produced by Films Jean Epstein, the production
of Six et demi, onze allowed Epstein to explore several pet themes. The title refers to
a standard format of Kodak camera, making the film immediately self-referential
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in its photographic processes. The primary dramatic movement of the film de-
pends as well on photography, inasmuch as the dual heroes of the film – two
brothers quite unalike in all ways except their care for each other and their unfor-
tunate liaisons with Mary Winter (an undeserving, selfish, greedy young beauty) –
discover the duplicitous nature of the (deeply flawed) heroine by the passage of a
photograph from one brother (Jean) to another (Jerôme) after the first brother’s
death. Literalizing the claim that he made about La Belle Nivernaise that, in his
mind, the trees and the river played starring roles, in the credits for Six et demi,
onze Epstein includes the roles of “the sun” and “the lens” in addition to each of
the human actors.
The first half of the film depicts Jean’s love affair with Mary. While Jean’s
brother Jerôme, a doctor, is seen among the glass bottles of his profession, Jean
is seen with Mary in his “palace of love,” a hotel out in the country where they run
off together before she throws him over for a flashy young dancer, Harry Gold (in
keeping with the English, symbol-laden character names of the film). The film
explores the beautiful grounds of their love palace and all the stunning imagery
of their romance: one sequence shows them on the water in a boat, with sharp,
sparkling cinematography fixated on the water and the moonlight; another shows
them driving alongside the seashore in a car and superimposes water, their car
driving, and a medium close-up of them kissing. It appears that they are driving
through the water, and the image serves as a mobile, dynamic update on the pin-
ing lovers Jean and Marie in Coeur Fidèle, here with a disastrous conclusion based
on the heroine’s coeur completely infidèle.
The second half of the film begins anew, with the aftermath of Jean’s suicide
and Marie’s seduction of Jerôme. Again, while the film appears to transpire in
melodramatic territory, the complexity of the themes and the filming, in excess
of the needs of the narrative, tell another story altogether. Between the first and
second half, the pivotal scene wherein the camera plays the central part most
readily illustrates that story.
Jean buys a camera and brings it back to the love palace, where he takes Mary’s
picture. She demures, saying she doesn’t like photography. Her image is reflected
in a shot of the camera lens. A close-up of the sun follows – a cameo of the light
necessary to take her photograph – then the lens again. Jean takes several photos,
and then Mary walks away (in long shot), covering her face. Without really any
definitive sign of a break in time, Epstein then gives us a close-up of Jean’s face.
Several images – the waves of the sea, pigeons flying, the grounds at the hotel –
are intercut with beautifully lit close-ups of his face before shifting to long shots
of him searching for Mary: we are in another, later moment in the diegesis.
Shortly thereafter, there is a shot of Jean looking seriously into the mirror in his
room. Epstein superimposes this long shot with an extreme close-up of his eyes
and a close-up of his face. Thus, including the mediating frame of the mirror into
which he looks, Epstein gives us four images in combination here. Jean then
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shoots his four-fold image in the mirror with a little gun (taken from Mary). Fi-
nally, he turns this gun to his heart and shoots. Shots of the camera and its lens
follow before the image fades, signaling Jean’s demise.
Here, the camera becomes a crucial character in the drama, as well as a means,
a variation of a deus ex machina, for the complicating action and climax. Epstein
calls to mind both the mechanical quality of the camera (the idea that Jean need
only push a button and his unfaithful lover will be revealed, even in a later time
and context) and the agency of the cameraman in exacting his revenge (à la The
Cameraman’s Revenge, a trope frequently cited in early accounts of itinerant cine-
mas). Photography is rampant as a device and theme in the film: Jean’s picture at
Jerôme’s home alerts Mary to the connection between the brothers; Jean’s picture
falls from Jerôme’s wall when he dies; and the revelation that saves Jerôme from
Mary’s machinations arrives via the development of film left in Jean’s camera. The
photographic theme is mobilized, as well as served, by Epstein’s use of superim-
position, the close-up, lighting, and temporal ellipses, such as that effected in
Jean’s search for the missing Mary, often in a very literal way (lens = the revealer
of the truth about Mary).
After Six et demi, onze, the “more dominant” final film of this period, La Chute de
la maison Usher – with some of its footage shot in Brittany – led to another, very
different series of films, including Finis Terrae (1929), Mor’Vran (1930), L’Or des mers
(1932), and Chanson d’Ar-Mor (1934). Thus commenced another phase in Epstein’s
development, toward a more explicit exploration of the relationship between rea-
lity and the filmic image.
World and film: 1928-1948
Even before his transformative encounter with cinematic reality marked by his
Brittany films, in La Chute de la maison Usher, with its excessive digressions, Epstein
scrutinized the relationship between pro-filmic and post-filmic reality. While Ro-
derick Usher is solicitous toward his wife Madeline, and tends to her in her ap-
parent illness, the fascination of her representation in Roderick’s portrait of her
overcomes him in the end – to the point of not noticing that she has died. In the
sequence depicting her death, images of the painting, the person, and the object
are swapped within a frame insert. The painting, a still image, is represented by a
mobile (filmic, photographic) inset of Madeline: one can see her mildly blinking
at the camera although she is supposed to be a painting, which points to the life-
likeness of Roderick’s representation of her. Meanwhile, when Epstein means to
depict the “real” woman outside of her portrait, he gives the viewer a still, nega-
tive image, superimposed over several shots of a mobile Madeline. Much is made
over the “truth” of the image, so much so that Epstein equates it with life: “C’est la
vie même!” In fact, for Epstein and for Roderick Usher, what is filmed is greater
than life: the realm of the photographic exposes something more fascinating
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about the thing (or person) photographed than that thing (or person) holds on its
own.
In the series of films he made on several of the islands off the coast of Brittany
over the course of two decades, Epstein demonstrates his investment in the rela-
tionship between reality and representation, between documenting and narrating.
Although Finis Terrae on the one hand tells a story about a small group of kelp
fishermen on a remote island, on the other hand it focuses more on the experi-
ence of the island life itself than on the characters populating that island. Indeed,
Epstein noted that among its other directives, Finis Terrae covered documentary
ground:
Finis Terrae endeavors to be psychological ‘documentary,’ the reproduction of a
brief drama comprising events which really happened, of authentic men and
things. Leaving the Ouessant archipelago, I felt I was taking with me not a film
but a fact.36
Moreover, the film examines the subjective distortions of reality through the per-
spective of a hallucinating character, further demonstrating Epstein’s interest in
the often blurry line between reality and the perception of it in images. Accessing
the inaccessible ‘reality’ of subjective experience proved to be something of an
anthropological project for Epstein’s film work in this region.
Like Finis Terrae, Epstein’s 1930 film Mor’Vran opens with a series of images and
text meant to situate the striking imagery and fictionalized account that will fol-
low in documentary realms. After the opening credits, Epstein’s camera observes
the open ocean in an establishing shot. This seascape will serve as the backdrop
for the simple story of the islanders whose rough lives both depend upon and are
deeply threatened by their environment. The next shot cuts to a drawn map, over
which Epstein’s camera pans, in pursuit over the expansive sea for the string of
islands about which he wishes to demonstrate something. An initial shot of the
map is followed by a closer view of the same, drawing us closer to the island in
question.
A title interrupts to tell the audience about where we are: Ouessant, “queen of
the archipelago.” A series of shots that adumbrate life on the island ensue:
– a long shot of a church (center of social contracts and life more generally for
the islanders), followed by
– a close-up of a crucifix,
– a long shot of boats resting on land at low tide,
– a close view of a windmill,
– two shots of sheep (first in the medium distance, then from a further distance)
The regular variation of camera distance alone (long view, close view) creates a
feeling of rhythm underlining the harmony of the simple life Epstein sees being
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led by the island inhabitants. The lives of the islanders are sketched out by these
visual references to the church, the boats, the sheep: the bucolic and the aquatic
life. Moreover, several levels of signification are introduced from the beginning,
allowing multiple ways to access the image, the nature, and the mediated state of
these islands. For instance, the titles offer one sort of “documentary informa-
tion,” while maps are icons of another sort, and the photographic images that
then accumulate are of yet another sort. Additionally, the photographic images
also register multiple valences: one leans toward documentary, the other toward
fiction, and they assist each other in the making of meaning. So an islander
(“played” by an actual islander) acts out a common occurrence in the lives of his
fellow islanders: a death at sea, lent pathos by a trip to the fair to buy souvenirs
before the fateful trip. In telling this story, Epstein focuses on the natural land-
scapes and the people who occupy them. He emphasizes the “documents” of the
islanders’ lives, which pervade the film: more maps, a registry of funeral costs, an
icon on the necklace (which serves as both a souvenir and the sign that marks the
death of the sailor at sea: it is a tangible reminder of something passing). As
such, we might say that during this period, Epstein was especially interested in
navigating, through filmmaking, the impulse to document the world and to make
meaning from its sea of details.
One of the most interesting of the films Epstein made in this vein, L’Or des mers,
derives from a novel Epstein himself wrote, partly in response to his experiences
in the region over several years. Conceived of first as a written text (one of two
novels Epstein wrote, both of which deal with experiences on the islands off Brit-
tany), and filmed with astonishingly disorienting continuity effects, it also fea-
tures equally disorienting uses of sound (added after the fact, which may contrib-
ute to the disembodied feeling it creates). Together, all of these aspects of the
film generate a highly moving yet somehow disturbing portrait of the inhabitants
of a remote, wind-swept island. It addresses the character of the wind as readily
as it does its apparent protagonist, an unlikeable fellow who in his impoverished
state imposes himself upon his neighbors until one day he finds a treasure from a
shipwreck washed up on shore. Although the treasure turns out to be a box of
junk, his neighbors, none the wiser, ply him with wine and food. Before his un-
timely death, he tells his abused daughter where he has stashed the box, which
leads her, under threat by her fiancé’s father, to a dangerous area of quicksand,
where she nearly perishes. In this climactic scene, the images – alternating be-
tween close-ups of the girl’s face on the vertical axis, long shots of her body stuck
in sand on the horizontal axis, and extreme long shots of her fiancé crossing the
treacherous beach toward her rescue – in addition to the very close-up recordings
of her voice calling weakly out for help even when she is in long shot – provide a
jarring set of collisions in our expectations for the rules of continuity, heightening
our sense of distress and confusion about the innocent girl’s plight.
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L’Or des mers, just like Finis Terrae, Mor’Vran, and the other Brittany films, thus
mixes Epstein’s interest in the rough natural features of this landscape with nar-
rative and experimental concerns. A stunning sequence of superimpositions, last-
ing impossibly long near the end of L’Or des mers, both provides narrative context –
the villagers exiting the church will not be there to rescue the girl, and their circle
of dancing shows the march of their lives despite the dangers of the sea – and
cinematic excess. The ability of the camera to show several places/images from
several different angles and distances – a layering effect similar to the strategies
of Bonjour Cinéma – serves Epstein’s purpose in multiple ways.
Moreover, we should note that within this period of greater documentary em-
phasis, Epstein did not entirely abandon more strictly fictional filmmaking either,
as most accounts of his artistic trajectory suggest. During this same period, he
also made Sa Tête (1929), a short film about a young man tried and eventually
released for a murder he did not commit, with a remarkable sequence involving
the intercutting of images of cigar smoke, a miniature guillotine, tarot cards, and
the unwitting guilty consciences of the protagonists. The swift, deft filming and
editing of this thirty-six minute long film – including another fairground attrac-
tions sequence used to an entirely different purpose than the fête foraine sequence
in Coeur Fidèle – demonstrate Epstein at the height of his powers even when treat-
ing a slight subject. L’homme à l’Hispano (1933), La Chatelaine de Liban (1933), and
the aforementioned Marius et Olive à Paris (1935) and Coeur de Gueux (1936) also
come out of this period, as well as La Femme au bout du monde (1937), which could
reasonably be considered a hybrid of the two instincts driving Epstein’s creative
output during this time. In this last film, a woman running an inn on a remote
island must navigate the rabid attraction every man to come through the village
discovers he possesses for her; however, while the film employs a greater propor-
tion of film actors than the more documentary Brittany films, and spends more
time developing its narrative, the sound of the wind and the rough geography of
the island as well as the sea that borders it on every side are of strong interest to
Epstein’s project in addition to the woman’s plight.
This series of later films – both those more inclined to documentary and those
more inclined to narrative conventions – also developed alongside several shorter
projects filmed by Epstein for a variety of commercial or cultural interests, which
fall into two main categories. First, Epstein made several filmed songs. For exam-
ple, Les Berceaux (1932), a popular song with lyrics based on a poem by Sully Prud-
homme and with music composed by Gabriel Fauré, features a great deal of ab-
stract images meant to (elliptically) illustrate a song about babies rocking in their
cradles and the men who feel drawn back from their sea ventures by their loved
ones. Second, Epstein accomplished a series of short documentary features made
for a variety of purposes. These included La Bretagne and La Bourgogne (both 1936),
made with a certain degree of exasperation on Epstein’s part for the Exposition of
Arts and Technology in the troubled years just before Epstein unwillingly left
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filmmaking and Paris in the late 1930s, just prior to the war. After this period of
multivalent activity, it was not until after the war that Epstein’s film practice re-
sumed with Le Tempestaire (1947), which is treated within the essays of this collec-
tion, and Les Feux de la Mer (1948), Epstein’s final cinematic work. The fact that this
last film is a documentary, as was his first film, rounds out the trajectory of the
oeuvre of this filmmaker so much more interested in multiple, radiating and cir-
cuitous paths than in one linear one.
* * *
In the next section the reader will find a dozen essays by an international collec-
tion of scholars at several stages in their careers. Together, these essays offer a
range of ways to think through Epstein’s complex oeuvre. While this introduc-
tion, then, has offered broad context for the work of Epstein over the course of
his career, it falls upon the critical essays as well as Epstein’s own writings to lay
some groundwork toward the recovery of Epstein’s significance in Anglophone
cinema studies.
The twelve critical essays that follow grapple with the complexities of Epstein’s
thought and point to the crucial and comprehensive terms of his film theory and
practice. Arranged according to both the historical trajectory of Epstein’s work
and the major themes that preoccupy each stage of his career (which have been
outlined above), the organization of the essays allows the reader to begin with
Epstein’s earliest work and observe its development over time, with several recur-
sions, ellipses, and moments of significant overlap that should begin to feel quite
natural to anyone becoming familiar with Epstein’s work.
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forthcoming 2012).
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Rupture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
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papers, Fonds Jean et Marie Epstein, Bibliothèque du film, Paris, EPSTEIN176-B82.
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34. This film was left off the Epstein filmography as late as the Séghers edition of Ep-
stein’s Écrits in the mid-1970s.
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36. Epstein, “Approaches to Truth,” Abel1, p. 424.
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Essays

Epstein’s Photogénie as Corporeal
Vision: Inner Sensation, Queer
Embodiment, and Ethics
Christophe Wall-Romana
Let us begin with a puzzle. In the following passage, Jean Epstein is referring to
something…
…all the planes and volumes of which have been rounded and polished by
patient forces into a symphony of forms that unfold out of each other [se dérou-
lent les unes des autres], that conjoin each other [s’entr’épousent] into a complex yet
unbreakable unity, like that of revolving solids – these spatial matrices defined
by the movement of a mathematical function.
This language of serial and kinetic fusion will be familiar to readers of silent
cinema theoreticians who found ever more ingenious ways of describing how the
fluid motion from frame to frame and shot to shot produces the effect of filmic
animation. But in point of fact, Epstein is not talking about cinema here – at least,
not explicitly. He is describing teeth, the human dentition whose beauty is for
him “a living crystal,” and “an ivory landscape erecting its scintillating peaks,
inclining its soft slopes hollowed with glens.”1 According to an annotation by his
sister Marie, this unpublished text, titled “The Echo of Pythagoras,” dates from
the years 1918-1920 and thus predates Jean’s first writings on cinema as well as
his involvement in the film industry. Although Epstein was then a medical student
in Lyon, not only is this lyrical focus on teeth clearly not a medical gaze on the
human body, but it strikingly encapsulates what would become over the 1920s
part of the stylistic signature of the photogénie movement: the extreme close-up. I
take this cryptically cinematic close-up on teeth as my point of entry into Epstein’s
corporeal vision of photogénie.
The word photogénie has itself been grinded down like a bad tooth. From astron-
omer Arago’s original coinage in 1839, to denote a model, object, or scene having
a signal aptitude for photographic capture, photogénie was redirected in 1919 by
Louis Delluc into a broad didactic slogan calling attention to the filmic image as
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such.2 By the mid-1920s, after Delluc’s early death, Epstein became its erstwhile
proponent, notwithstanding the fact that his mentor, the poet Blaise Cendrars
(also production assistant to Abel Gance, the ‘master’ of early photogénie), assured
him the word was, “cucul-praline-rhododendron.”3 This slang expression means at
once ‘cheesy’ and ‘airy-fairy’ – we shall return to the effeminate and homosexual
connotations later.4 Although his work with documentary and sound in the 1930s
to the late 1940s foregrounded other aspects of his filmmaking panoply, Epstein
never wavered from his commitment to photogénie, which he reasserts in his last
(posthumously published) text, Alcohol and Cinema, written in the 1950s. For con-
temporary film studies, photogénie conveniently labels the group of filmmakers
also known as the first French film avant-garde and the French Impressionist
School of the 1920s. In spite of the painstaking recovery and careful analysis of
its theoretical writings by the likes of Nourredine Ghali5 and especially Richard
Abel, the term photogénie has now been reduced to denote an exalted but now
obsolete technical aestheticism, a naïve fetishism for the filmic shot, even a mis-
taken theory of cinematic vision.6
I take the “Echo of Pythagoras” as an intimation to rethink Epstein’s theory and
practice of photogénie in terms of corporeal vision. I will argue that Epstein’s cine-
matic vision is corporeal in two ways: first, because for him cinema is an appara-
tus of vision of and into the body, especially the male body, and second, because
cinema’s mode of vision and spectatorship is tightly intertwined for Epstein with
bodily affects and non-visual sensations, especially what he calls “coenaesthesis,”
the inner sensations that the body has of itself:
The inconstancy and fuzziness of lived time are due to the fact that the ego’s
duration is perceived by a complex, obtuse, imprecise inner sense: coenaesth-
esis. It constitutes the general feeling of living, in which a host of indistinct
sensations coalesce and fuse, collected by the very imperfectly conscious sen-
sibility of our viscera. A primitive, fetal, and very much animal sensibility…7
Reframing Epstein’s photogénie as corporeal vision opens a number of perspectives
on his writings and film work, three of which we will examine here. First, it
makes for a productive confrontation with the influential ideas of a critic of cine-
matic spectatorship who came after Epstein, Walter Benjamin. Second, together
with Epstein’s unpublished book on male homosexuality, it points to a different
gendered and ethical mode of spectatorial experiencing. Finally, its immersive
haptic quality relates to models of vision developed in the post-digital era by per-
ception researchers, new media theoreticians, and video artists such as Bill Viola.
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1Let us begin by looking at the span of Epstein’s use of the term photogénie. Its
canonical definition comes from “On Some Conditions of Photogénie” (1923), col-
lected in The Cinema Seen from Etna (1926): “I will term photogenic any aspect of
things, beings and souls that enhances its moral quality through cinematographic
reproduction.”8 Photogénie is thus the filmic as such, yet not devalued as a copy or
simulacrum less essential than its model, but on the contrary as the enhancement
of the model’s “moral quality.” The latter is a fuzzy expression in French, since
‘moral’ ranges from the spiritual to the ethical and social, and ‘quality’ has the
Bergsonian ring of duration. Fortunately, Epstein twice alters his definition, to
add that only “mobile aspects” are photogenic, and further on that “only mobile
and personal aspects of things, beings and souls can be photogenic.”9 Here the
moral would seem to have merged into the ‘personal,’ which connotes a Bergso-
nian vitalist singularity. Epstein recognizes elsewhere that “you fall flat on your
face trying to define [photogénie],” yet from the examples he gives we can infer the
following.10 First, photogénie is a hyper-aesthetic phenomenon – that is, a heigh-
tened mode under which things and beings animated by film appear to percei-
vers; and second, photogénie involves an emotional response by the perceiver to
this very mode of appearance (besides the contents themselves). There is also a
curious temporality and interpersonality to photogénie, since Epstein writes that
“Photogénie is to be conjugated in the future and imperative. It is never a state.”
This echoes Bergsonian duration and its sense of becoming, yet with an interpel-
lative and intersubjective dimension – a calling, as it were.11 The mobile-temporal
aspect is associated with the notion of cinema as non-human sight, but also with
music and poetry as arts of time functioning always through a certain form of
virtuality. The personal-interpersonal aspect is linked to the beauty of film stars
(the trivial sense of photogénie in movie culture), to a physical sense of promise,
pleasure, and the extraordinary, and also to temporal retention and protention.12
At the intersection of both series, Epstein formulates photogénie as “sensorial loga-
rithms,” an apt expression conveying the poly-sensorial compression of the
photogenic sequence.13 Let us sum up provisionally. Epsteinian photogénie is at
minimum a triadic relation between the perceiver as embodied, the profilmic as
hyper-aestheticized, and the filmic as a kinesthetic condition of and ethical poten-
tial for the relation of perceiver to profilmic.
This view of photogénie may be productively compared to Walter Benjamin’s
aura through their remarkable operative similarity: minimally, both photogénie and
aura stage a scene of beholding between a subject and an object-field in which a
qualitative change results from cinematic mediation itself. The canonical formu-
lation of aura, from Benjamin’s “The Work of Art” essay is, “A strange weave of
space and time: the unique appearance of a distance, however near it may be.”14
Both photogénie and aura are then products of middle terms in so far as they alter
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time and space, since Epstein writes, “The photogenic aspect of an object results
from its variations in space-time.”15 This deserves emphasis in terms of aesthetic
philosophy. No longer is immediacy between subject and object privileged or even
posited – the common premise of both Romanticism and realism – but on the
contrary, a new form of semi-agency arises between them and mediates them.
Benjamin’s auratic ‘distance’ proceeds also from cinema, as is made plain from
another passage in the essay: “[F]or the first time – and this is the effect of film –
the human being is placed in a position where he must operate with his whole
living person, while forgoing its aura.”16 In other words, cinema’s pressure de-
stroys auratic distance while generating a new mode of embodiment. Thus, while
Benjamin’s aura as a qualitative loss is the exact opposite of photogénie as a quali-
tative enhancement, both describe the very same phenomenon at the level of the
body: a qualitative shift in the mode of embodiment due to cinema and cinema
alone.
We can push the similarity further. If the close-up in Epstein’s hyperbole is
“cinema’s soul,” he adds immediately: “it may be brief, for photogénie is a value of
the order of the second.”17 We might recall Abel Gance’s rapid edits of medium
close-ups and iris shots during Sisif’s flashback as he is about to fall from the
mountain in La Roue (1922) or Epstein’s own Coeur fidèle (1923) with the famous
merry-go-round sequence. Rather than the isolated or still close-up, Epstein fa-
vors in fact a sequence of shots of alternating scales. Hence he states that “the
dance of the landscape is photogenic,” not any one shot of the landscape itself.18
Epstein propounds shot variation around close-ups, for example describing an
actual dance filmed with a mobile camera taking very close shots of dancers,
then pulling back to their periphery.19 I belabor the importance of scale shift here
because of Benjamin’s enigmatic illustration: “To follow with the eye… a moun-
tain range on the horizon, or a branch that casts its shadow on the beholder is to
breathe the aura of those mountains, of that branch.”20 In her essay on the aura
hysterica, Ulla Link-Heer points out an instance of a hill returning Marcel’s gaze in
Proust’s La Recherche as a possible source for Benjamin’s image.21 Yet a more com-
plete similarity is found in the first section of The Cinema Seen from Etna, where
Epstein writes, “One of cinema’s greatest powers is its animism. On the screen
there is no still life. Objects have attitudes. Trees gesture. Mountains, like this
Etna, signify. Each element of staging becomes a character.”22 Of course, this is
just the kind of magical animism Benjamin warns against: cinema’s reproductive
“mass existence” replacing the “unique existence” of things to satisfy “the desire
of the present-day masses to ‘get closer’ to things.”23 Yet Epstein’s animism is not
“a passionate concern for overcoming each thing’s uniqueness” as Benjamin
adds, but exactly the contrary: a vision of the singularity of filmic objects, preser-
ving their “character” and “gesture.” This is what Epstein calls “the persona of
the gaze [le personnage du regard],” that is, the filmed object’s gaze-like emana-
tion.24 That is why the third definition of photogénie is crucial – “mobile and per-
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sonal aspects of things” – because, like philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, who
holds that the face/gaze is irreducibly human, this “persona of the gaze” con-
tained in the filmic image is foremost ethical. This explains Epstein’s paradigma-
tically photogenic objects – a telephone, a gun, a door handle – in that they con-
vey inter-human involvement: they crystallize intersubjectivity into a material form
disclosed through the film’s singularized motion. Hence, while Benjamin’s pro-
found skepticism about cinema (at least at one pole of his thought25) raises the
traditional objection of the simulacrum, within the very same operative model
Epstein theorizes photogénie from the ethical standpoint as the filmic’s capacity to
disclose the human gaze and implicate inter-human relations. While this return
of the gaze is fundamental to Benjamin’s aura as well, the latter structurally ex-
cludes the mediation of technology.26
In view of this closeness between them, we might ask whether Benjamin was
aware of Epstein’s theoretical work from the 1920s. I believe that he must have
known of it and very probably also read it. The direct link between them is Léon
Pierre-Quint, the French critic who wrote the first book on Proust in 1925. Two
words of general context are needed first. As Michael Jennings has shown, when
Benjamin turned his attention toward popular culture and cinema around 1924,
after his failed Habilitation, he became close to the Gestaltung group of Berlin for
whom photomontage and film constituted an intermedia franca where all arts
could meet.27 Hans Richter was its main figure and a journal was launched in
1922 around Moholy-Nagy, El Lissitsky, and Mies van der Rohe. Yet the prototype
of such postwar interart journals was L’Esprit Nouveau, edited by Ozenfant and
Jeanneret (later to be known as Le Corbusier), starting in 1920. It is in that journal
in 1921 that Epstein contributed an early version of his first book under the title
“The Literary Phenomenon,” which ran through six issues.28 Perusing the list of
L’Esprit nouveau subscribers for the years 1920-21, we can find the names of Mo-
holy-Nagy, Lissitsky, and Tzara – among hundreds of well-known artists (Brancu-
si, Duchamp, Pound, Stevens, Gide, Faure, etc.).29 If Benjamin did not directly
discover Epstein in L’Esprit nouveau, certainly the latter’s theories were dissemi-
nated within the group. The only direct link I have been able to find so far comes
from footnotes to the “Work of Art” essay that mention L’Art cinématographique,
second volume.30 It is a 1927 collection of essays on cinema (one of eight vo-
lumes) by Germaine Dulac, Abel Gance, Lionel Landry, and Léon Pierre-Quint.
Taken together, these essays may be seen to push Impressionist theory in a direc-
tion very close to what Benjamin would theorize after Freud as innervation (Bah-
nung) – the counter-impulse capable of undoing the anesthetic effects of shock or
trauma by reviving the path of the original impulse. In her essay, Dulac writes for
instance: “It was cinema which revealed progressively to us the presence within
our unconscious [inconscient] of a new emotional sense allowing for our sensorial
comprehension of visual rhythms.”31 Minus the idea of rhythm, this progressive
new sense of “sensorial comprehension” is closely related to Benjamin’s innerva-
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tion via the optical unconscious.32 Now, it is the essay by Léon Pierre-Quint in
this collection – from which Benjamin cites a passage from Pirandello – that es-
tablishes a link between Benjamin and Epstein. In his essay, Pierre-Quint tells of
his recent conversion to cinema in the following terms: “The ray of light from the
‘surreal eye’ as Mr. Jean Epstein puts it, has lit my darkness.”33 Benjamin’s “Paris
Diary” of 1930 indicates that Léon Pierre-Quint was Benjamin’s closest friend in
Paris, both men sharing a daily breakfast.34 Pierre-Quint adds in his essay, “A
wholly new image […] prolonging the reach of our senses, creates in ourselves a
stimulation until now unknown in our consciousness.”35 This “prolonging” into
a “new stimulation” is again a close approximation of innervation via the optical
unconscious. A third passage by Lionel Landry, who refers to films of Epstein
including Le Lion des Mogols (1924), reads: “Should we hope that, through a fusion,
a progressive simplification, through some unconscious ‘facilitation’ of associa-
tions [‘frayage’ inconscient d’associations], a pure cinematic sensibility might be cre-
ated?”36 The word “frayage” is the sanctioned translation of Freud’s “Bahnung”
into French from Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
From this quite sophisticated volume, Benjamin excises for the “Work of Art”
essay three flat-footed passages in the most exulted of the four essays, that by
Abel Gance. Benjamin willfully leaves the link between photogénie and the optical
unconscious by the wayside.37 His citational strategy aims only at illustrating “the
obtuse and hyperbolic character of early film theory,” insofar as “these theoreti-
cians […] attribute elements of cult to film – with a striking lack of discretion.”38
Epstein’s comment about the “surreal eye” concludes the 1923 essay, “On Some
Conditions of Photogénie,” collected in The Cinema Seen from Etna (1926), and Pierre-
Quint obviously read it carefully. In view of his conversion, it is quite probable
that he either gave it to Benjamin to read, or at minimum talked to him about
Epstein’s photogénie. Thus very likely aware of the theoretical and psycho-physio-
logical savvy of French photogenists, Benjamin refuses any acknowledgment.
As Miriam Hansen’s recent exhumation of Benjamin’s formulation of aura pre-
vious to “The Work of Art” essay attests, the tactical dissolution of aura occluded
“broader anthropological, perceptual-mnemonic, and visionary dimensions” in
Benjamin’s earlier work not inimical in my view to Epstein’s photogénie.39 Both
share as profound inspirations the sensory nature of remembrance and childhood
mediated by Proust, the paradoxical temporality of the past informed by Bergson,
and the Kabbalah as a messianic mode of making present rather than representa-
tion.40 Among more minute similarities, we could mention Epstein’s “The Lit-
erary Phenomenon,” which opens with a long section on modernity’s technologi-
cal erasure of distance, “le loin,” in terms that are very close to those of Valéry’s
1933 “The Conquest of Ubiquity,” an excerpt of which opens the last version of
“The Work of Art” essay.
It isn’t very difficult to see why Benjamin would repudiate photogénie. Epstein
embraces neither the Hegelian dialectic (rejected in La Lyrosophie) nor Freud’s ra-
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tionalization of the unconscious which he denounces as a detective scenario of
bourgeois sexuality (in “Freud or the Nick-Carterianism in Psychology”41). Ep-
stein’s financial backers were Russian émigrés around the production company
Albatros – the landless white bird of long migrations – and Marxism plays no
explicit part in Epstein’s thought. Moreover, Benjamin attempted to get close to
André Breton from the late 1920s onward. Epstein’s use of the word “surréel” –
similar to Ivan Goll and Paul Dermée titling their new journal Surréalisme in 1924 –
would have triggered a violent anathema from the surrealist’s group proprietary
control of Apollinaire’s word.42 By comparison to Benjamin’s silence, we may cite
his friend and editor Siegfried Kracauer who freely refers to Epstein in his Theory
of Film, in fact more than to Béla Balázs, Fritz Lang, and Hans Richter combined.
Kracauer would most certainly have brought Epstein to Benjamin’s attention as
well, and perhaps further comments are yet to be found in Benjamin’s correspon-
dence and archive.
2
Although Epstein’s thought about cinema begins, as will Benjamin’s, with its
place in mass modernity and its homeopathic potential to alleviate modernity’s
anaesthetizing effects, it points to a very different set of implications. Epstein’s
view of mass culture, for instance, lacks the intellectual condescension and fear
for cultural capital deflation that are all too palpable in André Breton’s and Theo-
dor Adorno’s allergies to commercial cinema and jazz respectively. He even
grants a putative confidence to popular film spectators that they have the ability
to derive from the culture industry an “autopsychology” of their own state of psy-
chosomatic exhaustion. Popular culture comes first phenomenologically for Ep-
stein, who defines modernism as the avant-garde’s belated realization of the new
psychosomatic economy it deploys. In a way, then, surprisingly close to Marx’s
attention to the history of the senses, in The Poetry of Today, A New State of Mind
(1921), Epstein bases his theory of modernist poetry entirely on the sensorial con-
ditions dictating pulp literature and cinema.
Rather than the psychic unconscious (l’inconscient), what he places at the core of
the new homeopathic art he tries defining is a somatic subconscious (le subcons-
cient) that functions on an energetic model of counter-anaesthetizing or restoring
the individual’s sensorium. Melodramatic cinema for Epstein exemplifies this re-
storative psycho-corporeality with its strict finalism of feel-good logic, artificial
justice, Manichean characters, and happy ending. Epstein neither condones nor
condemns pulp culture: his analyses are meant only to understand why and how
it has become dominant, and in the second part of The Poetry of Today he shows
that modern literature from Proust to Aragon has implicitly extrapolated its coun-
ter-anaesthetic traits into a new organization of the literary text. At the very center
of the subconscious sensorium, Epstein locates “vegetative life”: “This life has
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been called vegetative, sympathetic life. It is a diffuse, deep, active, silent and
animal life.”43 This vegetative life – which recalls Freud’s vesicular body in Beyond
the Pleasure Principle – regulates fatigue and sensorial erosion, nervous discharge
and sexual over-excitation, psychosomatic ailments and revivification, involuntary
memory, and even intellectual stimulation. For Epstein, “[the modern mind]
reaches to it, leans over its rumor, examines it by auscultation, scrutinizes it,
interrogates it and expects marvels from it.”44
The sensory disposition that corresponds to this attention to one’s vegetative
life Epstein calls “coenaesthesis,” the inner sense of one’s own senses, that which
“summarizes the sensory state of an individual at any given time…. the physiolo-
gical face of the subconscious.”45 Epstein’s photogénie – to which we can now
return – is intimately tied to coenaesthesis: in fact, his general philosophy of aes-
thetics amounts to finding the best possible means of disclosing how human and
inter-human experience springs from coenaesthesis.46 Cinema would seem better
suited to give it expression than medicine, poetry, or philosophy: “Beyond the
scenario’s drama, the screen violently resonates with an immense trove of wild
desires and continual worries, the spirit, photogénie’s sweet smell like that of saint-
hood, poetic persona.”47 Cinematic techniques such as the close-up, rapid edit-
ing, slow motion, and slow-moving staging, among others, aim to make percep-
tible the inner sensory state of the actor – especially in the case of the non-
professional actors in Epstein’s Brittany films between 1928 and 1947 – as well as
re-amplify the inner sensory state of the spectator. But the style of writing that
Epstein adopts – empirical, clipped, steeped in the logic of affect – also fore-
grounds the coenaesthetic rhythms of embodied subject-position over the trap-
pings of anonymous rationality.48
This centrality of embodiment in photogénie might be related to the fact that
Epstein was a homosexual. I should preface this statement with my sense of sur-
prise when, consulting the Epstein archives at the Bibliothèque du film in Paris, I
stumbled upon a 300-page manuscript entitled: Ganymède: Essay on Masculine
Homosexual Ethics, dated circa 1930-1940, and written under the pseudonym of
Alfred Kléber. In the perhaps unique French mélange of respect of privacy and
hypocrisy, nowhere had I read that Epstein was a homosexual, and no reference
had ever been made to this work. The manuscript itself makes it clear that it is for
social and not for personal reasons that Epstein dissimulated his homosexuality,
since he presents it as a civil right: “[S]uicide, contraception, and homosexuality
are discoveries of the same, and I will say, highest order… [in terms of] the ac-
ceptance of the priority of essential individual rights upon certain collective im-
peratives.”49 Ganymède seems to me an important document for the history and
self-theorization of homosexuality. Epstein asserts for instance that, “the least
prejudiced minds are rallying around the conception that homosexuality is an in-
nate disposition” (G, 44), and he questions both the model of inversion and the
notion of heterosexual norm (G, 53). After systematically debunking arguments
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against homosexuality (from the purviews of nature, reproduction, heterosexual
masquerade, and society), Epstein presents various configurations of male homo-
sexual couples, including those with a large age differential, and looks towards
the future of homosexuality. Rejecting “anatomical and physiological determina-
tions of the homosexual,” Epstein steers clear of essentializing or even character-
izing a homosexual sensibility, and in this sense it may be more precise to speak
of a queer aesthetics (G, 41).
While nothing indicates therefore that male homosexuality informs photogénie
in any direct way, we may note nonetheless that Epstein’s films focus equally on
male and female bodies, that the male body is explicitly a site of photogénie in his
writings, especially in Bonjour cinéma (1921), and that Epstein’s coenaesthesis em-
phasizes a non-phobic relation with inner bodily sensations, whether one’s own
as spectator or that of a male body on cinematic display.50 His films such as La
Glace à trois faces (1927) and Finis Terrae (1929) feature male heroes wrestling with
coenaesthesis, whether it be a fatal restlessness and unexplained dissatisfaction
towards three different women in the former (none of whom seem capable of
reflecting back his desire), or a fever due to an infection of the main character’s
(phallic) thumb following a dispute with his best friend in the latter. Epstein’s
most famous film, The Fall of the House of Usher (1928), stages two older males
competitively hovering over Roderick, himself splenetically involved in painting
his wife Madeline and progressively robbing her of life. Certainly, this film cir-
cumvents heterosexual desire with a morbid narcissism involving fetishized fe-
male likeness.51 Even Coeur fidèle (1923), a film featuring a reciprocated and seem-
ingly victorious heterosexual love, ends with a scene of deflation or distraction,
which more than suggests that the male rivalry that propelled the plot acted as its
affective center as well. Yet any such ‘readings’ of queer elements in silent film
should take care to gauge contextually cinematic norms of gender coding. Thus
the elegant and thin male character of La Glace à trois faces appears to wear more, or
more conspicuous, make-up than may be the norm for contemporary male leads
– but is it really so? The repugnantly abusive and caricaturally straight husband in
Germaine Dulac’s The Smiling Madame Beudet (1927) seems to wear about the same
amount of make-up. The love triangle in Coeur fidèle resembles the one in Abel
Gance’s J’accuse (1919) in that male rivalry leads to a form of accommodation: is
the former more ‘queer’ than the latter? One single scene in Epstein’s oeuvre
stands out as staging a homosexual pickup. In Le Double amour – another of Ep-
stein’s ambiguous titles – a rich son finds himself in a large jail cell where he
encounters an apache, a working class hoodlum in French slang, whose demea-
nor, dress, and high-top hairdo with thin sideburns, as well as his odd pet mouse,
display clashing masculine and feminine attributes. In Ganymède, Epstein makes a
special case for what he calls “homosexuality by confinement,” as opposed to
“essential homosexuality,” and it is unclear which kind is displayed in that scene
(G, 126). With super-impressions of an ostrich feather fan and a viola, the two
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men are shown circling each other in a diegetic ellipsis that may or may not be
taking place, or may be the phantasm of either or both of them.
There is very little critical work available on homosexuality and silent cinema,
especially in France.52 Germaine Dulac, another central figure in the photogénie
movement, was a lesbian who co-founded a film production with her scriptwriter
and lover Irène Hiller-Erlanger in 1915, and Marcel L’Herbier was also a “known”
homosexual, although this is again undocumented. Several critics such as Ruby
Rich have noted the crisis of masculinity and male embodiment following World
War I: the fascination of Delluc and Epstein for the bodies of actor Sessue Haya-
kawa and Chaplin, for instance, in their exotic extremes of hypo- and hyper-activ-
ity, might be understood in such a context of traumatology.53 This does not pre-
clude, however, a homoerotic component whether related to it or not: in Bonjour
cinéma, two of the titles for Epstein’s poetic sequences are “Amour de Charlot”
and “Amour de Sessue” – which read ambiguously in French as either “Lovely
Chaplin” or “Love for Sessue.” I believe that the experimental motivation to find
cinematic techniques for objectifying subjective states from a ‘queer’ perspective
represents a promising area for future research on the photogénie movement.
There might be similarities to pursue as well between Jean Epstein, Jean Cocteau,
and Derek Jarman, all three queer filmmakers influenced by and having written
poetry, belonging to the avant-garde yet at an idiosyncratic remove from it, and all
three exploring the thematic tension between “the mirror and the sea”54 – that is,
between on the one hand narcissism and self-exploration, and on the other hand
the dissolution or sublimation of the ego within a broader engagement with rea-
lity.55 Perhaps, then, Epstein’s formulation of the self belongs to this queer dia-
lectic in its essential fluidity:
Individuality is a mobile complex, that each of us, more or less consciously,
must choose and construct for himself, then rearrange ceaselessly, through a
diversity of aspects which, themselves, are far from being simple or perma-
nent, and within the mass of which, when too numerous, the individual suc-
ceeds with great difficulty in keeping a clear form. Then, so-called personality
becomes a diffuse self, whose polymorphism tends towards the amorphous
and dissolves itself in the watery current of motherly depths [le courant de ses
eaux-mères].56
The sea, moving water, and fluidity are indeed central to Epstein’s photogénie in
bringing into sensorial intimacy visual mobility and non-visual coenaesthesis:
“The world of the screen…constitutes the privileged domain of the malleable, the
viscous, and the liquid.”57 From a non-human living environment in his Brittany
films, the sea becomes in his last major feature, Le Tempestaire (1947), a kind of
quasi-human figure of photogénie’s ethical relation. The famous shots of the sea in
slow motion and in reverse motion embody and index – underneath the diegetic
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conceit of a magical taming of the ocean – the magmatic affects stirring between
the two distant and off-screen lovers. It is a Baudelairean “correspondence” run-
ning along sensorial experiences of vision, kinesthesia, fear, nausea, and longing.
In Esprit de cinéma, (1955), Epstein reformulates this slowed-down photogénie as,
What the mind does not have time to retain, what the eye has neither the time
nor the field to see in one expression: the premonitory symptoms, the evolu-
tion, the strife among emotional inter-currents [sentiments intercurrents] that
compose their synthesis – all this is what slow-motion displays at will.58
Photogénie as mobility of vision correlates both with the liquid element and the
churning of affects; what Epstein qualifies as, “the perpetual flux and reflux agi-
tating the affective domain,” which finds in cinema a privileged mode of objecti-
fication, the “revelation on the screen of a deeper inner life, with its perpetual
palpitation, its crisscrossing meanders, its mysterious spontaneity….”59 This coe-
naesthetic life constitutes the fluid bedrock of meaning:
… In the reality of the psyche, verbal thought… only smothers under it and
rejects in the shadow, in most cases, other modes of visual, auditory, olfactory,
tactile, gustative, and coenaesthetic representations. And this thinking via the
evocation of sensorial impressions can organize itself in concepts no less pre-
cise than those used in verbal thinking…
Repressed in the subconscious, the memories of sensorial impressions
constitute nonetheless the feeding roots on which words graft themselves and
upon which they continue drawing their greatest resource of meaning.60
Epstein’s coenaesthetic photogénie suggests a broad affect-based theory of experi-
ence compared, for instance, to Freud’s arch-determinism of the sex drive. Given
the centrality of (heteronormative) psychoanalysis in film studies’ classical con-
strual of spectatorship, whether in Jean-Louis Baudry’s apparatus theory or in
Laura Mulvey’s pioneering essay, Epstein’s photogénie offers an alternative histori-
cal model. I would propose that photogénie implies a particular mode of scopophi-
lia whereby the apparatus concentrates and reflects back optical desire in a way
that discloses the spectator’s body as sensorially self-relating – sensing itself
viewing – through the ‘enactive’ aspect of filmic images (see section 3 below).
We could contrast this mode precisely with Benjamin’s reticence at the apparatus’
reflex reach within the spectator’s body. In “The Work of Art” essay, Benjamin’s
references to cinema as “the most intensive interpenetration of equipment and
reality” and “the desire of the present-day masses to get closer to things,” betray
a worried if not phobic relation to haptic-optical closeness.61 Whereas the magi-
cian and the painter “maintain the natural distance between [themselves] and the
person treated,” the surgeon and the filmmaker, “greatly diminish…the distance
epstein’s photogénie as corporeal vision 61
from the patient by penetrating the patient’s body.”62 I wonder whether auratic
distance, for Benjamin, safeguards the (male) body from contact and disclosure
via the reflex reach of photogénie into the spectator’s coenaesthetic affects. In a
1926 piece on Klages, Benjamin writes: “The erotic life is ignited by distance. On
the other hand, there is an affinity between nearness and sexuality.”63 Benjamin,
it seems, remains here within an early Romantic sensibility, found in Rousseau’s
Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert on Theater and Diderot’s Paradox of the Comedian, for
instance, whereby the danger inherent to theatrical spectatorship is that it might
feminize the male viewer’s body by disclosing its sensorial insides, by moving and
emoting his affects through interoceptive sensations – precisely what Epstein
means by coenaesthesis. What makes such a model of non-Freudian and hetero-
abnormative spectatorship ethical, again recalling Levinas, is its vulnerability – its
“cucul-praline-rhododendron” corporeal openness towards the other.64
3
I have suggested that Epstein’s photogénie results equally from the technological
mediation of the apparatus and the embodied experience of the viewer. Truncat-
ing either condition leads to mischaracterizations of Epstein’s theory. This is just
what Malcolm Turvey does in a recent book on what he calls the “revelationist
tradition” that, besides Jean Epstein, includes Béla Bálazs, Dziga Vertov, and Sieg-
fried Kracauer.65 Turvey’s central argument is that Epstein and other revelation-
ists exaggerate the failings of unaided human vision in order to inflate cinema’s
capability as a technological medium. Bracketing the psycho-sensorial and ethical
aspects of photogénie, Turvey aims to discipline cinema theoreticians by way of
gauging the truth-value of their propositions regarding sight. This approach is all
the more perplexing given that a previous essay of his had keenly brought to light
the centrality of immanence and corporeality in Epstein’s thought.66 Turvey’s ob-
jections are nonetheless useful to further define photogénie and introduce links
between Epstein’s corporeal vision and contemporary research on perception, the
immersive sensorium, and digital media.
Turvey sets out to demystify a number of claims that revelationists like Epstein
make regarding cinema’s “ability to uncover features of reality invisible to human
vision” (DV, 3). He claims that for Epstein these features are: the mobile aspect of
reality (DV, 28), the fourth dimension which is time, in particular the future (DV,
12, 52), the inner emotional life of human beings (DV, 59), the personality or
interior life of an object (DV, 60), and family resemblance (DV, 61). In addition,
Turvey asserts that for Epstein, “the naked human eye is unable to see the true
nature of reality” (DV, 23) and moreover that “skepticism about everyday sight is a
very general feature of modernism” (DV, 108). In prosecuting his case, Turvey is
careful to adopt a narrowly optical model of cinematic vision, so that he grants
cinema’s capacity as art for “revealing truths that we are capable of seeing un-
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aided but that were previously concealed or that we did not pay attention to” (DV,
128). Hence, he condemns revelationists for their claims about cinema’s novelty
as an optical prosthesis, and not for their claims about cinema’s novelty as a new
form of expression (even though his critique of modernism ultimately links both).
This is important, in Turvey’s view, because “film theorists are woefully confused
about what it is we actually see when we watch films” (DV, 130), and they tend to
echo and amplify a general skepticism about human vision that is nothing but a
“category mistake” inherited from the modernist creed.
There are a number of problems with Turvey’s general thesis, the first of which
is that nowhere does he describe what he thinks human vision does, nor does he
acknowledge the unsettled debates taking place in human vision science today.
Instead, Turvey takes it for granted that we know what we see unaided and what
we see in films. This is a crucial point because experiments in perception studies
are increasingly confirming the general conclusion that we idealize our own per-
ceptual processes, and in fact build for ourselves a deeply skewed sense of what
our vision does.67 The work of visual perception theoretician Alva Noë shows that
perception makes little sense if we abstract our bodily involvement in what we
see.68 Noë propounds an “enactive” theory of visual perception based on our sen-
sorimotor knowledge of our environment – that is, on the fact that we only see
insofar as we (potentially) interact with what we see. Vision for Noë cannot be
explained as the result of optical stimuli deciphered by the brain, because it is
our sensorimotor involvement that allows us to decipher what we see. This means
that vision, besides being optical in a trivial sense, is more interestingly haptic,
proprioceptive, kinesthetic, and projective: we see not ‘in’ our heads but ‘in’ what
we see, ‘in’ the world. Failing to present a reliable scientific theory of human
vision against which to gauge that presented by revelationists invalidates Turvey’s
logical critique. For example, Noë demonstrates on an experimental basis that at
any one time we construct only a very small part of our visual field, the rest (most)
of which remains cognitively virtual – at the ready, as it were, but not in any
tangibly sensorial way present. Hence Turvey’s indictment of Epstein for propos-
ing that “the naked human eye is unable to see the true nature of reality” (DV, 23)
takes for granted that reality is fully given to human vision, like a photograph.
Noë shows that such a “snapshot” hypothesis misrepresents our limited focus
and its inferential reconstruction of the perceptual field. Epstein’s point that with-
out cinema we cannot access the mobile aspects of reality would also seem to be
confirmed, in that our vision is hyper-mobile both muscularly (saccadic) and cog-
nitively (focal invariance), so that we have a remarkable ability to ‘lock on’moving
objects within our visual field, and thus do not ordinarily experience visual mobi-
lity as such, that is, as other than non-focal blur. When Epstein writes that, “an
aspect is photogenic if it moves and varies simultaneously in space and time,” we
must understand underneath the oxymoron (nothing can move in space but not
in time!) that cinema presents us with the composed spectacle of space-time var-
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iation in an enframing way that the human eye – because of its locking mecha-
nism – ordinarily cannot.69 The difference between natural and cinematic vision
is aptly couched in terms of “secondary intentionality” by Vivian Sobchack.70 Phe-
nomenologist Edmund Husserl renamed consciousness ‘intentionality’ to indi-
cate that its perceptual-cognitive beholding of something is its basic character.
Because cinema’s beholding, for Sobchack, resembles and precedes our own, it
can be termed a secondary intentionality, and for Epstein this secondary inten-
tionality – which he calls “the gaze of the lens” – lets us attend to composed
motion in a way qualitatively beyond what our eyes can do.71
By positing that Epstein’s invocation of the fourth dimension shows his
modernist bias, Turvey diminishes Epstein’s quasi-phenomenological approach
to temporality. Turvey cites Epstein’s comments from “The Photogénie of the Im-
ponderable” that “Man…seems constitutionally unsuited to capture a continuous
event in four dimensions all by himself.”72 If this was really the case, we would
not be able to drive a car or catch a ball! But Epstein is talking only about “cap-
ture” – that is, cinema as a “recording” device (mentioned in the previous sen-
tence in both versions) – and Epstein’s point here is simply that human vision is
incapable of such recording because our perceptual apparatus locates us over-
whelmingly in the present. Two pages later, Turvey misrepresents this simple ob-
servation:
But does this mean that humans are confined to the present due to the weak-
ness of our perceptual and mental faculties? Is time really something that we
could see or experience more of if our eyes were only stronger, as Epstein
claims? This claim suggests that time is like a spatial whole that we can see
more or less of. (DV, 52)
Turvey is disingenuous on three counts. First, Epstein does not make the claim
Turvey says he does, but asserts only that cinema records time better than man.
Second, the spatialization (quantification) of time is precisely what Bergson’s
qualitative duration opposes most strenuously: Turvey can hardly argue both that
Epstein is thoroughly Bergsonian (DV, 49-51) and that he misses Bergson’s basic
thesis. Finally, (and this is precisely why Bergson distrusted cinema) a film is
indeed a “spatial whole that we can see more or less of,” whether it be on a
celluloid strip or in a series of bits. Adducing comments by Augustine and Witt-
genstein, Turvey concludes: “It is therefore nonsensical to accuse the human eye
of failing to see the fourth dimension of time, as Epstein does, and equally non-
sensical to argue that the cinema is capable of revealing it” (DV, 54). While the
first part of this conclusion plainly misrepresents Epstein’s comment, the second
part is more intriguing. Turvey explains that “making the fourth dimension of
time visible” does not merely consist in altering the diegesis of the film with
flashbacks or flash-forwards, but in allowing “the viewer to see the flashback
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when it was shown at the previous night’s screening” (DV, 54). This reference to
Wells’ time machine misses the mark (although Laura Marcus has recently shown
that cinema was precisely what allowed Wells to dream up time travel!73). Ep-
stein’s thought about the fourth dimension is not primarily based on reordering
the diegesis, but on technical manipulations associated with the cinema of attrac-
tions which Turvey entirely fails to mention: slow motion and acceleration, and to
a lesser extent, reverse motion. Epstein calls cinema “the time thinking machine”
in that it assists us in a meditation on time “by experimentally effecting very
broad variations, unknown until then, of temporal perspective.”74 Epstein adds:
A short documentary describing in a few minutes twelve months of the life of a
plant, from its germination to maturity and decay, up to the formation of the
seeds of a new generation, is enough to take us on the most extraordinary trip,
the most difficult escape, that man has ever attempted.75
Turvey eschews such capabilities of cinema probably because they are clearly be-
yond what the human eye can do. Unfortunately, slow motion in particular is
essential to Epstein’s claim that cinema allows us to see the inner emotional life
of humans in a way the human eye cannot. In Finis Terrae and The Fall of the House of
Usher, it is slow motion – various speeds of slow motion in fact – that loosens the
dramatic diegesis to create small eddies of four-dimensional affect exemplifying
the coenaesthetic or interoceptive reception of the photogenic image. This is how
Epstein describes his use of slow motion in The Fall of the House of Usher:
I know of nothing more absolutely moving than a face in slow motion freeing
itself from an emotion. First a long preparation, a slow fever, which might be
compared either to a morbid incubation, or a progressive ripening or, more
crudely, a pregnancy. Finally, this whole effort bursts out, breaks away from
muscular rigidity. A contagion of movements animates the face… Such a
power of discrimination of the mechanical and optical super-eye [sur-oeil]
clearly reveals time’s relativity.76
Although Epstein’s views on cinema include a reverence that occasionally verges
on mysticism, his photogénie remains solidly anchored in a phenomenological de-
scription of the corporeal basis of visual perception and of its ‘enactive’ involve-
ment in the filmic image to which Turvey’s critique of logical inconsistencies
simply does no justice.
4
To conclude, let us briefly point to recent developments in digital art and new
media theory that unknowingly recoup or revive Epstein’s photogénie. Filming
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staged emotions of human subjects with high-speed equipment and projecting
these images at normal speed (thus appearing to us in slow motion), video artist
Bill Viola has focused on the ethical aesthetics of bodily and facial expressiveness
in his Passions series, in a way that is so closely reminiscent of Epstein’s films and
theories that his work should be plainly termed photogenic.77 Viola’s Passions ser-
ies has, in turn, been taken up by Mark Hansen as the cornerstone for a theory of
new media that seeks to elude “the ‘cinematocentrism’ plaguing most accounts of
new media.”78 Hansen cites Viola’s characterization of his work as creating a
“subjective image… an image that can only be experienced internally” (NP, 268)
to argue that Viola’s images uniquely link “the domain of properly imperceptible
microphysical stimuli and the phenomenological dimension of affectivity” (NP,
267). Yet this, again, was exactly Epstein’s photogénie program of using various
speeds to show how “the theater of the skin” is rooted in coenaesthesis.
Setting aside Hansen’s declaration of independence from cinema, we might see
his theory of digital media as a way to understand photogénie as enactive in Noë’s
sense – that is, in Hansen’s words, “demonstrat[ing] the plasticity of the nervous
system and the operative role of bodily motility in the production of sensation”
(NP, 39). Moreover, by characterizing the originality of new media through the
formula “affect as interface” (NP, 127), via facialization and the close-up (NP,
130), but also beyond them, Hansen substantially enlarges the conceptual reach
of photogénie. It is, nonetheless, a mark of Epstein’s originality that it has taken so
long for artists and theorists like Viola and Hansen to reconstruct a conceptual-
affective context akin to photogénie, and to which a fuller recovery of Epstein’s
writings on photogénie and of his still-misunderstood films such as The Fall of the
House of Usher have much to contribute. Hansen’s reliance on the thought of Gilles
Deleuze – whose profound absorption of Epstein’s photogénie in his two Cinema
books also deserves close scrutiny – represents a direct, if occluded, channel of
influence.
While Cendrars thought little of photogénie as a word and as a practice, it seems
that we are now past the intimation that focusing on pre-subjective affective and
ethical experience in both perception and film studies is an ‘airy-fairy’ project. It
nonetheless took three-quarters of a century to catch up with the ‘queer eye’ of
Epstein’s corporeal photogénie of cinema’s ‘hyper-eye.’ Perhaps it is due in part to
the difficult recognition of the close ties between the virtual, ethical, and corpor-
eal aspects of vision. For while Levinas considers that the gaze alone holds the
ethical calling of the face, we might wonder, to return in closing to “The Echo of
Pythagoras,” whether teeth for Epstein – as the very trivial emblem of glamorous
photogénie – do not disclose another ethical injunction through the non-visual
aperture of the human face, accessible to the other not only visually but physi-
cally. Thus superimposing the mouth as metaphoric ‘eye of the body’ on the tra-
ditional image of the eye as the ‘window of the soul’ would be in keeping with
Epstein’s cinematic revaluation of the base, the popular, and the bodily.
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Novelty and Poiesis in the Early Writings
of Jean Epstein1
Stuart Liebman
More than half a century after his death in 1953, Jean Epstein remains too much
of a prophet without honor in American annals of European film theory and film-
making. Despite some impressive archival work and several pioneering studies
over the last couple of decades, as well as a number of recent reassessments, it is
nevertheless correct to say that Epstein’s films and film theory figure largely as
terrae incognitae on current maps of cinematic achievement, at least in the English-
speaking world.2 Many topics must still be pursued in greater depth. A fuller
understanding of how Epstein’s theories informed his cinematic practice over the
course of his three-decade-long career awaits more intensive analyses of many of
his films and the circumstances in which they were made. The complex, quite
often dissonant relationships his theoretical writings and films sustained with
the various European avant-garde filmmaking ventures of his time certainly de-
serve more concerted attention. A searching exploration of the sinuous course of
his later quasi-philosophical reflections on cinema has never really been at-
tempted, while the reason for his marginal position in the shifting intellectual
milieus of French film culture since the 1940s remains an important topic for
further scholarly investigation. Happily, Epstein’s catalogued archive was opened
to the public several years ago and, as the present essay collection demonstrates,
scholars are now beginning to unpack it for new insights into the work and
thought of a man who is as fascinating – though also as elusive – as he is mis-
understood and undervalued.
One area in particular that has been too little studied is the relationship be-
tween Epstein’s earliest intellectual venture, his construction of the poetics sub-
tending the French modernist verse produced by his contemporaries, and his as-
sessment of the capabilities of that newer medium with which he had grown up
and to which he would contribute so much: the cinema. In my dissertation, com-
pleted thirty years ago, I argued that Epstein’s first book on poetry, La Poésie d’au-
jourd’hui, un nouvel état d’intelligence (1921), the series of critical essays on literature
entitled Le Phénomène Littéraire (1921-22), as well as his quasi-philosophical specu-
lations in La Lyrosophie (1922) and other essays of the early 1920s ought to be
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closely examined because they constituted the basis for his earliest theoretical
speculations about film.3 In this respect, to be sure, Epstein was not entirely
alone; a number of European writers of his day – Reverdy, Soupault, Canudo,
and Cendrars, just to name a few of his peers in France – also used their reflec-
tions on poetry as jumping-off points for fledgling theories of cinema.4 Com-
pared to their rather circumscribed remarks in brief, occasional essays, however,
Epstein’s analytic framework was incomparably more ambitious, detailed, and
far-reaching. It warrants further investigation.
Indeed, as of 1922, when the publication of La Lyrosophie capped off a remark-
able two years of achievement for the young critic, one may fairly say that Ep-
stein’s theorization of modernist verse in his earliest books aided him in develop-
ing – in his famous plaquette Bonjour Cinéma and related writings – a theory of film
that was unmatched in scope or daring anywhere in Europe. By that year, for
example, Kuleshov had written but a few of the short essays on montage that
would soon make his reputation, while his erstwhile pupils Vertov and Eisenstein
had barely published a word. As Sabine Hake has noted, the “cinema’s third ma-
chine” had only just started to function in Germany: “Most contributions [to film
criticism and theory up to that time] remained essayistic: short, fragmentary,
spontaneous…”5 And, to conclude this brief summary of the state of film theory
in 1922, the exiled Hungarian poet and librettist Béla Balázs only took up writing
film criticism in Austrian newspapers toward the end of the year. His famous
theoretical tract, Der Sichtbare Mensch – claimed by some to be the first major Euro-
pean text on film theory – would not appear until two years later.6
Indeed, the sophistication of Epstein’s ideas about poetry was arguably only
comparable to the formulations proposed by another group who would also soon
turn their attention to the theorization of cinema: his near contemporaries collec-
tively known as the “Russian Formalist” critics, preeminently Viktor Shklovsky,
Roman Jakobson, Yuri Tynianov, and Boris Eikhenbaum.7 In my dissertation I
had, in fact, noted in passing that Epstein’s and the Formalists’ reflections on the
poetry of their times often converged to a surprising degree, though the context
of my argument did not require me to pursue the comparison further at the time.
I also did not explore how markedly different their explanations for the psychologi-
cal and cultural dynamics motivating modern poetry were, nor how these differ-
ences would eventually bear significant consequences for their visions of what
cinematic art could/should be. The aim of the present essay is, then, precisely to
revisit some of the intellectual territory I passed through too quickly years ago. By
exploring both the convergences and divergences between Epstein and the Form-
alist critics, I want to highlight the range and singularity of Epstein’s theoretical
voice on several issues – the nature of cinematic representation, the relation of the
new medium to modernity, and the dependence of film structure on narrative
logic, among others – that were crucial to the film-theoretical debates of the
1920s.
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The Russian Formalists, of course, had begun their meetings to discuss poetics
before Epstein had finished his secondary education. As is now well-known, the
Russian Formalists formed two somewhat informal groups in St. Petersburg and
Moscow in 1915-1916, following on the publication of a few groundbreaking criti-
cal and theoretical essays about poetics by Viktor Shklovsky and others.8 One of
Shklovsky’s signature early essays, “Art as Technique,” published in 1917, laid a
famous foundation stone for the group’s perspective on literary art. In a well-
known passage, he lamented the extent to which social and linguistic routines
had taken hold of experience, dulling perception of the world. “Habitualization,”
he wrote with comic hyperbole, “devours works, clothes, furniture, one’s wife,
and the fear of war. If the whole complex lives of many people go on uncon-
sciously, then such lives are as if they had never been.”9 He later echoed this
concern in a strikingly graphic image: “We live as if covered with rubber...,” and
in the early essays of this most colorful of Formalist critics one can find many
similar passages decrying the linguistic ciphers through whose agency people
filtered – and also occluded – the world of things and experience.10
Happily, Shklovsky added, art – and he, more than most of his peers, included
visual as well as language arts in his thinking – rescued individuals from this
malaise.11 Art’s innovative linguistic or imagistic techniques fulfilled a key exis-
tential function: they removed screens of habit – including veils of routinized
language – that beclouded perception, and by doing so reconnected individuals
to the world. Art made objects and experiences palpable once again, releasing
them from the deadening grip of the already “known.”
Art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel
things, to make the stone stony. The purpose of art is to impart the sensation
of things as they are perceived and not as they are known. The technique of art
is to make objects unfamiliar. [...] Art removes objects from the automatism of
perception....12
His hyperbole later went so far as to attribute “all the horror...of our present day –
the Entente, Russia” to “the absence in us of a sensation of the world, by the
absence of art....To this end, in order to make an object into a fact of broad art, it
has to be extracted from the quantity of facts of life.”13 This “extraction,” yielding
a work of art he deemed ontologically distinct from ordinary things, was achieved
through innovating artistic forms, as poets and visual artists deployed new tech-
niques to challenge and thus to refresh perception.
Unfortunately, even older art of the highest quality was subject to a tendency to
become conventionalized over time. Repetitions of earlier modes of poetry or
painting styles degraded the effectiveness of existing artistic structures in accom-
plishing their assigned task. Roman Jakobson forcefully insisted upon this point.
“There comes a time,” he wrote in 1921,
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when the traditional poetic language hardens into stereotype and is no longer
capable of being felt but is experienced rather as a ritual, as a holy text in
which even the errors are considered sacred. The language of poetry is as it
were covered by a veneer and neither its tropes nor its poetic licenses any long-
er speak to consciousness. […] Form becomes stereotype and it is no longer
alive.14
For both these Russian critics, the power of art declined whenever its audience
became habituated to the conventions it used. Experience of the world then grew
stale; what had formerly been vibrant and alive became bland, or even sterile. The
antidote Shklovsky and Jakobson proposed involved a breaking of the vessels, a
renovation of form by constituting new prisms of language or original visual vo-
cabularies through which the world could be made to feel new once more, in
which stones, in Shklovsky’s phrasing, could again be perceived as stony. In this
stirring credo, the stakes both for art and human existence were high indeed.
In the very same year in which Jakobson warned against the threat of stereoty-
pical language in art, hundreds of miles away to the West another young literary
critic of East European Jewish background was writing texts that would soon
make him famous in his adopted country of France. Jean Epstein, then at the ripe
age of 24, had already published the first of his two monographs on contempo-
rary poetry, and the second was then appearing in the pages of Le Corbusier and
Ozenfant’s prestigious review, L’Esprit nouveau. Over the next eighteen months, he
would add his now famous film-theoretical tract Bonjour Cinéma, the speculative
philosophical book, La Lyrosophie, as well as essays on diverse intellectual topics:
the alleged follies of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, Rimbaud, contemporary
scientific thought, the Kabbalah, and love.
Using a vocabulary strikingly reminiscent of his Russian Formalist contempor-
aries in his analysis of modern poetry, he decried the torpor of the age – sympto-
matized by what he called modern “fatigue” – and stressed the need for new
forms of verbal art to respond to it.15 Indeed, in the following quotation that
referenced Pavlov more than once, Epstein seems to have echoed Formalist views;
he sounded almost like a proto-Eisenstein in his insistence on “conditioned re-
flexes” as the foundation for a reader’s or spectator’s reactions to artistic techni-
ques.
Habit, which deadens, renders blasé, fatigues and extinguishes aesthetic emo-
tion, steadily demands that new details, novel processes, and original ideas be
added to the more durable characteristics of works of art – a change corre-
sponding to a change in the conditions of life. This is necessary if one wishes
to awaken beauty from its torpor, to astonish, to strike the intelligence and stir
the sensibility. The impression of the beautiful is a sort of conditioned reflex and
undergoes the physiological law of all reflexes, which eventuates at length in
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extinction. It becomes necessary to introduce new conditions into the produc-
tion of phenomena of beauty in order to revive this conditioned reflex.16
Epstein’s warning was, in any case, as clear as the Russians’ had been: formal
innovation was crucial because “The extinction of the aesthetic emotion specific
to each literary school marks the end of these schools. There is no eternal
beauty.”17
Clearly, these young literary critics all perceived the verbal art of their day to be
in crisis, and they understood the symptoms of that crisis in strikingly similar
terms. Their analyses converged in the observation that modern societies had in-
creasingly oriented themselves to a certain mental economy based on practical
transactions employing utilitarian ciphers with which to communicate. The result
was a kind of “algebraization” of thought – effective, perhaps, in encouraging
daily social intercourse and pragmatic action, but with dire consequences for the
human sensorium and intellect. As Shklovsky suggested, for most modern indi-
viduals it was as if the world were covered with rubber. Moreover, the linguistic art
that had formerly broken through the veneer dulling the vividness of the world
had itself been neutralized by burdensome, outmoded tropic and formal conven-
tions. It was therefore no longer capable of fulfilling art’s special social role,
namely, to reestablish a vital connection to the world through a renovation of
perception. What was needed, all agreed, was nothing less than a far-reaching
renewal of poetry’s words and phrasings; novel concatenations of imagery and
rhythms had to be developed to allow the world to blossom forth once more. An
analysis of these new techniques embodied in the works of poets they admired
became the key gateways to the perspectives they offered.
The basic orientation and the prescriptions offered by Epstein and the Formal-
ists were, in fact, so close in both letter and spirit as to raise the question of
influence. I have found no evidence that Epstein, who did not know Russian, was
aware of any of the essays by Shklovsky or Jakobson I have cited; these were, as
far as I know, not translated into any West European languages until many years
later.18 It is true that by the first years of the 1920s, both Shklovsky and Jakobson
were in exile in Berlin and Prague respectively. In these cultural capitals they
might very well have gained access to Epstein’s books in French, a language they
surely knew well, and almost certainly could have perused some of his many texts
in the internationally distributed L’Esprit nouveau. Two of Epstein’s early short texts
on cinema, moreover, were even translated into Russian and published in the
Moscow journal Zénith.19 Epstein’s writings on poetry, however, post-date most of
the Shklovsky and Jakobson essays already cited by several months, and in some
cases, by years; the Russian critics would, at best, probably have found confirma-
tion of some of their own insights in Epstein’s independent writings. The appar-
ent absence of contact or any genetic influence in either direction therefore likely
points to a shared source or sources, which might be profitably explored by future
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researchers. The celebrated French philosopher Henri Bergson’s writings are
most certainly one possible discourse they might all have read, as some scholars
are beginning to suggest.20 For now, it is enough to note how much the prescrip-
tions for formal innovations recommended by these critics in both Eastern and
Western Europe overlap.
In general terms, Shklovsky and Jakobson argued that the language of poetry
had to be “roughened,” made difficult so as to retard or even “impede” the read-
er’s ease in consuming the poem. The Formalists’ jargon for this process was
“defamiliarization” (ostranenie). In their view, poets used language to make objects
“strange.” By this procedure, automatized responses were derailed, allowing
“things” to be perceptually redeemed. Epstein did not use the word “defamiliar-
ize,” but he did employ one quite closely related to it: déformation. He opined that
artists – and at this early stage of his career he was thinking primarily of poets,
but soon the work of visual artists was encompassed as well – had to “deform”
the world, rendering it more complex and new by multiplying not entirely compa-
tible perspectives on it.21 He likened the procedures as akin to those of scientists
who used diverse instruments and not always congruent standards of measure-
ment in their research to bring new phenomena into sharper relief.22
What is more, their general orientations and vocabularies were echoed to an
astonishing degree in their descriptions of the linguistic devices characterizing
poems capable of defamiliarizing or deforming the world. Jakobson catalogued
many of them in his famous text on Xlebnikov from which I have already quoted.
First and foremost, Jakobson praised Xlebnikov’s verse for what he termed the
“self-developing, self-valuing word” as the ground of a poetry importantly di-
vorced from its communicative function. Indeed, Xlebnikov’s strikingly original
works often reached the state of zaoum, that is, “trans-sense,” chiefly by rejecting
any logical motivation or connecting threads among the words through such stra-
tegies as temporal displacement, anachronism, arbitrary arrangements of story
elements, linkages by formal likeness or contrast, and a tendency toward “verb-
lessness,” among others. Such techniques complicated language; denotations
were suspended and the range of connotative meanings expanded. This “rough-
ening” also conferred greater emphasis on the phonic dimension of verbal repre-
sentations in and for themselves. “Cumulatively,” Jakobson observed, “these de-
vices became exemplary indices of the differentia of poetry as language in its
aesthetic function.23 In Shklovsky’s words, these strategies restored “density (fak-
tura) [to objects]… the principal characteristic of this peculiar world of deliber-
ately constructed objects, the totality of which we call art.”24
Epstein was no less alert to similar techniques in the works of the contempo-
rary French poets he admired. Approximation, slant rhyme schemes, exaggerated
metaphors, and the abandonment of rhythmic regularity were only some of the
strategies he isolated in verses by Cendrars, Cocteau, and Aragon, French coun-
terparts to the Formalists’ list of exemplary contemporary poets topped by Maya-
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kovsky, Kručenyx, and Xlebnikov.25 In one of the installments in L’Esprit nouveau of
“Le Phénomène Littéraire,” the monograph-length article series on poetry Epstein
published over several months in 1921 and 1922, he wrote:
...writers are obliged to make their grammar more supple, to make it more
flexible – and this is not always so easy – even to the point of completely re-
nouncing grammar and phrasing, and contenting themselves with words, el-
lipses, fragmented phrases, even syllables. Likewise, the punctuation that cer-
tainly exists in literature, rather less in speech, and much less so – indeed is
almost non-existent in our thoughts – has been attenuated or even suppressed
by certain authors.26
Rejecting syntax led to a new “flexibility” of grammar, sometimes even reaching a
point where it seemed to be suspended entirely. The French poems he prized
indulged in such linguistic escapades to open conundrums, producing a kind of
verbal hash that at times seemed to elude meaning of any kind, almost in the
manner of zaoum poetry. And this evasion or displacement of logical sense was,
Epstein noted, often augmented by the way a text was laid out on a page.
Thus the reader sometimes finds in modern works a word in capital letters
larger than those related to it, sometimes a space between two words, some-
times a space in the middle of a word cut into two or three parts, sometimes a
single word in the middle of a line, sometimes an entire phrase in letters smal-
ler than those surrounding them, sometimes a group of words and letters dis-
posed in such a way as to form a design corresponding to the idea of the text,
etc., etc. At first glance, people are surprised, and criticize it [the layout] as
willfully bizarre. Not at all. It is but a way of translating and measuring...the
architecture and three-dimensionality of thoughts. It is also a way of arousing
the reader’s fatigued attention.27
So typography, too, could be enlisted to disable ordinary reading procedures,
thereby conjuring different, more engaging, and potentially signifying visualiza-
tions that complemented the poets’ experiments with tropes, syntax, and
rhythms. With such observations, Epstein highlighted what were some of the
most advanced poems in the Western poetic canon of his time: Un coup de dés by
Mallarmé and the “calligrammes” of Apollinaire, in addition to diverse works by
Max Jacob, Cocteau, Aragon, and Epstein’s own mentor, Blaise Cendrars.
The search for new linguistic forms was for both Epstein and the Russians the
lynchpin of any solution to the perceived crisis in art in their time. As Epstein
stated pointedly in La Poésie d’aujourd’hui, “a search for the new is the springboard
of the aesthetic.”28 But what was to count as new? And how was formal innova-
tion to register with the reader or viewer? Jakobson’s answer was straightforward.
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“Only against the background of the familiar does the unfamiliar reach and im-
press us,” a statement which Epstein would have been quick to second. “The new
conditions of life,” he wrote,
have determined a literature, a necessary and sufficient literature, a new litera-
ture. However, it is not necessary to believe that this modern literature has
completely rejected all traditions, that it has broken completely with the past,
that it has entirely created itself as a thing in no respect comparable with what
has been. Even had it wished to do this, it would not have been able…In the
most ‘advanced modernism’ there survives an abundant heredity.29
Even Shklovsky, the most strident exponent of introducing striking new strategies
almost for their own sake, argued that the linguistic and formal novelties he
championed only assumed meaning as they altered older artistic conventions
which remained at least liminally present.30 For all three, artistic innovation de-
rived from a necessarily dialectical process engaging past and present, the old and
the new.
If, however, there was a surprising degree of agreement in their characteriza-
tion of modern poetry and of the crucial role it potentially played in the mental
well-being of the societies in which they lived, Epstein and the Formalists parted
company in major ways. This is most apparent, perhaps, in the scope of their
explanations of the circumstances in which modern art was generated and the
nature of the processes motivating art. Joined by Boris Eikhenbaum, for example,
Shklovsky and Jakobson were convinced that linguistic and formal changes in and
of themselves were all that was needed to effect the desired renovation of percep-
tion through verse. This renewal took place entirely at the level of the signs of
literary discourse by poets consciously acting on their own artistic initiatives. So-
cial conditions had little or no effect on such changes. In fact, in these early
Formalist writings, one can at times detect an almost belligerent resistance to the
idea that any broader social process might lie behind the impetus to transform
artistic practices. “Historical materialism is fine for sociology, but it’s impossible
to use it as a substitute for a knowledge of mathematics and astronomy. […] It’s
equally impossible to proceed from historical materialism to explain and reject, or
accept, a work of art or a whole school of art,” Shklovsky truculently observed in
an essay on the Suprematist painters.31 This and other rather cavalier pronounce-
ments were obviously at odds with the Marxist authorities and increasingly risky
in a Soviet Union moving toward exclusive government control of the arts.32 Such
anti-Marxist pronouncements even drew the critical attention of no less a figure
than Trotsky himself.33 But for Shklovsky and his colleagues, the realm of art
simply lay beyond the grasp of sociological or political categories – it was a world
apart. In Erlich’s paraphrase of Eikhenbaum’s argument: “No cultural phenom-
enon [could] be reduced to, or derived from, social facts of a different order. To
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account for literature in terms of sociology or economics [was] to deny the auton-
omy and inner dynamism of literature.…”34
Epstein would not have agreed with such a statement, and in comparison to the
early Formalists the larger scope of his analysis is striking. He sought to ground
the modes of modern poetry in a theory of the changing conditions of work in
modern capitalist economies. There had been, he noted, a marked transition
from manual to intellectual labor in recent times. New technological develop-
ments raised the speed and intensity of mental operations as work demands and
advanced communication and transportation networks projected increasingly
“cosmopolitan” individuals ever more rapidly through physical, as well as mental,
time and space.35 Escalating numbers of burdensome mental operations were
now of necessity demanded in the emerging modern society, and these resulted
in what Epstein, following many psychologists of his day, called “fatigue” as a
major psychological effect. Developing a schematic sociology and from it a theory
of social, psychological, and aesthetic effects suggests how much less cloistered
and more ambitious Epstein’s explanatory scheme was than that of his Russian
counterparts.36 Reminiscent at times of themes from Mosso, Durkheim, Simmel,
and Weber, among others, Epstein’s theorization of the dynamics of the modern
social order almost certainly would not have passed muster with Marxist ortho-
doxy. Nevertheless, as noted briefly above, Epstein’s attempt to ground his more
rarified psychological speculations in large social trends is certainly worth greater
scholarly exploration than is possible in this essay.
Conservative thinkers regarded fatigue as a malady and as a reason to contest
the rationalizing forces of modernity. Epstein, however, did not equate this new
condition simply with exhaustion, loss of focus, and mental depletion. Rather, he
considered it simply an inevitable, irreversible, and ultimately positive conse-
quence of modernity. According to him, fatigue favored a descent into subcon-
scious modes of cognition that were rich in soothing emotion beyond the reach
of the “logic” he identified with the strenuous pragmatic calculations and alge-
braic communicative speech increasingly demanded of the growing class of
white-collar workers. The poets’ delving into these layers of imagery and experi-
ence yielded works that helped to relax and soothe jangled brains, affording com-
pensation to them for their extraordinary exertions. The poems thereby acted as a
kind of therapy. Modern poetic works were in this respect both signs of the times
as well as a kind of haven for many workers in an increasingly abstract, distracted
world.
The Formalists could not have disagreed more fundamentally. As the historian
of Russian Formalism, Victor Ehrlich, reminds us, the Russians were inclined to
regard the process of literary change as supra-personal, and highly conscious.
Innovations were a “deliberate application of techniques to materials rather than
as self-expression, as a [change of] convention rather than as a confession.”37 So
deep-seated was their distrust of psychology that they saw no need to invoke any
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faculty of mind allegedly conducive to poetic creation or apprehension. Boris Ei-
khenbaum, a leader of the Formalists, perhaps formulated it most succinctly:
“Not a single phrase of a literary work can at any time be the direct expression of
the author’s personal sentiments; it is, rather, always a construction and play-
ful.”38
Epstein, however, insisted on pursuing precisely this line of inquiry by attempt-
ing to map the “subconscious” – the site, he claimed, of all aesthetic experience.
Attention brought to bear on one’s inner life discovers rather quickly that if
inner life that is fully conscious is very rich, there exist zones within it which
are infinitely more bountiful and strange because they have not been explored.
These zones are the liminal states of the subconscious. Authors have turned
toward this subconscious in order to look closely at it and examine it more
closely. […] Sometimes, the subconscious has risen spontaneously into the
poet’s consciousness…39
And, in a later installment of the same essay series, he forcefully asserted:
…Poetry in general seems to me impossible without the intense, distinctive
engagement of the subconscient. The enormous speed of thought, the rapid
comprehension of metaphorical analogies, the singular perspective of its men-
tal framework, the succession of imagistic details, create poetry because they
engage the life of the subconscient, setting this hundred-faceted, mirrored top
spinning.40
By monitoring the aesthetic transactions he believed took place in this “neuro-
pathic” realm, by burrowing down to explore the poet’s intense engagement with
what he called “coenesthésie,” Epstein hoped to anchor an explanation of how the
specific characteristics of the formal innovations he advocated, especially the
abandonment of grammar and the increased density of tropes, came into being.41
Epstein, then, regarded the poet’s efforts to introduce formal changes as an
ultimately personal, though not fully conscious experience. Pace the Formalists,
poetic renewal was not the result of playing with or consciously reconstructing
poetic language. Rather, it involved a physiologically motivated plunge into sub-
conscious depths where words, if not entirely dispensed with, existed uncon-
strained by rigidly grammatical aspects of ordinary communicative speech and
logic. The poet’s task consisted of faithfully noting down the very pattern of the
thought process as it was expressed in the strange, irrational linguistic forms
native to that realm. In the subconscious, he observed,
Writers have perceived that if thoughts are – at least for the most part, made of
words – [...] they are hardly composed of phrases; and if thoughts admit a
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logic, that is, an order determined by how its elements are linked, then this
logic is infinitely mobile, changing, complicated; in short, it is illogical, and
has nothing to do with the simple, stiff logic of expression, a part of which
forms grammar.42
In Epstein’s conception, innovative poetry had, in fact, become – and should be-
come – a kind of exquisite reportage of the twisting, meandering course of
thought necessarily transacted at the deepest cognitive levels of the poet’s “sub-
conscious.” Modern poets had grasped that their reports of fatigue-induced ex-
perience could only be authentic if rendered in phrases that at times made no
sense, but whose elliptical, eccentrically metaphorical figures were highly expres-
sive and restored density to words that, in turn, lent a new weight to the world
they somehow so tellingly disclosed.
Literature has progressively discovered the vast domain of thinking. [Litera-
ture] is therefore no longer a function of the contingent truth of facts that for
so long were understood as the sole truth, at a time when the mind was not yet
perceived as capable of being its own mirror and its own nourishment. From
now on, one will seek to represent the thought process. The truth would be the
precise representation of the course of thought. Next to the truth of action, an
external truth, the truth of thinking, an internal truth, has been born.43
Without mentioning his name, Epstein was engaged in theorizing what would
soon come to be known, preeminently through the work of James Joyce, as the
“stream of consciousness.” Such ideas would continue to inspire other film-
makers, preeminently Eisenstein during the late 1920s and, decades later, Stan
Brakhage.44
The details of Epstein’s theories of the subconscious and his intricate mapping
of the “irrational, … irresistible” transactions that purportedly shaped aesthetic
response in it would require at least another essay to sort through.45 However
precocious and resourceful the young critic was even to broach an explanation of
poetic innovation in such terms, there are certainly more than a lot of arcane,
questionable, and just plain confusing dimensions of his theorization of this al-
legedly more profound cognitive apparatus. Suffice it to say that in attempting to
theorize this realm as the ground for his poetics, Epstein embraced the possible
opportunities for artistic innovation it opened, but by doing so he was very far
removed from the orientations of the Russian Formalists.46
One might confirm this comment by jumping ahead in time a bit in order to
compare Eikhenbaum’s remarks on what he called “internal speech,” the putative
process through which, he believed, spectators negotiated the sequences of silent
film images. Interpreting such image structures, Eikhenbaum noted, required a
“new type of mental labor which does not normally develop in everyday life”; the
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film viewer had to connect the frames (i.e., shots) in order to “continually form a
chain of cine-phrases, or else he will not understand anything.”47 This general
description of the process of experiencing a film, however, was conditioned by a
key specification: the editing of the shots must operate so that contiguous shots
were perceived as preceding and following each other in time. “This is the general
law of cinema. The director, submitting to this law, makes use of it for the con-
struction of time; i.e., he creates the illusion of continuity.”48 Similar strictures
also held for the construction of space. Cinema’s inherent dynamism, its ability
to join together pictures of different places, needed to be reined in so that specta-
tors could negotiate the gaps between shots and create at least the illusion of
continuity so that “time-space relationships…play the role of a basic semantic
link, outside of which the viewer cannot orient himself…”49 Only when the film’s
narrative and montage complied to motivate such transitions between segments
could internal speech “give the viewer of a film the impression of completeness
and logic.”50 At this point, it seems clear that the Formalists had retreated from
their bolder claims about poetry and now advocated, as it were, a kind of cine-
matic prose.51
Epstein’s conclusions about how film images should engage with narrative de-
mands directly opposed such prescriptions, a point I will return to in a moment.
The divergence of their views about the function of editing and narrative structure
is all the more striking because both Epstein and the Formalists shared the same
fundamental conviction that the building blocks of film art – the punctuated flow
of moving images – were not simple reflections of the world, but the stuff of
poetry constituted by the devices of the medium. Shklovsky had referred to verse
writing as a “dance of the articulatory organs.”52 For Epstein, the literary critic
turned cineaste, the Bell & Howell, “a brain in metal,” was the vital articulatory
organ that enabled cinema to “dance” as modern poetry did.53 As recorded by the
camera, the things appearing on screen were endowed with a new vivacity and
immediacy. These film images, all agreed, were essentially “photogenic.”
Epstein, of course, was intimately familiar with the elusive concept of “photogé-
nie” which was first deployed in the influential film criticism of Louis Delluc for
whom he had served as an assistant on the production of Le Tonnerre (1921). By the
beginning of the 1920s, photogénie had already become part of the common cur-
rency of film discussions, not only in France, but even as far away as the Soviet
Union, where it was embraced by Formalists as a basic principle of their theory of
film. Eikhenbaum, for example, cited Delluc and identified photogénie as “the
‘trans-sense’ essence of film” that could be observed “on the screen – in faces, in
objects, in scenery – apart from any connection with plot.” However, while Delluc
had thought many modern objects – locomotives, ocean liners, etc. – were inher-
ently photogenic, Eikhenbaum disagreed. The cameraman, who knew how to po-
sition objects in the frame, who arranged the lighting, distance, and angle from
which they would be seen on screen, was the individual most responsible for
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creating photogénie.54 As I have already suggested, this insistence on the act of
fashioning through the conscious deployment of the devices of a medium was
entirely consistent with the emphases of Formalist poetics.
I have repeatedly stressed that Epstein’s poetics were rooted in a similar asser-
tion of the need for new artistic techniques. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
essays in Bonjour Cinéma, dependent as they were on his poetics, were replete with
paeans of praise for cinematic structuring devices, especially novel ones, and the
way in which these techniques radically transformed the world depicted on
screen. Close-ups and camera movements (especially rapid, whirling ones),
among other filmic procedures, extracted things from their ordinary contexts;
their removal often suspended denotations, refashioned referents, and thereby
broadened the scope of connotations.55
Interestingly, Epstein signaled the affiliation of his poetic and emerging film
theory by conveying his observations about cinema in a complex metaphorical
language that itself recalled some of the poetic strategies he championed in the
verse of his times. Consider his laudatory description of a face seen in close-up in
his remarkable essay “Magnification.” It opens with a gust of emotion and never
lets up.
I will never find the way to say how much I love American close-ups! Point
blank. A head suddenly appears on screen and drama, now face to face, seems
to address me personally and swells with an extraordinary intensity. I am hyp-
notized. Now the tragedy is anatomical. The decor of the fifth act is this corner
of a cheek torn by a smile. Waiting for the moment when 1,000 meters of
intrigue converge in a muscular denouement satisfies me more than the rest
of the film. Muscular preambles ripple beneath the skin. Shadows shift, trem-
ble, hesitate. Something is being decided. A breeze of emotion underlines the
mouth with clouds. The orography of the face vacillates. Seismic shocks begin.
Capillary wrinkles try to split the fault. A wave carries them away. Crescendo.
A muscle bridles. The lip is laced with tics like a theater curtain. Everything is
movement, imbalance, crisis. Crack. The mouth gives way, like a ripe fruit
splitting open. As if slit by a scalpel, a keyboard-like smile cuts laterally into
the corner of the lips. The close-up is the soul of the cinema.56
In this high-spirited description of what Epstein would certainly have identified as
a quintessentially photogenic moment, he conspicuously jettisoned simple de-
scription. Instead, in a manner akin to the poetic work he prized, he yoked to-
gether disparate notions to pulverize the language through which he evoked this
spectacular close-up. He translated the face – seen in unnatural proximity and
enlarged to fantastic scale on the screen – as a string of incompatible, stunningly
mixed, metaphors: the facial expanse was a theater set, a cloudy sky, a mountain
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range, a theater curtain; the mouth was a ripe fruit and the teeth a piano key-
board.
Metaphor assumed a central role in articulating this oblique, “roughened” dis-
course that suggested that viewers had to “read” images as differently as they
read poems; it was a process Epstein believed to be more rewarding and emotion-
ally engaging. Indeed, one may think of the description – it is really more properly
regarded as an evocation – of the face in this passage as a kind of prose poem of
the sort Epstein lauded in his critical writings on literature. Through its reconsti-
tution as metaphor, those who read it were thereby enabled to “see” a face ap-
pearing like no other seen before. Torn from its habitual context, several seman-
tic frameworks evolve around it as one reads, loosening the bond between sign
and object.57 As the metaphors shift, the identity of the object oscillates, its sen-
sory texture and polysemic density heightened by the eccentrically patterned lan-
guage representing it. Through such evocations of things, spectators became
deeply imbricated in the almost magical kind of cinematic representation Epstein
called the “photogenic.” This is by no means a unique example; there are many
others in Epstein’s early writings.58 All point toward a theory of cinematic repre-
sentation very far removed from any notion of “realism,” and it deserves a much
more detailed and extensive account than is possible here.59
Throughout Bonjour Cinéma, Epstein repeatedly extolled such effects and tended
to neglect larger concepts of structure beyond the idea of sequences representing
subjective experience or unprecedentedly dynamic physical action. Unlike the
Formalists, however, he rejected any need for temporal or spatial continuity as a
precondition for spectator comprehension and pleasure. On the contrary, he re-
garded the imposition of such constraints as attempts to reintroduce a narrative
“logic” reflecting dryly rational or conventional predispositions of the intellect
that he quite conspicuously scorned. Cinema was “true,” while the conventions
of an imposed story were a “lie.” Cinema did not render anecdotes very well and
“dramatic action was an error.” “The cinema assimilated the rational armature of
the feuilleton badly,” he noted. “…so why tell stories, narratives that always pre-
suppose an ordered series of events, a chronology. […] There are no stories.
There have never been any stories. There are only situations without heads or
tails; with no beginning, no middle and no end…”60
The gap separating Formalists and Epstein on this point is as obvious as it
would be difficult to bridge. His stunning refusal of plots with a beginning, mid-
dle, and end, at least in his film theory, should not surprise readers of his poetic
texts.61 Such radical claims clearly reflected the fundamental illogic he defined as
the essential dynamic of the subconscious that was, in turn, the source of all
aesthetic emotion. This was as true for the new medium of photogenic film as it
was for the more traditional arts. To impose story logic would be to betray the
needs of a modern mass audience in search of a spectacularly photogenic world
of cinematic poetry. It would limit – perhaps even banish – wonderment and
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reinstall the stultifying expectations and all too familiar reading procedures of
what Epstein referred to – scornfully – as “literature.” For Epstein, one might
say, the new world of cinema would be poetic, or would not be.
Notes
1. This article is a revised, expanded version of a talk given at the conference “Jean Ep-
stein’s Interdisciplinary Cinema and the French Avant-Garde,” held at the University
of Chicago in April, 2008. I thank the organizers, Sarah Keller and Jason Paul, both for
their invitation to speak, as well as their suggestions for revision, and their patience
while awaiting the final version of this text. Unless otherwise indicated, all transla-
tions from Epstein’s writings are my own.
2. See David Bordwell, French Impressionist Cinema: Film Culture, Film Theory and Film Style
[1974] (New York: Arno Press, 1980); Stuart Liebman, Jean Epstein’s Early Film Theory,
1920-1922 [1980] (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1981); Richard
Abel, French Cinema: The First Wave, 1915-1929 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1984); Jean Epstein: cinéaste, poète, philosophe, ed. Jacques Aumont (Paris: Cinémathèque
française, 1998); Vincent Guigueno, Jean Epstein, Cinéaste des îles (Paris: Jean Michel
Place, 2003); Laura Vichi, Jean Epstein (Milan: Il Castoro Cinema, 2003); and Malcolm
Turvey, Doubting Vision. Film and the Revelationist Tradition (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2008). One should also mention the very first extensive assessment of Epstein’s
work by Pierre Leprohon, Jean Epstein (Paris: Éditions Seghers, 1964).
3. See Liebman, Jean Epstein’s Early Film Theory.
4. Cendrars served as Epstein’s mentor and introduced him to the Parisian avant-garde
scene, including Paul Lafitte, publisher of Éditions de la Sirène.
5. Sabine Hake, The Cinema’s Third Machine: Writing on Film in Germany, 1907-1933 (Lincoln,
NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), p. 62.
6. See Joseph Zsuffa, Béla Balázs, The Man and the Artist (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1987), dust jacket.
7. Interestingly, all four would, like Epstein in France, later go on to work in the Soviet
film industry, though primarily as scriptwriters. Epstein, however, began his filmmak-
ing career at least three years earlier.
8. The best history of their work remains Victor Erlich, Russian Formalism: History, Doctrine,
3rd ed. (The Hague: Mouton, 1969). The inspiration of early Russian Futurist verse by
Mayakovsky, among others, to their theoretical initiatives should be underscored.
9. Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique” [1917], in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays,
eds. and trans. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1965), p.
12.
10. Viktor Shklovsky, Literature and Cinematography [1923], trans. Irina Masinovsky (Cham-
paign, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 2006), p. 13.
11. See, for example, Shklovsky’s comments in his seminal essay, “The Resurrection of
the Word” [1914], trans. Richard Sherwood in Russian Formalism, eds. Steven Bann and
John Bowlt (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1973), pp. 41-47. The visual arts also
play a major role in Shklovsky’s Knight’s Move [1923], trans. Richard Sheldon (Normal,
novelty and poiesis in the early writings of jean epstein 87
IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 2005), pp. 54-72. Note that all the articles in this book had
been published in Russia between 1919 and 1921. See also Shklovsky, Literature and
Cinematography, passim.
12. Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” p. 12. In his later Theory of Prose, Shklovsky referred to
this kind of automatism as “generalizing perception” (Viktor Shklovsky, Theory of Prose
[1923; 2nd enlarged ed., 1929], trans. Benjamin Sher [Elmwood Park, IL: Dalkey Ar-
chive Press, 1991], p. 5).
13. Shklovsky, Literature and Cinematography, p. 13.
14. Roman Jakobson, “The Newest Russian Poetry: Velimir Xlebnikov,” [1921], trans. Ste-
phen Rudy, in Jakobson, My Futurist Years (New York: Marsilio Books, 1997), p. 189.
15. For his notions of fatigue, Epstein drew on a number of thinkers that were well known
at the time, including Charles Féré and Angelo Mosso. For a survey of ideas about
social energy and exhaustion in the twentieth century, see Anson Rabinbach, The Hu-
man Motor. Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
16. Jean Epstein, “A Necessary and Sufficient Literature,” trans. Gorham Munson, Broom
2, no. 4 (July 1922), p. 309. Originally published as part of “Le Phénomène Littéraire”
in L’Esprit nouveau, no. 9 (1921), p. 967. See also Epstein’s more extensive elaboration
of the idea of aesthetic reflexes in La Poèsie d’aujourd’hui, pp. 32-37.
17. Epstein, “A Necessary and Sufficient Literature,” p. 309.
18. One tantalizing point of convergence is the appearance in the little journal Epstein
edited in Lyons of an undated “Poème” by “Chlebnikoff,” translated from the Russian
by H. Izdebska. See Promenoir, no. 6 (1921), p. 74.
19. See “Cinéma,” [identical to “Le Sens 1 bis,” a section of Bonjour Cinéma] in Zénith (Oc-
tober 1921); and “Le Bel Agonisant” [that had appeared in Epstein’s Lyon-based jour-
nal Promenoir in June 1922] in Zénith (May 1922).
20. One possible common influence might be the writings of Henri Bergson, which were
influential in Russia as well as France. Curiously, Victor Erlich, the leading historian of
the Formalist movement, mentions Bergson only once in Russian Formalism as part of a
general description of the intellectual interests of the era; he does not mention any
significant influence by Bergson on the Formalists’ emerging notions of literature and
fails even to list his name in the index. More recent commentators, however, have
begun to highlight the possible connections between Bergson and readers in Russia.
See James M. Curtis, “Bergson and Russian Formalism,” Comparative Literature 28, no. 2
(1976): 109-121. For a more general view, see Hilary Fink, Bergson and Russian Modern-
ism, 1910-1930 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999). There are also ob-
vious similarities between the Formalists’ views and those of Jean Cocteau, one of
Epstein’s favored poets during the late 1910s and early 1920s, who clearly was influ-
enced by Bergson. In “Le Secret Professional,” Cocteau wrote: “Suddenly, as if in a
flash, we see the dog, the coach, the house for the first time. Shortly afterwards, habit
again erases this potent image. We pet the dog, we call the coach, we live in a house;
we do not see them anymore...Such is the role of poetry. It takes off the veil...It re-
veals...the amazing things which surround us and which our senses usually register
mechanically. Get hold of a commonplace, clean it, rub it, illuminate it in such a fash-
ion that it will astound us all with its freshness, with its primordial vigor, and you
shall have done the job of the poet. Tout le rest est littérature.” By the way, Erlich attri-
88 stuart liebman
butes the dating of Cocteau’s text only to its late publication in book form. “Le Secret
Professional” was delivered as lectures in 1921, published in 1922, and finally reprint-
ed in Cocteau’s Le Rappel à l’Ordre (Paris: Editions Stock, 1926), pp. 215-216. Erlich only
cites the last date. See Erlich, Russian Formalism, pp. 179-180.
21. See, for example, Jean Epstein, “Fernand Léger,” Les Feuilles Libres (March-April 1923):
26-31.
22. Epstein, “Le Phénomène Littéraire,” L’Esprit nouveau, no. 8 (1921), p. 858.
23. Jakobson, “The Newest Russian Poetry,” passim.
24. Shklovsky, Knight’s Move, cited by Victor Erlich, Russian Formalism, p. 177.
25. Jean Epstein, La Poèsie d’aujourd’hui (Paris: Éditions de la Sirène, 1921), pp. 47-55.
26. Epstein, “Le Phénomène Littéraire,” L’Esprit nouveau, nos. 11-12 (1922), p. 1221. See also
Epstein, La Poèsie d’aujourd’hui, pp. 95-98.
27. Epstein, “Le Phénomène Littéraire,” L’Esprit nouveau, nos. 11-12 (1922), p. 1222. Mal-
larmé’s famous poem “Un Coup de dès” and Apollinaire’s Calligrammes were surely the
models for this practice. There are clear parallels in the layouts of poems by Futurist
artists and poets in Russian books of the period. See Susan R. Compton, World Back-
wards: Russian Futurist Books, 1912-1916 (London: British Library, 1978); and Margit Ro-
well and Deborah Wye, The Russian Avant-Garde Book, 1910-1934 (New York: Museum of
Modern Art, 2002).
28. Epstein, La Poésie d’aujourd’hui, p. 12. Epstein was certainly not alone among West Euro-
pean poets in calling for “the new.” Pound and Apollinaire, among many others,
made similar appeals. See also the writings on art by T. E. Hulme, which were migh-
tily influenced by Bergson. See his Speculations (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1967
[1924]). In his article “Bergson and Russian Futurism,” James Curtis calls attention to
the procedural similarities between Bergson and Shklovsky’s writings, which tend to
stress the de-automatizing devices in a work at the expense of more general structural
considerations of the work of art. I would argue the same holds true of Epstein, and
will briefly revisit the issue later in this essay.
29. Epstein, “A Necessary and Sufficient Literature,” p. 309.
30. Jakobson, “The Newest Russian Poetry,” p. 189; Epstein, La Poésie, p. 40. See also
Shklovsky, Theory of Prose, p. 20: “I would like to add the following as a general rule: a
work of art is perceived against a background of and by association with other works
of art. The form of a work of art is determined by its relationship with other pre-exist-
ing forms.” See also Yury Tynianov’s phrasing of this relationship in his “Problems of
Poetic Language” [1924], trans. Tzvetan Todorov, in Théorie de la litterature, ed. Tzvetan
Todorov (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1965), p. 118.
31. Viktor Shklovsky, “Space in Painting and the Suprematists,” in Knight’s Move, p. 58.
32. Viktor Shklovsky, “Ullya, Ullya, Martians,” in Knight’s Move, pp. 21-24.
33. Leon Trotsky, Literature and Revolution, trans. Rose Strunsky (Ann Arbor, MI: University
of Michigan Press, 1971), pp. 162-183.
34. Erlich, Russian Formalism, p. 109.
35. Epstein’s stress on speed and individual mobility in modern vehicles reflects the broad
social effects of Italian Futurist manifestos as well as that of related avant-garde artis-
tic groups.
novelty and poiesis in the early writings of jean epstein 89
36. Gerard Conio’s edition of Le Formalisme et le Futurisme Russes devant le Marxisme (Lau-
sanne: Éditions L’Age d’Homme, 1975), makes clear the extent to which by 1924, if
not sooner, the absence of a theory of society and social change led to political prob-
lems for the Formalists in the Soviet Union.
37. Victor Ehrlich, Russian Formalism, p. 190.
38. Cited in Conio, Le Formalisme et le Futurisme Russes devant le Marxisme, p. 11.
39. Epstein, “Le Phénomène Littéraire,” L’Esprit nouveau, nos. 11-12 (1922), p. 1220.
40. Epstein, “Le Phénomène Littéraire,” L’Esprit nouveau, no. 13 (1922), p. 1433.
41. For Epstein, “coenaesthesia” was the “physiological aspect of the subconscious,” a
variant of what other artists of an earlier period referred to as synesthesia. See Epstein,
La Poèsie d’aujourd’hui, pp. 82ff.
42. Epstein, “Le Phénomène Littéraire,” L’Esprit nouveau, nos. 11-12 (1922), p. 1222. Again,
see also Epstein, La Poèsie d’aujourd’hui, pp. 95-98.
43. Epstein, La Poèsie d’aujourd’hui, p. 100.
44. Eisenstein specifically took up Joyce’s example in his “A Course in Treatment,” trans.
Jay Leyda, in Film Form (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), pp. 84-107. For a fine read-
ing of the Russian director’s reading of Joyce, see Annette Michelson, “Reading Eisen-
stein Reading Ulysses: Montage and the Claims of Subjectivity,” Art & Text [Australia]
no. 34 (Spring 1989): 64-78.
45. Epstein, La Poèsie, p. 33.
46. Epstein, La Poèsie, p. 181ff.
47. Boris Eikhenbaum, “Problems of Film Stylistics” [1927], trans. Thomas Aman, Screen
15, no. 3 (Autumn 1974), pp. 14-15.
48. Eikenbaum, “Problems of Film Stylistics,” p. 21.
49. Eikenbaum, “Problems of Film Stylistics,” p. 25.
50. Eikenbaum, “Problems of Film Stylistics,” p. 27. In many of his texts on film from the
mid to late 1920s, Shklovsky, too, stressed plot as providing the logic binding images.
See, for example, his remarks in various texts collected in The Film Factory, eds. Richard
Taylor and Ian Christie (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 133,
153, 178, and 182.
51. Rising political pressures may well have played a role here, but it is also true that the
Formalists’ familiarity both with the demands of the film market and the attendant
political pressures while actively working within the Soviet industry may have influ-
enced their theoretical notions.
52. Cited in Ehrlich, Russian Formalism, p. 178.
53. Jean Epstein, “Le Sens 1 bis,” Bonjour Cinéma (Paris: Éditions de la Sirène, 1921), pp.
38-39. The camera “brain” was only a synecdoche for all the estranging powers that
cinema had at its disposal. Editing, rapid and slow motion, stop motion, as well as
close-ups and camera movements constituted images that were, for Epstein, the
equivalents of poetic tropes whose appeal and process addressed the fatigue of mod-
ern individuals in a manner similar to poems. See also the list of cinematic procedures
akin to poetic devices in chapter 18, “Le Cinema,” in La Poésie d’aujourd’hui, pp. 169-180;
infra, 271-76.
54. Eikenbaum, “Problems of Film Stylistics,” p. 9.
90 stuart liebman
55. See, for example, the many suggestions for the use of close-ups and moving cameras
mounted on cars and airplanes in “Grossissement,” in Bonjour Cinéma, pp. 93-108.
56. Jean Epstein, “Magnification,” trans. Stuart Liebman, Abel1, pp. 235-236.
57. I am here paraphrasing Ehrlich in Russian Formalism, p. 177. “By tearing the object out
of its habitual context by bringing together disparate notions, the poet gives a coupe
de grace to the verbal cliché and to the stock responses attendant upon it and forces us
into heightened awareness of things and their sensory texture. The act of creative
deformation restores sharpness to our perception, giving density to the world around
us.”
58. “...the photogenic and a whole new rhetoric are similarly concealed in the close-up. I
haven’t the right to think of anything but this telephone. It is a monster, a tower, and a
character. The power and scope of its whisperings. Destinies wheel about, enter, and
leave from this pylon as if from an acoustical pigeon house. [...] It is a sensory limit, a
solid nucleus, a relay, a mysterious transformer from which everything good or bad
may issue. It has the air of an idea.” See Epstein, “Magnification,” Abel1, p. 239.
59. A valuable study might be made of the way in which André Bazin read – and creatively
misread – Epstein. Bazin’s emergence as the most important critic of the generation
following Epstein may explain in part Epstein’s marginalization in French film circles
in his last years and over the decades since he died.
60. These quotations are all taken from “Le Sens 1 bis,” passim.
61. Clearly, Epstein’s filmmaking was constrained by the realities of the marketplace. As
Katie Kirtland points out in her essay in this volume, his celebrated Coeur fidèle is based
on a crude melodramatic scenario, and it was not alone in this regard. Perhaps the
films that best represented his vision of story-less cinema were the documentary La
Montagne infidèle (1923) and the compilation film, significantly named Photogénies
(1925). Both are unfortunately lost.
novelty and poiesis in the early writings of jean epstein 91

The Cinema of the Kaleidoscope
Katie Kirtland
Silent or sound, pure cinema is a cinema that would like to dispense with words:
the cinema, as the etymology already indicates, is essentially the painter, the
narrator of mobility, of all mobility, of mobility alone, because it alone is
photogenic…. But the word constitutes a fixed form, a stable state, a stop, a
crystallization of thought, an element of immobility.
Jean Epstein1
In 1926, film theorist Pierre Porte invokes Jean Epstein’s Bonjour Cinéma (1921) in
support of his argument for a ‘pure cinema’ whose fundamental principle is “to
express itself through the harmony and melody of plastic movement,” regardless
of whether such visual abstraction is embedded in a narrative structure.2 Epstein’s
response in the same journal two weeks later, an essay called “L’Objectif lui-
même,” protests this use of his work. While he acknowledges that, at the time,
the purely plastic qualities of passages of Abel Gance’s La Roue (1922), Dudley
Murphy and Fernand Léger’s Ballet Mécanique (1923-24), and the absolute films of
Viking Eggeling were products of genuine inspiration, they no longer represented
the path of artistic advance for the cinema. The central objective of Epstein’s essay
is instead to celebrate the possibilities of the camera lens as an “inhuman eye,
without memory, without thought,” capable of “escaping the tyrannical egocentr-
ism of our personal vision,” thus also relegating the subjective cinema, until then
predominant among the avant-garde, to obsolescence.3
That Porte associates Epstein with a cinema of plastic deformation is largely a
function of the renown of Epstein’s 1923 film, Cœur fidèle.4 Upon its release, the
film created a sensation in the press. Some writers criticized its scenario as merely
a melodrama. Likewise, L’Auxiliaire Financier finds it bizarre to have a film with no
action, “that is to say, without interest, with a deplorable predilection to adapt
cubism to the cinema.”5 According to Epstein’s account, the mobility of the film
wreaked havoc when it opened at the Omnia, a theater catering to a bourgeois
audience accustomed to films more conventional in execution, prompting its re-
moval from the program within two days.6 But by 1926, Cœur fidèle was regarded
as a classic achievement of the nascent art cinema; the film enjoyed pride of place
in the repertoire of the Parisian ciné-clubs until the occupation. The prominent
critic of painting, Waldemar George, for instance, describes Cœur fidèle as a melo-
93
drama reduced “to the state of an optical poem” by a masterful artist, “the sole
poet of the screen of today.”7
Most notable was its fête foraine sequence, in which a rhythmic accumulation of
rhyming rotational motion culminates in the dizzying spectacle of the vantage
point of a passenger on a carnival ride. In addition to its musical or poetic visual
abstraction, the sequence is also among the most subtle and effective instances of
the subjective cinema of the period. By placing the camera in the cart with the
characters, this vertiginous phantom ride performs a powerful transposition of
stasis and motion. The viewer’s access to the male character, Petit-Paul, is neutra-
lized by his paroxysms of glee and abandon. Edmond Van Daële’s almost clown-
ish physical performance in the role reflects Epstein’s conception of the character
as a distillation of “the rough force of man: brutal desire; human and animal,
drunk and passionate like Dionysus.”8 But the close-up of the heroine, Marie,
remains a stable and compelling anchor in shots that internally maintain a fixed
relationship between her and the viewer. As the ride accelerates and the back-
ground becomes an amorphous rotational force, the viewer is equally subject to
Marie’s impotence and immobility in the face of utterly disorienting circum-
stances. The powerful construction of identification with Marie is underscored
when, just after the sequence ends and her fate as Petit-Paul’s possession is
sealed, she engages the viewer by looking directly and plaintively into the camera
(Fig. 1).
Fig. 1: Marie’s direct look in Cœur Fidèle
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As Epstein continues extricating himself from a subjective cinema of pure visual
abstraction in “L’Objectif lui-même,” he addresses the unavoidable issue of the
fête foraine sequence:
In Cœur fidèle the turns of sleight-of-hand of the fête foraine have very much un-
balanced the way I would wish that the film be understood. […] If this abstract
cinema enchants some, let them buy a kaleidoscope, a toy for a second child-
hood, in which a very simple device can give a speed of rotation, regular and
variable at will. As for me, I believe that the age of the cinema-kaleidoscope
has passed.9
Epstein here seems to equate the idea of the kaleidoscope with mere visual ab-
straction in order to dismiss such formal exploration as antiquated child’s play, a
trick akin to sleight-of-hand. In doing so, however, he elides the importance of
the kaleidoscope in his thinking of the early 1920s. The operation of the device is
analogous to the model of subjectivity and its relation to language that shapes his
work at this time. Indeed, in his 1921 book, La Poésie d’aujourd’hui: Un nouvel état
d’intelligence, Epstein claims that modern poetry and cinema display an “aesthetic
of the kaleidoscope.”10 Cœur fidèle may be read as illustrative of this aesthetic, but
less for its groundbreaking visual abstraction than for its subversion of conven-
tional forms.
Both Epstein and his sister Marie recount that the scenario for Cœur fidèle, a
formulaic melodrama whose execution rubs against the grain of the formula, was
written in the course of a single, feverish night, but that the photogenic possibi-
lities of a drama set in a fête foraine had preoccupied Epstein for quite some time.
In his 1921 essay, “Magnification,” for instance, he writes:
I yearn for a drama aboard a merry-go-round, or more modern still, on air-
planes. The fair below and its surroundings would be progressively con-
founded. Centrifuged in this way, and adding vertigo and rotation to it, the
tragedy would increase its photogenic quality ten-fold.11
Marie Epstein writes that in 1920 he submitted a scenario for a project called
Week-End, which was set in a fair, to a competition, and that when finally given
the opportunity to direct a film on his own, Pasteur (1922), he was disappointed
that there was not a feasible means by which to depict Louis Pasteur on a carnival
ride.12 Pasteur, however, finds other means of exploring the capacity of the me-
dium to transform the viewer’s perspective, both through what Epstein later
deemed an excessive reliance upon the bird’s-eye-view,13 and through a pervasive
investigation of the evocative hybrid worlds created by reflections in the curved
glass – an on-screen analogue of the camera’s lens – of Pasteur’s scientific appa-
ratus.14
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It is likely that the idea for the fête foraine sequence was developed in conversa-
tions with the painters Pierre Deval and Fernand Léger. In early 1921, while still in
Lyon pursuing a medical degree, Epstein founded a short-lived cultural review
called Promenoir, whose first two issues featured his meditation on the close-up,
“Magnification.” Deval also contributed an essay on the close-up to Promenoir,
“Agrandissement,” which demonstrates the depth of the integration of both the
fairground and the close-up into the larger avant-garde conversation. Parroting
Epstein, Deval claims that cinema, by virtue of its close-ups in space and in time
– slow-motion photography – is “more amorous sentiment than art.” He quotes
André Breton who, in the context of a preface to a Max Ernst exhibition, empha-
sizes the capacity of slow- and accelerated-motion photography to render the
ordinary marvelous and to transform visual perception. Finally, Deval draws a
parallel between the close-up and the riot of color in the posters, paintings, and
painted sculptures of fairground attractions, citing the enthusiasm of Pablo Picas-
so, André Derain, and Léger for this kind of popular imagery. He concludes:
“Fairs and the cinema, and the magnification that is in them both – there is the
modern, fecund and full.”15
Léger’s contribution to Promenoir, “La Couleur dans la vie (Fragment d’une
étude sur les valeurs plastiques nouvelles),” is distinctive among his other writ-
ings in that it bears in tone some resemblance to the staccato rhythm of the
simultaneist prose poems of Blaise Cendrars celebrated by Epstein. It begins:
“Action and influence of new visual phenomena – conscious and unconscious.”
Its third paragraph proposes a consideration of a fête foraine.
To conceive the popular fête in all its brilliance, to save it from current deca-
dence. To conceive it on the scale of surprise, by the magnification of em-
ployed values. To admit the floats, follies or grotesques, to ‘enormify’ the vol-
ume and the color to 100%, higher than the houses. To outshine the gray and
lifeless houses. To erupt like the unexpected thing. To invent an enormous
and new object, expressing the opposite of all the average and habitual meas-
ures in which one lives. Violent and aggressive object, tragic in the grossest
popular taste, contrary to gray and nuanced, dreary and faded bourgeois
taste.16
This directive is fully in keeping with Léger’s notion of a “realism of conception,”
developed in his critical writings of the 1910s. According to Léger, the art relevant
to a modern environment marked by visual rupture, fragmentation and hyper-
stimulation demands a pictorial practice that orders line, volume, and color ac-
cording to a structural principle of maximum contrast, with the aim of offending
the bourgeois taste for a tasteful tone-on-tone decorative concept and a sentimen-
tal narrative. Ten years before Ballet Mécanique, Léger writes that “the screen of any
cinema” intensely captures this mode of realism.17
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The eruption of mobility, magnification, and plastic deformation in the fête for-
aine sequence of Coeur fidèle, housed within the framing device of the melodra-
matic formula, which Epstein describes as “sub-literature” pandering to the taste
of “a people of vulgar organisms,” fulfills Léger’s prescription.18 Indeed, of this
sequence, among others, Léger writes, “It is plasticity, it is the image alone that
acts on the spectator, and he submits to it, is moved, and conquered. It is a beau-
tiful victory….”19 But although the rapid editing, tight framing, and pervasive ro-
tational motion serve to fragment and abstract images as the mirrors in a kaleido-
scope do, it is the ironically-employed word amour iced onto a chocolate pig in a
graceful looping gesture as the sequence winds down that is more relevant to the
aspects of the aesthetic of the kaleidoscope that are at issue in this discussion.
The image in a kaleidoscope is largely a function of the relationships between
the objects of vision, as created by the device which itself remains invisible, rather
than a function of properties inherent in the objects themselves. It is only with the
operation of the device, and the unsettling of fixed relationships, that the princi-
ple governing the image becomes discernable. For Epstein, the underlying princi-
ple that governs both love and aesthetic effect is the operation of the subcon-
scious, which can only be perceived askance. Thus, an aesthetic of the
kaleidoscope requires constant mobility. This is not a question of the literal mo-
bility of the fête foraine sequence, however, but rather one of establishing friction
between a rationally governed representation – the lifeless house of a word, or the
melodramatic form – and its meaning.
As Epstein describes it in La Poésie d’aujourd’hui (1921), the melodramatic formu-
la is comprised of a logical progression toward a just dénouement for characters
clearly delineated by their moral stature. In privileging logic, morality, justice, the
institution of marriage, and the sentimental, the melodrama reiterates each of the
hackneyed, artificial forms in which subconscious sentiment generally is con-
tained. The function of all literature for Epstein is to serve as a cathartic device
when the flood of sentiment emerging from subconscious memory – as physiolo-
gical a phenomenon as a glandular secretion – exceeds the capacity of one’s avail-
able object of desire to embody it. The melodrama provides a tidy and hygienic
effigy. In short, it is the perfect foil to more elevated modes of literature, in that it
privileges many of the rational structures that, to Epstein, modern poetry dis-
rupts.
The scenario for Cœur fidèle is a rather spare document of less than three pages.
What little specification it provides conforms rather closely to the melodramatic
formula.20 Marie, an orphaned young woman, suffers the desire of the thug Petit-
Paul to whom she has been promised by her indifferent adoptive parents. When
Petit-Paul learns that he is under surveillance by the police – a motivation that is
only scantily suggested in the actual film – he seizes the opportunity to spirit her
away to the fête foraine, which to him is tantamount to a wedding and its subse-
quent consummation of his desire. Marie’s true love, the honest dockworker Jean,
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is thwarted in his attempt at rescue and serves a year in prison for brawling with
Petit-Paul, where he pines for her. Upon his release, he immediately seeks and
finds her. Marie’s oppressor is then vanquished by her neighbor, the little
crippled girl who serves as the free-floating force of justice and good in the world
by shooting Petit-Paul in both the head and the heart. Finally, Jean and Marie have
unfettered access to the fair.
The epilogue of the film is a comment on this conventional structure, and the
layers of cliché that factor into a formulaic marriage plot. It opens with a shot of
exploding fireworks intercut with Jean and Marie on the carnival ride and an im-
age of the crippled girl caring for Marie and Petit-Paul’s infant child. After a final
burst of fireworks, there is an intertitle that wryly alludes to the relationship of
love to subconscious memory: “Love makes it possible to forget everything.” Ep-
stein had a collection of postcards marketed to sailors, and conceived of the pas-
sage that follows the intertitle as an allusion to this genre of popular imagery.21
First, there is a superimposition of a pan over a bed of roses and a formal floral
arrangement. The bed of roses fades out as another layer of the image irises in on
a close-up of the two lovers. Then, the floral arrangement fades to the image in a
rotating kaleidoscope, which fades to hand-written words. The image of the cou-
ple irises out, and the last image of the film is a single exposure of the words “for
ever.”
Note the role-reversal in the film’s two episodes on the carnival ride. In the
dénouement of Cœur fidèle, justice and the freedom to love without obstacle have
done nothing to dispel the mood of deflated and impotent dissatisfaction that has
pervaded Jean’s mien throughout the film. His emotional base remains constant,
but with the turn of events, relationships have shifted, dislodging the one-dimen-
sional roles from their inhabitants, and now it is Jean who appears to be in need
of escape from a makeshift marriage (Figs. 2 and 3).
There are numerous occurrences of an ironic take on true and lasting love in
Cœur fidèle. When Jean is released from prison, he does not immediately go in
search of Marie, as the scenario would suggest. In fact, his first stop is for a drink
in a bar, where in fumbling in his pocket for a match, Jean inadvertently discards
her photograph on the floor for a fellow patron to retrieve once he has left. The
intertitle at this moment reads “Cœur fidèle....” Next, in a mockery of the melodra-
matic trope of a relentless pursuit of the beloved, there is a leisurely depiction of
Jean’s search for employment over the course of several days.
That they meet again at all is entirely an accident. When Jean encounters Marie
outside a charity hospital, the presence of her infant prevents him from identify-
ing himself; instead he follows her home. But even in finding Marie trapped in
misery and desperation, living in a garret room with Petit-Paul, Jean is unable to
act in any but the most token way: he gives her pocket money to purchase medi-
cine for the child.
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Figs. 2 & 3: Shifting relationships in Cœur Fidèle
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Driven away from Marie’s room by the imminent arrival of an intoxicated Petit-
Paul, Jean visits another bar, where he has an encounter with the woman of the
port, whose mischievous gossip and morally suspect mobility provoke most of the
confrontations in the film. She lends a sympathetic ear and hand as the camera
cuts in to signify a growing intimacy. And then, superimposed over a close-up of
Jean, there is a slow pan from a distorted close-up of the woman of the port to
one of Marie, a slippery substitution. This subjective moment in the midst of their
conversation seems to indicate the ease with which either woman could occupy
the position of the object of desire. Jean relaxes into comfort in the presence of
the wrong woman, resting his head on her shoulder as she tenderly kisses his
forehead. But then the camera cuts out as he catches himself doing so, a develop-
ment shown through a series of gestures whose artifice is underscored by the
shadow of his hands cast on the wall. This moment is a wry demonstration of the
redirection of a surge of accidental sentiment toward the object rationally deter-
mined as appropriate.
At its simplest, the accident of love reduces itself to its gestures. Civilization
has infiltrated everything; it has transformed, multiplied, perfected everything,
everything except the amorous accident which remained barbarous, natural,
sincere!22
Recoiling from his own faithlessness, Jean reluctantly returns to Marie and, one
agonizing step at a time up the stairs to her room, to form.
The words ‘for ever’ hang over Cœur fidèle like a reproach, both in the form of
graffiti on the wall of the bar where Marie works, and non-diegetically as in the
epilogue (Fig. 4). That they are in English and thus defamiliarized is important;
Epstein is deliberately putting space between the words and their significance.
This is in emulation of the modern poets he praises for destabilizing stale rela-
tionships between words and their denotative meaning while privileging the acro-
batic associations that may be engendered when words become sounds, symbols,
or intellectual games. Embedded within ‘for ever’, for instance, is a scathing pun;
pronounced in French it becomes ‘faux rêvé’ [false dream].23 In Cœur fidèle, Jean’s
dejection about the rewards of a successful reunion is a demonstration of the
inherent danger of cleaving too closely to this false ideal.
The heart shape as a sign for love ossified into predetermined conventional
forms serves a similar function in the film. Jean and Marie believe that a heart-
shaped chalk mark on a wall by the docks functions as intimate communication,
but its inherent universal legibility belies this misconception. The woman of the
port reads the sign, and, as is her wont, amuses herself by thwarting these machi-
nations toward the morally-appropriate union. She uses the information to incite
a murderous rage in Petit-Paul, whose passion, according to the scenario, is “vio-
lent, odious, but sincere,” thus provoking the violence that ends the film.24 The
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Fig. 4: “For Ever” as Graffiti in Cœur Fidèle
heart shape also appears at the moment in the film when Petit-Paul is coercing
Marie to join him at the fair while Jean waits in vain for her on the dock. Jean sees
a woman approaching at a distance, and lets himself believe that it is Marie. At
this moment there is a close-up of Jean framed by a heart-shaped mask. But as
she approaches, it becomes clear that she is just another itinerant woman and not
Marie. Jean, inhibited by the form, forgoes the opportunity.
For Epstein, love and aesthetic pleasure are both general sentiments that reside
in subconscious memory, periodically erupting through the threshold of con-
sciousness in search of an object. Each is an emotional reflex, and being a reflex
is “irrational, unreflective, and irresistible.”25 Indeed, given that for Epstein the
subconscious operates according to a kaleidoscopic logic of contiguity and simili-
tude – that is to say, of magic – they are virtually interchangeable.
Epstein makes this claim about the magical structure of the subconscious in a
1922 volume of philosophical speculations, La Lyrosophie, a companion piece to La
Poésie d’aujourd’hui.
Sentimental knowledge develops through contiguities and similitudes. And if
in this development one sees ellipses, gaps, slips of the tongue, digressions,
chaos, it is erroneous to name them as such, what would be ellipses, gaps, etc.
in the rational continuity….26
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Whereas the logic of the continuity of reason is a linear one of cause and effect
that may be deduced, in the grammar or logic (neither word comfortably applies,
although Epstein uses them both) that determines associations of sentiment,
causes are created to the measure of effect. This mode of determinism, which to
Epstein is one of the laws of memory, has two facets. On the one hand, connec-
tions are made between sentiments that come into contact by having been experi-
enced in direct temporal contiguity, enabling substitutions that engender fresh
metaphors. The other mode of subconscious association is homeopathic and me-
tonymic; when a magician throws water at the sky expecting rain, it is a futile
attempt to externalize this logic. In both cases, the associations made are subjec-
tive and entirely subject to chance.
In “Freud ou le Nick-Cartérianisme en psychologie,” an essay that purports to
refute the very basis of Sigmund Freud’s at the time sensational psychoanalytic
method, Epstein takes this magical structure of the subconscious as a given.27
His claim is that Freud’s method and that of the magician share the same fallacy:
that psychic determinism is identical in form to the logical determinism that gov-
erns cause and effect in the external world. Thus in applying deductive reasoning
to psychic research and denying the fundamentally elusive nature of subconscious
motivations and association, psychoanalysis is therapeutically ineffective and even
deleterious. What Freud misses, according to Epstein, is that which is grasped by
the narrator critiquing phrenology in Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Imp of the Per-
verse”: “Induction, a posteriori, would have brought phrenology to admit, as an
innate and primitive principle of human action, a paradoxical something, which
we may call perverseness, for want of a more characteristic term.”28 Psychoanalysis
is entertaining, however, Epstein admits, which is perhaps why he associates the
method with the popular detective characters Nick Carter and Sherlock Holmes.
La Lyrosophie is Epstein’s most expansive description of the transformation of
subjectivity in modernity. In Epstein’s view, the general intellectual fatigue – un-
derstood as a biological or chemical phenomenon – that follows from the speed
of modern life and its concomitant increase in the speed of thought, contributes
to the general development of a more complete mode of apprehension of the
world, lyrosophy. In the lyrosophical mode, intellectual fatigue has created lapses
in conscious attention, which allows the subconscious to flood consciousness
with emotion, and possibly stimulate a revelatory analogy structured according to
a magical logic of contiguity and similitude. That Newton being struck on the
nose sparked the discovery of universal gravitation is one such revelatory ana-
logy.29
Epstein adopts the metaphor of the two faces of a coin to explain how, to-
gether, conscious and subconscious knowledge transform distinct two-dimen-
sional views into one coherent three-dimensional aspect.30 And yes, sentiment –
that is to say, love – is for Epstein a form of knowledge, one that provides a truth
that is closer to the object than the truth provided by reason. Whereas the rational
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procedures of science seek truth, and do provide general data that may be shared
among observers, scientific truth is:
a function of the future, that is to say, a function of hope, a function of senti-
ment. […] Truth, outside of science, is a sentiment. […] The state of love, on
the contrary, does not seek the truth. It contains it. […] In general, it does not
call the truth, truth, only certitude. Love is sure of itself.31
In transforming the concept of truth into that of certitude, Epstein shifts its locus
from the object to the subject. One may have conviction in, say, the beauty of a
woman, but that beauty is not a property of the woman. It is projected upon her
as the general sentiment of love emerges from the undifferentiated soup of sub-
conscious memory and overpowers the idea of this particular woman.
Beauty is a thing in itself, that is to say, in us. It can be projected on almost any
object or person who, immediately, will become beautiful. Everything depends
on the quality, the force of our subconscious….32
But that it is projected makes the beauty of the woman no less true.
Epstein incorporates into Cœur fidèle the idea that love is a projected subcon-
scious sentiment in the sequences in which Jean waits for Marie by the docks.
There are long passages in which close-ups of Jean are intercut with superimposi-
tions of shots panning past Marie’s face and the surface of the water. In 1924,
Epstein explained the quasi-Kuleshov effect of this passage to Porte as evocative
of both memory and a flood of emotion:
For Jean, the sea evokes the memory of the rendezvous, every evening, on the
jetty, with Marie. […] And the poetry, the sweetness of this vision of sea and
sun, drowns the close-up of Mathot in a melancholy […] that it would not have
without that, believe me!33
Although he does not explicitly associate the sea with the subconscious in this
conversation, Epstein’s writings during this period are pervaded by such meta-
phors as to describe reason as an îlot in la mer subconscient.
The idea of love as projection is also a central theme of Epstein’s La Glace à trois
faces (1927). In this film, three very different women each see their own desires
and fears embodied by the unnamed leading man, played by René Ferté, whose
demeanor oscillates between frivolity and a deadpan dispassionate elegance –
bearing a striking resemblance in this respect to Buster Keaton – that accommo-
dates such diverse projections. Pearl, a wealthy society woman surrounded by
suitors and dripping with jewels, considers him to be “a man of extraordinary
strength, calm and tyrannical.” To Athalia, the worldly sculptor, he is infantilized,
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an enervated exotic plaything on a par with her pet monkey. And finally, to the
young seamstress Lucie, whose pinpricked fingertips and insecurity about the
position of her pinkie while holding a teacup bespeak a difference in class, he is
a sophisticate beyond her reach. Each woman imagines herself to be very much in
love, but the lover is actually just a mirror who reflects and deflects the women’s
desire.
The central conceit of this essay is that the kaleidoscope is analogous to Ep-
stein’s notion of the subconscious, in that substitutions and associations are mo-
tivated according to a magical logic of contiguity and similitude, and that the
structural principle of the ensuing patterns may only be intuited through ongoing
substitution via the rotational motion of the device. Thus far, the focus largely has
been the extent to which Cœur fidèle and La Glace à trois faces engage the idea that
love is an arbitrary projection of subconscious overspill – the product of a fati-
gued consciousness – onto an object whose attraction is more a product of that
which is projected than a property of the object itself. But the idea that the beauti-
ful is more a mirror than a property is crucial to Epstein’s take on poetic effect as
well.
Poetry in general appears to me impossible without the intense and particular
participation of the subconscious. This enormous speed of thought, this rapid
comprehension of metaphorical analogies, this unique perspective of the intel-
lectual plane, this succession of image-details make poetry, because they en-
gage the life of the subconscious and set spinning this top of a hundred mir-
rors.34
Given that both love and aesthetic pleasure are functions of subconscious senti-
ment, the dynamic that these films represent applies equally to the experience of
photogénie.
Indeed, Epstein is explicit about the extent to which sentimental conviction is
the foundation of his claim that cinematic representation animates what is rep-
resented. Consider his explanation of how cinema provides an experience of
‘knowledge through love’:
…on the screen you see what is not there and cannot be there. You see this
unreality more specifically, sentimentally, with all the precision of real life.
The film shows you a man who betrays. You know perfectly well first that there
is no man, then that there is no traitor. But the film addresses itself to your
always aroused ‘knowledge through love’. It created, by the phantom of a
thing, a sentiment, and as this sentiment cannot live without the thing for
which it is made living, and as this sentiment also tends above all to conserve
its life in it, the fallacious thing will live for you. Or rather a sentiment-thing
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will live, and you will believe better than in a traitor: you will believe in a be-
trayal.35
That it is the betrayal rather than that particular traitor that is animated by senti-
mental conviction is what Epstein means when he says that cinema generalizes.36
And yet, given that this nexus of sentimental associations underlying the general
concept of betrayal is essentially private, as well as contingent upon the unique
self created by the subconscious, this particular fallacious thing lives in this way
only for you.
These are indeed strange arguments. Itself lyrosophical, La Lyrosophie has a ka-
leidoscopic rhetorical structure. That is to say, it progresses via a mobile logic of
contiguity and similitude. What to Epstein are instantiations of reason and the
subconscious, respectively, are treated as if interchangeable. That is to say, that is
to say. Often, what turns the kaleidoscope is the expression c’est-à-dire, employed
without full elaboration of reasoning to connect one term to the other. The man-
ifestations of reason are: the sentimental, otherwise described as a pale intellec-
tual reflection of genuine sentiment; the alexandrine in poetry; the scientific
method; grammar; a word’s denotation; any and all human institutions such as
marriage; morality in general; deductive logic; and, by virtue of its sentimentality
and logical structure, the melodramatic form. The subconscious, on the other
hand, has domain over: sentiment; the aesthetic; the poetic; the sexual drive to
perpetuate the species and of which all human endeavor is a sublimation; love
and all other emotions; religious feeling; truth; and the ineffable.
As another example of how a kaleidoscopic mode of argument operates, let us
consider how Epstein approaches the idea of scientific evidence. Were the evi-
dence upon which all scientific knowledge rests to require an argument to sup-
port it, it would no longer be the absolute foundation. Thus it is ineffable; thus
evidence too is sentiment; thus it is a product of the subconscious. Anything at all
that is ineffable is subconscious; and anything that is subconscious is ineffable.
Thus science, despite claims to objectivity and centuries of an increasingly futile
effort to suppress and exile sentiment, is lyrosophical.37
Epstein first became interested in the question of the relationship of the sub-
conscious to artistic creation and aesthetic response when the works of Remy de
Gourmont captured his imagination and enthusiasm in the late 1910s. Like Gour-
mont, Epstein considered physiology crucial to an understanding of artistic crea-
tion. Similarly, they both related the aesthetic to the sexual drive. Epstein quotes
Gourmont on this point in La Poésie d’aujourd’hui: “The aesthetic emotion, in its
purest, most disinterested form, is thus only a derivation of the genital emo-
tion.”38 In addition, Gourmont’s project of the dissociation of ideas that had be-
come reified as immutable truths – words or concepts encrusted with stale emo-
tional associations – was one that Epstein emulated at least until the 1940s. But
the most important affinity in this context is Gourmont’s conviction that the sub-
the cinema of the kaleidoscope 105
conscious is the source of inspiration. Rational consciousness may only collabo-
rate in creative thought and artistic endeavor, as it serves a fundamentally critical,
and in Epstein’s case, homogenizing, function.
For scientific justification of the notion of the subconscious as the seat of the
aesthetic, Epstein relies largely upon evidence provided by the Polish experimen-
tal psychologist, Edouard Abramowski, whose findings appeared in French in Le
Subconscient normal in 1914.39 In this work, Abramowski seeks to demonstrate ex-
perimentally a comprehensive theory of memory. That the subconscious is the
domain of sentiment and the aesthetic, both ineffable, is a central tenet. It is
Abramowski’s view that when fatigued or distracted, what is perceived but not
intellectually elaborated into conscious verbal or mental representation is still
stored in the subconscious as generic sentiments that function as affective poten-
tial. The process of forgetting an intellectually elaborated perception undergoes a
reduction to undifferentiated affect and is similarly stored.
This amalgam of the forgotten and the passively perceived, stored in the form
of generic sentiments, constitutes the continuity of the self, one’s coenesthésie. Si-
multaneously spiritual and physiological, this baseline determines an individual’s
particular mode of subconscious association, the shape of one’s imp of the per-
verse, as it were. Epstein adopts the term in La Lyrosophie, quoting Abramowski’s
definition of ‘individualité cénesthésique: “the sentiment of ourselves, that conserves
its unity and continuity despite all the variations in the conditions of life, health,
and thought; it’s the profound base of our character and our temperament….”40
In Coeur fidèle, Jean’s emotional consistency regardless of circumstance is a reflec-
tion of the dominance of his coenesthésie; the logic of cause and effect bears no
relationship to his emotional response.
Abramowski’s research protocol was designed to access the subconscious by
separating subconscious memoration and recognition from the processes of
memory that involve intellectual elaboration into words or mental images akin to
pictures. For instance, each of his experiments included the variable of induced
mental distraction and fatigue, usually in the form of the subject’s simultaneous
absorption in mentally calculating sums. He also utilized alcohol and such gam-
bits as unexpected loud noises to this effect. For his first experiment, concerning
recognition, Abramowski designed the image to be perceived by the test subject –
the rather valiant Mme. M – to resemble the images in a kaleidoscope, specifically
because this resists verbal representation: “They were arabesques of different col-
ors and forms, difficult to retain in words and to classify.”41 What he claims to
demonstrate with this exercise supports Epstein’s thinking about sentimental cer-
titude. Recognition, and by implication, memory in general, is found to have a
dual structure. First, there is an instantaneous surge of certitude from the subcon-
scious that takes the form of a sentiment, in this case, of familiarity. This ‘primi-
tive fact’ is the essence or ‘central kernel’ of the recognition and “cannot be de-
scribed in representative terms” such as words or mental pictures.42 The surge of
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certitude is followed by a gradual intellectual elaboration into a conscious mem-
ory that is subject to doubt (Fig. 5).43
Fig. 5: Abramowski’s Sentimental and Intellectual Recognition
Another series of experiments concerned the relationship of language to distrac-
tion and mental fatigue. In the first, for instance, Abramowski had the subjects
read aloud from a series of fifty words flashed in two-second intervals. The sub-
jects then were instructed to write down all of the words that they had retained.
The conclusion drawn from these exercises is that a major factor in the recollec-
tion of a word, particularly one perceived in a state of distraction, is “the influence
of the affective tone of the word, of its symbolic value. The evocation provides the
depth, not the surface of the word….”44 In an exercise designed to induce a dys-
gnosie [dysgnosia], or a sentiment of étrangeté [the uncanny], Abramowski had a
series of young women (and one man) focus all of their concentration on the
word ‘fly’ for what to them was an indeterminate amount of time, but turned out
to be approximately five minutes. Several temporarily lost the ability to associate
the word with a mental image of a fly, and thus Abramowski concludes that étran-
gété is a perception in which the object is separated from its representation as a
result of a fatigue-induced inability to concentrate. Clearly, these experiments
provided Epstein with what he took to be experimental verification of the central
hypothesis of his poetry criticism, that a chronic intellectual fatigue and the atten-
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dant hyperactivity of the subconscious was indeed the catalyst for the transforma-
tion of language in modern poetry.
The specific experiment that Epstein cites most frequently is the one in which
Abramowski establishes that “the aesthetic element is found in the generic senti-
ments of the forgotten.”45 According to Abramowski’s reasoning, this is because
the memory of an object is more beautiful than the perception of it. The experi-
ment proceeded as follows: subjects were instructed to learn ‘by heart’ a series of
seven reproductions of prints by prominent pre-modernist artists while subject to
variable degrees and kinds of distraction. The subjects produced verbal descrip-
tions of the images immediately and then eight days later. Twenty-five or fifty
days later, the subjects compared their memories – at this point presumed to be
largely subconscious – to the actual images. Abramowski found that in at least
half of the cases, subjects were surprised to discover that they had misremem-
bered the spatial relations of an image, exaggerating the scale of the space, the
perspective, and the sky. He attributes this to lacunae in the intellectually elabo-
rated memory image; the excess space corresponds to the details of the image
that are presumed to have been forgotten, or otherwise directly absorbed into the
subconscious. The other common surprise that emerged when the subjects com-
pared their memories to the reproductions was that, in a majority of cases, sub-
jects found that the image was not as beautiful as their memory of it. François
Boucher’s La Cage (1763) most frequently produced this result – eight out of
twelve times. Abramowski attributes this to the unexpected interruptions and irri-
tating electrical sound that distracted subjects from fully intellectualizing their
mental image while initially viewing the print. The remaining pictorial details by-
passed this process, he claims, and because they were passively received they be-
came associated with the subconscious sentiment of aesthetic pleasure.
Abramowski is particularly interested in paramnesia – the appearance in con-
sciousness of either the forgotten, or perceptions that had never been intellec-
tually elaborated in the first place. He makes the claim, and claims to demon-
strate, that art is an instance of paramnesia. “The unique problem and goal [of
art, and religion for that matter] is the rememoration of the forgotten, the search for
complete representations that correspond to these generic sentiments … under
the threshold of consciousness.”46 But given that, for Abramowski, both lan-
guage and representational images are in the domain of conscious intellectual
elaboration, there remains a bedeviling quandary. As Abramowski puts it,
the artist never expresses all that he possesses in memory. There always re-
mains an irreducible part that despite all his efforts to translate it into represen-
tative expressions, remains in the state of generic sentiment of the forgotten.
This part, it is ‘beauty’ itself.47
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The artist must somehow transmit this irreducible facet of the memory to her
audience by evoking in them a sentiment that is equally real, and equally resistant
to representation. Abramowski does pepper his study with critical discussions of
poetry, mainly to claim that a succession of poetic images provokes an emotional
fusion that is analogous to the emotional tint that one’s coenesthésie casts upon
every lived event.48 But he leaves the practical solution of the artist’s problem to
the aesthetes, artfully evading the question of whether or not he himself is a Sym-
bolist.
Epstein articulates the quandary that poetic effect is a function of the evocation
of that which cannot be represented by an intellectually elaborated form, in terms
similar to, although perhaps more poetic than, Abramowski’s:
Because it is in the moment when the most precious words would be pro-
nounced that words may fail. That in the force of emotion the poet finally
comes to have nothing more to say, constitutes poetry itself. The most subtle
thoughts inscribe themselves on the illegible inverse of the most common
words, and between the lines, as if with this ink called sympathetic [invisible
ink], because, without a doubt, only ineffable sympathies can decipher it.49
As the means of inscribing thoughts in invisible ink on the inverse of words,
Epstein proposes abrupt, disjunctive metaphors akin to Newton’s apple. In the
aesthetic of the kaleidoscope, the subconscious is projected onto the conscious
intellectual plane. Through the ensuing simultaneity and disorder, such “mon-
strous analogies” – by virtue of their logic of contiguity and similitude – dislodge
the word from its conventional significance. Whereas a single word, or an ex-
hausted metaphor, is static and fixed in meaning, the collision of ideas in a fresh
metaphor is a form of “comprehension in movement.” Epstein envisions a kind
of play with words – la pensée-association – that operates on a deeper level than their
denotative meaning, oscillating between consciousness and subconsciousness:
“Sometimes surge words whose signs bizarrely can be reduced to their sonority
alone, to an inexplicable coloristic association.”50 The magical logic of the sub-
conscious is the sole guide motivating these associations.
The attempt to formulate a definition of photogénie is always a perilous under-
taking. Indeed, if an aesthetic response to the screen involves evoking the viewer’s
projection of subconscious sentiment onto it, photogénie is, by definition, resistant
to formulation in words. Epstein’s remarks on the subject are descriptions, not
definitions, of the photogenic. But it is remarkable how closely these scattershot
descriptions correspond to what to Epstein are the “stigmata of the subcon-
scious”: “Suddenness of its apparition, immediate perfection, sentimental halo,
affective aspect, apparent indetermination as to its causes.”51 Abramowski be-
lieved himself to have circumvented the process of intellectual elaboration
through induced distraction and fatigue, and thus to have discerned the operation
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of the subconscious. According to Epstein, poets are able to express the inexpres-
sible through monstrous analogies that destabilize language. But how, as a prac-
tical matter, did Epstein as a filmmaker during this period encourage the accident
of photogénie?
That mobility on the screen creates conditions conducive to photogénie goes
without saying. It is important to note, however, that particular modes of mobility
should not become reliable tricks, or a style template. “Like contemporary litera-
ture, the film accelerates via unstable metamorphoses. […] The film borrows
[from fashionable clothing] certain charms, and such a faithful image of our in-
fatuations, aged five years, remains suitable only for the lantern of the fair-
ground.”52 To Epstein, the aesthetic effect of cinema is subject to the modernist
logic, first and best articulated by Baudelaire, in which novelty and beauty are
inextricably combined.
Given the temporality of photogénie, that it is an incidental eruption in the midst
of what is generally a narrative medium, the circumvention of intellectual elabora-
tion is only possible in fragments. Thus such moments must be housed in a form.
They may even be housed in an ossified form, such as the melodrama, of course,
but in such a way that acknowledges and disrupts its status as form. This is
clearly the compositional strategy of Cœur fidèle. La Glace à trois faces also disrupts
conventional narrative exposition in that each of the three initial episodes is nar-
rated by a different woman, and that in each, the same thing – almost nothing –
happens: the character and milieu of the relationship is clearly articulated from
the woman’s perspective, and then the gentleman caller sends the woman a dis-
missive note and drives away. There is a general suggestion that the episodes are
narrations of the past, but this remains ambiguous, and there are no markers
whatsoever to establish temporal relations between the episodes. Indeed, they
feel simultaneous. It is only in the final episode – effectively an epilogue – that
there is an actual event, the accidental encounter when the bird and the reckless
driver disastrously collide.
As a director of silent film actors, Epstein developed a novel strategy that corre-
sponds to the idea that the language of cinema should be exclusively visual. In an
interview with Musidora conducted for the Cinémathèque Française in 1946, Gina
Manès, who plays Marie in Cœur fidèle, recounts that in order to minimize the
mouthing of words on the screen, Epstein would direct his actors to condense
their lines: “Thus, for example, when one had to say ‘Good day, madame, I am
pleased to see you,’ he told us to say ‘day madame pleased see you.’”53 With
similar effect, in editing a sequence depicting a spoken line, Epstein would cut at
the moment when the actor began to speak, insert the intertitle, which most likely
had been designed as much for its visual properties as for its words, and then cut
back to the actor just as the line was completed. “Thus the actor retained his
natural expression and this prevented the flapping of useless jaws.”54 The effect
of this editing strategy is that interpersonal encounters, whether confrontational
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or amorous, are structured as a series of close-ups, thus enhancing the emotional
intensity and photogenic potential.
Concomitantly, Epstein shaped his filmmaking practice in order to enable
chance, subconscious intuition, and improvisation to guide the execution of the
film. This involved an attempt to bypass as much as possible the formulation of
its visual aspects into words prior to shooting.
There is a kind of thought through action that precedes conscious thought.
One makes a thing and then after thinks that one made it because one was
called by the will to achieve it. This could be a perfect psychological illusion
and one could very well make things entirely by chance….55
That the scenario for Cœur fidèle was spare and sparingly followed has already been
mentioned. In a 1950 interview, Epstein tells Henri Langlois that he only prepared
detailed shooting scripts when compelled by a producer to do so; apparently Alex-
ander Kamenka of Films Albatros was particularly demanding in this regard. But
after La Belle Nivernaise (1923), these were fictional documents. Instead, Epstein
would spend the early morning hours of each day of shooting provisionally plan-
ning the day’s work: ten to twelve shots.56 In “Mon Frère Jean,” Marie Epstein
quotes her brother as he, in 1927, associates this attitude toward the shooting
script with the idea of the limitations of language as a representational medium
that shapes his poetry criticism:
The shooting script must never be a shackle. Artistically, it is a mnemonic
device. […] All writing is too rigid, if one holds oneself to the letter, or too
feeble, because it never contains enough spirit. One carries one’s film secretly
in the heart….57
That Epstein associates the practice of making a film with the revelation of a
secret carried in the heart reiterates the connection between love and artistic crea-
tion in his thinking. Each involves the investment to the point of saturation of a
form or an object with the particular cast of one’s coenesthésie, the point of contact
between one’s subconscious and the world.
Nothing can explain this continuity between love and the world. Love creates
itself in an ineffable and secret manner, in creating the creature. Invisible, it
renders itself visible; incomprehensible, it makes itself comprehensible; super-
natural, it gives itself a nature.58
It is for this reason that in the early 1920s, Epstein claimed that cinema is essen-
tially subjective as well as animistic. Like love, photogénie is less an expression than
a manifestation of what is essentially inexpressible.
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This essay begins by immediately following an epigraph in which, in 1946,
Epstein defines a pure cinema as one that would dispense with words with his
objection to being pigeonholed as an advocate of Pierre Porte’s conception of a
pure cinema of visual abstraction. The purity whose relationship to cinema inter-
ests Epstein is not a question of plastic deformation; although in the early 1920s
he clearly believes that this may contribute to a film’s photogenic potential.
Rather it is one that inspires sentimental conviction through destabilizing ossified
representational forms, effectively bypassing the rational relay between love and
the world.
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Distance is [Im]material:1 Epstein Versus
Etna
Jennifer Wild
Then through the city, coursing in the lists,
It travels, forming islands in its midst,
Seeing that every creature will be fed
And staining nature its flamboyant red.
Charles Baudelaire, “The Fountain of Blood” (1857)
– You didn’t know that Etna woke up?
– I don’t know this gentleman and I don’t give a damn about his awakening.
Vincent Gédéon, “Les Opinions de Vincent Gédéon” (1923)
What we used to call art begins at a distance of two meters from the body.
Walter Benjamin, “Dream Kitsch” (1927)
In 1923, Jean Epstein traveled to the island of Sicily to film Mount Etna’s latest
eruption. Stuart Liebman’s pioneering research on Epstein has confirmed that the
resulting film produced by Pathé Consortium, La Montagne infidèle, is now lost.2
Yet, the eponymous first chapter of Epstein’s book, Le Cinématographe vu de l’Etna
(1926), survives not only as one of the most evocative texts about an encounter
with the live volcano. It also persists as one of the most powerful early texts on
film aesthetics and technological mediation – the epicenter of the modern aes-
thetic experience according to Epstein.3
Throughout the “Etna” chapter, Epstein uses the classic convention of anthro-
pomorphosis not unlike the humorist cited in the epigraph, but toward far more
philosophic ends.4 Etna is described first as a “great actor” whose molten incline
later took on “an obstinate, human face.”5 The volcano’s fullest human incarna-
tion in the essay is also its most startling. It is followed by a phrase that continues
to strike film scholars with its signifying force:
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We felt ourselves to be in the presence of someone lying in wait for us.
The laughter and the stunning cries of our eight mule-drivers quieted. We
marched in the silence of a thought that was shared until I felt it before us
like an eleventh, gigantic person. I don’t know if I can communicate the
degree to which this, this is cinema, this personage of our preoccupation.”6
In this passage, Epstein neither posits a facile comparison of Etna to the cinema
nor simply shifts to a cinematographic discourse; nor does he, in my view, de-
scribe this experience “as if he were in a film,” as the phrase has been otherwise
interpreted.7 Rather, by equating the experience of the volcano’s force at a dis-
tance with the cinema’s signifying force that also occurs at a distance, Epstein
begins to transform the classic Romantic paradigm of a solitary, sublime encoun-
ter with nature into a treatise on modern aesthetic experience.8 He provides the
initial parameters for what in modernism can be thought of as the technological
sublime, and the role that distance – as well as proximity – plays in its experience.
Epstein’s thought undeniably shares the intellectual and experiential topos of
such (technological) visionaries as William Blake, Georg Simmel, Henri Bergson,
and Edgar Allan Poe. There is a particularly striking correspondence between Ep-
stein’s and Walter Benjamin’s influences insofar as both derive important strains
of their thought from Jewish mysticism, modernist literature, and the cross-polli-
nation of yet other disciplines.9 Benjamin’s concept of aura is especially pertinent
to Epstein’s modern technological sublime. Not only do both conceptualize dis-
tance and proximity as essential components of the epistemological and aesthetic
transitions inherent in modernity, they conceive of the transitions themselves as
primarily perceptual distinctions tied to the history (and historicity) of technology
and its engagement with social and aesthetic experience.
While the Benjaminian aura is most frequently summarized as “[a] strange
tissue of space and time: the unique apparition of a distance, however near it may
be,”10 Miriam Hansen has shown that the term possesses a far more complex
history in Benjamin’s thinking as it developed in and around the Munich Kosmi-
ker circle and the writing of vitalist Ludwig Klages, in particular. Benjamin’s aura
is both “medium of perception” and a method used to “reimagine” classical and
modern experiential structures.11 However, Hansen suggests that by the time he
formulates aura in “The Artwork in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility,”
Benjamin had overlaid the concept with the Kantian notion of “beautiful sem-
blance” such that distance and nearness become “spatiotemporal categories that
define antithetical perceptual regimes.”12 While Hansen maintains that Benjamin
nonetheless continues to invoke the (Goethean) sense of distance and nearness as
a “polarity” rather than simply as an oppositional antinomy, she rightly observes
that the term’s deployment in the artwork essay constitutes a calculated – if nec-
essary – political move of reduction.13 It was only in this way that Benjamin could,
at that moment, detail the conditions for productive and collective self-alienation in
technological modernity by way of reception and innervation. While Benjamin
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detailed the power of particular films (by Chaplin, Mickey Mouse films) in this
regard, cinematic reception generally would emerge thus as the modern collective
experience par excellence capable of “detonating” the “otherwise destructive poten-
tial” of “distorted, mass-psychotic responses to modernization.”14
The “Etna” essay is, in essence, a treatise similarly devoted to exploring pro-
ductive self-alienation, and the role that proximity and distance play in the collec-
tive sphere of technological modernity. As the center of Epstein’s encounter with
the natural world in this essay, however, Etna has been considered more as a
trope for his own “interior cinema” – one that frames the travel-narrative of his
self-discovery – than as a radical figure in the evolution of his modern aesthetic
theory. It follows that critics have heard Epstein’s essay and its narrative purely in
the Romantic key, and as foregrounding the sublime encounter with the volcanic
as Kant did: “Consider […] volcanoes with all their destructive power. […] [W]e
like to call these objects sublime because they raise the soul’s fortitude above its
usual middle range and allow us to discover in ourselves an ability to resist which
is of a quite different kind.…”15
In a similar vein, the essay’s image of a tempête (tempest), a similarly violent yet
more ephemeral natural phenomenon, has proven especially productive for scho-
larly reflection on this essay and Epstein’s theory more generally: toward the es-
say’s end, Epstein famously transposes his ascent toward the volcano’s dynamic
spectacle upon his equally disturbing descent within a mirror-lined, spiral stair-
case.16 Indeed, the essay’s sudden, tourbillon-like turn down the sloping staircase
proves to be a crucial point in the essay whereupon Epstein confronts a decon-
structed version of his body, himself. He writes:
In the morning two days before, as I left the hotel for this trip, the elevator had
been stopped since six-thirty between the third and fourth floors […] To get
down, I had to take the grand stairs, still without a handrail, where workers
sang insults directed at Mussolini. This immense spiral meant vertigo. The
whole shaft was lined with mirrors. I descended surrounded by my many
selves, by reflections, by images of my gestures, by cinematographic projec-
tions. Each rotation caught me by surprise in a different angle. There are as
many different and autonomous positions between a profile and a three-quar-
ter view as there are tears from an eye. Each of these images lasted only an
instant, no sooner glimpsed than lost from sight, already another […] And
there were images of images. Third images were born from second images.
The algebra and descriptive geometry of gestures loomed [apparaissaient] […]
Looking at one and then another, I acquired another awareness of my relief.17
For some, this passage reveals the apex of Epstein’s theory of film spectatorship
and of cinema as an “epistemological machine” – a position that takes Epstein’s
language to be similar to the passive and “objective” work of the camera.18 For
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others, it further anchors Epstein’s place within the Romantic tradition19 that, in
the words of literary scholar Frances Ferguson, might be summarized in the fol-
lowing way: “The viewer creates a singular nature by seeing a face in the land-
scape; the landscape creates the singular viewer as the projection of its perspecti-
val movement.”20
Early on in La Lyrosophie from 1922, however, Epstein made it clear that his aim
as a theorist was not simply to adumbrate the Romantic sensibility for his con-
temporary moment, but instead to formulate a revisionist stance toward it. In this
ranging philosophical work of literary theory, he clearly positioned “science,” or
what should also be understood as technology, in relation to “sentiment,” or
what Epstein translates in this context as the Romantic inheritance:
Romantics we are, that is to say sentimental [sentimentaux]; but we are also so
reasonable that we inaugurate romanticism from reason and reason from ro-
manticism, in what I call lyrosophy. Science begins thus a new, and perhaps
last, phase of its history, and intelligence [begins] more of a metamorphosis in
its life, a crisis, a molting.
For more years to come, or even a dozen, the learned ones won’t be able to
take seriously this sort of threat and psychological cataclysm that I am antici-
pating. They will be able to ridicule them as visions [imaginations] and phan-
tasmagoria. But, seriously, who doesn’t know what science has always been?21
We learn here, and in La Lyrosophie more generally, that Epstein sought a fully
modern approach to the categorization and description of the dialectical tensions
within both modern literature and the subject’s transitional epistemology in the
face of technology. Nietzsche’s philosophy played a central part in his efforts,
although, as Chiara Tognolotti has pointed out, Epstein’s sources were rarely di-
rect but instead “vulgar” secondary texts that distilled Nietzsche’s metaphorical
richness, use of contradiction, and rejection of systematicity that greatly appealed
to Epstein’s rhetorical and stylistic sense as a writer and thinker.22 A central dis-
tinction from Benjamin in this context, it should be pointed out, is Epstein’s de-
clarative interest in spiritualism and in experimental and parapsychological writ-
ing by figures such as Edouard Abramowski and, as I will explore in depth, Sir
Walter Moore Coleman.23 Whereas Benjamin resisted using aura for its connec-
tion to both theosophy and spiritualism, in La Lyrosophie and in later publications
such as Etna, Epstein formulates key aspects of his counter-Romantic approach by
liberally drawing from and in some cases re-transcribing the abstract postulates
of experimental, spiritualist-infused psychology, alongside those drawn from
scientific studies and technological history.24
When Epstein wrote “Etna” in 1926, he brought his literary-philosophical and
spiritualist thinking to bear on what had become his central preoccupation by this
time: the cinema. He also drew explicitly from late eighteenth and twentieth-cen-
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tury technologies to theorize his encounter with Etna’s natural spectacle of vio-
lence and, more specifically, to move beyond an idealized account of nature that
maintained distance as a paradigmatic measure of self-preservation and indivi-
duation in an encounter with the sublime. In Epstein’s view, technology both
mediates the experience of distance and overcomes it; it thereby provides him the
tools with which to formulate the modern aesthetic encounter as “a reflexive rela-
tion to the modality of vision rather than to its contents,” as Rosalind Krauss
describes the essential if “fetishized” position of sight in the modernist para-
digm.25 Following Trond Lundemo’s observation, Epstein’s notion of the sublime
is neither Kantian nor Burkean, but is instead “a technology that presents new
material forms of space and time.”26
In the opening paragraph of “Etna” we find the first technological metaphor
that inaugurates Epstein’s new theoretical approach to classic aesthetic problems
and that signals his interest in formulating a revision of the classic sublime en-
counter insofar as it is conveyed by way of, or mediated by, modern technology:
The fire spread (se communiquait) to the red corner of the sky. At a distance of
twenty kilometers, the murmur was delivered in instants like a far away tri-
umph, with thousands in applause, an immense ovation. What tragedian,
from which theater, has ever known an equal thunderstorm of success, the
earth suffering but overcome, cracking open in curtain calls. A dry shiver ran
suddenly in the ground where we had placed our feet. Etna telegraphed the extreme
tremors of its disaster.27
First, Epstein reroutes the magnitude of Etna’s power within the sounds of an
approving audience, and in turn figures the volcano’s geographical distance with-
in the dialectical relationship between actor and vociferous collective.28 In effect,
Epstein’s perception exceeds the purely visible realm of appearance as audible
expression; however, he does not register merely “applause” but also the force of
approval it signifies: the distance of the spectacle is overcome, summarized, and
“delivered” by the expressive force of its reception. Distance here is conceived less
as a separation between observer and object observed than as an actor through
whom communication travels. Then, in a telling catachresis, Epstein turns to the
late eighteenth-century technology of the telegraph in order to depict the power-
ful, supersensible communication achieved in its overcoming of distance. Like
the wireless telegraph (télégraphie sans fil; T.S.F.), whose powers to transmit bypass
the visual realm, Etna’s force reaches Epstein as the invisible material of vibrating
waves. “Do we know what the T.S.F will be in ten years? Without a doubt an
eighth art that will be as much an enemy of music as cinema is now to the thea-
ter. We do not know much more about what cinema will be in ten years,” Epstein
mused in the second chapter of Etna.29
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Beyond such speculation, however, Epstein uses the T.S.F at the beginning of
“Etna” as a figure for cinematic perception that, first, takes place across distance
by way of modern technology; and that, second, is an invisible communication
emitted from, yet different than, the object of predilection. As Charles Altieri has
summarized Hegel’s concept of force, Epstein similarly sought to convey that
“our most elemental experience of force is as something whose effects are visible
in or on the objects of perception but that cannot be the simple object of our
attention, since we cannot refer to the force within the same pictorial model we
use to refer to the objects.”30 By substituting the telegraph for a “pictorial” model
of the volcano, Epstein denotes the volcano’s force as that which is perceived
above and beyond its mere visual perception in the landscape. By distinguishing
the force of the volcano from the volcano itself, Epstein engages in a dialectical
process that clarifies his own perceptive faculties from the content of perception.
In so doing, he qualifies not only the transformation of his own consciousness in
the act of perception, but also the autonomy and immanence of the natural world
that he later likens to cinema’s similar “eruption” of sublime force that was, in
1923, rendering a significant challenge to the classically conceived bases of the
work of art: “The philosophy of cinema is to be written. Art can’t imagine the
eruption that threatens its foundations.”31 In this way, Epstein’s essay can be un-
derstood as a meditation on apperceptive and self-conscious awareness that
emerges from an encounter with a force that affects perception, yet that cannot
be reduced either to the object of perception alone or the affective state of the
perceiver – as is the case of the telegraphic emission.
Yet, because his account signals the overcoming of both physical and psychical
distance as the sublime technological encounter, Epstein’s use of telegraphic
mediation deserves more attention for how it specifically revises the Romantic
paradigm. Epitomized by Epstein’s receipt of the volcano’s telegraphic emission,
the distance that formerly maintained a subject’s integrity in a sublime experience
is here broken down or technologically bridged in modernity. One might say that
modern technologies quite naturally and by their design overcome the distance
that once threatened to undo the subject; however, the telegraph and cinema also
mediate it such that the subject might marvel at the (sublime) psychical and phy-
sical overcoming: “In Nancy,” Epstein recalls, “ an auditorium of three hundred
people groaned out loud upon seeing a kernel of wheat germinate on the
screen.”32 To invert Benjamin’s (late) formulation for aura, this unique apparition
of a nearness, however far an object may be to the viewer (we should recall that
the screen nonetheless maintains a distance), is an effect of Epstein’s technologi-
cal sublime more broadly. The expression of radicalized self-consciousness – an
audience’s audibly expressed stupefaction, weeping at the sight of one’s self on
screen, or at the fragmented sight of one’s reflection in the mirrors of a spiral
staircase – Epstein insists, is “not a result of mere self-interest [présomption de soi]
or of exaggerated coquetry.” Rather, “if the first movement before our own cine-
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matographic reproduction is a kind of horror, that is because, as civilized individ-
uals, we lie about nine-tenths of our selves every day. […] Abruptly this gaze of
glass pierces us with the light of its amperes.”33 Hence, Epstein’s position cor-
rects the conventionally Romantic stance that delineates the mind as a “lamp”
projecting outwards upon the external world such that “we create nine-tenths at
least of what appears to exist externally,” as Christopher North (John Wilson) put
it.34 The “action at a distance” that structures the Romantic encounter with the
sublime’s boundlessness (in Kantian terms) is overturned in Epstein’s thought:
technology mediates and overcomes distance, and, in so doing, claims phenom-
enological experience as knowledge received and revealed rather than projected
from within the subject.35 In Epsteinian thought, it is within this essential reversal
that a thoroughly modern, and productive, self-consciousness manifests as one
coefficient of cinema’s technological sublimity.
In order to more fully explore the new experiential possibilities Epstein saw in
the modern technological sublime of cinema, and the role of proximity and dis-
tance therein, the rest of my essay will be devoted to examining other, primarily
nineteenth-century writings on Etna. These put Epstein’s departure from the clas-
sic paradigms of Romanticism into clearer focus, while they additionally demon-
strate the role played by the volcano’s classical sublimity in the modernist voca-
tion more generally. A renewed focus on the legacy of distance and technology’s
mediation thereof in the literary and (para)scientific field that surrounded Epstein
not only reveals his position in a broader modernist context of writers who simi-
larly attempted to revise the tenets of the Romantic aesthetic encounter. It also
animates the continuity between Epstein’s aesthetic project concerning cinema
and his earlier theoretical, spiritualist, and literary efforts to complicate the tenets
of Romanticism such that they could speak to his contemporary, technologically
canted moment.
* * *
There was no dearth of writing on Etna by the time Epstein transformed his ex-
perience at the volcano’s site into a meditation on the technological sublime and
the cinematic image. From ancient Greek odes to essays written during the six-
teenth through nineteenth centuries, Sicily and its volcanic phenomena had been
the subject of texts from a wide range of disciplines and literary genres. Begin-
ning with Pindar’s description of Etna as a “monster,”36 these accounts often
transform the volcano into a telluric figure that, as Noah Herringman has co-
gently argued regarding eighteenth-century scientific writing, emerges less as an
“object of knowledge” than as an “actor and agent.”37 Mediating scientific, nat-
ural-philosophic, and historical-aesthetic discourses, Etna was a sublime trope
and a trope for the sublime that exposed the lyrical underside of scientific inquiry
and development. In many accounts, the experience of Etna importantly posi-
distance is [im]material 121
tioned both phenomenological and aesthetic observation as an expression of
knowledge in and of itself. In the words of nineteenth-century spiritualist and
geographer, Élisée Reclus, who in 1866 described seeing the Sicilian volcano,
“You feel frightened, as if before a living being, at the sight of this group of hills
that murmur and smoke, and whose cones grow incessantly from the debris pro-
jected from the interior of the Earth.”38 By way of metaphor and catachresis, the
geological discourse in Reclus’ passage emerges from a phenomenological en-
counter that serves as the basis for a positivist account of the phenomenon of
volcanic activity and the “coagulation of lava.” For Epstein, such an image would
become equivalent to an encounter with cinematic movement: “A thousand arms
and legs intertwine, fuse, and unravel, overlap, are joined, melt and multiply […]
Everything foams, vibrates, crackles, overflows, breaks out, molts, strips,
surges.”39 Although he did not liken his experience directly to the cinema, in
Georges Bataille’s 1939 account of Etna we find an interesting parallel to move-
ment and its threatening force: “[o]ne could not possibly imagine a place which
demonstrated more clearly the fearful instability of things…”40
Nineteenth-century texts by Alexandre Dumas (père) and Guy de Maupassant
frame an experience of Etna’s volcanic activity in positivist as well as aesthetic
terms, while their travel narratives detail arduous ascents up Etna’s façade as tes-
taments to the mysteriousness of being in the world. In 1920s France, texts by
these authors would have been read by travelers preparing for a trip to Sicily:
written for a general if literary public, Dumas’ and Maupassant’s first-person ac-
counts were vivid travel guides whose description of natural sublimity appealed to
readers interested in foreign travel and the experiential thrill or fantasy of mastery
it provided. While the writing of these authors helps to foreground the extent of
Epstein’s modernist departure from a nineteenth-century ethos, it is in the
modernist writing of Auguste de Villiers de L’Isle-Adam and Poe that Epstein’s
modernist enterprise finds particular resonance. Considering Epstein’s film Fall
of the House of Usher (1928), Poe’s influence on Epstein is no mystery, yet the poet’s
oeuvre extends much further into Epstein’s theoretical project than simply by pro-
viding source material for his films and writing. Although, at the end of “Etna,”
Epstein claims that Villiers “never dreamed of an equal soul-confessing machine”
capable of the “analytic power” of the cinema’s “gaze of glass,”41 Villiers’ style
abstracts a Romantic encounter with Etna such that its force becomes resonant
as, precisely, a sublime modernist agency. Insofar as Poe and Villiers both con-
ceive of “experimental transfers” at a distance in both literary and scientific
terms, they further corroborate Epstein’s fascination in experimental psychologi-
cal transfers across distances that he first discusses in La Lyrosophie, and that I will
reorient with respect to the modern technological sublime found in “Etna.”
Dumas père’s Le Spéronare (1842), part of his collection called Impressions de voy-
age, opens the narrative of ascension along Etna’s façade by casting the author’s
own privilege within the terms of Nature: only a small, seasonal window per-
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mitted safe voyage to the summit’s crater. Dumas’ advantageousness provides his
voice documentary authority as he goes to great lengths to describe each stage of
the voyage, carefully inserting the names of literary figures who preceded him on
the journey, as well as historical information regarding Etna’s past eruptions that
make it, perpetually, “in construction.” While the effect of Dumas’ contribution
survives primarily as an adventure tale, at moments he notes his perceptual and
corporeal alienation as a significant part of the experience:
All of this was terrible, somber, majestic; I saw and perfectly sensed the poetry
of this nighttime voyage, although I was so cold that I did not possess the
courage to exchange a word with Jadin [his travel companion] to ask him if all
these visions weren’t the result of the numbness I was feeling, and if I wasn’t
having a dream. […] We left the casa Inglese [a protective cottage found along
the upper route of the ascent]. We began to distinguish the objects: all around
us stretched a vast plane of snow in the middle of which […] arose Etna’s
cone. Below us, everything was in darkness. […] It is this cone, eternally mo-
bile, that changes form with each new eruption, damaging the old crater, and
reforming itself with a new one.42
With each step he takes on the upper crest, his description augments in suspense
as the earth becomes more “crumbly,” and as the sulfurous fumes multiply and
become nearly too much for Dumas to bear.43 Once at Etna’s summit – a position
Epstein’s text only truly takes in the book’s title, The Cinematograph Seen from Etna –
Dumas finds a source of unrivaled spectacle: Malta “floated on the horizon like
fog; around you, all of Sicily, seen from a bird’s eye view […] its fifteen towns, its
three hundred villages; its mountains that resemble hills […] its rivers that ap-
peared as silver threads.” It taught him to “forget everything, fatigue, danger,
suffering.”44 And in a “radically subjective lyrical expansiveness,”45 to use Al-
tieri’s words, that only the Romantic ethos could provide, the view instantiates in
Dumas the power of individualism and presumption as he “admired fully, without
restriction, with good faith, with the eyes of a body and the eyes of the soul.”
“Never had I seen God so close, and consequently so big.”46
By 1890, fellow Frenchman Maupassant published La vie errante in which the
details of Etna’s treacherousness conclude in a claim toward a general aesthetic
theory of art akin to the Symbolists: “A work of art is superior only in the case
when it expresses at one and the same time a symbol and the exact reproduction
of a reality.”47 Naturalistic though his style may have been, Maupassant’s critical
stance toward modern technology throughout this text places him well within the
reach of Romanticism’s own rejection of it. The book begins with the author’s
declaration of lassitude (weariness) – a theme that we might recognize in Epstein’s
La Lyrosophie as the modern “fatigue” of the artist.48 Unlike Epstein’s altogether
modern concept of “fatigue” that results from the intensified experiential condi-
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tions of modernity, Maupassant’s comment follows upon a willful critique of
what he understands to be the message of the Exposition Universelle: the predomi-
nance of “industry and sale” over the purer, more natural impulses that guided
knowledge-seekers of times past. In this passage, we should note the likely refer-
ence to Edison:
But does not the genius of the one who, with one grand leap of his mind,
jumped from the fall of an apple to the great law that reigns over this whole
universe seem born of a more divine germ than that of the sharp American
inventor, the marvelous manufacturer of bells, megaphones, and lightning ap-
paratus?
Is not that the secret vice of the modern mind, the sign of its inferiority in
its triumph? […]
At all events, these things which interest us to-day in a practical way do
not absorb us as do the ancient forms of thought, for we are far too much the
poor, irritable slaves of a dream of delicate beauty that haunts and spoils our
lives.”49
Maupassant decides that “it would be good to see Florence again,” whereupon
the second chapter, “Night,” commences a willful if somewhat naïve travel narra-
tive in which he searches for opportunities to discover ancient forms of knowl-
edge and/or “genius.” Passing lithely between documentary account and meta-
physical speculation, his narrative modes reveal the author’s curiosity in the
aesthetic and literary revolutions that were taking place in his era. In a fit of sleep-
lessness, for example, Maupassant queries Baudelaire and Rimbaud for their
heightened perceptual understanding of nature, a discussion that swiftly incorpo-
rates the contemporary scientific study of synesthesia as well as a reference to the
experimental thinker Hippolyte Taine. In this context, Taine is likely mentioned
for his application of scientific positivism to humanistic inquiry, if not for his own
Voyage en Italie, published the same year as his Philosophie de l’art en Italie (1866).50 It
is important to recognize Maupassant’s guiding, theoretical emphasis on empiri-
cism, however skeptical it may be: for this writer, empiricism’s potentially tortur-
ous power derived from the senses nonetheless aids the modern poet’s expressive
development of form:
The mind, that blind and hard-working Unknown, can know, understand, dis-
cover nothing except through the senses. They are its only providers, its only
agents between Universal Nature and itself. It works exclusively on the materi-
als furnished by them, which they, in turn, can gather only in proportion to
their own sensitiveness, strength, and acuteness.
The value of thought evidently depends directly upon the value of the or-
gans, and its breadth is limited to their number. […]
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There are five senses, and only five. They reveal to us, by interpreting
them, certain properties of surrounding matter, which possesses also a num-
ber of other phenomena that we are unable to perceive. […]
But suppose [man] had been given other organs, powerful and sensitive,
gifted with the faculty of transforming into acute perceptions the actions and
attributes of all the inexplicable things that surround us – how much more
varied would be the extent of our knowledge and emotions.
It is into this impenetrable domain that every artist attempts to enter, by
tormenting, violating, and exhausting the mechanism of his thoughts.51
In the context of this passage, Maupassant’s previous reticence toward technology
seems to anticipate what Epstein would claim as the most revelatory aspect of the
cinema medium, and that he would eventually extrapolate from his experience
before Etna: cinema’s ultra-sensory capability to, in Maupassant’s words, “trans-
form into acute perceptions the actions and attributes of all the inexplicable
things that surround us.”
For all of these implicit connections between them, Epstein’s qualitative differ-
ence from Maupassant (and Dumas) is brought into relief by comparing the mo-
ments of geological discovery that appear in each writer’s travel-narrative. Like
Maupassant, Epstein also apparently traveled from Etna’s facade to the former
quarry-prisons of the Latomies where the famous geological formation called the
“Ear of Denys the Tyrant” (also referred to as the Ear of Dionysius, following
Caravaggio) can be found. Maupassant’s encounter with the “surprisingly magni-
fied” sounds echoed in the Ear of Dionysius led him to aesthetic conclusions that
he transposed upon an image of human form. Immediately following his encoun-
ter with the “subterranean hall” of the Latomies, Maupassant entered a museum
whereupon he saw her, the Venus [of Syracuse]: “It was not a poetical woman, an
idealized woman, nor was it a divine or majestic woman, like the Venus de Milo,
but it was a real woman, a woman such as you love, such as you desire, a woman
you would fain clasp in your arms.”52 The rhetorical link Maupassant makes be-
tween the auditory reproduction in the cave and the statue’s replication of human
form prepares him for his most explicit claim for nature’s “snare of reproduc-
tion” as, he reminds us, Schopenhauer referred to it.53 With the power to both
conceal and reveal “the disquieting mystery of life,” mimetic representation in
Maupassant’s terms strikes with a magnitude similar to an encounter with the
sublime, although it echoes also within the vein of Symbolist thought whereby
the “perceptible and the ideal or spiritual worlds intersected.”54
On the contrary, Epstein’s encounter with auditory reproduction during his vis-
it to the Latomies incisively amputates – disfigures – any remnant of the ideal
from his perception: the return of the “real” is painful; it is aggrandized at the
expense of Epstein’s perceptual integrity; it is a force altogether distinct from its
sources; it is, furthermore, self-alienating but productively so. Describing his visit
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to the Ear of Dionysus, Epstein draws an explicit parallel between Nature, dis-
tance, and a newly formed sense of self-awareness. The first line of the quote
below places Epstein in the mirror-lined staircase beholding his own fractured
reflection:
Looking at one and then the other, I took in another awareness of my own
relief. Parallel glimpses were repeated exactly, were sent back, reinforcing
themselves, attaining themselves in an echo with the more superior force than
that of acoustic phenomena. Even the smallest gesture became enormous, like
at the Latomia of Paradise when words are spoken at the deepest point in the
Ear of Denys the Tyrant, thanks to the rock’s (roc)55 sensitivity, they swell and roar
at the top of their lungs.56
Once again doubled within an acoustic phenomenon (recall the “applause” fig-
ured in the text’s earlier section), this perceptual event occurs across the dialecti-
cal distance between what Epstein casts out and what returns magnified and dis-
figured. Distance here is framed as the conduit for sound as well as echo, but
insofar as the return is marked by radical transformation, Epstein’s modern, tech-
nological perspective refutes the primacy of mimesis as a structuring element of
aesthetic experience or representation.
Further, in its ability to obliterate the narcissistic crust that formerly prevented
the apprehension of one’s own real appearance in the world, the Latomies’
depths, and that he likens to the spiral staircase, become a force, an agency, that
differentiates between, as Alteiri notes, a “world of pure perception and one in
which awareness of the world proves inseparable from the intricacies of self-con-
sciousness.”57 If in Epstein’s self-discovery narrative we recognize the traces of a
sublime encounter, we must also acknowledge his insistence that cinema pos-
sesses an “analytic power” to destroy – disfigure, de-figure – what had previously
amounted to “ideal” in both mimetic formations and in the previously dominant
aesthetic terms of, for example, Romanticism, to which Maupassant adhered. Ep-
stein concludes this passage with a ranging description of his new self-awareness
brought on by the technological animus of perceptual distance:
This staircase was the eye of another, even more spy-like tyrant. There it was
as though I descended through the multifaceted perspective of an insect. Other
images by their contrary angles intersected and amputated themselves; dimin-
ished, partial, they humiliated me. This is the extraordinary moral effect of
such a spectacle. Each perception is a disconcerting surprise that offends.
Never had I seen myself so and I looked at myself with terror…Such a lesson
of reverse egoism is merciless. An education, an instruction, a religion, had
patiently consoled me from being. Everything was to begin again.58
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While Epstein sought the insight of contemporary art historians such as Henri
Focillon in his own work, he departed from any stance that upheld a singular
aesthetic view in its entirety. Focillon did just this in 1922 when in Epstein’s jour-
nal Promenoir he declared: “I remain loyal to the principles expressed by Kant so
clearly in his Critique of Judgment: art is an activity of play (jeu), perfectly free and
disinterested, and upon which no constraint weighs.”59 Not least because he
would have deemed such staunchness outdated, Epstein also sought the insight
of authors who were similarly at work to define “The Future of Science” (the title
of the last chapter in La Lyrosophie) as an agent of aesthetic illumination. Because
science and technology indeed weighed heavily upon Epstein, Poe’s Eureka, a radi-
cally analogical scientific theory and poetic treatise on universal oneness, would
have provided Epstein with a significantly more powerful source for his thinking
on the technological sublime than academic art historians’ more conventional
writing. Poe’s prose poem was first translated into the French language by
Charles Baudelaire in 1863, and it is generally cited in relation to Epstein for its
opening scene that bypasses an account of any arduous, physical travail upon
Etna’s façade for an immediate description of an onlooker’s view atop the volca-
no’s summit. Poe writes:
[…] I propose to take such a survey of the Universe that the mind may be able
really to receive and to perceive an individual impression.
He who from the top of Ætna casts his eyes leisurely around, is affected
chiefly by the extent and diversity of the scene. Only by a rapid whirling on his
heel could he hope to comprehend the panorama in the sublimity of its one-
ness. But as, on the summit of Ætna, no man has thought of whirling on his
heel, so no man has ever taken into his brain the full uniqueness of the pro-
spect; and so, again, whatever considerations lie involved in this uniqueness,
have as yet no practical existence for mankind.60
Uncanny though it may be with respect to Epstein’s “Etna,”61 the filmmaker
would have been drawn further into the poem’s depths, as it also functioned – as
Paul Valéry described it in his introduction to a 1923 illustrated edition of Baude-
laire’s translation – “an abstract poem, one of the rare modern examples of a total
explanation of material and spiritual nature, a cosmogony.”62 As an “aesthetic
cosmology,” John Irwin argues that “just as Poe makes the ongoing mystery at
the heart of his three [Dupin] detective tales the mystery of the self’s structure,
the puzzle of self-consciousness, so in Eureka by presenting the universe as an
apotheosized self, he makes this same mysterious structure the central puzzle of
the universe…so Poe in Eureka links the concept of inﬁnity to the reflexive struc-
ture of self-consciousness…”63
Epstein would have also, I think, closely followed the concepts of magnitude
and distance that Poe used throughout Eureka with regard to a number of telluric,
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astral, atomic, and conceptual forces.64 In fact, Poe’s illustration for one such
force, “irradiation,” would have been helpful for Epstein’s conceptualization of
the technological sublime and its characteristics of mediated distance and experi-
mental transfer (Fig. 1).65 From Poe’s illustration of the “degree” of light’s out-
ward diffusion (or inward, as “concentralization”) from a singular source upon
variously distant planes, Epstein would have taken an efficient summary of Eure-
ka’s thesis concerning the “continuous outpouring of ray-streams” from the uni-
verse, as well as the identical reciprocity of “matter and spirit”66 and their endless
“rejuvenescence” in the universe.67 Epstein may have also perceived a method by
which to think about the components of cinematic reception: representational
force, its source, and its recipient. Summarized as it is in Poe’s graphic, the
shared point between Epstein and Poe is that the reception of force – for example,
gravity as the received force upon objects, or the cinema image as the received
force of light projected upon a screen – is conceived as the reception of matter, a
claim that exacts a “concrete relativity” between a subject’s perceptual faculties,
her bodily identity, and the visual experience of representation.
Fig. 1: Poe’s original illustration as it appeared in Eurêka
Jacques Aumont similarly interprets the central axis of Poe’s metaphysical tale
in relation to Epsteinian thought, arguing that for Epstein cinema “becomes a
creator of worlds, and of material worlds. Or, if we wish a less metaphorical defi-
nition, it becomes an instrument to test hypotheses on the relation of our psyche
to the physical laws of the universe. […] [T]he cinema provides access to these
laws.”68 Although cinema was Epstein’s particular tool for the measurement and
assessment of such laws, he was not as interested as Poe in defining them in
scientific terms. Rather, he concentrated on cinema’s concrete diffusion of matter
through its “gaze of glass” (or through what Poe otherwise called the “hollow
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sphere of glass”): cinema’s delivery of variously experiential forces by way of dis-
tance or proximity.69
For this reason, the dynamic scale of the close-up deserves special attention as
the vehicle through which the “atoms” of the image were delivered with particu-
lar force in Epsteinian thought. In his legendary essay, “Magnification,” Epstein
declares in no uncertain terms the link between the proximity of the close-up, the
magnitude of its reception, and the sublime geological aspects of this encounter:
I will never find the way to say how much I love American close-ups. Point
blank. A head suddenly appears on screen and drama, now face to face, seems
to address me personally and swells with an extraordinary intensity. […] The
orography of the face vacillates. Seismic shocks begin. Capillary wrinkles try to
split the fault. A wave carries them away.70
According to the OED, “orography” came about during the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury (1846) as the science of the description of mountains; in contemporary
terms, it is the science of geomorphology. Importantly for Epstein, the proximity
of the close-up – or the camera’s ability to render objects at a closer range despite
the screen’s stable distance (here, Poe’s theory of irradiation bears directly) – is
capable of rendering the world’s force in terms of a telluric encounter. As in his
experience with Etna only a year or so later, here Epstein delineates the overcom-
ing of distance as the sublime encounter provided by – mediated by – the technol-
ogy of the cinematic close-up. By attributing the force of cinema to the agency of
magnification, Epstein asserts that cinema’s effects cannot be reduced either to
the object of perception alone, or to his stimulated, phenomenological state. We
could say that the close-up “telegraphed” cinema’s supersensible capacity so to
render Nature independent from, yet seated within, the technology that delivers
its force across a distance.
Epstein’s particular interest in the close-up makes it evident that the technolo-
gical sublime turns more concisely around cinema’s capacity to mediate percep-
tion across distance than cinema’s function to pictorially represent. As an explic-
itly modernist predilection, this is also the case for Villiers who, in his 1888 tale,
“Etna chez soi” (Etna at Home), chooses never to represent the eponymous volca-
no but instead constructs his modernist allegory around an experimental transfer
in literary perception. Like a snow-capped peak barely visible behind the clouds in
the troposphere, Villiers’ title summons Etna’s image, but then displaces it out of
view in the deeply analogical field of its text that performs the violence, explosive-
ness, and centuries-old threat of destruction for which Etna was known. The last
in Villiers’ volume of Histoires Insolites (Strange Stories), and published two years
after what is perhaps his best known novel, L’Eve future (Tomorrow’s Eve, 1886),
“Etna chez soi” is a fictional manual for anarchist revolutionaries. It borrows
directly from contemporary advancements in engineered explosives (the author
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cites, among others, the work of Eugène Turpin, and Captain J. M. Lewin of Swe-
den) in order to effect what Paola Salerni calls an “experimental transfer” of Et-
na’s “explosive” signifying force to the lexical domain and the reader’s imagina-
tion.71 This is an operation that Epstein extrapolates and reroutes concerning the
explosive, signifying force of cinema insofar as the concept of photogénie is itself
never named in the “Etna” essay: like steam involuntarily rising from a crater’s
rocky source, photogénie issues forth – unnamed, invisible – from Epstein’s cat-
achreses that invoke the volcano’s “psychology of organic movement.”72
The discursive parameters of Villiers’ literary experiment possess a conceptual
plasticity that, after supplying the “real” know-how to create an initial “eruption”
of violence, draws the figure of a volcano’s molten flow within the final, orgiastic
image of Paris in ruins:
And suddenly the vociferation of a screaming multitude, the thousands of pa-
nicked cries of men and women choking in a vertiginous panic – recalling for
example (and with such magnification [grandissements]) the horrifying cata-
strophes at the theaters in Nice, Exeter, and our own Opéra-Comique – sud-
denly these explosions and all of these cries of carnage, at last, reach the two
killers.
The mist seems to have taken on a reddish shade, over there! And, at the
same moment, the other five arrows were sent flying. And the surrounding
retaliations begin again, mixed with the sounds of crumbling, with the fracas
of the powder kegs, in the purple light that burns in the distance. The capital,
prevailing in its countless roar over the swaying of carriages and the whistles
of parting trains, had become, in a quarter of an hour, nearly equal to Sodom
under the fire of the heavens. Sudden mass graves are piling up.73
The writer rectifies revolutionary violence (“The future is in explosives” reads the
text’s epigraph, penned by Prince Kropotkine) by figuring it as natural occurrence
within an elaborate prosopopoeia wherein, following Paul de Man, “one begins to
perceive a world of potential ghosts and monsters.”74 But by transforming Etna’s
natural force into this ghostly, textual “monster,” Villiers’ narrative mode
emerges as a distinctly modernist strategy that forcefully subverts any kind of
Romantic impulse. Villiers does not simply place an explicitly drawn political or
satirical face upon the volcano to incite either symbolic “freedom”or “revolution”
as earlier visual uses of the volcano had (Fig. 2).75 Instead, he subsumes natural,
sublime violence within the materialism of anarchist alchemy and action. Thus,
he sacrifices the rarified individualism of a Romantic encounter with the natural
world in favor of an experience whose power emerges from the collective and
material conflagration of politics, science, and aesthetics: it is this fire that is cap-
able of penetrating the appearance and distance that, in the Romantic order,
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maintained concepts of individuation, and that held Nature at a distinct, self-pre-
serving remove.
Fig. 2: La Caricature
But insofar as Villiers substitutes the materiality of anarchist alchemy for the
distant ideal of natural sublimity, he also anchors revolutionary change with the
scientific exactitude of explosive recipes. The numbers, terms, descriptions, and
volumes of each chemical operation become explicit variables of transformation
put forthrightly into the hands of the reader so that she too may exact materiality
from the penumbra of Romanticism’s individualist sublime. Couched as they
were within scientific materialism, Villiers’ experimental literary transfers may
have satisfied Epstein’s own desire for scientifically explicit accounts – explana-
tions – of the “revolutionary” forces harbored within nature, art, and the subjec-
tive experience when mediated by technology. Such accounts would legitimately
and scientifically “inaugurate romanticism from reason and reason from romanti-
cism” – as Epstein wrote in La Lyrosophie – as well as bridge the unfathomable
distance between phenomenology and scientific reason as technology so effi-
ciently did.
In the writings of “lyrosoph” Walter Moore Coleman, Epstein found an ap-
proach that dared to openly combine the materialism of science with the mystery
of subjective experience that he sought in his theory of lyrosophy: “Every time in
which, in one way or another, the personal coefficient of the observer manifests
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within a scientific observation, we have the right, nearly always correct, to speak
of lyrosophy.”76 Although Epstein quotes an unnamed text by Coleman in La Lyr-
osophie (“Lyrosophie and personal coefficient once again chez Walter Moore Cole-
man”) that ostensibly explored the phenomenon of the “human aura” as the ori-
gin of telekinesis,77 Epstein devoted a long section to Coleman’s experiments a
year earlier in Bonjour Cinéma. Permit me to quote at length this passage from the
essay “The Extra Sense:”
One more example. M. Walter Moore Coleman has shown through meticulous
observations that at certain moments all the movements (locomotor, respira-
tory, masticatory, etc.) of a group of the most diverse individuals, including
both animals and men, without being synchronized at all, are subject to a
given rhythm, a specific frequency which may be either uniform or based on a
simple musical ratio. Thus, when one day the lions, tigers, bears, and ante-
lopes in the Zoo at Regent’s Park were walking and chewing their food at 88
movements per minute, the soldiers walked around on the lawns at 88 steps
per minute, the leopards and the pumas walked at 132, that is, in the ration of
3/2, do-sol, and the children ran at 116, that is, in the ration of ¾, do-fa. There
is, thus, a sort of euphony, an orchestration, a consonance whose causes are
obscure. We know how the crowd scenes at the cinema, when there is a genu-
ine mentally active crowd, produce effects that are rhythmic, poetic, and
photogenic. The reason for this is that the cinema, in a way better and differ-
ent from that of our eye, knows how to disengage this cadence and to inscribe
this rhythm, both the fundamental and its harmonics. Do you remember how
Griffith always had his characters move, even at the risk of having them oscil-
late on the beat, practically from one foot to the other in many of the scenes in
True Heart Susie? It is here that the cinema will one day find its own prosody.78
Like the hollow glass tube that for Poe demonstrated the equal diffusion of rela-
tional energies across distance, and like the volcano that “telegraphed” the waves
of its disaster, Epstein here conceives of cinema as a scientific instrument imbued
with similar powers of transmission. It “disengages” unnamed forces from their
invisible, mystical, non-scientific realm and transports them to the visible and
material plane in a process that demonstrates the layered, vibrating, and quantifi-
able relay of life’s relational energies as artful cadence.79
The author of Mental Biology: Experiments in Telergy or the Supersensory Control of
Vital Activities at a Distance to which Epstein refers above, Coleman (1863-1923)
was an American fellow of the Physical Society who authored a range of works
concerning the biological and physical sciences, including textbooks.80 Cole-
man’s parapsychological research in Telergy attempts to supply a scientific ac-
count of the relational parameters between disparate things and their expressive
rhythms or force. In short, his aim was in “making subconscious activity amen-
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able to quantitative tests,” while “[t]he word telergy (‘far-working’),” Coleman
tells us, “is used by Sir Oliver Lodge and others in the sense of the unconscious
control of vital activities at a distance.”81 Coleman finds that telergic force affects
the will and mood (hence, indirectly, emotion and thought), and is “reciprocal”:
it simultaneously affects the most apparent functions of any two subjects such as
heartbeat, breathing, blinking, voice, mastication, and locomotion, or “muscular
activity in general.”
Although Coleman notes that he has never found records of telergy “operating
the physiological mechanism through space” and opts thus for the more recog-
nizable agent of “telepathy,” it is clear that for Coleman this mysterious force
bridging “the reality of distance” holds the key for an altogether new concept of
consciousness and its “social origin.”82 As experiments in telegraphic waves at-
test, Coleman argues, telergic forces exist in an as yet unknown region wherein
the communication between entities erupts in a mysterious synchrony that can be
parsed out in musical ratios (Fig. 3). In effect, the study of telergic action (found
in crowds, “in most assemblies, in companies of soldiers, in flocks of birds, in
herds, and even between two or three individuals”) is a study of the (im)material-
ity of distance and the “properties and modes of action of this unnamed force” or
agency that bridges it.83
Fig. 3: Coleman, Experiments in Telergy
Clearly, Epstein utilized Coleman’s experiments to explain how, in Liebman’s
words, “the cinema uncovered or at least confirmed the existence of immanent
physical laws.”84 But it was more insofar as it also permitted Epstein to radically
define his theory of film as also a conceptual operation upon the distance be-
tween the poles of science and mysticism, phenomenology and aesthetics, Ro-
manticism and Modernism. On the one hand, “The cinema is true,” and on the
other, “The cinema is supernatural in its essence.”85 And yet, it is also “psychic.”
The theoretical expanse between these seemingly disparate elements of Epstein’s
reasoning in fact orients us to the force of mediation that works in his theory to
restructure the Romantic ideal for his modern moment:
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To see is to idealize, to abstract and to extract, to read and to choose, to trans-
form. On screen, we see what the camera has already seen: a double transfor-
mation, or rather, because it is thus multiplied, a vision squared. A choice
within a choice, a reflection of a reflection. Here, beauty is polarized like light;
it is the beauty of a second generation, a daughter, but a daughter born before
its time from its mother whom we love with our naked eye. It is a slightly
monstrous daughter. That is why the cinema is psychic. It presents us with a
quintessence, a product twice distilled.86
Like the return of a sound distorted by echo, and like the monstrous refraction of
Etna’s violence subtended beneath Villiers’ worldly figuration of destruction, the
cinema image here is an experimental transfer providing a return of the real be-
yond the scope of Epstein’s original, subjective encounter with it. To see the cine-
ma image is not simply to “see” the world, he explains. Rather, it is to see it by
way of technological mediation across distance, hence by way of a return that
frames the modern technological sublime as also a relation to pastness, to his-
tory. It is in this sense that Epstein’s theory finds its closest rapprochement to Ben-
jamin’s aura as Hansen explains it: “…by insisting on both the aura’s internally
retrospective structure and irreversible historicity, [Benjamin] can deploy the con-
cept to catalyze the ensemble of perceptural shifts that define the present – such
as the ascendance of multiplicity and repeatability over singularity, nearness over
farness, and a haptic engagement with things and space over a contemplative
relation to images and time – and posit this ensemble as the signature of techno-
logical and social modernity.”87
As Jacques Rancière has argued, Epstein’s aesthetic paradigm demonstrates the
specifically modern collision of “fictional with sensible matter,” a place where
“the sensible and the intelligible remain undistinguished” as similar if not identi-
cal “textures.”88 In this way, Rancière continues, cinema “literalizes a secular idea
of art in the same stroke that it actualizes the refutation of that idea: it is both the
art of the afterwards that emerges from the Romantic de-figuration of stories, and
the art that returns the work of defiguration to classical imitation.”89 However,
the priority of return in Epstein’s theory is contingent upon modern technology’s
ability to mediate and scientifically materialize both literal and figurative dis-
tances inherent in phenomenological or aesthetic encounters.90 The monsters
still lurk and return in Epstein’s post-Romantic aesthetic paradigm, delivered
again and again in cinema’s force that permits the “supersensible beyond” to
come into being by way of reception. Just as telergy’s mediation implies recipro-
city between its subjects, the spectatorial encounter with cinema, Epstein argues,
“procures such unexpected encounters with one’s self.”91 Indeed, the most horri-
fic, monstrous encounter in the “Etna” essay is found in the “moral effect” of
self-consciousness before one’s own image mediated, returned by way of cine-
ma’s glass gaze that the author extrapolates from his own refracted reflection in
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the mirror-lined staircase: “I would have run far to escape this spiral movement
where I seemed to be thrust toward a hideous center of myself.”92
Epstein, like Benjamin, presses us to recognize the distinct agency of cinematic
reception/perception as one part of the reciprocal coefficient that defines the
modern aesthetic experience – as well as the modern technological sublime. As
also a collective, rather than solely individualized, receptive possibility, cinema’s
mediation of distance redirects the phenomenological experience of seeing to-
ward an altogether transformative encounter with, as Altieri succinctly sum-
marizes, “consciousness becoming conscious of itself. Consciousness has to see
itself caught up in this logic of appearance and otherness.”93 As an “analytic
force,”94 in Epstein’s words, that is reducible neither to the Natural object per-
ceived nor the subject’s own perceptual state before it, cinema’s transmission
across distance demonstrates – again in Altieri’s words – the mind’s “simulta-
neous sense of its bondage to appearance and its freedom to bring our values and
causes within a world that now on one level exists for consciousness, hence as
appearance.”95 The cinematic image of a revolver efficiently demonstrated this
fact for Epstein: “The desires and the despair that it represented; the mass [foule]
of combinations to which it was key; all the endings, all the beginnings that it
permitted to be imagined, all of this provided it a kind of freedom and moral
person. Such a freedom, such a soul, are they more epiphenomenal than our
alleged ones?”96
The extent to which, for Epstein, this experience is attributable solely to cine-
ma’s mediation of distance becomes even more apparent in “Langue d’Or,” the
third essay in Etna. Epstein writes:
In this darkness that is favorable to the phenomenon of telepathy, that is to say
to the most far away understandings [compréhensions], to the most secret corre-
spondences of the spirit, the astonishing language was born, of a nature that
we didn’t expect of it, assimilable by sight and not by sound. It is not read, it is
seen, and this ‘sight’ is very well the most nuanced exercise, the most subtle,
the most attentive, the most specialized of all the exercises of the gaze.97
Once again Epstein replaces the pictorial model of cinema with a metaphor –
telepathy – in order to summarize the particular activity of seeing the cinematic
image as a sublimely modern transfer, as well as to exact cinema’s particular
force from its identity as a modern, “natural” fact. We know that, through the
work of Coleman, telepathy was for Epstein linked to the experimental psycholo-
gical sciences as it was also to the mystical. But a few pages later, he states: “A
telegraph without words teaches the exact sense of the soul of a people.”98 In this
phrase, we are faced with the same figure of mediation he first used to describe
the phenomenological encounter with Etna’s invisible communication. We are
then, in a sense, returned to that place where Epstein could best think about:
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the most animated living machine, this zone of quasi absolute death that en-
circled the first craters by one or two kilometers […] At two hundred meters
the rapids of fire appeared suddenly from a nearly circular crevasse and de-
voured the slope, forming a river of red like ripe cherries and as big as the
Seine in Rouen.99
From out of the appearance of this violent, sensuous world, cinema rose up like
its sublime underside as though, in Hegel’s words, “each is solely through the
other, and what each thus is it immediately no longer is, since it is the other.”100
Stripping Epstein of his own analytic powers such that he could only and simply
assert, “I don’t know if I can communicate the degree to which this, this is cine-
ma, this character of our preoccupation,” the volcano prompted Epstein to under-
stand cinematic mediation as a distinctly material force and sublimely modern
agency. It assisted Epstein’s recognition of a post-Romantic aesthetic experience
wherein, by way of the camera’s glass gaze that mediated (im)material distances,
“Mountains, as well as this Etna, signify.”101
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“The Supremacy of the Mathematical
Poem”: Jean Epstein’s Conceptions of
Rhythm
Laurent Guido
Jean Epstein’s ideas about rhythm, expressed in a series of talks, articles, and
books from the early 1920s to the late 1940s, cannot be fully understood without
being situated within a larger theoretical debate over the aesthetic and social po-
tential of the cinematic medium. Already discussed at the beginning of the 20th
century as a key concept in many artistic and scientific fields, the notion of
rhythm occupies a central position among the early attempts by French critics
and cinéastes to grasp the so-called “specific langage” of film. I would like to
emphasize a historical-contextual approach, according to which “French film the-
ory” does not amount to a coherent discourse, but instead gathers together a set
of conflicting views on similar issues and problems. In the 1920s, rhythm clearly
stood out as one of the central conceptions within these theoretical debates over
ways to define and to legitimize cinema as an art form.1 I will start by examining
two well-known notions that are closely related to rhythm in Jean Epstein’s film
aesthetics: movement and photogénie. Studying the connections between move-
ment and photogénie will foreground the rhythmic properties that early commenta-
tors and theorists observed in film. More importantly, these connections will help
define Epstein’s thoughts about cinematic rhythm, which lay at the intersection
between art and science, and refer as much to a recognition of modernity’s most
revolutionary aspects as to the persistence of traditional philosophical ideas and
values.
Movement is a recurring preoccupation among critics and cinéastes writing
about the aesthetics of film during the twenties. At the time, critics frequently
asserted that cinema epitomized a new kind of mobility, resulting broadly from
the major changes brought about in everyday life by the new techniques and prac-
tices associated with industrialization. According to many French film critics of
the twenties, movement characterized not only concrete and daily existence, but
also the aesthetic experience itself. Moreover, the plastic arts were considered
primarily a static means of expression, from which cinema should absolutely dif-
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fer. As the art historian Elie Faure puts it in 1920, only film gives “new plastic
impressions” from “a mobile composition, constantly renewed.”2 One year later,
in his book Bonjour Cinema, Jean Epstein follows Faure in describing film as “all
movement, without any obligation to be stable or balanced.”3 Epstein sees stabi-
lity and balance as the main flaws of painting and sculpture, which he harshly
condemns for their superficial attempts to depict movement. The director Marcel
L’Herbier takes the same position, maintaining that cinema expresses “a taste for
perpetual movement,” which explains why it must struggle against the “tendency
toward immobility” represented by the plastic arts.4 L’Herbier’s apparent contra-
diction is echoed in the same year by Leon Moussinac, who blames the static arts
for being “breathless” and claims that these “immobile towers” will soon “col-
lapse” thanks to the positive action of cinema.5 Not only traditional arts such as
sculpture, painting, and architecture but also a mechanical medium such as
photography are perceived with a hostility that pervades texts from Ricciotto Ca-
nudo to Louis Delluc.6 A similar hostility towards immobility constitutes the start-
ing point for Germaine Dulac’s conception of movement, which she unfolds in an
important article entitled, “Le film, son esthétique, ses entraves” (“Film, Its Aes-
thetics, Its Hindrances”).7 If Dulac rejects every means of expression that appears
to her as essentially “frozen in its immobility,” she acknowledges that film itself
is comprised of immobile images whose rapid succession generates what is
merely an illusion of animation. She admits that it is “the sensitivity of the photo-
graphic images recording a phase of movement [which], by means of their multi-
plicity, succeeds in building up the whole movement.”8 However, Dulac doesn’t
seem to be bothered by this artificial dimension of filmic movement, which had
been identified and stigmatized previously by Henri Bergson in his book, Creative
Evolution (1907). On the contrary, Dulac seems to be fascinated by this ability to
set immobile elements in motion. Her position anticipates a stand taken by Jean
Epstein in such late writings as Intelligence d’une machine (1946). In this book, Ep-
stein follows other early film theorists, such as Rudolf Arnheim,9 who believed
movement is not to be found in the immobile images set into motion by the
projector, but in the spectator’s inner perception of the moving images shown on
the screen: “The animation and the merging of these shapes take place not in the
film, neither in the camera lens, but in man itself. Discontinuity becomes conti-
nuity only after having gone into the spectator.”10 Cinema is thus based on static
images, but it goes beyond this elementary stage by making these immutable
images move.11 Hence, when Epstein points out the marvelous ability of film to
“turn a discontinuity into a continuity” or, more precisely, to “synthesize discon-
tinuous and immobile elements in a continuous and mobile set,” he is respond-
ing to Bergson’s concern that film embodies a scientific conception of movement
and has nothing in common with the real, inner motion that Bergson places at
the heart of his philosophical system.12
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According to French film theorists, cinema seems on the contrary to fit Berg-
son’s ideal process, which is to get closer to the true and infinite “mobile reality”
he locates beyond the reach of human language and intelligence. Whereas Berg-
son himself perceives cinema as an embodiment of the technoscientific inability
to apprehend the most important level of reality – that is, the indivisible continu-
ity of a perfect inner duration – many early advocates of film embrace its almost
mystical ability to reveal new aspects of the universe. When Germaine Dulac com-
pares cinema to “an eye wide open upon life, more powerful than our own eye
and which sees what we don’t see,” she follows Canudo, who defines film as the
“art to express the invisible through the visible,”13 or Abel Gance, who believes
that cinema is able to “translate the invisible world through the visible world.”14
This property of the cinematic medium, this possibility to see the world and its
objects with a superhuman keenness is one of the various notions that many
critics and theorists have described as photogénie. For instance, Louis Delluc, Léon
Moussinac, Juan Arroy, and Epstein himself all define photogénie as a specific reve-
lation of beauty or moral value in things that are being filmed.15
However, there is an additional detail in many of these definitions, which re-
minds us that photogénie cannot really be effective without movement and, further-
more, without timing and rhythm. Among the leading French film theorists, Ep-
stein is one of the most dedicated to this connection between photogénie and
rhythm. When he specifies in 1924 that the additional “moral value” brought
about by the cinematic technique16 only applies to what he refers to as the “mo-
bile aspects of the world, of things, of souls,” he echoes Louis Delluc’s earlier
urge to “qualify, develop, measure” filmed objects with “rhythm, humanity, out-
burst,” without which photogénie would seem “powerless.”17 But Epstein’s stand
refers above all to his own previous definition of photogénie in Bonjour Cinema
(1921): Photogénie is one of the “sensory logarithms of reality,” specifically asso-
ciated with the possibility to expand and multiply “mobility.”18 By alluding to a
mathematical term such as “logarithm,” Epstein demonstrates his obsessive com-
mitment to the idea of a systematic and rational analysis (and control) of the con-
stantly shifting processes of cinema. Moreover, these processes are not only re-
lated to movement, which evolves in time, but also to the spatial configuration of
every frame. In this regard, Epstein affirms in 1923 that the “photogenic aspect
figures among the time-space variables”; and that “a dimension is photogenic if it
moves and changes simultaneously in space and time.”19
Epstein’s statements about the spatiotemporal quality of photogénie lead, in my
opinion, to one of the essential, if obvious, properties of rhythm: namely, rhythm
can refer not only to aspects related to space (for instance the calculation of the
rhythmic proportions of volume and space within the frame), but also to time and
movement. Thanks to its ability to bridge space and time, the concept of rhythm
is very popular in the aesthetic discourses, systems, and methods of the early
twentieth century, and especially in early theories of film. As stated by Canudo,
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cinema synthesizes the “[r]hythms of time” and the “[r]hythms of space.”20
Therefore, cinema links together dimensions traditionally divided in the classical
view of fine arts, as theorized since Lessing. Apart from this aesthetic aspect, the
notion of rhythm has a more general sense, most often following the all-encom-
passing definition by Plato, “order within the movement” (Laws 665a). Hence,
rhythm turns out to be very useful for understanding all types of movement, be
they related to philosophy, science, society, or culture. Hence, scientists use the
term on the one hand to describe fundamental, archaic, and traditional move-
ments, from the biological pulses to human gestures related to work or dance,
and on the other hand to characterize new types of movements generated by
modern life and the machine age, including new modes of transportation and
communication. The obsession with rhythm during this period makes it the key
principle for understanding how the new movements of modernity shaped them-
selves according to a very traditional view of universal harmony. As Epstein puts it
in his later writings, “cinema brings us back to Pythagoras and Plato’s poetry [in
the sense that] reality is only the harmony of Ideas and Numbers.”21 He elabo-
rates on this argument the following year, when he affirms that modern science
has revealed the “supremacy of the mathematical poem,” a privileged way to con-
ceive reality. He also calls this basic principle “the number in motion, the plural
and quantized movement.”22 So, if we take into account Epstein’s opinion that
photogénie explores movement in both space and time, only rhythm seems to be
able to control, channel, and organize mobility.23 As the theorist Paul Ramain –
at the time one of the leading proponents of the “musical analogy” (or “musical-
ist” trend) – reminds us, “Every movement, be it visual or acoustic, creates a more
or less symmetrical chain of elements, comprising moments of softness and mo-
ments of strength. This is cadence. This is rhythm!”24
From movement to rhythm: an outline of film history
Underlying Jean Epstein’s definition of photogénie is an aesthetic program that en-
courages filmmakers to focus on the rhythmic exploration of motion. In fact,
rhythm was a primary concern for many French filmmakers of the 1920s. For
instance, Germaine Dulac argues that cinema must, first and foremost, be cen-
tered on the “knowledge of movement and visual rhythms.”25 Dulac’s work is
especially important for its delineation of the stages leading from movement to
rhythm, as found in “Le film, son esthétique, ses entraves.” This article is among
her finest contributions to film theory: from a teleological and determinist posi-
tion (typical of avant-garde criticism between theory and militancy), Dulac gives
an outline of film history up to her day, according to the different types of move-
ment that cinema has produced. In this section, I will show how Dulac’s account
of movement relates to Epstein’s own theoretical project, particularly in the ways
they link aesthetic discourses with film practice. Many of their views are based
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upon the critical appraisal of concrete films, which they evaluate according to a
progressive and idealistic view of film art. Specifically, both Dulac and Epstein
consider cinema’s capture of reality as a mere starting point for their artistic en-
deavor, in which rhythm is destined to play the essential role.
Dulac begins her history of cinematic movement by claiming that early cinema
produced only a mechanical movement, which is mainly linked with the most trivial
aspects of life itself: it is an “ordinary vision of people and animated things,
going, coming, agitating, without any other purpose than moving in the
frame.”26 Note the choice of the word “ordinary” (banal). The same year (1927),
Epstein suggests that the contingency created by the camera’s capture of reality is
basic material in need of a creative step: “This ordinariness studied, explored
thoroughly, broken down, multiplied, detailed, applied, will give to the cinematic
drama a striking human relief, a hugely amplified power of suggestion.”27 Ep-
stein thus echoes his own, aforementioned definition of photogénie as a multiplied
and expanded movement: even the radically new dimensions of reality, which are
unfolded for the first time by the cinematic device, must be apprehended by hu-
man artistry.
In Dulac’s opinion, this elementary, mechanical movement is only the “scienti-
fic and material basis” of the “capture of movement, taken directly from life it-
self.”28 She gives the example of an early film, the arrival of a train at a station,
which seems to be “the capture of a raw movement, a machine with its rods, its
wheels, its speed.”29 Even if Dulac perceives some reality in that type of image
(she refers to it as the “vrai cinématographique”), she specifies that this obvious
impression of truth results more from the “sensation of speed” than from the
ontological realism of the moving image, a realism she nevertheless describes as
an “exact observation of characters and their gestures.”30 Dulac’s reasoning, like
many of her fellow avant-garde critics and filmmakers, is deeply rooted in a desire
to surpass mechanical movement in order to reach a more elaborate level of artis-
tic creation.
According to Dulac, the early mechanical phase was actually abandoned for the
benefit of narration.31 In earlier essays on the connections between film, theater,
and literature, she says that narration is another way of structuring movement, a
principle capable of building up dynamic structures, such as relationships be-
tween tension and resolution.32 Dulac regrets this turn away from mechanical
movement to what she calls a “fictitious narrative” movement, which involves, in
her opinion, film’s submission to other means of expression and to a series of
plots and characters. Yet, she indicates that it is within the framework of narrative
film that the first signs of a truly rhythmic cinema became evident. She argues
that rhythm made its decisive appearance when film evolved from a series of
frames without any reciprocal relations to a succession of shots “which are de-
pendent on each other and follow a psychological logic.”33
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The psychology of characters linked to narrative movement can thus be orga-
nized in a more rational and systematic way. Contemporary historical studies
have shown that this kind of systematization occurred when editing practices
were standardized according to continuity principles honed in the American fic-
tion film. After the First World War, French film critics began writing about the
ongoing standardization of narrative cinema; and in 1924, Epstein suggests that
American cinema carried out the first concrete experiments involving photogénie, a
“precocious and unconscious cinematic sense,” a “sketch of “space-time ciné-
grammes”34 which D. W. Griffith organized in “the classical shape of abrupt, inter-
secting endings.”35 Epstein notably praises the “measured way in which [Griffith]
assembled all these fragments of scenes, according to mathematical proportions
between shot lengths….” This calculation “ravished spectators who at that mo-
ment discovered a new sensation: visual rhythm.”36 The notion of rhythm there-
fore lies at the heart of the narrativization process associated with the American
feature films discovered in France after the Great War.37 Chaplin, Fairbanks, Grif-
fith, William Hart, and Thomas Ince are the main figures whose enthusiastic re-
ception among early French critics establishes the advent of a cinematic culture,
but whose major influence on French cinéphiles would decline in the mid-twen-
ties.
Even if Dulac is hostile towards narration, she considers this rhythmic narrative
movement as the epitome of technical progress: thanks to the development of the
rhythmical properties of film art, cinema “goes forward to the visual idea […]
From the shots, from the necessary fragmentation, the cadence stood out, from
juxtaposition rhythm was born.”38 She implicitly refers to montage when she
evokes the “logic” according to which “a point of movement must [always] antici-
pate another one.”39 In Dulac’s mind, the next stage in the history of cinematic
movement was already explored by some French filmmakers who were associated
with the avant-garde and who occasionally emphasized rhythm over narration in
their films.40 This practice is one of many aspects of the stage that Dulac calls
“impressionism.” Considered a minor notion at the time, impressionism later
became a prevalent expression in film historiography, in spite of being defined in
different, sometimes conflicting ways – from Georges Sadoul’s Histoire générale du
cinéma to David Bordwell’s thesis on Impressionist cinema. The rhythmic prac-
tices to which Dulac refers were most often based upon fast editing practices,
comprising typical acceleration patterns. Essays, lectures, and special anthology
screenings during the early twenties often featured a familiar set of recurring ex-
amples taken from these avant-garde experiments.41 These examples included the
fair sequence from Epstein’s Cœur fidèle (1923), the car and the lab sequences from
L’Inhumaine by Marcel L’Herbier (1924), Mosjoukine’s wild dance from Kean by A.
Volkoff (1925), and the circus scenes from La Galerie des Monstres by Jaque Catelain
(1925). The best example – and the most often mentioned – is without a doubt La
Roue (1922) by Abel Gance. In her 1927 essay on movement, Dulac, like many
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other critics of the time, sees La Roue as a “great step forward,” appearing as a
multiplied, rhythmic version of the early train film which she regarded as an em-
bodiment of mechanical movement. Dulac refers to the “impressionist” trend
either as a symphonic poem of images when it relates to the expressivity of each
image or as a visual symphony when she wants to emphasize the structure of time
– that is, the rhythm. In both cases, narrative patterns (causality, psychology, etc.)
do not play an essential role anymore; instead, Dulac shifts her focus to the tem-
poral expressivity of rhythm, to “the length of images, their opposition, their har-
mony.”42
Dulac shows that some sequences from La Roue showcase the formal, geome-
trical properties of filmed objects and not their meaning or narrative value. In her
opinion, the art of motion seems to be “at last rationally understood.” Here, Du-
lac echoes Fernand Léger, who praised the plastic value of La Roue,43 and Epstein,
who perceived in it a major development in the history of montage, a step beyond
Griffith’s achievements in editing.44 This idea would be revived in the 1980s by
Gilles Deleuze, in his book L’Image mouvement, where he evokes the “French
School,” which was led by Abel Gance and was characterized by a logic of quality
and bravura, a school in which filmmakers concentrated mostly on “the amount
of movement and on the metrical relations allowing to define it.”45
About inner and outer rhythms
In order to tackle these “metrical relations” more thoroughly, one must take into
account an article Leon Moussinac wrote in 1923 in which he raises, more pre-
cisely and systematically than any other text from the time, the question of cine-
matic rhythm. In this article, which would be republished two years later in his
landmark contribution to film theory, Naissance du cinéma, Moussinac makes a very
important distinction between inner rhythm and outer rhythm.46
Inner rhythm is the structuring principle of movements within the frame: on
the one hand, movements by people and things themselves and, on the other
hand, movements generated by the camera. In 1921, Epstein addresses this speci-
fic problem, inspired by a passage from a book by the biologist Walter Moore
Coleman (Mental Biology, notably dealing with “Experiments in Telergy”), who
proposes that, at any particular moment, there is a common rhythm synchroniz-
ing every single movement coming from a human or animal group, be it a gesture
or breathing, and that this common rhythm could be reduced to an elementary
musical bar. Epstein suggests that cinema should find inspiration in such rela-
tions for the pace of its own gestures, a pacing that he describes as both “rhyth-
mic” and “photogenic.” In his opinion, film is able to “catch this cadence, in-
scribe that fundamental rhythm with its harmonics.” This is what Epstein calls
cinema’s own “prosody.”47
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Regarding this rhythmical apprehension of bodily motion, which is a recurring
pursuit in early French psychological and anthropological studies (besides works
by Théodule Ribot and Pierre Janet, see the tremendous artistic and cultural im-
pact of Marcel Jousse’s thesis on rhythmical gesture in 1925),48 Epstein makes
various statements during the twenties in which he often praises very fast move-
ments taken from traveling cameras placed on horses, cars, trains, and planes. He
calls this practice the “extreme” mobilization of cinema, fitting the new rapid
conditions of everyday modern life.49 I have shown elsewhere how Epstein posits
this energetic view of modernity through a much-favored metaphor of dance.50
But, quite early on, he also warns against the excesses of this culture of speed: in
fact, rhythm does not relate solely to fast movements, but also to slow ones. Ep-
stein refers for example to the gestures of the actors in his film L’Auberge rouge
(1923, from Balzac’s novel). There, the idea was to find a filmic equivalent of
what Epstein calls the “dreamlike life allure,” which corresponds to the peculiar
“psychological rhythm” of Balzac’s novel.51
About outer rhythm, Moussinac’s call to create “cinematic bars” (just as there
are “musical bars”) constitutes a real obsession in the early work of Gance, Dulac,
L’Herbier, and Epstein. In order to structure film sequences according to simple
and repetitive metrical patterns, they specify in several of their shooting scripts
the actual number of images (that is, the number of photograms) that are re-
quired for any specific shot.52 Two fundamental patterns appear when analyzing
some of the famous “rhythmic” sequences mentioned above: the systematic alter-
nation of a few similar shots and a gradual increase in speed (or decrease in
length for each shot), in order to produce striking climactic effects.53 The funfair
scenes in Cœur fidèle seem to organize on a rhythmic basis the contingency and
ordinariness of the mechanical movement I discussed earlier: images of crowds
which are channeled and set in motion according to very simple and repetitive
pulses; people in seesaws, swing-boats or merry-go-rounds; alternating figures
and various subjective point-of-view shots. All these features aim to generate
what Epstein himself refers to as a “photogenic dance” in which spectators are
supposed to be mobilized as well via direct, primary identification with the cam-
era. In Bonjour Cinéma (1921), he already qualified as “photogenic” the “land-
scape’s dance” taken from a train or car at full speed, and looked forward to a
time when he would be able to depict “a dance taken successively in the four
cardinal directions. Then, with panoramic shots […] the theater seen by the dan-
cing couple. An intelligent editing will reconstitute […] the life of dance, both
according to the spectator and the dancer, objective and subjective.”54 In Cœur
fidèle, such visual composition is structured through elementary rhythmic succes-
sions, which testify to a precise measurement of shot length. Marie (A) and Petit-
Paul (B) are treated as true visual motives, which can be arranged in a metrical
way. There are, for instance, A-B-A series of shots in which B exactly equals the
sum of A + A’; or AB-A-B-AB series in which the addition of the two outer shots
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(AB) equals the sum of the two inner shots (A and B). This metric conception is
theoretically supported, at least at the beginning, by Epstein. According to him,
the “rhythmic” passages of a film must be “composed of frames where one has
determined in a very precise manner the length and the proportions between the
shots.”55 He underscores the necessity for the shot lengths to remain in an “ele-
mentary ratio,” in order to strike the eye with more efficiency. For instance, in a
fast editing piece, Epstein estimates that “a series of 2-4-8 images creates a
rhythm which will surely be ruined by the introduction of a 5- or 7-image ser-
ies.”56
At first, Epstein appreciates these “rhythm selections” or “rhythmic frag-
ments,” seeing in them the ability to “separate style from anecdote,” a necessary
experiment for the future development of film art.57 But, from the mid-1920s on-
wards, he begins to think that productions such as La Roue suffer from their het-
erogeneity. In 1926, for instance, he says that La Roue’s fast editing sequences look
like an “accident in the film.”58 Such rhythmic passages should not appear as
self-sufficient, but instead refer to the overall structure of the work in which they
are inserted, according to logic and dynamic principles. This flaw is the same
aspect of French cinema that the Russian critic, Yuri Tynyanov, would criticize in
the “Formalist” book Poetika Kino (Poetics of Cinema) in 1927, calling it the logic of
eclecticism: a part of a film follows the rules of “old” editing, devoted only to
representing the scene and the fabula, while another part is clearly devoted to
“new,” avant-garde montage as a perceptible element of construction.59 Even La
Roue’s director, Abel Gance, does not defend this hybrid conception of film as a
series of potentially detachable pieces. In 1923, he warns that “there would be art
if the fragment was a piece inscribed in a mosaic from which it cannot be sepa-
rated without compromising the perfect harmony of the whole. But it ain’t so, the
great mosaic does not exist, the fragment is only a mere fragment.”60
Towards Photogénie pure
It is well known that, after the mid-1920s, and most notably in a 1924 lecture
about photogénie, Epstein becomes quite skeptical of some avant-garde theories
and ideas; he is especially hostile towards fast editing, which, in his view, has
turned out to be a mere trend appearing in every documentary or dramatic film,
losing any real aesthetic interest.61 Therefore, “movement symphonies” in the
manner of Cœur fidèle seem to him as annoying and ridiculous as “Caligarism,”
the derisive term used by some French critics of the time to refer to German
Expressionism.62 Consequently, in 1924, Epstein calls for a more complex study
of cinematic rhythms, notably in comparison to musical equivalents, but without
falling into what he refers to as “easy and deluding analogies.”63
Unlike literature or theater, music is constantly used as an analogy by many
film theorists of the twenties (Canudo, Moussinac, Ramain, Emile Vuillermoz,
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and, of course, Dulac), who regard it as an emblematic means of expression that
can help filmmakers create their own, autonomous language of cinema. At first
sight, it seems quite paradoxical for an art to find its own specificity through
another art. Nonetheless, music functions here as a model for structuring motion
not only through its mastery of rhythm but also through its various techniques,
structures, harmonic systems, and melodic developments. If rhythm is an ele-
ment common to cinema and music, allowing useful comparisons between these
two means of expression, other references to so-called absolute relations between
musical harmony and visual elements (that is, between certain chords or notes
and certain shapes, colors, or frames) seem far less convincing, and are grounded
only in the lyrical, metaphorical language that frequently characterizes early film
theories. When Dulac affirms in 1925 that cinema should first and foremost try to
find out its own “visual symphony made of rhythmic images,” she is appealing to
Romantic tradition, like most of her fellow filmmakers and critics involved in the
musicalist trend.64 On the one hand, this obsessive allusion to music refers to the
philosophical tradition of the early nineteenth century (Hegel, Schelling, Hoff-
mann, and Schopenhauer), according to which music has a privileged relation to
immateriality and the inner movements of the soul. As many French filmmakers
grappled with cinema as a means for revealing invisible thought – the stream of
consciousness or the inner durée as identified by Bergson – they found themselves
naturally attracted to this Romantic aesthetic.65 On the other hand, the idea of
“pure music” is an aesthetic conception developed from the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury onwards by critics such as Eduard Hanslick, who strongly opposed the idea
that music should be applied to narrative or scenic performances and praised
those aspects of music that fit the requirements of an absolute, autonomous art
form. Besides (and mostly thanks to) its influence in the field of plastic arts and
poetry, the concept of pure art became a major issue in the French debates about
film aesthetics. In the twenties, this issue led to various conflicting views on the
role of abstraction in film and its relation to representational features. In order to
grasp more clearly Jean Epstein’s own position, one should not underestimate the
subtleties of this complex set of discourses.
Most critics and filmmakers affiliated with the avant-garde shared a common
idea of cinema, which was to restrict narrative elements to a unifying subject or
theme (which they most often describe as a kind of “pretext”) in favor of a more
rhythmical and specifically visual way of structuring movement in film; however,
they greatly differ on what they mean by pure cinema. For Ramain, Faure, Moussi-
nac, Gance, and a majority of the avant-garde supporters, pure cinema is more
the ideal of a stylized narrative, inspired by Wagnerian operas in which essential
subjects and ideas were reduced to a dynamic series of musical themes. For
others, led for a time by Dulac, the future of film instead lies in a tendency to-
wards abstraction, beyond the hybrid aesthetics she describes as “impression-
ism.”66 While this position is notably advocated by Henri Chomette67 and René
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Schwob,68 the most convincing definition of it is given by Louis Chavance in a
1927 essay.69 Chavance draws a very clear line between visual symphony and pure
cinema. According to him, a visual symphony is essentially based upon abstract
movements executed by geometrical shapes, as in the early films by the German
filmmakers Walter Ruttmann and Hans Richter. It creates an immediate emotion,
needing neither “representation” nor “imagination.” Visual symphonies are thus
very different from pure cinema, which consists of figurative images and frag-
ments captured from reality which are then integrated into rhythmic develop-
ments such as the urban symphonies and the surrealist films near the end of the
twenties – for instance, in films produced at that time by the same Ruttmann and
Richter.70
The opposition that Chavance draws between abstraction and non-figurative
realism fits perfectly with the dichotomy Jean Epstein describes in an article titled
“Bilan de fin de muet” (“Assessment at the end of silent cinema”), written in
1931. Epstein differentiates the absolute film – with its geometrical abstraction,
which he strongly rejects – from photogénie pure – which embodies a renewed in-
terest in filming nature and great human creations and which Epstein praises
(like Jean Tedesco71) in a reactionary stance. In Epstein’s opinion, the pursuit of
photogénie pure originates in an impulse to resist the oversimplification implied by
absolute films, which are certainly able to capture motion “very close to its princi-
ple,” but, “as every abstraction, are quickly annoying.”72
Although on opposite sides, Chavance and Epstein acknowledge the same dif-
ference between two aesthetics of cinematic purity. Both agree to reject narration,
even as a stylized form based upon visual leitmotifs, but they disagree about ab-
straction. On the one hand, Chavance calls for displays of non-figurative shapes
(the visual symphony, which fits into the absolute film hated by Epstein). On the
other hand, Epstein praises a photogenic purity centered upon filming the uni-
verse (which fits into pure cinema according to Chavance). However, there is an
intermediary position, in which photogénie pure does not necessarily imply a refusal
of geometrical abstraction. This idea is notably sustained by Dulac, who theorizes
abstraction as the main goal of artistic cinema, but observes it mostly in docu-
mentary and scientific films dedicated to the tiny, invisible movements of nature
(for instance, films using fast-motion to reveal the movements of a plant or wheat
germ). This stance – of locating abstraction in nature – is in keeping with an
approach chosen by many abstraction theorists such as the futurists Bruno Corra
and Arnaldo Ginna, who, in 1910, foresaw the “Art of the Future” as a series of
moving harmonic colors based upon the observation of nature.73 In addition to
the ideas developed by the painter Frantisek Kupka in his essay Creation in the
Plastic Arts (1910-1913),74 there are also the conceptions, more contemporary to
Dulac, that Kandinsky outlined in 1926 in Point et ligne sur plan (Point and Line to
Plane). Looking for a new method of plastic composition inspired by music, Kan-
dinsky insists on finding within nature itself the minimal structural elements that
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are necessary to create a lexicon of essential geometrical shapes.75 This is exactly
what Dulac sees in the scientific films she considers as foreshadowing pure cine-
ma: they not only contain an expression of rhythm and speed, but also various
displays of shapes, lines, curves, light, or shades,76 all of which she finally refers
to as the only “sensitive factors” of film.77
Epstein evidently would agree with the premise, according to which any real
artistic expression originates in the essential and harmonious langage of nature.
For example, in 1924, he draws parallels between the cinematographic treatment
of movement and the “astonishing life of plants and crystals” and, two years later,
between cinema and the eruption of Mount Etna.78 This type of comparison
stems from Epstein’s early interest in science (he left impressive notebooks on
various topics such as biology, physics, and mathematics).79 In accordance with
the neo-platonic idealism of the era, and a broad renewal of Pythagorean models
and ideas, Epstein frequently depicts the universe as a rhythmically regulated geo-
metrical system. In an unpublished note, he evokes
the symmetry which one observes in most aspects of nature: structure of mo-
lecule, steadiness of crystal, axis of stem, alternation of leaves, radiance of
petals, spirals of seashells, balance of right and left in almost all living beings.
Still more amazing is the mystery of symmetries which unite microcosm to
macrocosm, which repeat the infinitely small in the infinitely large, and the
universe in the atom.80
By seeing these “harmonious connections” as potentially related to some “intel-
lectual optical effect,” Epstein reveals his constant fascination with the human
mind’s powers to read, comprehend, and even manipulate the external world. As
a new perceptive mode inherited from science, cinema appears as the most effec-
tive tool to accomplish such goals. Like many of his fellow avant-garde film-
makers and critics, Epstein in fact perceives the cinematographic device as a pros-
thetic means able to reveal the universe.81 Hence, he describes the “strange gaze”
of cameras, thanks to which “rivers, forests, snows, factories, railroads, and the
sea have unveiled on the screen their intense and personal lives.”82
There are many examples of these preoccupations in Epstein’s work, the most
famous one being the sequence from Le Tempestaire (1947) in which Father Floch’s
magical mastering of time is echoed in specific cinematic devices, such as reverse
motion. There is also slow motion, which appears to be a crucial aspect in Ep-
stein’s rhythmical treatment of temporality. Epstein’s use of slow motion by
means of a Debrie high-speed camera in La Chute de la Maison Usher (The Fall of the
House of Usher, 1928) has been frequently commented upon, and notably by Ep-
stein himself.83 In an interview, he justified the recourse to slow motion as a way
to enhance the filmic capacity of discovering life’s most subtle movements:
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There are an infinite number of movements, of expressions, as much among
my human actors as among the things that act in my films and in all the details
of every landscape that the normal camera is mechanically incapable of com-
prehending, of seizing, of reproducing. It’s not a question of the use I make of
this slow motion, of simply or bizarrely decomposing a few subtle plastic as-
pects of the mobile world.84
This rejection of superficial distortion echoes Epstein’s condemnation of the
avant-garde’s unsystematic praise of fast editing or highly fragmented framing.
This statement also refers to Epstein’s early belief (taken from Walter Moore Co-
leman, as I discuss above) in a world within which all gestures are in fact perfectly
synchronized. Epstein’s own theory ultimately owes less to the modernist aes-
thetics typical of the twenties (based on speed, discontinuity, fragmentation, and
so on), which he perceived early on as purposeless and prematurely canonical,
than to a persistent reference to the technical and scientific abilities of the cine-
matic medium. Slow motion epitomizes cinema’s technoscientific capabilities,
which hold, for Epstein, deep philosophical notions on time and movement. In
his article “L’âme au ralenti” (“The Soul of Slow Motion,” 1928), he reminds us
that “this power of separation which belongs to the mechanical and the optical
super-eye makes the relativity of time clearly manifest.”85
Again, Epstein was not alone in expressing such views. Many French film
critics from the twenties echoed similar ideas about cinema’s prosthetic abilities,
as was notably demonstrated by the enthusiastic reception of the Cinématographie
ultra-rapide – slow motion – presented publicly on several occasions during the
1920s by the Marey Institute. In spite of the utilitarianism professed by the crea-
tors of this device (especially for the Taylorist standardization of factory work),
film critics were especially interested in its aesthetic value and its power to reveal
the hidden gestures in movement’s flow. Emile Vuillermoz estimated that it ren-
dered “the fundamental rhythm of life ‘readable,’” and used a choreographic me-
taphor: “all is dance in the universe. […] Dance of muscles, dance of the life of
vegetation, dance of water and fire, dance of volumes and lines.”86 By identifying
an intimate relationship between the tool of cinematography’s vision and the
rhythmic ordinance of nature, this claim indicates one of the key foundations on
which rested many French conceptions of cinema in the early twentieth century.
From an obsession with the upbeat tempo of modern life to the unveiling of nat-
ure’s elemental vibrations, Epstein’s various stands on cinematic rhythm origi-
nate from this common ground, and evolve from it in order to offer a provocative
conception of film’s dynamic relation to the world.
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The “Microscope of Time”: Slow Motion
in Jean Epstein’s Writings
Ludovic Cortade
Jean Epstein’s numerous writings, many of which have not been translated into
English, testify to a paradoxical conceptualization of movement. Early on, Epstein
was aware that the film medium entails immobility insofar as it relies upon
photographic recording. In his 1923 talk, “On Some Conditions of Photogénie,”
Epstein points out that photogénie is possible only with the successive mobilization
of these photographic images, and that this mobilization alone allows for the
revelation of movement: “[T]he mechanism of cinema constructs movement by
multiplying successive stoppages of celluloid exposed to a ray of light, thus creat-
ing mobility through immobility, decisively demonstrating how correct the false
reasoning of Zeno of Elea was.”1 By drawing on Zeno’s famous paradox, Epstein
acknowledges the role of immobility from a technical perspective: it is the discon-
tinuous succession of motionless frames which eventually conveys the impression
of continuity and movement, the basic ontological problem of cinema to which
Epstein would return throughout the remainder of his career, as exemplified in
L’Intelligence d’une machine (1946):
All film provides us with the obvious demonstration of continuous movement,
which is formed at what we could call a deeper level, by immobile discontinu-
ities. Zeno was therefore correct to suggest that the analysis of movement re-
sults in a series of still images; his only error was to deny the possibility of this
bizarre synthesis which actually reconstitutes movement through the addition
of pauses and which the filmmaker creates by virtue of our feeble vision.2
From a stylistic perspective, however, the art of cinema clearly relies on move-
ment. Acknowledging the central role that immobility plays in the cinematic ap-
paratus, Epstein nonetheless discards it when it comes to devising a conception
of photogénie. He states in 1923 that “only the mobile and personal aspects of
things, beings and souls may be photogenic.”3 Indeed, Epstein makes the case
for the primacy of movement throughout his career as a filmmaker and theorist:
in an article published in Les Temps modernes in 1950 (three years before his death),
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he posits that “still life is abominable on screen: it commits a sin against the very
nature of cinema, it is a barbarism.”4 While Epstein’s severe condemnation of
“still life” in cinema recalls the obsession with speed among the avant-garde of
the 1920s, Epstein’s investigation of movement, in both his films and film theory,
was more complex than this outright rejection of stillness suggests.
Though the celebration of movement remains the backbone of Epstein’s theo-
ry, his writings bear witness to an attempt to bring cinematic movement to the
threshold of immobility. Conversely, immobility for Epstein is nothing but a po-
tential movement. In this respect, a distinction should be made between Epstein’s
condemnation of “still life,” which is actual immobility, and his inclination to the
cinematic representation of the “inanimate” or “repose” – terms which by con-
trast designate the potentiality of movement.
Epstein’s ambitious theoretical exploration of slow motion entails two stages.
In spite of the growing interest in slow motion by numerous directors at the time,
the texts written between 1921 and 1928 do not refer to slow motion. However,
they constitute an important step in Epstein’s theory, introducing a dialectical
tension between movement and repose which laid the foundations of his ap-
proach to slow motion, as testified by his works in 1928 and thereafter. 1928 was
a turning point in Epstein’s career, not only because he completed The Fall of the
House of Usher, a film which is emblematic of the director’s use of slow motion, but
also because it is from 1928 onwards that Epstein formulates and revises the char-
acteristics he assigns to slow motion. For Epstein, this technique presents a ten-
sion between movement and immobility, giving rise to a “tragedy” of duration,
and also imbues the image with transparency, revealing the hidden movements of
reality which would otherwise remain invisible to the naked eye, thus making
slow motion a “microscope of time.”
1921-1928: Prelude to slow motion
Between 1921 and 1928, Epstein does not mention slow motion in his writings:
the technical methods he advocates during this time include camera movements,
close-ups, and editing. Epstein’s relative lack of interest in slow motion is surpris-
ing given that other French “impressionists” testify to an enthusiasm for this
multi-faceted technique.5 Slow motion was at the time regarded as an all-purpose
device whose function could be comical, dramatic, scientific, or “photogenic.”
The majority of these writers agree that slow motion reveals a state of the soul
that escapes the normal speed of filming or captures a movement in nature that
otherwise would elude our perception.6 In 1920, Colette expresses her fascination
for slow motion and time-lapse photography in scientific films; she recalls that “a
‘slow motion’ shot rose from the ground, immobilized itself in the air, then held
on a seagull suspended on a breeze. […] These spectacles are never forgotten and
give us the thirst for further knowledge.”7 In 1921, Louis Delluc is equally en-
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thused by this device which reveals unknown aspects of reality: “And what to say
of what is added to them by this extraordinary invention of the slow motion tech-
nique [ralentisseur]? […] Men have, in this analysis of images, a grace that we did
not suspect of them.”8 In 1924, Germaine Dulac sees in the use of slow motion a
device that reveals the soul: “Slow motion intensifies tics, accelerations, it inten-
sifies sounds. A state of the soul described by speed.”9 In the same year, slow
motion was used comically in René Clair’s Entr’acte, while in 1926, Dimitri Kirsan-
off emphasizes the acute perception of reality through slow motion, a hybrid de-
vice giving rise to both the transformation and revelation of movement: “Slow
motion is stranger because the dimensions of its ‘time-movement’ are not the
same as the dimensions of the ‘time-movement’ that we know. And because we
find strange and mysterious things attractive, a horse’s jump in slow motion is
more beautiful for us than a natural jump – as it is the opposite of what could
have been produced.”10
While Epstein does not mention slow motion before 1928, his early reflections
on time and movement reveal an interesting distinction between the “still life”
and the “inanimate,” which represent two aesthetic categories of stillness:
namely, the still life is an essential entity which is perceived through actual im-
mobility, while the “inanimate,” or “repose,” comprises the starting point of a
potential movement. As early as 1922, Epstein attends to the beauty of the inani-
mate, making what seems to be a paradoxical statement: he has “uncovered the
as yet little-known beauty of inanimate objects, all prodigiously alive.”11 This per-
ception of life in spite of immobility was refined and reinforced in his text of
1926, Le cinématographe Vu de l’Etna, in which he expresses his sensitivity to the
secret movements of landscapes and objects: “One of the greatest powers of cine-
ma is its animism. On screen, nature is never inanimate. Objects take on airs.”12
One can detect the far-reaching influence exerted by Bergson on Epstein in these
passages. In “La perception du changement,” a text in La Pensée et le mouvant, the
philosopher argues: “There is indeed change, but in this change, it is not the
objects that are changing: change does not require anything in order to occur.
There is movement, but there is no invariable, inert object that moves: movement
does not imply mobility.”13 Whether we perceive actual or potential movement,
the world is always a perpetuum mobile because what we call “immobility” is in-
scribed in duration. Hence, Epstein’s distinction between “still life,” which is ne-
cessarily detestable, and the beauty of the lively “inanimate” is not as paradoxical
as it seems.
To Epstein, still life and cinema are a contradiction in terms because the per-
ception of “motionlessness” turns out to be inscribed in the duration of percep-
tion itself: in this sense, actual “immobility” is nothing but a potential movement.
It is for this reason that Epstein bans freeze frames from his aesthetic, contrary to
figurative strategies common in the 1920s such as the sudden petrification in
René Clair’s Paris qui dort (1923) or the freeze frames in Dziga Vertov’s films. To
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Epstein, immobility as such is inconceivable because it does not reflect the com-
plexity of perception which is inscribed in duration. In this sense, the “immobili-
zation” of the moving image is the expression of a death drive, which Serge Da-
ney will later analyze in the case of freeze frames:
A freeze frame (a return to inanimateness = death drive) implies that there are
images beyond which movement does not continue. This can be any one of the
24 images per second of recorded film. Yet at some point, they are no longer
just any images: they are, in essence, the end point.14
Avoiding the death drive of the freeze frame, Epstein attaches more importance to
the subtlety and ambiguous duration that characterizes the perception of the “in-
animate” as opposed to “still life.” Movement and stillness should not be consid-
ered separate entities, for it is the dialectical tension between the two that makes
possible the perception of time. Epstein was aware as early as 1922 that “We must
recognize that no one is able to experience time, in and of itself, outside of move-
ment and repose.”15 Consequently, if Epstein posits that the inanimate actually
gives rise to a virtual movement, conversely, the representation of movement
should not reach its climax. This point is crucial, for it paves the way for Epstein’s
later view that slow motion is the simultaneous synthesis of actual and potential
movement.
The dialectic of movement and stillness is developed on the basis of the dis-
tinction Epstein makes in Le cinéma et les lettres modernes (1921) between an “aes-
thetic of proximity” and an “aesthetic of suggestion.” The “aesthetic of proxi-
mity” designates the revelation of movement through the use of film techniques,
especially the close-up. In “Magnification” (1921), he posits that “the close-up,
the keystone of the cinema, is the maximum expression of this photogénie of move-
ment. When static it verges on contradiction.”16 This “aesthetic of proximity”
emerges from a theological frame of reference. His approach to cinematic move-
ment consistently links the notion of the film’s revelation of the world to the no-
tion of transubstantiation: “It is the miracle of real presence, of evident life.”17 In
fact, Epstein’s texts, and more specifically the vocabulary he uses, often carry re-
ligious connotations. For instance, Epstein’s aesthetic of proximity is based on
the real presence of movement on the screen, drawing a parallel between the
spectator’s gaze consuming the image and the worshipper’s mouth consuming
the host:
The close-up modifies the drama by the impact of proximity. Pain is within
reach. If I stretch out my arm I touch you, and that is intimacy. I can count the
eye-lashes of this suffering. I would be able to taste the tears. Never before has
a face turned to mine in that way. […] It’s not even true that there is air be-
tween us; I consume it. It is in me like a sacrament. Maximum visual acuity.”18
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Epstein’s aesthetic of proximity thus echoes the Eucharist and its dogma of the
presence of Christ’s body in the host. This theological backdrop is all the more
relevant to Epstein’s conception of slow motion, for it raises the issue of continu-
ity versus discontinuity, which was a staple of the medieval scholastic controversy
around the transformation of the host and its inscription in time. Thomas Aqui-
nas poses that time is necessarily continuous; hence the instant of the host’s
transformation is indivisible because it cannot be simultaneously a piece of bread
and the body of Christ.19 Rather than following this Christian dogma of change
and continuity, Epstein’s understanding of time is marked by a greater tension
between continuity and discontinuity, thus aligning his approach to time with a
deviant argument defended in the fourteenth century. Scholastic philosophers
such as Landulf Caraccioli, Ugo di Novocastro, and Jean Baconthorpe questioned
the dogma of continuity and made a case for the principle of contradiction, allow-
ing for the juxtaposition of continuity and discontinuity, bringing together two
contradictory states during the transformation of the host, which is both the
body of Christ and a simple piece of bread.20
In this respect, Epstein’s writings testify to a certain consistency in regard to
his interest in the issues related to continuity and discontinuity. Twenty-five years
after Le cinéma et les letters modernes, Epstein elaborates on this conception of time in
L’Intelligence d’une machine, an ambitious text theorizing cinema in light of the latest
scientific debates: drawing on quantum physics and the works of Heisenberg,
Planck, Bohr, and de Broglie, Epstein discards the distinction between continuity
and discontinuity, just as in the early 1920s he blurs the distinction between mo-
bility and immobility.21 By recognizing the moment of indeterminacy separating
these two stages of movement, Epstein treads the tenuous line separating actual-
ity and virtuality and lays the foundation for his later formulation of slow motion
as the simultaneous representation of movement and stillness. Thus, the “aes-
thetic of proximity,” including its religious origin in the celebration of “real pres-
ence,” is dialectically linked to its negation: the “aesthetic of suggestion.” While
the former designates actual movement, which is captured by the camera and
consumed as a “sacrament” by the spectator’s gaze, the latter designates the po-
tentiality of movement, conveyed by the “inanimate.” In other words, the revela-
tion of the world through movement is made possible in as much as the actual
commencement of movement is deferred, a theoretical stance which lays the
foundation for Epstein’s conception of slow motion: “On the screen, the essential
condition of the gesture is never to be attained. The face does not express like that
of a mime, it does better, it suggests. […] Of an action that begins astutely, the
development adds nothing to intelligence. One foresees, one guesses.”22 Epstein
demonstrates hostility toward the resolution of tensions brought about by the
culmination of movement. In 1921, he gives a description of the ambiguous dura-
tion which precedes the opening of the mouth, thus combining the “aesthetic of
proximity” and the “real presence” of a face moving in close-up, with the “aes-
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thetic of suggestion”: “Instead of a mouth, the mouth, larva of kisses, essence of
touch. Everything quivers with bewitchment. I am uneasy. In a new nature, an-
other world. The close-up transfigures man. For ten seconds, my whole mind
gravitates around a smile. In silent and stealthy majesty, it also thinks and lives.
Expectancy and threat.”23 This explains his fascination with the ambiguity of the
frozen duration that precedes the commencement of movement: “Waiting for the
moment when 1,000 meters of intrigue converge in a muscular dénouement satis-
fies me more than the rest of the film.”24
Epstein places his “aesthetic of suggestion” under the auspices of tragedy, with
its tension of opposing movement and stillness, avoiding the resolution of such
tension in a dénouement:
Generally speaking, the cinema does not render stories well. And ‘dramatic
action’ is a mistake here. Drama that acts is already half resolved and on the
healing slope to crisis. True tragedy remains in abeyance. […] Now the sus-
pense is at freezing point. Waiting. One sees nothing as yet, but the tragic
crystal which will create the nucleus of the drama has begun to form some-
where.25
The tragedy of duration Epstein discusses in this text refers to the power of the
film medium to make visible the virtual animation of seemingly lifeless objects
and bodies over time. While slow motion is not specifically discussed, Epstein
paves the way for his conceptualization of it, bringing together actual immobility
and potential movement. He assigns a tragic dimension to duration, for the ten-
uous line separating actual stillness and potential movement plunges the viewer
into a perceptual double-bind: if the perception of stillness over time gives rise to
the expectancy of a continuous movement, the actual cinematic representation of
a movement is undermined by the discontinuity instilled by Epstein (“I must in-
terrupt”). It can thus be said that he elaborates a fetishism of movement based on
a celebration of waiting:
Even more beautiful than a laugh is the face preparing for it. I must interrupt. I
love the mouth which is about to speak and holds back, the gesture which
hesitates between right and left, the recoil before the leap, and the moment
before landing, the becoming, the hesitation, the taut spring, the prelude, and
even more than all these, the piano being tuned before the overture. The
photogenic is conjugated in the future and in the imperative. It does not allow
for stasis.26
If the photogenic does not allow for stasis, it nonetheless relies on repose;
while the former designates a type of immobility which does not give rise to any
movement (“still life”), the latter designates the “inanimate,” in the sense that
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Epstein assigns to this word – namely, the propensity of a figure to move. It may
be argued that the significance Epstein assigns to the duration that precedes
movement is a remnant of a conception of time that sparked the debate around
eighteenth-century theories of French neo-classical art.27 In the Salon of 1763,
Denis Diderot shows enthusiasm for the Pygmalion myth, a popular subject of
eighteenth-century French sculpture, including Pygmalion aux pieds de sa statue qui
s’anime created by Diderot’s friend, Étienne-Maurice Falconet. The work repre-
sents the instant during which Pygmalion realizes that Galatea, the statue he
sculpts, is becoming animate. What is at stake in Diderot’s critical judgment of
Falconet’s work is whether his friend indulged in representing the climax of the
action or chose to defer it on the basis of an aesthetic of suggestion. While the
first part of the text is full of praise, Diderot eventually concludes by reproaching
Falconet for having represented the culminating point of action: the moment
where Pygmalion is literally moved, which is to say, the moment in movement.
For Diderot, the sculptor’s movements of surprise must be “contained and mod-
erate.” He advises Falconet to represent not the climax of the surprise experi-
enced by Pygmalion but the instant that precedes it. As much in Diderot as in
Epstein, the “inanimate” is not the opposite of movement; it is the prelude to,
and therefore a modality of, movement. Indeed, one can argue that the frozen
imminence which exacerbates the potentiality of movement and fascinates Ep-
stein from 1921 onward is a remnant of the paradoxical definition of “repose”
given by Diderot in his Detached Thoughts on Painting [Pensées detachées sur la peinture]
(1775-1781): “Life is in the figure which is in repose. Artists have attached a parti-
cular sense to the word ‘movement.’ Of a figure in repose, they say that it ‘has
movement,’ which is to say that it is inclined to move.”28
Between 1921 and 1928, Epstein’s writings clearly show that he attached great
importance to the potentiality of movement rather than its actualization: “re-
pose,” “inanimate,” and the “suggestion” of movement substitute for “still life”
and “stasis,” both of which epitomize the death drive of cinema. The texts of this
period paved the way for his marked interest in slow motion from 1928 onwards.
The year is a turning point not only in his theoretical approach to slow motion,
but also in his own practice: though Epstein first attempted to use slow motion in
his film of 1923, L’Auberge rouge, a use which is barely detectable, it is in 1928 with
The Fall of the House of Usher and thereafter that he refined his views and explicitly
discussed the characteristics of slow motion – most importantly, a tragic concep-
tion of duration and the revelation of reality through the “microscope of time.”
A tragedy of duration
The role of literature in shaping Epstein’s views on cinematic time cannot be
overestimated. In L’ABC du cinéma, a text completed in 1921 (the same year as Ep-
stein’s Bonjour Cinéma and Le cinéma et les lettres modernes), Blaise Cendrars states that
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“the whole of classicism is conveyed by biceps flexing in slow motion.”29 Cen-
drars’ conception of classicism ought to be discussed in light of Simultaneism, a
movement whose ramifications were still palpable in the French avant-garde after
World War I. From this perspective, the so-called “classicism” of slow motion
does not designate a mere magnification of movement: it is the visual synthesis
of the conflict between movement and immobility, conveying a sense of a “simul-
taneous present.”30 Cendrars’ definition of slow motion pertains to the classic
tragedy: the ambivalence of slow motion may be regarded as a remnant of the
inner conflict experienced by characters who are subject to a set of passionate
and duty-bound conflicts resulting in a geometry of double-binds. Likewise, the
frozen dialectics of slow motion opposes the temptation of actual movement and
the withholding of it. In that sense, slow motion is a tragedy of duration.
The tragic paradigm of slow motion appears in light of further elements per-
taining to the literary context under which Epstein made The Fall of the House of
Usher, adapted from the eponymous short story by Edgar Allan Poe. Luis Buñuel,
who was then Epstein’s assistant, recalls that he had met Symbolist playwright,
poet, and essayist Maurice Maeterlinck during the making of the film.31 Maeter-
linck, who expressed a strong interest in cinema, was himself strongly influenced
by Poe.32 At the end of the nineteenth century, Maeterlinck forged a conception of
drama which was deprived of heroism, staging characters who are sensitive to the
unknown and the sublime, and who experience the mere act of living as a trage-
dy. In “The Tragical in Daily Life,” a chapter from The Treasure of the Humble, a
collection of mystical essays first published in 1896, Maeterlinck situates the cor-
poreal language of his characters in the wake of the tradition of static actors in
Greek tragedies: “I do not know whether it be true that a static theatre is impos-
sible. Indeed, to me it seems to exist already. Most of the tragedies of Aeschylus
are tragedies without movement […] What have we here but life that is almost
motionless? […] It is no longer a violent, exceptional moment of life that passes
before our eyes – it is life itself.”33 Stillness lies at the crux of Maeterlinck’s
works, at the expense of the climax of dramatic action: movement comes to a
standstill and excavates the hidden, mystical dimension of life. It should be
stressed, however, that stillness is always inscribed in duration and consequently
turns into a stream of perceptions – the passage of life.
The dialectics of movement and immobility forged by the Symbolist writer
sheds light on Epstein’s adaptation of The Fall of the House of Usher, a film that
testifies to an extensive use of slow motion which the director himself places
under the auspices of tragedy:
It now seems impossible to me to make a film without a high-speed camera at
my disposal. […] Slow motion really brings a new set of possibilities to drama-
turgy. Its ability to dismantle feelings, to enhance drama, to infallibly repre-
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sent the sincere movements of the soul is such that it obviously surpasses all
the other known tragic modes.34
Epstein’s conception of slow motion stands in contrast with that of Colette, for
instance, in that Epstein’s cannot be considered a special effect whose function is
to simply ravish the gaze of the viewer. On the contrary, Epstein clearly assigns a
dramatic function to slow motion which excavates and magnifies the subtle varia-
tions of the state of mind of a given character, without calling attention to the
distortion of time it implies. In other words, what is at stake is whether slow
motion should be transparent or convey a sense of self-reflexivity. In May 1928,
Epstein discarded a conception of slow motion that would spectacularize the
marks of enunciation: “At no time in the film will the spectator be able to say to
himself: this is slow motion.”35 Indeed, The Fall of the House of Usher distinguishes
itself by its use of “subtle slow motion.”36 In 1948, twenty years after making The
Fall of the House of Usher, Epstein specifies the transparency of the technique he had
been using extensively since 1928:
This film best captures its tragic and mysterious atmosphere through the sys-
tematic use of a subtle slow motion and through the ratio of 1.5:1 or 2:1 that
not only allows for a precise reading of gestures and expressions, like through
a magnifying glass, but also automatically dramatizes, prolongs, and holds
them in suspense as if waiting for something to happen. The actor can usually
perform anything: he comes in, sits down, opens a book, flips through the
pages; only the camera gives him a profound gravity, burdens him with an
inexplicable secret and makes him a fragment of tragedy through the simple
reduction of the temporal ratio of this performance.37
To Epstein, slow motion is not an artificial entity destined to demonstrate the
technical possibilities of the medium or a filmmaker’s intention. On the contrary,
most important for Epstein is the undetectable and fluctuating line separating the
slightest movements of a muscle. It is the organic character of duration that
brings together movement and immobility in such a way that the viewer is not
able to pinpoint the use of the slow motion device nor to analytically separate the
successive stages of a movement. Slow motion is not a special effect: it reveals the
world and exposes the spectator to the conflicting forces inherent to it. In “L’âme
au ralenti” (“The Soul in Slow Motion,” 1928), Epstein analyzes the kinetic uncer-
tainty perceived in duration and which corresponds to a middle ground between
movement and immobility. In slow motion, the spectator experiences the impos-
sibility of isolating the precise moment at which pain or its quintessential mani-
festation, crying, emerges:
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I am not aware of anything more absolutely moving than a face delivering
itself from expression in slow motion. First a thorough preparation, a slow
fever which one does not know whether to compare to a morbid incubation, a
progressive maturity or more grossly, to a pregnancy. Finally all of this effort
overwhelms, ruptures the rigidity of a muscle. A contagion of movements ani-
mates the face. […] And when the lips separate to finally indicate a cry, we
have born witness to the entirety of its long and magnificent dawn.38
Slow motion discards any clear-cut distinction between movement and immobi-
lity because it organically inscribes the experience of duration in the plasticity of
the image.
By focusing on the prelude to actual movement and the kinetic indeterminacy
preceding its commencement, Epstein draws on themes he had already developed
prior to 1928, especially the notions of the inanimate and repose, which, as I
discussed earlier, stand in contrast with the still life. In his 1931 essay, Bilan de fin
de muet (“Assessment at the End of Silent Cinema”), Epstein works on the as-
sumption that the use of slow motion is not an alteration of the world but rather
the revelation of its ambiguity, precisely because the technique presents us with
the spectacle of a frozen dialectic inscribed in duration. The film medium gives
rise to a “temporal perspective” whose “simplest effects, slow motion and fast
motion, are always striking, penetrating the world with a life as new and as fertile
as the extraordinary, surreal life that one finds looking into a microscope.”39 Four
years later, in his Photogénie of the Impondérable (1935), Epstein builds on the theme
of the revelation of the world through slow motion, emphasizing in the very title
of the text the fact that recorded phenomena reveal themselves over time in un-
predictable ways. Hence, Epstein mentions the importance of the ongoing fight
between conflicting micro-movements which cannot be perceived by the naked
eye: “What the mind does not have time to retain, what the eye has neither the
time nor the capability to see in an expression – the prenatal pains, the birth, the
evolution, the struggle between inter-current feelings (which ultimately determine
the outcome) – slow motion displays all of this at will.”40
The advent of the sound era in French filmmaking did not make Epstein’s use
of slow motion obsolete, despite the fact that the vast majority of sound films
were under the influence of a theatrical approach to speech that seemed incom-
patible with any visual distortions of movement and time. However, in Mor’Vran
(1930), one of Epstein’s first sound films, the director remains attached to the
visual resources of slow motion he used in both The Fall of the House of Usher and
Finis terrae (1929), the first film he made in Brittany. The final shot of Mor’Vran, for
instance, is filmed in discreet slow motion, capturing the dramatic explosions of
waves along the coast. The impression of prolonged duration is not conveyed by
the soundtrack, as the viewer’s attention is caught in the uncanny visual sensa-
tions created by the waves, which seem to come to a standstill and hover in the air
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in moments of kinetic indeterminacy. The dramatic function of slow motion in
Epstein’s films of the early 1930s remains merely visual, thus exemplifying the
director’s early skepticism towards sound film.
It should be stressed, however, that Epstein’s reluctance to use the resources of
sound changed over time. In his “Le gros plan du son” (“The Close-Up in
Sound”), a text focusing on his film of 1947, Le Tempestaire, Epstein explores the
aesthetic and technical aspects of a slow-motion sound, a technique that was
eventually made possible thanks to the collaboration of sound engineer Léon Var-
eille and composer Yves Baudrier. Le Tempestaire features a mysterious old man
called “le tempestaire,” who has the power to control the movements of waves by
blowing on a crystal ball through which he keeps an eye on the tempest. Epstein’s
experiments seem to signal a resurgence of the myth of “frozen words” [paroles
gelées] exemplified by Rabelais.41 The author of Le Quart Livre devises a fantasy in
which words would be encapsulated in the cold but freed – and audible – when
brought close to a fire. However, a distinction between the two should be made:
while Rabelais envisioned a sonic equivalent of the “freeze frame,” Epstein by
contrast inscribes sound in time and seeks micro-distortions in order to reveal a
soundscape which would otherwise be imperceptible. The difference between the
two is that the former links sound to the instant, whereas the latter uses duration
to reveal sound in its subtlety: “[Slow motion] enables phenomena to be spread
out over the duration; it constitutes a sort of microscope of time.”42 In Le Tempes-
taire, the movements of the raging sea gradually slow down to the point where the
spectator can barely make a distinction between movement and immobility. The
ocean seems to come to a standstill: “…in extreme visual slow motion the eye no
longer perceives the choppiness of the sea, which now appears as a solid, frozen
surface.”43 The subtle distinction between the expiration of movement and the
gradual solidification of the waves conveys a tragic experience of duration that
plunges the spectator into an instant of kinetic ambiguity. In Le Tempestaire, the
use of slow motion is transparent; in this respect, Epstein remains faithful to his
conception of slow motion first expressed twenty years before, when making The
Fall of the House of Usher. Even when the waves are reversed by the old man, the
faith that is placed by the spectator in the revelation of the world through slow
motion is not undermined. Roger Odin has demonstrated that the spectator’s
belief is preserved, despite the fact that this technique tends to foreground the
marks of enunciation.44 For Epstein, the transparency of slow motion lies in the
dialectic between movement and stillness, in “the uncertain relationship between
that which is animated in the shot, and that which seems to be motionless,” as
Raymond Bellour puts it.45 The impossibility of establishing whether the waves
will continue their movements, become frozen, or even go backward lies at the
crux of Epstein’s conception of slow motion.46 It is the experience of the uncer-
tainty of time and movement that constitutes the spectator’s belief in slow mo-
tion, a transparent image crystallizing the conflicting forces of the tragedy of
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duration. In this respect, Epstein’s conception of slow motion embraces the defi-
nition of photogénie he gave at his 1923 conference: “I would describe as photo-
genic any aspect of things, beings, or souls whose moral character is enhanced by
filmic reproduction. And any aspect not enhanced by filmic reproduction is not
photogenic, plays no part in the art of cinema.”47
Conclusion
Epstein assigns three characteristics to slow motion: photogénie, the revelation of
unknown features of the world; transparency, avoiding any reflexivity the specta-
tor might perceive; and tragedy, based on the inseparability of movement and
immobility in the perception of duration.
Epstein’s conception of slow motion needs to be compared to the debates in
French film criticism of the 1950s. The intersections between Epstein’s and André
Bazin’s writings have long been underestimated, especially because Bazin devel-
ops a conception of the potentiality of movement which, to a certain degree, re-
calls Epstein’s work. The author of What is Cinema? was familiar with Epstein’s
films; in 1953, the Cinémathèque française organized an Epstein retrospective at
the Cannes Film Festival which Bazin reviewed:
The only time this year when we have felt the spirit of Cinema was during the
Epstein retrospective, not so much because of the snippets of films presented
by Henri Langlois, but because of the fervor and reverence conveyed in the
speeches of Jean Cocteau, Abel Gance, Charles Spaak, and Jean Dréville. Every-
one who was there was there out of love and respect for cinema – it was only
about art. In the middle of the Festival, this small ceremony almost took the
shape of an initiation ceremony, or a mass in catacombs. We left it feeling
revived, as if we had taken communion.48
Bazin was struck by the foregrounding of the film medium in François Cam-
paux’s documentary Matisse (1946), and developed in his review an analysis which
paved the way for his essay on Clouzot’s documentary: “Un film bergsonien: Le
Mystère Picasso.”49 It may thus be argued that Bergson is the common denominator
between Epstein’s and Bazin’s theories of duration.
We all remember this deeply moving moment (in an otherwise mediocre doc-
umentary): Matisse’s hand fumbling about in slow motion on the canvas. […]
[T]he work of fine art, completed, is timeless; it offers itself to us in a block of
timeless space, unlike music, poetry, or novels. Cinema, an intermediate and
mixed art, so to speak, restores to us, from space and time, that privileged
instant in which creative time will crystallize, for eternity, in patches of color
or in masses of stone, and solidify like a cast of bronze in a mold.50
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Bazin was interested in the resources of slow motion, as long as it preserved the
transparency of the film medium over the display of the marks of enunciation.
According to Bazin, the function of slow motion does not lie in demonstrating
the power of the technique, but rather in capturing and organically revealing the
ambiguous stages of the deployment of movement as duration. In that sense,
Bazin is not only Bergsonian; he is also is Epsteinian.
Moreover, although the author of “The Myth of Total Cinema” was interested
in the evolution of the techniques of the seventh art, he placed the emphasis on
the psychology of the viewer. Technological breakthroughs are manifestations of
the mental categories of the spectator: in other words, the consistency of the
spectator’s myths overcomes the avatars of technique. Epstein’s texts bear witness
to a remarkable consistency in his conception of the tragic duration inherent to
the “microscope of time.” From 1921 to 1927, Epstein developed his conception
of duration without presenting a single occurrence of slow motion in his writ-
ings. These texts nonetheless encapsulate his views on slow motion, even before
he comprehensively discussed and made extensive use of the device from 1928
onwards. It may thus be argued that Epstein’s assessment and practice of slow
motion did not originate in the technique itself. Rather, his theory of slow motion
draws on a complex frame of references, including the early twentieth century
(Maeterlinck) and the avant-garde of the 1920s, particularly Cendrars’ Simultane-
ism. It should also be stressed that Epstein’s theoretical foundation can be traced
back to the debates gravitating around time and movement long before the inven-
tion of cinema, as demonstrated by the similarities between his “aesthetic of real
presence” and the Christian dogma of transubstantiation on the one hand, and
the “aesthetic of suggestion” and Diderot’s preference for repose on the other.
Consequently, slow motion in Epstein’s writings should be regarded not only as
a device rooted in the technological history of cinema, but also as a mental cate-
gory that invokes a much older dialectical tension between movement and immo-
bility that cuts across centuries and different types of media. Slow motion is im-
pure. From this perspective, Epstein anticipates Bazin.
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A Different Nature
Rachel Moore
Il y a toujours un rapport secret entre le voyageur et la terre qu’il paraît choisir
pour s’arrêter.
There is always a secret bond between the traveler and the land where he
apparently elects to rest.1
Jean Epstein
Jean Epstein’s writing highlighted cinema as the preeminent modern form, ad-
dressing the changing nature of labor and its fatigue, the new relative conception
of time and space, and the virtuosity with which the camera machine gave percep-
tual access to a nerve-wracking world. His films were dramatic vignettes about
love, friendship, and loss that engaged in variations of speed, magnifications of
objects and bodies, manifold angles, and superimpositions. The films operated in
parallel pursuit with his theoretical work to meet perception’s evolving demands.
These qualities situate Epstein comfortably within the historical avant-garde, and
indeed his writings are a continuous point of reference for filmmakers and theor-
ists alike to describe a radically different, modernist cinema throughout much of
the history of experimental film. Shattered perception, speed, and movement
were key to both his films and his theoretical writing, which emphasized the
ways the moving image could make bodily contact with the spectator. The signifi-
cance of the camera’s mechanical nature to accomplish this bodily effect comes
through clearly in his evocation of other sorts of moving transport:
The landscape may represent a state of mind. It is above all a state. A state of
rest. Even those landscapes most often shown in documentaries of picturesque
Brittany or of a trip to Japan are seriously flawed. But “the landscape’s dance”
is photogenic. Through the window of a train or a ship’s porthole, the world
acquires a new, specifically cinematic vivacity. A road is a road but the ground
which flees under the four beating hearts of an automobile’s belly transports
me. The Oberland and Semmering tunnels swallow me up, and my head,
bursting through the roof, hits against their vaults. Seasickness is decidedly
pleasant. I’m on board the plummeting airplane. My knees bend.2
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Cinema begins with the external world; in this case, a landscape passes through
the machine and ends affecting the body. From a moving vehicle, landscape be-
comes a ‘landscape dance’ that moves the body. Without such mediation, land-
scape is merely ‘a state.’ Perhaps in part to work through this tension between the
natural and the technological, Epstein turned to landscape and to Brittany in par-
ticular for the latter part of his career. Given his enthusiasm for the modern and
the mechanical, along with his disdain for the pictorial, the choice to spend the
better part of his last two decades filming at places that were at the time markedly
un-modern is striking. Epstein’s personal engagement with these places may well
remain their secret. But there is clearly more at stake when an eminent modernist
with a passionate investment in the potential of cinema spends the better part of
two decades filming on four small islands off the coast of Brittany. This paper
aims to situate this film work, often relegated to the docile genre of pictorialism,
within the context of Epstein’s various theoretical concerns. Further still, the
work becomes more significant when viewed in its broader social and intellectual
context. What follows here looks to the work of ethnography and Critical Theory
in order to situate the set of films Epstein made in Brittany – including Finis Terrae
(1929), Mor’Vran (1930), L’Or des mers (1932), and Le Tempestaire (1947) – within the
larger modernist project, not for the sake of categorization, but rather to try to
account for the peculiar relationship between nature and artifice exemplified in
two astounding minutes of cinema: the penultimate scene of Epstein’s penulti-
mate film, Le Tempestaire, which traverses nature’s depths with the height of cine-
matic artifice, fusing technology with sorcery, the modern with the un-modern.
While Bruno Latour may finally be correct that “we have never been modern,” the
onset of the twentieth century in Europe saw significant changes that brought
people in contact with technologies and societies that were new to them.3
In France, ethnography and a fascination with cultural difference flourished in
the twenties. Whether in the form of the Surrealists’ interest in African art objects
or the founding of the Institut d’Ethnologie in 1925, “the other,” as James Clif-
ford put it, “was a crucial object of modern research.”4 In post-war Germany,
Marx had left a gaggle of scholars (who now come under the heading of Critical
Theory) scrambling to overcome a trend toward reification through engagement
with contemporary labor, art, and the everyday life around them. The interplay
between French Surrealism and ethnography yielded the idea that the Other was
a serious alternative to the unsteady ground of modern reality whose abstract
nature, best articulated by Georg Lukács’ landmark essay of 1923, “Reification
and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” required new creative methods.5 In
both the French and German cases, reality was no longer straightforward; there-
fore its representation and, hopefully, transformation, set scholars and artists
alike on uncharted paths. Despite his early friendship with Blaise Cendrars, Ep-
stein was not directly connected to either the Surrealists or French ethnography,
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and he certainly did not read German Marxism. As his writing clearly indicates,
however, he was indeed living in the same, newly enigmatic world.
In the context of 1925 Paris, Michel Leiris describes the emergent modernity
that was associated with the current influx of Africans and African Americans to
which Paris was in thrall:
The Revue nègre enjoys a smash season at the Theatre des Champs-Elysées, follow-
ing on the heels of W.H. Wellmons’s Southern Syncopated Orchestra. Spiri-
tuals and le jazz sweep the avant-garde bourgeoisie, which haunts Negro bars,
sways to new rhythms in search of something primitive, savage…and comple-
tely modern. Stylish Paris is transported by the pulsing strum of banjos and by
the sensuous Josephine Baker “abandoning herself to the rhythm of the Char-
leston.”6
While the avant-garde bourgeoisie sought “something primitive, savage…and
completely modern” according to James Clifford, 1925 also saw Paul Rivet, Lucien
Lévy-Bruhl, and Marcel Mauss establish the Institut d’Ethnologie for fieldwork
training and the publication of ethnographic scholarship. The antics in the wake
of the 1924 Surrealist Manifesto were in full swing, and France was engaged in a
minor war with anti-colonial rebels in Morocco. This is the stage Clifford sets to
ground the concept of ‘Ethnographic Surrealism,’ which grows out of a commu-
nion between the arts and sciences that share in the project of defamiliarization.
For Clifford, this is a significant, if short-lived, historical moment, when every-
thing was equally valuable as art and as an object of study, largely through the
mechanism of radical contact – that is to say, through maintaining difference by
decontextualization, juxtaposition, and collage. At that point in history, “reality
was no longer a given, a natural, familiar environment. The self, cut loose from
its attachments, must discover meaning where it may – a predicament, evoked at
its most nihilistic, that underlies both surrealism and modern ethnography.”7 The
look to other cultures, then, was a way of dealing with the modern ‘predicament.’
Radically different practices and beliefs provided a new lens through which to
look at your own society not so much to understand or represent other people,
but to open up new creative ground. To look at Epstein’s film work on the Breton
Islands through the lens of Ethnographic Surrealism is to ask what this contact
with difference generated in terms of his artistic and theoretical project.
One of Epstein’s essays, written in January of 1926, exemplifies both the influ-
ence of engaging with otherness and the valences of modern progress encoun-
tered as part of the context for his work. He writes: “But that young black, who
used to kneel in worship before the headlights on explorers’ cars, is now driving a
taxi in Paris and New York. We had best not lag behind this black.”8 Epstein’s
staged encounter between “this black” and the explorer’s headlights, in its his-
torical context, enunciates Parisian projections of primitive modernism.9 In its
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immediate context, however, he is arguing for a refinement of photogénie, away
from exploiting the many technical feats only cinema can accomplish and to-
wards their more subtle deployment. Those that desire to hang onto this form of
enchantment, he writes, “should buy a kaleidoscope, a plaything for a second
childhood.”10 The refinement of photogénie brought with it shifts in location and
subject matter. The artistic and ethnographic urge towards contact with the radi-
cally other emerges first in Epstein’s writing as contact with cinema – for it is
cinema that is alien and magical – and then as contact with the Breton Islands,
distinguished by their isolation and strangeness. Epstein’s early invocation of ani-
mism and “primitive religions” sets cinematic perception loose to wildly explore
all that met his eye, as if his camera were a spirit that could go anywhere, and
could imbue things captured on film with magical powers:
I would even go so far as to say that the cinema is polytheistic and theogonic.
Those lives it creates, by summoning objects out of the shadows of indiffer-
ence into the light of dramatic concern, have little in common with human
life. These lives are like the life in charms and amulets, the ominous, tabooed
objects of certain primitive religions. If we wish to understand how an animal,
a plant or a stone can inspire respect, fear, or horror, those three most sacred
sentiments, I think we must watch them on the screen, living their mysterious,
silent lives, alien to the human sensibility.11
Here Epstein claims that such elemental things as stones acquire the power to
elicit emotion, if not religious significance, through the mechanism of the cam-
era. The alien nature of the camera is key to its power to transform objects into
things that can inspire sentiment. This contrast of the mechanical with emotion is
more than a rhetorical turn; rather it characterizes the basis of Epstein’s approach
to filmmaking.
Epstein’s writing often stages the encounter between the primitive and the
technological, between science and poetry, between objective reality and the
world the film creates – to put it more generally, between nature and second
nature. Second nature is the nature that culture makes, largely through mimetic
practices through which we take un-natural things to be natural. The headlights
scene is staged at the intersection of nature (a projected primitive authenticity)
and second nature (which casts that authenticity in a blinding, mystifying light).
From this encounter, the specter of a different nature – Epstein called it a second
reality – emerges, one that has the properties of both nature and second nature
but blurs the difference between them. Small wonder, then, that he calls the thing
that turns, morphs, mimics, and mutates reality the “metal brain.”12
In its recognition of the difference and confusion caused as film images gained
significant ground on reality, Epstein’s thought echoes the work of Georg Lukács,
who in 1920 formalized the difference between nature and second nature. For
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Lukács, the difference between nature and second nature was clear, even if both
ultimately depended upon the alienation of the senses. People find themselves
isolated from first nature through their own folly: “Estrangement from nature
(the first nature), the modern sentimental attitude to nature, is only a projection
of man’s experience of his self-made environment as a prison instead of as a
parental home.”13 First nature does not signify anything, nor does it include feel-
ing. In contrast, second nature, despite its disaffection, even displays a hint of
subjective presence: “…second nature is not dumb, sensuous and yet senseless.”
For Lukács, it is “a complex of senses – meaning – which has become rigid and
strange, and which no longer awakens interiority; it is a charnel-house of rotting
interiorities.” Here, second nature’s effect is to flaunt meaning, but a meaning
that doesn’t resonate in any genuine way with a person.14 Lukács’s definition of
second nature posits a world that alienates and yet has power over us; moreover,
“this second nature could only be brought to life – if this were possible – by the
metaphysical act of re-awakening the souls which, in an early or ideal existence,
created or preserved it.”15 Thus second nature is riddled with meaning that has
been distorted from its cultural origins beyond human recognition, access, and
control.
However inadequate Lukács’ metaphysical solution to the problem of reclaim-
ing second nature may now appear, the problem of “reawakening” as set forth in
The Theory of the Novel was to animate much of Critical Theory’s subsequent work.
Adorno, in his address to the Frankfurt chapter of the Kant Society in July of 1932,
saw in Lukács’ introduction of second nature the division between “a meaningful
and a meaningless world”16 – that is, an immediate world and an alienated world
of commodities” that, in Adorno’s words, “supplies neither a meaning for the
subject in search of a goal nor sensuous immediacy as material for the acting
subject.”17 As to first nature, Lukács says, “it can only be defined as the embodi-
ment of well-known yet meaningless necessities and therefore it is ungraspable
and unknowable in its actual substance.”18 In Epstein’s later work, the Breton
Islands can be seen as a foil to second nature, if not exactly a place where first
nature was knowable.
In Epstein’s early writings, however, second nature emerged with alarming
clarity and he greeted it with enthusiasm. He points to the mimetic phenomenon
of second nature in relation to first nature within the context of film viewing: “I
see what is not and I see this unreal thing exactly.”19 Second nature is so good at
taking nature’s place that the values attached to the distinction between nature
and second nature become difficult to maintain: “Even though it’s merely light
and shadow whose only material element is the cloth on which it’s projected, as
a spectator, I do not doubt that they exist.”20 A phantasmagoric situation ensues:
Actors who thought themselves alive here show themselves to be more than
dead, less than nothing, negative; while others and objects that are inert seem
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suddenly to feel and think, to transform themselves, to threaten and to live the
life of insects, accelerated twenty metamorphoses at a time. As they exit, the
crowds, […] preserve the memory of a new found land, or a second reality, si-
lent, luminous, rapid and shifting. It is a feeling – something far better than an
idea – that cinema brings into the world.21
As Lukács wrote a year before, second nature has subjective presence; it acts upon
us. Epstein’s second reality, while formed under the conditions of second nature,
is a different nature still, for it appears to bring feeling into the world. The ‘feel-
ing’ with which the audience is left at the movie theater is both a physical trans-
formation and a memory of direct contact brought on by second reality. People
become things, things take on life, and in so doing create a second reality that
generates feeling.
Epstein was far from sanguine, however, about this second reality: “Life frag-
ments itself into new individualities. Instead of a mouth, the mouth, larva of
kisses, essence of touch. Everything quivers with bewitchment. I am uneasy. In a
new nature, another world.”22 This new and other world, accessed by cinematic
attention, is the world that has been hidden by naming, by classification, by mere
“symbols of reality uniform, proportionate, elective metaphors” – in other words,
by the mechanisms of reification.23 In opposition to this process, the camera re-
veals the secrets hidden in reality’s apparent uniformity. In Epstein’s view, you
don’t know a place until you have filmed it, through close-ups and multi-faceted
inspection. Our senses, by contrast, merely present us with symbols of reality that
are “uniform, proportionate.” These are symbols, in Epstein’s words, “not of
matter” but of “energy.” Epstein continues: “We say ‘red,’ ‘soprano,’ ‘sweet,’ ‘cy-
press’ when there are only velocities, movements, vibrations.”24 With a codifying
stamp like ‘red,’ a word masks the disorderly complex of energies at work, but
film can capture the forces in the color that our language cannot. Our senses have
been impoverished by symbolization, in much the same way we use a word to
simplify, order, and thus contain a more raw and dynamic reality. Just as the con-
vention of language turns energy and matter into static dead things, to see ac-
cording to a conventional perspective deprives things of their formless vitality. To
follow Epstein in the process of undoing the shackles of language and liberating
our overly trained senses is difficult. It is a matter of seeing “what is,” which is
always dressed up, shaped not only by language, but also by the conventions of
seeing and the hegemony of form.
For Georges Bataille, the difficulty of seeing ‘what is’ arises because of the
authority of form, which requires things to take shape, have form; shape up! The
lack of form, by contrast, is always degraded. In Bataille’s essay of the same
name, “formless” is a term that denigrates where it has no right to do so. It is:
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a term that serves to bring things down in the world, generally requiring that
each thing have its form. What it designates has no rights in any sense and
gets itself squashed everywhere, like a spider or an earthworm. In fact, for
academic men to be happy, the universe would have to take shape. All of phi-
losophy has no other goal: it is a matter of giving a frock coat to what is, a
mathematical frock coat.”25
The power of form over a world that simply ‘is’ for Bataille and the tendency to
make uniform what is fragmented for Epstein present formidable obstacles. In
his discussion of photogénie, Epstein not only voices the difficulty of defining a
concept that refers to things for which there are no words, but also suggests, as
does Bataille’s advocacy for the formless, that photogénie is elusive, underfoot, and
at risk of being trod upon:
Photogénie is not simply a fashionably devalued word. A new leavening; divi-
dend, divisor and quotient. One runs into a brick wall trying to define it. The
face of beauty, it is the taste of things. […] Elusive, it is often trampled under-
foot like the promise of riches with which an undiscovered coal-seam embla-
zons the earth.26
Although photogénie is jeopardized precisely because of its characteristic elusive-
ness, it derives its strength from its relationship to the camera, which can give us
access to “velocities, movements, and vibrations.” Although our human senses
fail to see what simply is, the camera succeeds precisely because it is not human
and therefore not spoiled by intention.
Epstein’s writing presents the same temporal and spatial elasticity as cinema,
expanding moments of encounter with the world from a close-up outwards, be-
ginning at cellular levels, or condensing a complex scene into one word. As was
his claim for photogénie, his writing circumvents conscious cognition and instead
grabs you with the tempo of a good film. Epstein records his surroundings in
fragments, by shifting angles and focus, by breaking down the environment into
close-ups. Gliding along the Seine, for example, his attention is drawn to the
lights’ glow, to the moths clustered around them, and finally to the ash marks
left by the touch of their wings on someone’s forehead.27 The boat, like the cam-
era, turns landscape into a “landscape dance.” Epstein’s interest in minutiae often
makes it difficult to get a concrete purchase on the scene as a whole. From his
interest in the moth’s ash residue to his curiosity about what lies beneath appear-
ances – that is, “the consistent world of our practical experience” beneath which
“hide the surprises of a reality that is very diffuse” – Epstein can be seen as a
reader of ruins and fragments.28 “The consistent world of our practical experi-
ence” to which one is habituated – the world of frock coats which has become
second nature – hides another reality that is diffuse, formless, and invaluable.
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Reducing the world to ruins and fragments was the crucial ‘awakening’ from the
second nature that so preoccupied Lukács, Benjamin, and Adorno. “For radical
natural-historical thought,” wrote Adorno, “everything existing transforms itself
into ruins and fragments […] where signification is discovered, in which nature
and history interweave.”29 Seeing things in pieces rather than whole, where their
shape or name makes them impervious to history, that is the task of the radical
historical materialist. Like the elusive moments of photogénie, these readings of the
material world are fleeting, transient, and precious.
Epstein’s atomist, materialist understanding of the world, with references from
Democritus30 to Lucretius,31 renders the world ripe for cinematic inspection, but
the camera’s transformation of the world is also “an occult business.” Like the
Epicureans, Epstein turned to the world of matter for the material of enchant-
ment; however, the transformation of matter into cinema was, for Epstein, reli-
gious. Cinema was “animistic, polytheistic.” Quite simply, Epstein wrote, “the
cinema is supernatural.”32 The close-up, for example, has powers of divination,
just as the study of an organ’s cells can determine the organ’s pathology. Indeed,
Epstein’s medical references blend seamlessly with cinema’s supernatural
powers: “Possibilities are already appearing for the drama of the microscope, a
histophysiology of passions, a classification of the amorous sentiments into those
which do and those which do not need Gram’s solutions.”33 In histophysiology,
the microscopic structure of cells and tissues is related to the entire organ; some-
thing can be detected about the heart, for example, by focusing on its smallest
component. Someday, wrote Epstein, “Young girls will consult [close-ups] in-
stead of the fortune-teller.”34 The close-up as a fortune-teller for matters of the
heart resurfaces later in his film work on the islands, but his point here is that
close-ups help us understand the truth of things better. They do this precisely
because they do not show things in their entirety, but rather cut them up and
expose them. “While we are waiting,” he continues, “we have an initial sketch in
the close-up. It is nearly overlooked, not because it errs, but because it presents a
ready-made style, a minute dramaturgy, flayed and vulnerable.”35 The close-up
shows the formless underbelly that is shrouded by the tendency to name and
order things. The alien sensibility of the camera offers entrance into a second
life, one through which the world’s matter becomes the source not only of under-
standing but also of enchantment.
Epstein’s exhaustive explorations of the sensibility the modern world requires
to perceive it puts him at the advance front of the modernist project, in both
artistic and theoretical terms. In what appears to be a retreat from modernity,
however, Epstein turned his camera toward that which he felt to be already
authentic, the Breton Islands. His interest in this environment commences with
his work on Finis Terrae, filmed on the island of Ouessant beginning in the sum-
mer of 1928. He then continued by returning multiple times, eventually making
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six films on the islands of the archipelago and three in mainland Brittany, the last
of these in 1948.
The islands of the Ouessant archipelago were thinly populated, barren, and at
that time, free from modern technology.36 The islands were marginal to the
French state and dominated by the church. Houat Island, for example, was
known as a theocracy and did not become fully part of the French administrative
system until 1891.37 Even the islands’ relationship to the church was not simple,
for the rector had a significant financial and bureaucratic hold over the villagers.
In 1903, the rector was not only parish curate, but also head of the fishermen’s
union, city toll collector, post officer, captain of the port, justice of the peace,
notary public, letter writer, pharmacist, and doctor, to name but a few. As late as
1973, he was still public letter writer, solicitor, chemist, and owner, on behalf of
the church, of the island’s self-service shop. Through his ability to extend credit,
he had absolute power over the people’s finances. He also controlled their access
to alcohol as well as to the foyer of the church, which was the only suitable festive
meeting place.38 This control belied the deeper ways in which the demands of
fishing life on the islands did not align with Catholic practices and beliefs. For
example, a fisherman would not be able to attend mass routinely, and there was a
rift between life on land – associated with the church, women, and children – and
life at sea, which was exclusively male and was associated with more traditional
religious beliefs and customs than those of the Catholic church. Death at sea was
such a dominant fact of life that talk inevitably turned to that topic, according to
Paul Jorion’s 1982 account of his fieldwork from 1974-75. According to Jorion,
the beliefs associated with death at sea that lie outside the Catholic Church are
various products of the life of these men at sea where religion is a matter between
them and the heavens. The fortunes and misfortunes of fishing were attended to
by magical as well as religious observation. It is into this complex context that
Epstein brings his metal brain.
Ouessant Island is at the very margin of the nation-state, historically and physi-
cally. Insofar as the center needed the periphery to authorize the modernist proj-
ect, the countryside is an important part of the conceptual furniture of the nation-
state. Epstein arrived in this region curious about how the technological progress
so endemic to the city might find ways to impact the Islands and why the people
there nevertheless seemed, in his eyes, to prefer their isolation. While he went
there for authentic, raw material, he also noted how modern life was seen
through the islanders’ eyes. When a merchant, for example, came to demonstrate
the wireless, Epstein described the scene with mockery. There was so much sta-
tic, he wrote, the only thing you could hear clearly was Poland.39 Although he
clearly saw the islands as “terres vierges pour le cinéma,” they were not unknown
territory.40 Vincent Guigueno’s study, Jean Epstein, cineaste des îles, stresses the point
that to see Epstein’s first trip there as a “shock” is a serious mistake. He had
visited the area, though not this island, as a child; he had read and derided novels
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and travel journals that painted the people as simpletons, exotics, or primitives;
and he had written passionately against the heavy-handed and uncaring behavior
of the church. Moreover, the area, though remote, had long been a site for adven-
turous tourists, artists, and writers in the summer months. The island was virgin
territory for his cinematic encounter, but not for Epstein himself.
Epstein wrote of Ouessant: “In this place and people is resumed the mystery of
men dedicated to land that is but rock, to a sea which is but foam, to a hard and
perilous trade suffering a meager self-sufficiency.”41 Why, Epstein asked, so close
to the mainland, do they prefer this risk? Lukács’ description of first nature is a
possible response: “When the structures made by man for man are really ade-
quate to man, they are his necessary and native home; and he does not know the
nostalgia that posits and experiences nature as the object of its own seeking and
finding.”42 The islanders operate within nature, whereas Epstein is looking from
outside and would be, in Lukács’ view, looking at a product of his own objectifi-
cation. Given the many artifices that ensnare filmmaking, such as make-up, act-
ing, sets, and lighting, along with Epstein’s reverence for the material world, the
islands seem to have offered him precisely what Lukács had claimed was no long-
er accessible: “[t]he first nature, nature as a set of laws for pure cognition, nature
as the bringer of comfort to pure feeling.”43 Time and again, Epstein writes of the
camera’s unique perceptual access to the world, through which one could see the
minutiae and energies otherwise hidden by the habits and prejudices of human
perception. For Epstein, the world of matter already is full of energy and drama, if
we would only train the camera upon it. The Island, free of all manner of make-
up, sets, and acting, was a place where “existing reality” could make more direct
contact with the camera than in urban or staged settings. Writing of filming Finis
Terrae, he said, “Most films are an invention which the author tries to make seem
real. [...] I have tried to achieve dramatic illusion in reverse, as it were, by lending
an existing reality to the more general characteristics of fiction.”44 To present the
camera with a location generally free from mediation and artifice, flush with nat-
ural matter – stones, plants, seas, skies – surely featured in his choice of these
locations.
It is difficult to pinpoint what prompted Epstein to go to Ouessant Island to
make Finis Terrae because he was uncertain about his own motives: “Drawn by
what I no longer know,” he wrote, “I went to Brittany to seek the authentic ele-
ments for this film which became Finis Terrae.”45 The film was, in his words, “the
reproduction of a brief drama comprising events which really happened, of
authentic men and things.”46 But it was specifically the mixture of artifice and
nature that provided the formula for Epstein’s investigation there. The narrative
of Finis Terrae builds upon this natural setting and its native people. It tells the
story of the friendship between two men, Ambroise and Jean-Marie, who languish
in the hot sun on a small island to which they have sailed to gather kelp. Insofar
as the story was derived from a local newspaper clipping, it is comprised of
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“events which really happened.” As to “authentic men and things,” the characters
are played by Islanders – men and women in their native setting, acting out that
story. The simplicity of the story obscures its subtle and complex psychodramatic
elements, in which a series of perceived slights and rebukes escalates to a brief
violent moment. Their bottle of wine smashes on the rocks, a sad, brutal occur-
rence on this island where alcohol was a uniquely valued commodity to which the
priest controlled access47 and where red wine was worth double its price in cur-
rency.48 Worse still, Ambroise has cut his finger, and the wound begins to fester.
In the ensuing drama, Ambroise lies in the hot sun, sweating, his pain ignored by
Jean-Marie. Lying in a hammock at dusk, Ambroise becomes delirious and falls
into a dream-like state. Phare du Creach, one of the most powerful lighthouses in
the world, appears, although it is otherwise not within his field of vision in the
film.
Until this moment, the film had been designed to show the workings of kelp
gathering in almost ethnographic detail, occasionally employing slightly slowed
motion for the sea and the actors’ emotions. The appearance of the lighthouse
marks a dramatic change in the film’s style, introducing a kind of hallucinogenic
encounter. Ambroise’s delirium is crosscut with a direct beam from the light-
house as if refracted in Ambroise’s eyeball, although it is not. The cinematic ex-
change between bodily pain and technological ocular power, between his arm
and the lighthouse, repeats. Intercut with his memory of the breaking bottle, the
lighthouse and its light create a dizzying spectacle from which he eventually
wakes. While the lighthouse is not a camera, it nonetheless evokes photogénie and
produces its effects insofar as it communicates directly with Ambroise’s body.
The lighthouse appears once more in the film when the doctor tries to locate the
men after an absence of three days. (Although the people announce they are
going to the Stiff lighthouse, also on the island, it is clearly Phare du Creach.)
Although they learn the sea is rough, they nonetheless embark on a rescue mis-
sion. Ambroise’s life clearly at risk, Jean-Marie puts him in a boat and attempts to
row back to the larger island but his efforts are hardly a match for the current.
When the fog sets in, the voyage looks impossible. Meanwhile, the doctor has set
out with a search party, and the two boats eventually meet in the sea passage,
where the doctor drains the wound and Ambroise begins to recover. Returned to
the main island, the drama is over, and Ambroise’s healing begins.
Although the drama has ended, the film has not. An important, epilogue-like
ending reasserts Epstein’s investment in examining the tension between technol-
ogy and nature in the film. The doctor is called away to another patient, and the
film ends with his walking away towards an empty landscape, a little drunk due to
the thankful offices of Ambroise’s mother. Though the film began as the story of
a friendship, it ends abruptly with the doctor walking off, with a boy at his side,
their backs to the camera. The ending highlights the doctor’s role in the drama
and his position relative to the community; moreover, it suggests an affinity be-
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tween Epstein, who trained as a doctor, and the character in the film. When we
are introduced to the Dr. Lesser, he is shown playing his gramophone for a group
of children, immediately associating him with modern technology and a privi-
leged outsider status. This is precisely Epstein’s own status, and in the end – after
having brought modern mediation (in the doctor’s case, modern medicine; in
Epstein’s case, the camera) into direct contact with the rugged, hazardous, primi-
tive landscape – he departs. Epstein wrote of this filmmaking experience: “Leav-
ing the Ouessant archipelago, I felt I was taking with me not a film but a fact. And
once this fact had been transported to Paris, something of the material and spiri-
tual reality of the island life would henceforth be missing. An occult business.”49
If one understands Epstein the director as the technological doctor, once the story
is over, and his work is done, he rightly packs up and leaves, taking this “fact,”
namely the film, along with him.
While the action of Finis Terrae largely takes place on land, shots of the water
dominate. Water, with its inherent movement, is by nature photogenic, and Ep-
stein’s filming of water is almost trance-like. While this creates a kind of filmic
reverie, it also reflects the omnipresence of the sea’s danger – whether because it
is too calm or too tempestuous for safe travel – in the Islanders’ lives. Belle-Île-en-
Mer, the much larger island on which Le Tempestaire was shot in 1947, shares in
the isolation and danger of the Ouessant archipelago. The film’s prelude swings
wildly back and forth, panning the ocean and sky in the midst of a storm as if
attached to a ship’s boom gone out of control. The drama opens in stillness, a
stillness reminiscent of René Clair’s Paris que dort (1925), with fishermen frozen in
motion, looking out at the sea, and women caught in the midst of spinning wool
and knitting.50 The film winds into motion, a motion that increases in intensity as
the storm gathers its forces.
Structurally, the film crosscuts the drama of nature with a simple human dra-
ma, a wife’s fear of her husband’s death at sea. The constant proximity of death
exercised a strong hold on people’s daily lives that extended religious practices
and beliefs beyond Catholicism. Death at sea could mean a lost body, and with
that the threat of chaos for its soul. Jorion writes, “by his presence the priest
manages to keep things under control when death seems to be threatening, but
the coming of the night…brings non-Christian beliefs concerning the dead back
to the mind.”51 While spinning wool at home during the day, a woman is frigh-
tened by an ill omen that she believes concerns her husband; by nightfall she is
terrified. She inquires about the Tempest Master, whose ability to control storms
had saved Islanders from danger long ago. She first stops at the lighthouse to
find out what can be done about the storm. The two men there point to the wire-
less and say that sometimes it can help. She doesn’t even glance at the wireless;
instead she asks about the Tempest Master, now a reputed drunk.52 She hurries
off in search of him. As she exits the lighthouse, the camera crosscuts between
the Tempest Master in his garden with a close-up of the wireless, continuing to
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pit his magical powers against the wireless. Upon entering the house, the noises
of the impending storm are temporarily shut out. After repeated appeals, the
Tempest Master unveils his glass ball, and conjures the sea.
With Le Tempestaire, Epstein was both expanding the photogenic properties of
cinema to sound, and refining, sobering his optical strategies. In 1926, Epstein
had said that the cinema of the kaleidoscope was a thing for children. After film-
ing Le Tempestaire some twenty years later, Epstein noted that within the category
of the fantastic, film can do anything: “Trick photography can do everything,
change pumpkins into coaches, divide the waters of the sea, make magic carpets
fly, compel John the Baptist, once he has been beheaded, to carry his own head to
Herod.”53 However, for Epstein, these tricks are amusing but not convincing; all
such devices will eventually cease to astound. He dismisses the magic of tricks,
which exist merely to deceive, and distinguishes another sort of magic: “On the
opposite pole to the fabricated marvels, laboriously worked out and burdened
with decrepit futility, there exist, everywhere about us, true mysteries which the
motion picture camera discovers by itself, with a prodigious insight.”54 The reve-
lation of true mysteries doesn’t require tricks (complicated technical refinements,
photo-montage, etc.): “the camera discovers them by itself.” Indeed, “the only
sorcery the film requires is the basic faculty, of its organic and natural power of
making things and events larger or smaller in space or time.”55 Film’s basic facil-
ity to expand and condense time brings it back to its roots in consciousness, for
film, Epstein notes, was able to replicate the feeling of time.56 He is not interested
in the trickery of deception, but in a far more serious sort of magic: “Slowed
down eight times, a wave also develops an atmosphere of sympathetic magic.”57
The derision of tricks puts pressure on those moments in these later films when
he uses overtly disorienting, or re-orienting cinematographic methods used for a
more serious purpose than “contrived miracles.” These moments are associated
with both technology and the risk of death. In Le Tempestaire, sorcery and technol-
ogy combine as they did in Finis Terrae, only this time through cinematic as well as
narrative devices, to save the husband’s life by quieting the impending storm.
The Tempest Master deploys the imitative form of sympathetic magic by blow-
ing at the stormy sea’s image in the glass. With this first attempt, as if to put
sorcery and science in competition, the scene is rapidly inter-cut with shots of
the wireless. The filming of the sky speeds up, accompanied by high musical
shrieks; then the alchemy begins as the sound of the slowed-down waves enters
the room. Disorienting, almost impossible views made possible by the camera
lens, coupled with reflections at the level of mise-en-scène, signal the collapsing
of technology and magic. At one point, the close-up of the crystal ball condenses
four spatial layers: the Tempest Master holds the ball, and the sea churns within
it, while this already- complex image is superimposed onto a seascape outside, as
the young woman’s face is reflected on the surface of the glass ball. The close-up
of the orb shows the sea, which then appears in full screen. Epstein repeats this
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cut from the shot of the sea in the orb to the full-screen shot of the sea several
times, as if to emphasize that the camera has taken over the sorcerer’s role. The
sorcerer blows onto the glass for the second time, the sea stops and ultimately
reverses its motion, followed by a parallel reversal in the sound, until finally the
seas relax, tranquil. He blows a third, final time; the glass orb falls to the ground
and shatters, and at that moment the husband appears.
While Epstein had left his “tricks” far behind, in this scene he demonstrates
the ability to convey a new, cinematic nature. The object under the lens’s indiffer-
ent scrutiny – the object in close-up – is at once the glass orb and the sea. In
Epstein’s terms, such a close-up should give us access to something else: “res-
pect, fear or horror.” In the context of this island story, the camera’s power is
even graver, for it faces off with the fact of death at sea and subjugation to nature
at its most extreme. The sea is the face of death, both in the individual story and
in the way Epstein has built its image in the film, returning to its muscular waves,
noisy foam, and swirling currents over and over again, as if death itself were
underneath with all its energies colluding to pull in the living. The moment when
the crystal ball (in close-up in the Tempest Master’s hand) is superimposed onto
the sea yields the viscerality that defines photogénie. Nature (the sea) and second
nature (the lens through which we see it, the glass ball) combine; the sea’s move-
ment and its sound slow down, stop, and reverse in a moment of physis. Momen-
tarily, cinema’s sorcery is palpable.
Adorno notes that it is not to nature but to second nature that we must attend
in order to deal with its deadening effect on modern life. Epstein went to the end
of the earth, where the risk of death at sea was an everyday fear, to film nature
unadorned. He did so not to redeem nature, but to demonstrate the camera’s
magical power. No longer merely a mimetic tool that turns nature into second
nature, in the film’s confrontation with death, Epstein goes beyond the limits of
nature versus second nature, which continually keeps us in such a double bind.
Critical Theory referred to such an event as ‘awakening.’ In the case of this film,
the conflict between nature and second nature is finally staged as a confrontation
with death. It is death, as Benjamin wrote in The Origins of German Tragic Drama,
that most profoundly distinguishes between the immediate and the mediated
world. He writes, “Death digs most deeply the jagged demarcation line between
physis and signification.”58 Cinema continually rests atop that line between visc-
eral natural eruptions (physis) and the conferral of meaning (signification). Photo-
génie transports the secrets of the material world – their significance – through
sight and sound to the body of the spectator. Its use in this scene not only con-
joins the technological with the magical, but also shows the redemptive possibil-
ity that cinema can stave off death. Not so much the death of a person, but the
stultifying conundrum of modernity’s phantasmagoria.
From the point of view of ethnographic surrealism, Epstein’s filming on the
Breton Islands was an encounter between the camera and the elements of nature
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in a site free from theatrical trappings, a place of “true mystery.” Epstein focused
on movement in nature and the minutely slowed-down actions of his non-profes-
sional actors; however, in rare bursts of photogenic frenzy, the encounter also
affected a head-on collision with other optical and aural technologies, which
form stylistic, if not narrative, climaxes within the films. In the case of Le Tempes-
taire, sorcery wins over the wireless, only to have that power purloined by the
camera. Recalling Epstein had predicted that “Girls will consult [close-ups] in-
stead of the fortune teller,” we can see that he has labored to make his own theory
an actuality. However, the cinematic engagement with sorcery here tells us
squarely where our faith and skepticism lies, whether or not we think the cam-
era’s reversal of motion has a sympathetic effect on the tempestuous ocean. Con-
densing interior and exterior spatial planes, stopping and reversing time, and
lowering the sea’s thunder, it is cinema, not sorcery, that emerges victorious.
Using film’s manipulation of time and space, cinema no longer merely copies
physical reality to make an uncanny double (this unreal thing, exactly), but
changes fate. Epstein’s boldest ethnographic-surrealist move is to usurp the sor-
cerer’s power.
From the point of view of Critical Theory, these films can be seen as experi-
ments with second nature’s transformative potential. Adorno wrote, “Whenever
‘second nature’ appears, when the world of convention approaches, it can be dec-
iphered in that its meaning is shown to be precisely its transience.”59 Second
nature reveals its meaning through its ephemerality. Second nature can be re-
made to be useful, immediate, and human through critique from the inside. The
elements of Epstein’s scene could not be more raw (water, sky, earth) nor the
technology more manifest. By reducing the film down to the elements of nature
and technology, and charging them through their friction, Epstein forces open a
new, different nature.
Clifford elaborated on a brief historical moment to theorize a Utopian concept,
hoping to influence anthropologists to take up a direction lost to the discipline.
Adorno and Benjamin understood the chances for “awakening” from second na-
ture as fleeting but not impossible. Epstein’s thoughts on photogénie too often
suggest that it is an ideal that is rarely realized. In 1928, he wrote, “Until now, I
have never seen an entire minute of pure photogénie. Therefore, one must admit
that the photogenic is like a spark that appears in fits and starts.”60 The alchemy
these ideas ask us to seek out is ephemeral by nature; at best they refer to mo-
mentary transformations. Epstein’s cultural encounter on the island allowed him
to assert the power of the camera in confronting such an environment; his stark
union of nature and second nature produced a moment that transcended those
confined categories. Ethnography’s radical encounter with cultural difference to
produce creativity and Critical Theory’s “awakening” are nebulous, fleeting, and
difficult to locate. Utopian thinking however, demands that we look.
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Cinema Seen from the Seas: Epstein and
the Oceanic
James Schneider
Traveling among the islands of Brittany, filmmakers – myself included – have
interrogated the crosscurrents of the cinematic and the oceanic. We have navi-
gated these waters accompanied by the specter of Jean Epstein’s own explorations
of the region from 1927 to 1948. My investigations of this fluid space have given
form to latent proposals found in Epstein’s work, which he had begun to elabo-
rate just before his disappearance, among them the theoretical and practical role
he accorded to the non-human in the filmmaking process. His cinematic experi-
ment in Brittany began by developing a profound collaboration with the real, in-
itially via the island population with whom he engaged. This evolved into one of
Epstein’s most striking propositions: that by using cinema to grant perspective to
the non-human – to the oceans, the tides, the tempests – humankind gains a vital
perspective on itself, a seeming reversal of perception and perspective.
Over several years, I recorded sounds and images on and between the islands of
Brittany.1 Part of this time, I was perched over the Atlantic on the westernmost
island of Ouessant, where Epstein shot his last, unfinished film. Once I filtered
this material, I placed it in interaction with elements from the vast archives Ep-
stein left behind: interviews, manuscripts, notes scrawled on scraps of paper,
newspaper clippings, and images from his films. The connections between these
elements have provided clues to understanding the mysterious impulse that drew
Epstein to the islands and have revealed the inspiring space his work inhabited
when he parted company with cinema. An image of Epstein’s oceanic experience/
experiments emerges from three principal sources: materials that document Ep-
stein’s making of the maritime films, his theoretical writings on cinema, and the
results, half a century later, of my own search – camera and microphone in hand
– for the residual traces of his work in Brittany.
Epstein’s motives for choosing to work among these rugged islands are evident in
the nature of the place itself. Here the cinematograph finds itself operating in a
space characterized by potent entities, where an interpenetration of death, fear,
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and unpredictability are all embodied in and directed by the ocean’s flux. When
Epstein began filming off the western coast of Brittany in 1927, he found cultures
that had remained virtually untouched by industrial society, functioning largely as
they had for centuries, poor but self-sufficient, hardened against the elements,
and anchored in moral, superstitious, and religious traditions. Coupled with the
severe natural environment and treacherous waters, this was and remains today a
land of extremes. Amidst this harsh reality, Epstein tested the extent to which the
region was receptive to his avant-garde techniques and to his broader aspirations
for cinema, on both human and geophysical registers. To reconsider cinema
within this oceanic realm today is to reassemble an image of how cinema can
mutate and evolve when faced with an abundance of the real.
Epstein did not immediately understand his “impulse toward the exterior,” the
strange attraction which drew him from a secure position within the Parisian
avant-garde toward the unfamiliar edge of France and the European continent.2
The westernmost tip of Brittany is at the margins of European identity and cul-
ture: France but not France, an in-between space and yet a specific location, a
metaphorical site for cinema. In 1921, Brittany had already entered Epstein’s con-
sciousness, as he observed in Bonjour Cinema that the region was indubitably other
than the “picturesque” it was popularly known for. By the late 1920s, these insu-
lar environments appeared in his films as uncorrupted by industrial or popular
culture: “[D]ifficult to access for tourists, this is virgin terrain for cinema.”3
From the outset of Epstein’s maritime cycle, the islands function as marginal
zones defined by fluctuations between presence and absence, solid and liquid,
life and death. The tensions inherent in the place itself provided an ideal labora-
tory for testing and developing an aesthetic that itself combined avant-garde tech-
niques with realist subjects. Over the next two decades, Epstein confirmed the
justness of this impulse to bring his avant-garde cinema to the “extrème occi-
dent.”
Two films stand as key references to his later maritime period: the dynamic
whirlwind of an auto-portrait, La Glace à trois faces (1926) and the “deliverance”
from his obsession with Edgar Allan Poe’s supernatural in The Fall of the House of
Usher (1927). According to one piece of evidence that lists sites in Brittany that he
visited, it was while shooting Usher that the region first seduced him. His return
trips took him further and further west, until eventually (in 1928) he brought a
camera to film a few tests. This marks the beginning of Epstein’s conscientious
process of allowing himself to be guided by cinema’s discoveries. It is following
his contact with the landscapes and peoples of the region in his first Breton film,
Finis Terrae (1928), a lyrical but threadbare narrative featuring kelp gatherers (goë-
monniers), that he pieces together his own motivations for an unanticipated yet
enduring shift to Brittany. He wrote: “After Usher, I believed that without the
sound film, the color and 3D film, progress toward the creation of a second rea-
lity was stopped short. In the meantime, I tried to obtain the dramatic illusion
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backward, so to speak, by giving an existing reality the more general characteris-
tics of fiction.”4 Epstein initially sensed the islands’ harrowing events and mythi-
cal narratives as beyond real, defying rational thought and able to offer a much-
needed boost to the art. In 1928, he thus inaugurated a phase in his work he
called “Approches à la vérité” (“Approaches to truth”) which would continue until
the end of his life.5 As Epstein’s treatise on his empirical-materialist experiment
in Brittany and as a theoretical guide to Finis Terrae, it establishes his revelation
that in a realm where human and natural life interact, the fantastic should be
unveiled rather than manufactured. These “approaches” were also propositions
for ways to expand popular film genres through avant-garde research.
Prior to filming in Brittany, Epstein presented a vision of a technically advanced
cinema whereby exterior filming would one day become obsolete. Studios would
be able to create all decors synthetically with full control over color and perspec-
tive. His initial experiences in Brittany not only radically changed this imagined
future, but fomented a rupture (at great professional cost) with the artifice and
technical dependence of his Parisian period. Heading west, Epstein abandoned
the urban exterior settings, stage sets, and oppressive infrastructure of studio
film production in favor of a “second reality.” Removing the exoskeleton of in-
dustrial production exposed his cinema to previously undocumented elements
and landscapes. Epstein’s films now would be shaped by the very reality they pre-
viously would have framed. In particular, the innate and unwieldy power of the
ocean precipitated new ways of conceptualizing and making films.
The move to the outer reaches of Brittany served as a conceptual displacement,
removing the filmmaking process from one cultural milieu in order to test it in
another. His later maritime films stand as experiments that work through an ar-
ray of techniques and theories. The results from these “research” films were
nearly imperceptibly folded into his subsequent experiments. Again transposed
back to Paris and the urban environment, elements of films such as Mor’Vran
“lost some of their magic” according to Epstein, but the aspects that weathered
this second part of the cycle confirmed their enduring value. Epstein’s close-ups,
slow motion, acceleration, and special effects innovations – in short, the elements
that contribute to photogénie in its technical sense – interacted with the material
presence and creative potential of these natural spaces. Epstein’s role was as an
enabler for the cinematograph, searching for ways the cinematograph could ac-
cess the unknown and the peripheral. His return trips to Brittany confirmed his
belief that the encounter between cinema, the “intelligent machine,” and the
oceanic expanded human perception and understanding, and disturbed the “very
foundations of philosophy.” From Epstein’s filmic experiments, texts, and inter-
views, it becomes clear that much of his important later writings, including L’In-
telligence d’une machine and Esprit du cinéma, are the result not only of his erudition,
curiosity, and genius but also of his empirical work of filmmaking during this
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period – as his sister, Marie Epstein says, not making “films according to his
theories, but rather theories according to his films.”6
Epstein’s experiments in Brittany began on a familiar scale, by filming “indi-
genous actors,” with their oceanic environment operating largely as dramatic
support. The initial access to the oceanic was thus through the inhabitants them-
selves. Just as the surrounding seas determined the overall ambiance of the films
and the production schedules, the inhabitants created the essence of their own
representation. In other words, the actual “acting,” as with other narrative deci-
sions, was only imposed as far as necessary, the non-professional actors “rigor-
ously determining the sense of the work.” For Epstein, inhabitants who lived
within the environment, with all its volatility and seemingly supernatural occur-
rences, became when filmed a projection of their experience in this space. The
emulsion of the film absorbs and transmits, as Epstein put it, “the action they’ve
already accomplished, of anything else they aren’t capable.” Having spent their
lives on and surrounded by water, these actors possessed an oceanic quality pecu-
liar to the region: “Isn’t their character a reflection of it? Have you noticed that
they never affirm how much volatility, fluidity there is in them; like the sea, their
thoughts are perpetually moving, everything moves within them; in the very way
they look, their physical appearance, there is something moving.”7 For Epstein,
cinema is seen to invest all filmed subjects with a trace of the oceanic. Likewise,
filming these island inhabitants upon whom the ocean has placed “its hidden
mark” draws the film towards the fluidity and unfamiliarity embodied by the in-
habitants.
Epstein foresaw this use of non-professionals as a technique that would evolve
beyond his time, predicting that non-professional actors of every “social class”
would some day participate in fiction films. This was part of his overall project of
locating the exceptional in, and rendering visible, the forgotten and the voiceless.
After Finis Terrae, all of his Breton films featured non-professionals, with the ex-
ception of Île Perdue (1938). This was a keystone of his “Approaches,” but was only
a part of both a larger dialogue with the islands and a more responsive and adap-
table method of production. What is particularly striking is that these films to this
day continue to operate as an integral part of the inhabitants’ identities, as docu-
ments of their cultural trajectories. Over the two decades he intermittently worked
in the region, much of his time was spent absorbing the local lore, documenting
recent and ancient tales. The scripts he carried to sea were minimal scenarios
within which local narratives could develop. A local guide would help to find
actors and locations and provide logistical information. Whether François Morin
on Ouessant or Christian Lanco on Belle Isle en Mer, the guides were charismatic
and well known.
Following the hardships and near-deportation that Epstein experienced during
World War II, there is a clear change in the perspective of his maritime films from
the 1940s. The role of objects, nature, and the ocean in particular take on far
198 james schneider
greater importance in these films and indicate yet another departure from his ear-
lier works. However, Epstein’s pre-Brittany films foreshadow the centrality of the
aquatic in his later films. In La Belle Nivernaise (1923), Cœur Fidèle (1923), Double
Amour (1925), and Le Lion de Mogols (1924), water becomes an element of psycho-
logical import, linked with notions of exile and destiny. The aquatic scenes in
these films are also where one finds the more frequent use of double exposures;
the liquid element was already inspiring and facilitating experimentation. In a
scene from La Glace à trois faces (1927), the protagonist rows a small boat as one of
the three lovers says to him, “I am but a poor girl.” We see him smile at her as if
to say, “It doesn’t matter,” followed by a close-up of her calloused hand. She then
smiles a sad smile and dips her hand into the water as the boat glides along. The
water takes on the role of an undiscriminating purifying element. Epstein would
later humorously criticize films whose only natural settings were the same sort of
harmless bodies of water found in the Parisian peripheries. But if these tranquil
waters could create such effects, the larger question remains what the power of
the ocean would be. Would it be a healing force? A provider? Or a future director
of human activity on earth?
While being interviewed on the subject of his final film, Feux de la mer, Epstein
was asked what attracted him to creating maritime films and working on the
islands. He responded that he was motivated by fear. It was fear of the ocean,
and more importantly, “fear that demands we do what we fear to do.”8 The ocean
and its islands represent for Epstein a “perverse” kind of potential which both
recognizes a spectral power beyond our understanding or control and inspires
one to feel reinvigorated with the desire to live, to respond to fear with actions
designed to remain among the living. In this sense, the ocean’s forcefulness, un-
predictability, and reign over humankind position it as an ultimate cinematic sub-
ject; indeed, it is my opinion that spending long periods of time with the sea
should be a required ritual for all aspiring filmmakers. While for some, the train
persists as the reigning metaphor for cinema, for Epstein (and I concur) it is the
ocean and seafaring vessels. This is also perhaps the case for Andrei Tarkovsky’s
film Solaris, in which another planet’s ocean functions as an omnipotent and un-
knowable entity, evading human understanding and humbling humankind while
manifesting its powers in unpredictable and dangerous ways. Oceans decide the
rhythms of daily life and who lives or dies, whether heroically or terrifyingly, as in
Poe’s Descent into the Maelstrom. Poe’s image of that decisive moment, when the
surface of the northern seas opens up, also encapsulates the power Epstein
sensed in the oceanic. It is the point when the buoyancy of man’s ingenuity sur-
faces and he resolves not to be drawn into the depths, but it is also the moment
that confirms the fragility and resignation of those who go down with the ship.
As much as they take lives, the seas surrounding the islands of Ouessant and
Sein in particular are viewed to this day as benefactors in the minds of the inhab-
itants, as if the seas could simply materialize desired objects. On the islands, I
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heard the typical tales of the once-bountiful seafood catches but also of barrels of
rum and wine washing up on shore, as well as containers of shoes, oranges,
cigarettes and (the less practical) hundreds of plastic ducks. And then, of course,
there is the increasing amount of trash. The houses themselves were once con-
structed with pieces of wood that floated ashore; one just had to wait one’s turn.
Epstein pointed out after his first shoot in the archipelago, “The primary virtue of
water is patience.”9 This revelation is as important for the island residents as it is
for filmmakers learning to adapt to an alien temporality and spatiality. The
ocean’s proper cycles are inextricably linked with its majestic and continuous
movements, its mysterious conveyor belts, global currents, and the altering
weather patterns and microclimates it shapes. It is a fluctuating, breathing entity
with neither commencement nor terminus. The cinematograph, uniquely capable
of adapting and representing these temporalities, also takes cues from oceanic
notions of distance, spacing, and continuity. The waters separating the islands
and continents from each other act as interstices between the distant locations of
shots or locations cut together. Water dominates the surface of the Earth but
generally is considered a nowhere, while its currents create the continuity between
all the somewheres. And as Thales advanced some 2,600 years ago, water is the
world’s primary unifying force, the world itself a sphere floating on liquid sub-
stance.
For the islanders the continent persists as the “other side,” and to move there
is a small death. The greater death is the other “other side,” an unknown that
Epstein would treat as a fear comparable to the vastness of the ocean itself. Cine-
matographically, the seas are a way to consider the passage from life to death.
This notion first appears in The Fall of the House of Usher (1928), where the coffin is
carried across the waters prior to burial. Many years later in 1953, this time with-
out a film camera and in deteriorating health, Epstein had one last wish to travel –
to the sea. Plans were made to drive to the coast with his sister, Marie, but the
night before their departure he died. After Usher yet prior to this final suspended
voyage came his maritime films, in which characters teeter constantly on the edge
of mortality, held in the squalls of tempestuous seas. As a vessel constantly navi-
gating between the worlds of the living and the dead, the animate and inanimate,
cinema is in its element on these islands and at sea. Brittany’s islanders have lived
for centuries with hundreds of ships sinking in their waters, with sailors regularly
lost at sea, anonymous bodies washing ashore. There were also those who joined
the merchant marine and simply disappeared. Death’s prominent role in the so-
cial fabric of the islands is quite particular, especially as it relates to cinema. The
ports of the region were, and to a lesser degree still are, a point of departure for
the open seas, where death navigates hand-in-hand with life, especially for fisher-
men. Two years after Epstein had attempted to reach the shores one last time, his
guide and closest friend on the islands François Morin, himself suffering from
heart troubles, was lost at sea in the waters off the mythical Pern Point at the tip
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of Ouessant. The Morin family related to me a telling encounter which occurred
during one of Epstein’s many visits to Ouessant. Epstein asked Morin’s sister,
Madame Drolec, who also plays the mother of Ambroise in Finis Terrae, how she
coped with her husband’s death at sea. According to family members, Epstein
was surprised to hear her say that it was for the best, that having borne so many
children it was a relief, for every time her husband returned from months at sea
she wound up with another child. The open discussions regarding death’s role
continue to serve as therapy on the islands, along with the acknowledgement that
it has a purpose and the ocean a place in executing its call. Close-ups of sailors’
faces serve in Epstein’s films as echoes of mortality, its marks engraved on their
visages. The same applies for filming the widows of lost sailors such as Madame
Drolec, her real loss transposed to the potential loss of her fictional son in Finis
Terrae.
With the knowledge that below the surface of the seas is a graveyard of ships,
the ocean’s fluid horizon separates the living and the dead. The perspective of
death, “a marvelous knower of man,” is yet another state of being from which to
solicit another approach to the living. During the maritime period this social trait
expands both the dramatic and structural aspects of Epstein’s filmmaking, as a
narrative theme and as another angle from which to enlarge the psychic space of
the film. Death acts as an invisible force, always lurking just beyond the visible.
Through the instruction of its works executed by the seas, and as one of man’s
ultimate fears and unknowns, it acts as a final instructive perspective. As Epstein
points out, “death makes us his promises by way of the cinematograph.”10
Chance and risk in this tragic oceanic realm can, in principle, draw cinema to-
ward new forms. As a child, Epstein’s first experience of cinema coincided with a
small earthquake that took place while he was traveling with his family in Croatia.
His sister, Marie, recounted her brother’s formative experience, adding that for
some time after “he no longer wanted to attend a spectacle that provoked such
dangerous phenomena, and which he believes can provoke even more dangerous
ones.”11 These elements of danger and unpredictability merge with Epstein’s pro-
found belief in cinema’s power to unveil what lies beyond common understand-
ing, its capacity to alter our relation to both the unknown and the unknowable.
Placed in formal and physical precariousness, cinema would also assure itself a
continuingly divergent path from the repetition of standardized narrative or doc-
umentary forms. With animate and inanimate objects and phenomena sponta-
neously entering into the filmmaking process, cinema is guaranteed ongoing per-
mutations. The decors, the actors, and the weather remain uncertain until fixed to
the emulsion, and even then, as with L’Or des mers, the entire film might have to be
re-shot, the rushes having been ruined by humidity. Epstein muses, “This victory
of the unpredictable is in no way deplorable. On the contrary, it contributes a
fresh element to cinematic art.” Epstein held that the human spirit requires this
element of the irrational and “external” so that rational thought would not dom-
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inate all human activity. In essence, the ocean fulfills this irrational function
throughout his maritime films. To this effect, integrating unpredictability into
the cinematic process acts as a form of control mechanism while paradoxically
marking a loss of control. And the greater the role of the unpredictable, the more
that failure and incompleteness becomes a possibility, as Epstein felt of a few of
his maritime films such as Mor’Vran. This he accepted as part of the experimental
process of advancing the art of cinema.
In 1947, with L’intelligence d’une machine (date places it in the maritime period),
Epstein cinematically describes the frontier between land and water and the pri-
mordial space in which our ancient ancestors first crawled ashore: “All of man is
no longer any more than a being of smooth muscles, swimming in a dense envir-
onment, where thick currents still carry and mold this clear descendant of the old
marine fauna, of the waters, mothers.”12 This pre-Socratic attraction to the vis-
cous, humid, and primordial finds its aesthetic counterpart in the turquoise
waters, foggy coastlines, and strange rock formations of the Breton islands, the
ideal space for a mutating cinema to evolve. Corsicans, islanders from a far cal-
mer Mediterranean sea, shiver at Ouessant’s nine-foot tidal differential, revealing
rocks invisible only a few hours earlier while the inhabitants of Molène speak of
strange mountainous forms that appear on the horizon. In such a place where
forms blend, objects seem alive, and the eyes play tricks, natural phenomena ef-
fortlessly transform into protagonists or antagonists, much like Victor Sjöström’s
The Wind (1928), in which the wind has a will and a way of its own. In Epstein’s
films, these phenomena develop on a plane with human beings, creating an at-
mosphere of suspended potentials. The environment performs much like the un-
biased non-professional actors, directly transmitting the authentic “movements”
found within it.
Epstein continued to de-center the human to a greater and greater degree over
the two decades of his maritime films. Brittany provided unlimited material for
fracturing, dislocating, and re-contextualizing human reality. The shift in per-
spective is apparent in Mor’Vran (1931). An intertitle of this film reads “The sea
speaks” as the non-human unwinds itself from the narrative. Sixteen years later,
with Le Tempestaire, a second effort at a similar narrative structure, these entities
inform and interact with each other, granting one another perspectives as a series
of reflections. In this film, described by Epstein as “my first avant-garde film
since L’Or des Mers in 1932,”13 the majority of screen time is completely devoid of
human presence; humans are “no more than symbolic figures against a back-
ground of earth and sea.”14 The film is a remarkable mise-en-scène of humankind’s
perilous status on earth. Humans are transformed into immobile objects sur-
rounded by a furious sea. Early in the film they figure as still images, then as the
winter storm unfurls on Belle Île en Mer, all they can do is run from shelter to
shelter.
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Le Tempestaire is Epstein’s prototype for his largely unrealized project of cine-
ma’s convergence of human and non-human perspectives. For this, sound oper-
ates as a key vehicle, yet was unavailable to Epstein during the filming of Mor’Vran.
Le Tempestaire, “a poem of the sea told by the wind,” was the only opportunity for
Epstein to truly experiment with access to perspectives through the “mechanical
ear,” opening up a whole field of possibilities regarding the expression of these
entities by way of their own proper voice quite apart from mankind’s perspective.
In Le Tempestaire, the sound of the ocean is played in slow motion, backward and
forward, with frequencies and textures drawn from the chaos of the winter storm.
Epstein predicted cinema would one day make use of a “sound perspectivism,”
whereby we could not only see objects expressing themselves but enter them
audibly. Sound is one of the key aspects of Epstein’s largely undeveloped projects
for cinema, an aspect which to this day is still arguably underutilized in cinema.
The shift towards an animist approach to filmmaking appeared early on in
Epstein’s work. Yet, it was after World War II and his decades-long engagement
with natural settings and phenomena such as storms, seas, wind, and clouds that
human figures were markedly de-centered. He seized on opportunities to multiply
perspectives in natural settings as he had previously done in Le Pas de la Mule
(1930) or his film about the eruption of Mount Etna, La Montagne infidèle (The Un-
faithful Mountain, 1923). The title of the corresponding text, Le Cinématographe vu de
l’Etna (The Cinema Seen from Etna, 1926) underscores the relocation of subjectivity
from the camera to the mountain, or the non-human subject. Other unrealized
films promised greater use of the non-human, such as Au Péril de la mer, for which
Epstein argues to potential producers that not only the ambiance but its budget
will profit from an abundance of exterior, characterless “ad hoc” shots. Epstein
suggests a pantheist-perspectivist cinema could develop alongside the emerging
science of quantum physics: “[A]n animism is being reborn. We know now that
we are surrounded by inhuman existences.”15 The cinematograph, as a vehicle for
appropriating perspectives, is ideally placed to interrogate man’s place in the ter-
restrial narrative, just as Galileo’s lens once did or as Doris Lessing also attempts
to do by investigating the perspective of extraterrestrials in order to analyze
earthlings’ destructive behavior from the vantage point of space. By engaging nat-
ural, rather than mechanical inhuman perspectives, cinema is capable of inex-
haustibly recognizing and analyzing the fictions and realities of civilization. This
blending of un-preconceived, “irrational,” natural, and outer perspectives con-
trasts with computer-generated works in which perspectives are either recreated
or entirely manufactured. Furthermore, this essay itself could be considered a
sketch for a much larger research project on Epstein’s late theory and practice as
it relates to the “geophilosophy” developed by Deleuze and Guattari in Mille Pla-
teaux.16
As the protagonist of Le Tempestaire frets about her fiancé perishing at sea,
clouds are accelerated, gestures slowed, temporality fluctuates, and the tempest
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master Floch blows into his crystal ball, the metaphorical cinema-eye accessing
parallel dimensions of existence and knowledge as the storm calms. In the origi-
nal script, however, Floch collapses and dies from exhaustion after engaging with
the movements of time and the natural elements. In this alternate ending, death
once again lies just beneath the surface. The figure of the Tempestaire, either dead
and martyred or alive and active, represents a vestige from an idealized pre-war
era, when the preferred “intelligent machine” was not the apparatus of war but
rather cinema’s advancement of human thought.
Epstein’s only two realized post-war films were Le Tempestaire and Feux de la mer,
both shot in Brittany, both using fear of the unknown and the imaginary no
man’s land separating life and death at the world’s end as a pressure zone power-
ing cinema. In the realm of the invisible and unrealized, the fiction film Bag Noz
remains one of the many post-war projects that he planned for the region.17 Ac-
cording to the script, which is drawn from local myth and adapted to a World
War II setting, the “boat of the night” would make port one last time on the
island of Ouessant, en route to the “exterior ocean” as it carried souls to the
beyond. Drifting into the land of shadows and fog, the sailors intuitively navigate
the fog and deceive the German marines, peering metaphorically into a freeze
frame, into mortality, but return to the island to tell the tale. Surviving Epstein to
this day, the real and mythological oceanic realms of Brittany remain an inspira-
tion for filmmakers, where cinema can die and be reborn again and again. Yet the
residual image of Epstein’s oceanic cinema remains perched on these outer edges
of reality not as a model but as an infinitely flexible cinematic ideal.
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A Temporal Perspective: Jean Epstein’s
Writings on Technology and Subjectivity
Trond Lundemo
The essence of technology, Martin Heidegger explains in “The Question Concern-
ing Technology” (1953), is nothing technological. It is a matter of the Erscheinung
(“coming to presence”) of Being of the work of art.1 The later writings of Jean
Epstein also identify a question of technology to be answered in the realm of
aesthetics and in processes of subjectivity. Instead of serving the development of
a necessarily strained and reductive analogy between Heidegger’s concepts and
Jean Epstein’s writings on cinema – indeed, Heidegger’s apparent techno-skepti-
cism and Epstein’s celebrations of film technology immediately seem irreconcil-
able – this relationship may prompt us to ask which is the “question concerning
technology” informing Epstein’s theory. The “automatic subjectivity” of cinema
asks the essential question of technology: whether it acts isomorphically in rela-
tion to our consciousness and our perception, and thus serves as a mere tool for
our actions and for our thinking, or if it invents an intelligence and a philosophy
of its own.2 Anyone familiar just with the titles of Epstein’s books and articles
knows his immediate answer to this question: there is a philosophy of the cine-
matograph and an intelligence of the machine. However, as the essence of tech-
nology is nothing technological, the answer is more complex than a complete
separation between human and technology. How does this other perception, this
differing space-time, relate to “everyday” human perception? How does it pro-
duce different ways of thinking and other forms of subjectivity?
I will approach these questions by looking at a central paradox in Epstein’s
writings: if the technology of cinema automatically sets off other perceptions of
time, space, and movement, this difference should apply to all films. That is not
the case, however. There is clearly an aesthetics of cinema informing Epstein’s
writings, where only some films in certain ages of cinema fulfill this potential for
transgression of the human boundaries of time and space. The relative lack of
analyses of specific films in his writings indicates that Epstein instead describes
an un-realized cinema yet to come. The paradox that these transgressive qualities
only exist in certain films at certain times while remaining an automatic aspect of
the technology is highlighted in Epstein’s description of the configuration of the
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senses in cinema, namely in the relationship between the ocular and the haptic. A
third topic of great importance for the development of cinema technology as an
essentially other perception than that of the human register is the concept of the
“temporal perspective.” Cinema introduces another modality of time into our
everyday regime of space-time, always making the one refer to the other without
assimilating the temporality of cinematic technology to our perception. Epstein
never defines “a nature of cinematic time,” since it is open to an infinity of mod-
ulations and variations. While everyday human perception tends to separate space
from time, cinema, according to Epstein, is a form that thinks by investing space
with time.3 This irreducible distance between the two regimes of perception of
time and space means that cinema technology is not a tool for human intention
and action, but forms different patterns of subjectivity and being than those that
exist outside cinema. Cinema cannot be assimilated to human perception and is
not structurally isomorphic with the mental apparatus.
The powerful canons of film historical periodization have grouped Epstein’s
films with the “French Impressionists,” leading scholars to find in them stylistic
figures as illustrations of subjective visions.4 This persistent view of his films has
also prejudiced the reading of his theory into an “Impressionist” agenda shared
with other theorist-directors of his time like Louis Delluc, Germaine Dulac, and
Abel Gance. While Epstein’s early writings sometimes offer space for such projec-
tions on the part of the reader, his writings from the mid-thirties on seldom do.
One possible reason why, up until today, his more consistent later texts have re-
ceived less attention than his early writings is that the break not only with the
“period” of impressionism but also with the “program” projected onto the move-
ment doesn’t fit with the expectations of the material. One element of resistance
to the modernist avant-garde offered by Epstein’s both early and late writings is
exactly the automatic powers of the technology of cinema, making cinema inassi-
milable to a subjective artistic vision or intention. Moreover, the significant ab-
sence of analyses of films as “works” also runs counter to the position of the art-
work as the cornerstone of modernist aesthetics.
Automatisms
Another French philosopher of technology and individuation, Gilbert Simondon,
criticized Western civilization for having failed to develop a culture of technical
objects, in his 1958 dissertation Du mode d’existance des objets techniques.5 Instead,
technology has been seen as either a passive tool for human needs or as having a
mind of its own, threatening to usurp the human mind. Both of these positions
are based on the idea of an isomorphic relationship between mental processes
and the way technology works. Epstein’s concept of “the intelligence of a ma-
chine” does at first glance look like a target for Simondon’s criticism of notions
of intellectual robots and artificial intelligence. Instead, the two theorists actually
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hold a similar position towards the question of the relationship between mind
and machine. Epstein’s “intelligence of the machine” designates an irreducible
difference between the machine and the human mind. In a passage called “The
Philosophy of the Cinematograph,” he claims:
The cinema is one of these intellectual robots, still partial, that fleshes out
representations – that is to say, a thought – through photo-electrical me-
chanics and a photo-chemical inscription. [...] This result would already be
remarkable if the cinematographic thought only did what the calculating ma-
chine does, to constitute itself in the servile imitation of human ideation. But
we know that the cinematograph, on the contrary, marks its representation of
the universe with its own qualities, of an originality that makes this represen-
tation not a reflection or a simple copy of conceptions, of an organic mental-
ity-mother, but rather a system that is individualized differently, partly inde-
pendently, which contains the incitements for a philosophy so far from
common opinions, the doxa, that one should perhaps call it an anti-philoso-
phy.6
This philosophy is only valid for the screen. The technology of cinema is not just
an augmentation of human vision but a different visibility altogether. This func-
tion in cinema is “individualized differently,” as it projects “an automatic subjec-
tivity” onto spectatorial subjectivity without these two dimensions ever coinciding
with each other.
This leads us to a consideration of what is sometimes a paradox, sometimes an
ambivalence in Epstein’s theory. As Nicole Brenez has pointed out, Epstein’s the-
ory of cinema presupposes that the cinematographic technology has these powers
to transform at its outset, and that every film necessarily performs these func-
tions.7 She confronts this with a position, exemplified by quotes from Abel
Gance, Robert Bresson, and Jean-Luc Godard, where cinema is called upon to
realize its true, still unattained, potential. While both positions are medium spe-
cific in that they pose that there is a power in cinema that exists nowhere else,
Epstein’s stance relies on the automatic powers of the technology, while the latter
position depends on the work and artistic agency. Epstein’s position in this cru-
cial question is inconsistent, however.
On the one hand, in line with his view of cinema’s automatisms, he rarely
analyzes single films. In an early text he singles out the Bell & Howell camera as
the true artist in cinema, and only after the technology comes the director, photo-
grapher, or editor, in the last of whom one often wants to invest the artistic
powers of the Seventh art.8 Epstein’s theory of cinema is one at code level, so to
speak, one that emphasizes that the techniques of inscription are the true “con-
tent” of the medium. This position breaks decisively with the cult of the singular
work or of the artist that is so central to the modernist aesthetics within which
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Epstein is so often grouped. By consequence, the idea of automatic powers of
ideation in technology has important consequences for the role of Epstein’s own
films in relation to his writings. Nothing in his films would make them more
interesting than any other films as examples of these powers of cinema if they
were automatically shaped by the technology. True to the principle of automa-
tism, Epstein only occasionally comments upon his films, and unlike many of his
contemporary filmmaker-theorists, like Eisenstein and Vertov, never analyzes
them at length.
The idea of an automatism of the medium is also what leads him to criticize
abstraction, surrealism, futurism, and, more generally, the avant-garde. These
movements have not realized the surreal powers internal to the technology, he
claims.9 All kinds of surrealism and abstraction are already present in cinema,
and any attempts at stylizing the pro-filmic fail to acknowledge this fact. Epstein
intervenes in the art debates by saying that the avant-garde film movements lack a
theory of the dispositif of cinema, and for this reason reproduce the same narra-
tives and shapes in cinema as in literature, art, and music.
On the other hand, Epstein repeatedly contradicts this “automatic” paradigm.
He develops a normative aesthetics of cinema that goes against his theses on the
automatism of the apparatus. Even if he only rarely makes observations on style in
films, and less and less so in his later work, he still comments on movements and
developments in cinema. Writing in 1930, Epstein claims that just like the old
films set up the camera in the “wrong” position, the microphones are directed in
primitive ways today.10 The only moments of phonogénie – Epstein’s neologism for
sonic effects analogous to the photogénie of the image – recorded so far have been
in faulty fragments of actualities. “Bilan du fin de muet” is brimming with these
appreciations about good and bad films.11 In “La naissance d’un mythe,” about
Charlot, he notes that Chaplin has not developed the dispositif of cinema, but used
it in a marginal and personal way, true to a British music-hall tradition.12 Epstein
is also critical of the concept of the ‘sound film’ in 1929, arguing that, in fact, it
only contains a few chansons.13 And in 1946, he worries that cinema has not
cultivated its most important powers and has instead gotten caught up in the
representation of fiction.14
Nicole Brenez positions Epstein’s theory of cinema’s automatism in opposition
to the idea – shared by Gance, Bresson, and Godard – of a potentiality in cinema
that remains unfulfilled; however, this account doesn’t take into consideration
Epstein’s ambivalence about this issue. Epstein’s inconsistency becomes apparent
in the concept of photogénie, which is at the same time a property of the technol-
ogy of cinema and yet only realized on rare occasions. In an early text on the
concept, which gradually loses its importance in his later writings, only a few
films have attained fragmentary flashes of this quality. Discussing some of the
works of his contemporaries from the French ‘avant-garde’ many years later, he
states: “Certainly, there are sequences by Delluc that are mysteriously successful:
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true cinema made almost entirely without any specifically cinematic means.”15
The idea of a “true cinema” even persists after the abandonment of the concept
of photogénie, and is opposed to films not realizing this potential, contradicting the
thesis of the automatic powers of technology. Epstein made the compilation film
Photogénies for exhibition in the Vieux-Colombier ciné-club in 1925, after which
the shots were disassembled. The selection of shots illustrating this key concept
in the film culture of the 1920s seems to demonstrate that “true cinema” only
occurs in certain places and particular states.
Epstein finds the reproduction of movement as we see it, in the fixed single-
shot cinema, uninteresting.16 This comment on the early cinema, in which he,
like so many of his contemporaries, fails to see all its transforming powers, de-
monstrates that it is in figures of time constructed through editing, slow motion,
and superimposed movements that the potential of cinema may be realized. Ep-
stein’s concept of movement does not concern movement in the image (which he
terms as static), but moving perspectives, editing, and aberrations of movement.
Almost all discussions of what cinema can do in Epstein’s writings are made up
of examples of movements being halted, accelerated, or reversed. This causes
problems for the theory of the philosophy of the “lens itself”, the automatic
powers of transformation of the camera.17 Rather, it is the powers of cinema to
suspend time, to instigate intervals in the flow of time, which can bring some-
thing new to our perception. There are technologically determined automatisms
in the reversibility of shooting and projection, but these seem in Epstein’s writ-
ings only to be uncovered through montage and composition. The automatic
powers of technology need excavation by making one movement enter into a re-
lationship with another, and by projecting cinematic time onto spectatorial time.
These configurations and juxtapositions are what Epstein addresses as the tem-
poral perspective.18 When time is no longer an absolute, aprioristic, and irreversi-
ble dimension but becomes inextricably linked to space, it becomes open to a
multiplicity of perspectives.
This concern with specific temporal and energetic figures in cinema is moti-
vated by Epstein’s theory of the technology’s automatic powers. However, these
powers often remain virtual and are seldom actualized. At the outset of the cine-
matographic technology there are sets of forms and powers, of which only a few
are realized given specific historical and social conditions. This virtual element in
Epstein’s writings complicates his tendency towards technological determinism,
as the existence of the technology is no guarantee for the realization of its
powers, and compels Epstein to analyze cinema’s specific temporal figures. The
result of this complex position is a time-based medium specificity, where cinema
is the technology that opens up to a multifaceted temporality. The intervals and
spacings of this heterochronia require a consistent theoretical and practical work.
This is the way cinema invents temporalities and distributes space.
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The senses of cinema
By offering a different perception of the world to the human sensory apparatus,
cinema re-invents the distribution of space and time. The technological condi-
tions for making cuts and incisions into the streams of time and space form a
medium-specific organization of the senses. When space is inextricably invested
with time, the entire body participates in observation. Epstein’s theory is unam-
biguously corporeal, as he understands vision as a form of touch, and often
evokes the whole sensory register. Henri Langlois observed this:
For Jean Epstein, everything is a three-dimensional object, and the lens is not
an eye, a means to record, but a means to appropriate the reality of things, just
like the child is never satisfied with just looking, but touches and feels things
at the same time, to obtain the total vision...19
However, Langlois’ comparison with the child’s coordination between vision and
touch misses out on the irreducible differences between human perception and
cinematic technology. While it is important to note that Epstein’s theory doesn’t
belong to the ocular-centric theories of vision found in many of the so-called
“impressionists,” neither is it an early instance of the film phenomenology em-
phasizing the corporeality of vision in cinema.20 Cinema doesn’t just replicate the
human forms of apprehending the world, as they vary according to cultural, his-
torical, and physical circumstances; instead, it projects the space and time of a
machine onto our everyday sensory apparatus.
If Epstein’s film theory doesn’t only elaborate on the technology as a different
visibility but as another intelligence and new philosophy, it is because it engages
the whole of the sensory apparatus as part of a mental process. Epstein’s resis-
tance to ocular-centric theories of vision is based in the same view of technology
as his rejection of a phenomenological model for cinematic embodiment. Ep-
stein’s writings ask which kinds of embodiment are engaged in the technologies
of moving images, in which ways they imply processes of individuation, and how
these questions depend on a notion of medium specificity in cinema. Epstein’s
implied question should become ours: How can cinema make us think of embo-
diment in new ways? Is it possible to invent forms of perception in cinema that
neither presuppose a disembodied eye nor are limited to the construction of an
environment where the actions of the phenomenological body can be simulated?
As in Jonathan Crary’s well-known discussion of the embodiment of vision, from
Goethe’s color theory through optical toys of the nineteenth century and up to
cinema, the issue rests with the temporality of the image.21 Epstein sees cinema
as a machine able to defy the irreversibility of time and the second law of thermo-
dynamics, as well as a means of access to the hidden movement and temporality
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of all objects. Time not only embodies vision, but also invents new configurations
of sensory perception.
Jean Epstein’s theory of cinema allows us to ask these questions because it
understands the sound and moving image as a form of perception and thinking
that is radically different from that of our everyday perceptions and our estab-
lished world view. The haptic refers to a kind of visuality that defies the hierar-
chies of vision and touch – it doesn’t subordinate the eye to touch (the manual),
or touch to the eye (the tactile) – by inventing a different regime of visuality. This
is Gilles Deleuze’s definition of the concept of the haptic in relation to painting,
but it has rarely received much attention from writers on the concept.22 In Ep-
stein’s view (even though he never refers to the haptic specifically), this alternative
sensorium is instigated by the technology of the moving image and brings with it
important consequences for the processes of individuation in cinema. This is also
a feature of the various image-types Gilles Deleuze devises in his books on cine-
ma.23 Deleuze’s taxonomical project is certainly absent in Epstein’s writings, but
there is an important connection between their projects: both understand subjec-
tivity as being formed according to variations in movement and intervals in time.
Malcolm Turvey, in “Jean Epstein’s Cinema of Immanence: The Rehabilitation
of the Corporeal Eye,”24 reads Epstein’s writings as an alternative both to the
ocular-centrism of psychoanalysis and to the “corporeal approach,” the two posi-
tions traced by Rosalind Krauss in her discussion of avant-garde movements of
the first decades of the film century.25 His outline of Epstein’s complication of
this dualistic framework of avant-garde theory is a highly valuable contribution to
the critique of a dichotomy that marks film theory to this day; the scopic regimes
of the apparatus giving way to general phenomenological approaches reconstitut-
ing the role of the body in visual perception. According to Turvey, Epstein sees
the camera as an instrument to make visible the interior life of human beings that
cannot be seen by the naked eye. Furthermore, it also extends beyond humans
and explores the interior movements of objects. In Epstein’s theoretical writings,
sight is capable of relating to the world, to truth, at the same time as it is an em-
bodied eye, a corporeal vision. Turvey’s reading of Epstein’s theory as an alterna-
tive to the “two avant-gardes” is still based on a phenomenological model of
vision, however. Turvey draws on Wittgenstein’s concept of aspect-dawning,
which implies a shifting recognition of a visual motive (e.g. the duck-rabbit figure).
Turvey expands on this concept in his book Doubting Vision in order to show that
Epstein makes ‘mistakes’ in the use of perceptual concepts when describing the
powers of cinema to see time and the inner movement of things.26 Cinema’s “re-
velation” of emotions and family resemblance, which are the examples from Ep-
stein’s early writings that Turvey chooses to discuss in relation to aspect-dawn-
ing, are properties of Wittgenstein’s concept of “seeing-as,”and depend not on
technology but on recognition.27 These properties depend on a familiarity of
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forms, in which visual technologies transform nothing. In its foundation in the
concept of a recognition of images, this theory has to sacrifice medium specificity.
Turvey’s discussion of Epstein’s corporeality takes as its point of departure Ro-
salind Krauss’ considerations of two strands of the avant-garde. However, Turvey
does not dwell on Krauss’ discussion of the role that empiricism plays in Her-
mann von Helmholtz’s theory of perception.28 Helmholtz finds, through an in-
vestigation of the workings of the stereoscope, that vision is not an anatomical
sensation but a mental act. As Jonathan Crary observes, Helmholtz’s theory of
vision poses the retina as part of the nervous system and, implicitly, as a part of
the brain.29 For Krauss, this is important for understanding the conceptualism of
Marcel Duchamp and his investigations of perception, for instance in the Large
Glass. Helmholtz’s position within “The Empirical Theory of Vision” – compare
his belief that alternative geometries could be illustrated – is complicated by the
need for a theory of “unconscious inference” based on previous experience. This
theory cannot account for sensory illusions. The problem is caused by the fact
that if illusions didn’t have a shape to begin with, they could not be illusions since
it is experience that makes them have a form. The recognition of forms encounters
problems in the question of the recognition of new forms. This problem, dis-
cussed by Krauss, also causes problems for Turvey, since the recognition aspect
of the “dawning” also bears on experience, and would not account for illusions of
movement. Even if Epstein sees a “higher truth” in cinema, and refuses to see
cinematic forms as illusions, his examples of wheels turning backwards and the
estrangement of close-ups cannot be accounted for by experience and recogni-
tion, but rather rely on the idea of a different vision at work in the cinematic
apparatus.
Epstein’s theory of cinema is governed by rules of perceptual processing that
differ from those of recognition. Recognition draws on a finite resource of
images. Even if this resource could be seen as virtually limitless through our “ter-
tiary memory” – that is, our memory constituted by mediated sounds and pictures
of events we have never experienced firsthand – it is still based on coherent sets of
sensory data triggering our recognition. In spite of its shifting aspects, the pro-
cess of recognition depends on shifts between static images, as in the duck-rabbit
figure. Recognition halts movement in order to function; it singles out an instant
in a flow of time. This is in contrast to the model of vision operating in Jean
Epstein’s theory, which is based on movement and change. Epstein’s writings are
concerned with conveying the ephemerality of cinema, as figures written in the
sand on the beach, continuously eradicated by the waves of the sea. In one of his
last essays, Epstein calls for a “geometry of the instable,” at home in quicksand,
that will “command a logic, a philosophy, good sense, a religion, an aesthetics,
based on instability.”30 In his writings, the impossible arrestment of motion in
cinema is highlighted as an element disallowing recognition of forms. The tem-
poral perspective of cinema projects a differing time into our everyday experience
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of time and movement, to give access to another time and space, and to other
configurations of sensorial perception.
Turvey’s critique of Epstein’s “revelationism” is based on the claim that Epstein
confuses space and time as visible categories, which a “better” vision would re-
medy.31 This confusion is rather on Turvey’s part, since Epstein’s argument is
that cinema offers a different, and not only “better” or more powerful, multi-sen-
sorial perception that transcends the division between the space and time of hu-
man consciousness. Epstein does not claim that the reason why the fourth dimen-
sion is invisible outside cinema is because the eye is not powerful enough. The
major contribution and the main point of Epstein’s writings is the very change of
perceptual categories produced by cinema. This is a multi-sensorial, haptic, and
extra-phenomenological dimension in Epstein’s philosophy, which completely
sets aside the question of seeing “more and better.”32
Turvey locates his evidence in human visual perception and demonstrates that
Epstein’s claims for the powers of cinematic technology are properties humans
cannot possibly see. For this reason, Epstein’s theory of the otherness of cinema-
tographic perception and philosophy is never targeted.33 Rather than taking this
feature of Epstein’s theory into account and considering it as a property of his
argument, Turvey prefers to diagnose it as a flaw in his use of perceptual cate-
gories. But the “category mistake” is less on the part of Epstein than on Turvey
himself.34 When considering the same “mistakes” in the work of Béla Balázs,
Turvey disregards the huge differences in the two authors’ theories of techni-
city.35 Indeed, the “revelationist tradition” consists of very different theoretical
positions.
Turvey identifies a “corporeal eye” at work in Epstein’s theory, but his view
leads to a position where the processes of visual embodiment can take place in
any medium. This move misses the originality that Epstein’s writings offer to an
established theory of the avant-garde and seriously undermines Epstein’s argu-
ment about technical conditions for perception and thinking. What makes Ep-
stein’s writings stand out from the phenomenological approach to embodiment
and subjectivity is that cinema is a machine that confronts our everyday percep-
tions and ways of thinking by offering a radically different logic and temporality,
thereby implying very different formations and positions of subjectivity. His theo-
ry of embodiment is not based on the phenomenological idea of the body or of
the subject, but on subjectivity as being formed in the dispositif of cinema.
Epstein often describes the processes forming subjectivity in cinema as an al-
ternative to psychoanalysis. Actors do not recognize themselves on the screen.
Cinema counters our self-impressions and reveals true identities. This is why ci-
nema produces a split of the subject, as an ongoing process of individuation.
Already the simple technique of shooting in reverse motion disturbs our concep-
tion of the universe. Cinema allows us to look at things in a different way because
it is not governed by the principles of human psychology and consciousness, but
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instead disturbs our conception of the universe as well as our image of ourselves.
Consequently, Epstein argues for a “cine-analysis” instead of the talking cure of
psychoanalysis:
Blown up 20 times, bathed in light, shown naked and confused, man
finds himself before the cinematic lens cut off from all his lies, confessing,
intimate, shameful and maybe true. The psychoanalysts of today teach us that
lies are our grace of life, first imagined, then learned, then appropriated. I
recommend the beautiful experience of cinematographic psychoanalysis,
which is far more precise than the symbolism where etymological cards are
drawn in the Freudian school. […] Every one of the angular interpretations of
a gestus [in the film dispositif] has a deeper meaning, which is intrinsic since
the eye that reveals it is an inhuman eye, without memory, without thought.
Most of all, I cannot say, as it was fashionable to do some time ago, that every
image of a film should be conceived as seen by one or the other of the char-
acters in the preceding image. This subjectivism is absurd. Why refrain from
profiting from one of the most rare qualities of the cinematographic eye, to be
an eye outside of the eye, to escape the tyrannical egocentrism of our personal vision?
Why force the sensible emulsion only to repeat the functions of our retina?
Why not seize with force a unique occasion to form a spectacle in relation to
another center than the one of our own visual ray? The lens is itself.36
Epstein’s non-representational position makes his theory exceed the stable posi-
tion of the subject crucial to many phenomenological readings of intention and
experience.
A temporal perspective
In Jean Epstein’s view of the dispositif of cinema, temporal figures that depend on
the technology of movement are invented. Cinema instigates diffractions of light
and cuts in the streams of time. The visualizations of these processes are to be
found in various ways in the many prisms and mirrors in his films (of which La
glace à trois faces is perhaps the least revealing, because the alternative perspectives
on the same person are narratively, if not ocularly, motivated by characters in the
story). As all dispositifs, cinema regulates the possible enunciations and visibilities
of an epoch, which in turn affects a third factor, the production of subjectivities.37
Foucault’s dispositifs install spatial confinements. These spatial arrangements of
the epoch of big institutions like the prison, the hospital, and the factory are also
temporal ones. The factory regulates the distribution of time (e.g., between work-
time and leisure), the prison between wasted, useless, and empty time when one
is “doing time” and productive time. Epstein understands cinema as a dispositif
that distributes time in new ways. The visible and the enunciable are subjected to
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a temporal perspective that performs an alternative partition of the sensible that is
material in the formation of subjectivity.
The theory of an “innovation of time” in cinema could be understood as a
typically avant-garde program. It involves modernist notions of medium specifi-
city, the production of new forms in the work, and the exceeding of the tradi-
tional boundaries of the medium. On the other hand, as is revealed by a recurrent
criticism of the avant-gardes for ignoring the surrealizing effects of technology
and for being based on the principles of creative subjectivity, there is an impor-
tant part of Epstein’s work that is at odds with such theories.38 It is instructive to
look at Epstein’s position in the context of the recent debate about modernity in
film studies, where David Bordwell, among others, has challenged the idea that
modernity implied shifts in processes of attention, memory, and perception it-
self.39 The former position claims that perception itself cannot be altered in a
short time span. Tom Gunning rightly notes that very few would raise such a
radical claim as the occurrence of a fundamental shift in human perception, and
that what is debated is a position caricatured by Bordwell and his followers. 40
Epstein’s theory of technology offers an interesting element in the debate, as he
claims that cinema can present an automated perception that confronts everyday
perception. The new forms of perception emerging in modernity do not have to
be related to the human sensory apparatus directly, as cinema is an intermediary
technology that acts on our perception and creates new configurations of time
and space. Epstein’s theory thus avoids one of the arguments against the moder-
nity paradigm by radicalizing the claims of the modernity thesis: new forms of
perception occur in the dispositif, but these are in every way separated from the
human architecture of perception. Still, they are subjectivity-forming processes
because they project another mode of perception onto human perception.
Epstein’s writings on slow motion and decomposition of movement focus on a
virtual dimension of the image co-existing with the actual image. When he con-
ceives of his famous film La chûte de la maison Usher in terms of “the soul in slow
motion” in 1928, this is a cinematographic soul and not a human one.41 Close-
ups and slow motion do not help the spectator to see closer or better, but open up
a different world. Superimpositions or decomposed motion are not representa-
tions of mental processes like attention, contemplation, or fantasy. It is a different
world that can only exist within the technology of cinema, and which always con-
fronts the human psychological world. This irreducible distance between the hu-
man psychological apparatus and the technology of cinema is one reason for
Epstein’s refutation of psychoanalysis,42 whereas he embraces ‘the optical uncon-
scious’ of cinema already in his first texts.43 It is also why Epstein often invokes
cinema as a form of hypnosis, which, as discussed with great care by Raymond
Bellour, differs from the psychoanalytic paradigm in that it is constituted by a
force from the outside, and not by an analysis of a subjective interiority.44
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The world in fast, slow, or reverse motion is not an image of our world that has
been manipulated or tampered with. It is a world of different physical and geome-
trical dimensions. Whereas our everyday perception is set in a spatial and tempor-
al linearity, cinema offers a temporal perspective. The technology of cinema can
invent a deferral of time, undertake selections and contractions of time, and form
intervals in time. This is what constitutes temporal innovations in cinema. Cine-
matic time is reversible, and Epstein argues how cinema can display a refutation
of the second law of thermodynamics, that of entropy.45 Epstein writes of the
transforming powers of slow motion in cinema as a technique accessing an elas-
ticity of time, capturing the coagulation and relative viscosity of fluids and the
suspension of solidity in things.46 Slow motion is not a diminution of movement,
but rather its intensification. The halted pace of movement approaches the core of
movement itself.
In Epstein’s writings about the differences between cinematic movement and
our everyday perception, there is often a double figure of movement. Every move-
ment enters into a relation with its counterpart, which is also its condition. It is
especially the post-World War II books on the movement of sound that opens this
line of reflection on time in Epstein’s writings. Slow motion of sound, its decom-
position and “close-ups,” leads Epstein to approach slow motion in relation to a
virtual image, sonorous or visual. His interest in “decomposition” of sound is
connected to the margins of human perception:
If this deepening of sounds is pushed far enough, it is lost in the inaudible
domain of the infra-deep. There, the vibrations of air are decomposed and
slowed down to the extent that the ear is insensitive to this movement that
appears still, in other words silent, in the same way as when in exceedingly
slow motion, the eye stops perceiving the agitation of the sea, for instance,
which appears as a solid, frozen surface.47
The absolute intensification of movement of sound invokes the inaudible, and in
the image it is linked to stillness. It is evident in this passage that the range of
frequency of human perception of sound and the visual can be transgressed
through cinematographic inscription. But it is equally clear that it is a relation
between movement and stillness, sound and the inaudible, that is formed in cine-
ma. Decomposition of sound is, like that in the image, a means of analysis, but
also a spacing between what is heard and its silence, between the moving and the
still. The absolute intensification of movement means making it communicate
with its absence, opening an interval between the two sides to all sounds and all
images. The technology of cinema functions as a production of a virtual time.
Every image is invested with a virtual side and every sound is connected to its
own silence.
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These double-sided sounds and images are far from any representation of our
perception or our mental processes, but a center of indetermination between the
stimulus and the reaction it sets off. Epstein’s writings keep returning to the dis-
ruption of any linear cause-and-effect patterns in cinema and how there is a sus-
pension between a received and an executed movement instigated between
images. The three stylistic figures shaping Epstein’s cinematic work are superim-
position, the decomposition of movement, and the reflected image. It should be
kept in mind, however, that these figures seldom work in isolation from each
other. Images in slow motion are often superimposed by images with decom-
posed or halted movement. One mode of movement is coupled to its counterpart
that is also its condition. The intensification of movement takes place in the face
of its own suspension; sound evolves in relation to a domain beyond perceptual
thresholds. This transgression and effacement of categories, solid or liquid, so-
norous or silent, is cinema’s revolutionary invention, according to Epstein, and it
rests on a superimposition of movements and temporalities.
This superimposition of different temporalities invests every present moment
with its respective hindsight. The property of cinema is to modulate one time in
another time, according to Epstein. We are set in front of a dispositif producing a
complex, multifaceted time, one that confronts our accustomed perception of
time as a continuous succession of present points. The elasticity of time, the vari-
able viscosity of matter, is a result of the multiple temporal registers at work in
Epstein’s writings and in his films. Where there is a fluidity of the perception of
space, there is also a porosity of time in disintegrated layers.
Epstein’s use of superimpositions subscribes to his technique of putting the
image in connection with its outside, with silence and stillness. Epstein’s critique
of the single-shot cinema of the early years is based on the idea that cinema must
always be a relation between images.48 One should point out the historical short-
coming of this argument, since early cinema frequently deployed various forms of
superimpositions and established relationships between images through the dis-
tributor’s provisional editing and programming. However, the statement that the
moving image that is not involved in montage is not yet cinema is an important
theoretical principle in Epstein’s philosophy. In Epstein’s films, there is a fre-
quent technique of inserting fleeting superimpositions between images, some-
times hardly identifiable, that relates a moving image to its stilled counterpart.
The superimpositions of Madeleine’s face when she is painted by Roderick in La
chûte de la maison Usher is a famous example, as is the sequence of Madeleine’s
resurrection, in which oscillating shots of interior spaces, timepieces, and the
guitar are superimposed onto static images. This technique does not mean that
the virtual is actualized in the superimposed still, but rather that the relationship
between movement and stillness opens a virtual dimension. Since cinema is not
bound by a singular time but consists of a system of coordinates that range over a
variety of times, there is a synthesis of multiple temporalities in cinema that keeps
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their differences and varieties intact. An image is always a relation of temporal-
ities in Epstein’s writings and films.
Epstein refers to this spatiotemporal variability as the fourth dimension, which
offers another perspective on matter: “The cinematograph is actually the only in-
strument that records an event according to a system of four reference points.
This makes it superior to man, who doesn’t appear to be constituted to grasp a
continuity of four dimensions by himself.”49 Human perception understands time
and space as distinct, linear, and given entities, whereas cinema allows for defer-
rals and variations in space-time. This relationship of cinema’s technological ca-
pacity for four-dimensional perception to the human psychology of perception is
central to Epstein’s concept of photogénie in his early writings and to the ‘temporal
perspective’ in his later texts. The following passage describes this relationship
and demonstrates that cinema is not a prosthetic medium – that is, a way to see
better – but rather an intelligence that shapes and describes the world in its own
right, intervening between the world and the human mind:
Man’s physiological inability to master the notion of space-time and to escape
this atemporal section of the world, which we call the present and of which we
are almost exclusively conscious, is the cause of most “accidents of matter and
knowledge,” most of which would be avoided if we could directly seize the
world as the flow that it is. […] Such is also the clairvoyance of the cinemato-
graph, which represents the world in its overall, continuous mobility. True to
the etymology of its name, it discovers movement where our eye sees nothing
but stasis.50
Human perception is here described as inadequate and illusory, which is not an
uncommon trait in descriptions of cinema technologies. Mary Ann Doane com-
ments on the discourses of the shortcomings of our physiology which give rise to
the “afterimage” theory of cinematic movement; and these flaws in perception
also give rise to other myths, like that of “subliminal” images in advertising.51
Malcolm Turvey discusses the “distrust in human vision” in Epstein’s theory, pri-
vileging the early writings, and finds in La chûte de la maison Usher an attempt to put
this theory into practice.52
In the passage above, one can also see that the movement of the image and
sound is entering into a relationship with the fixed, the still, and the silent. This
way, an interval between the still and the moving, between sound and silence, is
formed in cinema’s relationship with our everyday sense perception. It could even
be claimed that this relationship is always present in cinema, since it supplements
our perception with another perception and thus creates a true image of move-
ment, opens up for thinking a virtual dimension of the sound-image. However,
this virtual sound-image cannot be isolated, as it is always related to our percep-
tion of the world. It is a presence of the image itself, as it presents itself to us. “By
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developing the range of our senses and by playing with the temporal perspective,
the cinematograph renders perceptible through sight and sound individual beings
we thought invisible and inaudible and divulges the reality of certain abstrac-
tions.”53 Cinema develops the bandwidth of our senses by giving access to coor-
dinates in time. By making perceptible that which is invisible and inaudible, these
properties are no longer virtual. Yet, the imperceptible is always present in cinema
as a virtual dimension outside of what is heard and seen.
One should speak in two different senses of a virtual dimension in Epstein’s
theory of cinema. There is a historically conditioned virtuality that could have
been actualized given the right conditions, or that could become actual in the
future. This is the cinema for a time to come, as I will shortly return to, that so
heavily shapes so many of Epstein’s analyses of things moving outside the cine-
ma. On the other hand, there is the virtual that cannot become actual, which al-
ways enters into relations with the image without becoming audible or seen.
A cinema to come
It is striking how often Epstein provides examples of the transgressive powers of
cinema from outside cinema. As discussed above, this is a major paradox for a
medium-specific theorist. It is peculiar that the climbing of Etna, the perception
of wheels turning backwards, or the descent through a mirrored staircase should
provide the best examples of the radically other perception of cinema. In an often
quoted passage from Le Cinématographe vu de l’Etna (1926), Epstein describes his
descent of a mirrored staircase, comparing it to “the optical facets of an immense
insect,” as a visual form of psychoanalysis.54 This description of fragmentation,
repetition, and multiplied images is already another perception; but it is only at
the end of the passage that he reaches the conclusion that cinema serves this self-
estrangement far better than what is described. While cinema itself cannot be
described, the written text accounts for an extra-cinematic perception only to
point out the principles of perception taken much further by the cinema.
There may be two reasons for this tendency in Epstein’s writings to look out-
side cinema in order to describe its effects. First, Epstein is aware that cinema is
“an unattainable text,” in the same way as it is described by Raymond Bellour in
the 1970s.55 Any departure from cinema, as in written descriptions and illustra-
tions, halts the movement of the image and subverts the space and time of cine-
ma. If writing belongs in a different set of spatiotemporal coordinates altogether,
and every attempt at describing cinematic movement is bound to fail, descriptions
of extra-cinematic perceptions may evoke the properties of cinema as well as do
close readings of films. This is the reason why Epstein never offers a systematic
account of how the perception, intelligence, or philosophy of cinema works, but
rather chooses to explain how these things differ from the human registers of
experience and consciousness.
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The “unattainability” of cinema lies not only in the immobilization and limita-
tions in verbal description, however. There is, secondly, Epstein’s ambivalence,
discussed above, between cinema as an automaton and his idea that cinema has
not yet realized its powers. This position has affinities with Jean-Luc Godard’s
recurrent discussions of the shortcomings of cinema, especially in his references
to Epstein in Histoire(s) du cinéma. The subject of Epstein’s writings is, to a large
degree, a cinema to come. Cinema still ‘escapes us’ because it is a dispositif in
which virtual dimensions are yet to be actualized. It is a machine whose intelli-
gence is still not working. It invents a space and time for a mode of thinking that
is yet to come. The account of the descent down the staircase in Le Cinématographe
vu de l’Etna describes an embodiment that only exists virtually in cinema, as a
temporality that is still to be invented but which becomes possible thanks to an
inhuman perception that penetrates light and image. The haptic is not about how
the subject applies its sensorial faculties to cinema, but how cinema forms new
regimes of sensation and new modes of subjectivities, in a time to come. It de-
scribes a different temporality at hand in the “intelligent machine” of cinema,
that always exists as a virtual dimension of the image, always yet to be actualized:
“We are no longer concerned here with the existing cinema, but with the one
which will perhaps exist in a century or two.”56
What is Epstein’s recurring “question concerning technology”? Like Heidegger’s,
it is concerned with the “coming to presence” of Being in art. The essence of
technology is nothing technological, but rather the processes by which it forms
subjectivity. This is an important aspect of Epstein’s “paradox”: if the automatic
powers of cinema precede the aesthetic dimensions of the work (like montage,
framing, and composition) technology would inadvertently set off new forms of
perception and subjectivity. However, Epstein’s examples of the transgressive
powers of cinema exploit the “temporal perspective” of the technology through
figures of deferral, reversal, and deceleration demonstrates that the transgressive
powers of cinema lie with aesthetic choices. There is a utopian dimension in Ep-
stein’s philosophy: only with a cinema to come will there be pervasive revolt
against the reign of the present, and only then will a variability of time prevail.
Towards the end of his life, Epstein observed that popular cinema explored the
properties of temporal variability less and less. Perhaps the cinema to come will
never be realized and must always remain in the future. Its realization would
mean that the virtual would become actual, and that the technology of cinema
would coincide with human perception. Epstein’s theory of cinema depends on
the differences between human perception and mechanical perception. Perhaps
this dissimilarity is the true answer to the “question concerning technology” in
Epstein’s philosophy.
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Ultra-Modern: Jean Epstein, or Cinema
“Serving the Forces of Transgression
and Revolt”
Nicole Brenez
Jean Epstein disappeared over half a century ago, in 1953. Yet, few filmmakers are
still as alive today. At the time, a radio broadcast announced the following obit-
uary: “Jean Epstein has just died. This name may not mean much to many of
those who turn to the screens to provide them with the weekly dose of emotion
they need.”1 Since then, oblivion has swallowed up the cinema of small doses, but
the aura of Epstein, defender of great ecstasies, has only continued to grow. The
process was not achieved without breaks and detours, as the brilliant and erudite
historian Jean Mitry, for example, wrote in 1966: “Neglecting content in order to
pursue only form, his work is now in the past and has become considerably out-
dated.”2 For Mitry, only Cœur fidèle (1923) would survive. Meanwhile, today’s cine-
philes and analysts are passionate about Epstein’s most avant-garde and experi-
mental films (Six et demi-onze [1927], La Glace à trois faces [1928], La Chute de la maison
Usher [1928], Le Tempestaire [1948]), as well as the entire Breton period. As a theo-
retician and three-sided film director (a member of the Parisian avant-garde, a
Breton grappling with the real, a man faced with industry demands), Epstein
worked and inspired. His thinking intrigued the greatest creators of the period in
any given field: philosophy, cinema, and music, from Gilles Deleuze to Philippe
Grandieux. In Europe, four signs among others marked the 2000s: first, the pub-
lication of a pioneering and richly documented book by Vincent Guigueno, Jean
Epstein, cinéaste des îles;3 second, the making of a film essay by experimental direc-
tor Othello Vilgard (co-founder of the Etna laboratory, thus named as a tribute to
Epstein) called À partir de Jean Epstein;4 third, the publication in German of an
anthology of texts by Epstein, initiated by Alexander Horwath, the director of the
Vienna Filmmuseum in Austria;5 and fourth, the shooting of Jean Epstein, Young
Oceans of Cinema (2011) by the American director James June Schneider, dedicated
to the Breton portion of Epstein’s work.
Paradoxically, Jean Epstein’s importance as a stylist, a poet, and a theoretician
has grown in spite of the absence of his films: many of his masterpieces never
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underwent restoration (Mor’Vran [1931], L’Or des mers [1933], Les Berceaux [1934]),
many of his films remain invisible, and the fundamental anthology of his writings
on cinema published over thirty years ago is out of print and now sells for a small
fortune in specialized bookstores. The aesthetic shock is only more deeply felt
when discovering masterpieces that ought to be the object of scholarly editions
instead of owing their continued circulation to pirated videos shot from the
screening of an old and poorly preserved copy. Once reduced to La Chute de la
maison Usher, Epstein’s cinematic work now emerges as a permanent effort toward
an increasingly fierce and desperate realism that might answer to the demands of
analytic accuracy – on Epstein’s own terms, a cinema that is simultaneously
photogenic, demonic, and rebellious.
From Le Cinéma du diable:
On the skin of sorcerers, possessed men, heretics, agents of the Inquisition in
the old days looked for points or zones of insensitivity, which served to prove
that a man belonged to Satan. At the very heart of the cinematograph, we dis-
cover a mark whose meaning is much less dubious: the indifference of this
instrument toward lingering appearances that remain identical to themselves,
and its selective interest for all mobile aspects. This last predilection goes as
far as to magnify movement where there was hardly any, and to generate it
where it was deemed missing. Yet, the fixed elements of the universe (or those
appearing to be so) are the ones that condition the divine myth, while the un-
stable elements that evolve more quickly and thus threaten the restfulness, the
equilibrium and the relative order of the first one are symbolized by the demo-
nic myth. If not blind, the cinematic function is at the very least neutral when
considering the permanent characters of things, but it is extremely inclined to
highlight any change or evolution. It is therefore eminently favorable to the
devil’s innovative work. As it was outlining its very first aesthetic differentia-
tion between the spectacles of nature, the cinematograph was choosing be-
tween God and Satan, and siding with the latter. Since whatever moves, trans-
forms and comes in replacement of what will have been, proved to be
photogenic, photogénie, as a fundamental rule, clearly dedicated the new art to
the service of the forces of transgression and revolt.6
I. Two Sides of a French Critical Tradition
Cinema always already lost
Abel Gance, Robert Bresson, and Jean-Luc Godard dissociate actual cinema from
possible cinema. They criticize the limited character of the former and proclaim
the unlimited de jure nature of the latter.
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Abel Gance: “Cinema has only developed a small portion of its possibilities:
cinema is, and must absolutely become, something other than what it is, some-
thing other than what it is made to be.”7
Robert Bresson: “I think that the cinematograph is not yet fully realized, there
have been attempts, they have been stifled by the theater. It may be that the con-
ditions fit for the cinematograph will be a very long time in coming. The cinema-
tograph is lost from sight, decades may be necessary to find it again.”8
Jean-Luc Godard (positive version): “And cinema is going to die soon, very
young, having failed to give what it could have given, so we must… we must
quickly go to the bottom of things.”9
Jean-Luc Godard (negative version): “So cinema has been useless, it has not
achieved anything and there have been no movies.”10
Cinema forever innate
Conversely, Louis Delluc, Jean Epstein, and Gilles Deleuze defend the principle of
cinema as genius, conceived as an immovable set of characteristics and powers
that thus irrigate movies, even independently from an artistic project.
Louis Delluc: “I know but one pioneer in cinema.
It is cinema.”11
Jean Epstein: “Intelligence of a machine.”12
Gilles Deleuze: “Cinema is always as perfect as it can be.”13
For Jean Epstein, cinema is in itself “an experimental device that builds – that is,
that conceives – an image of the universe.”14 Such a conception determines two
attitudes: 1) the exclusion of cinema as envisioned by plastic artists outside the
legitimate field of art cinema; 2) the investment of all theoretical energy upon the
device’s spontaneous and permanent properties, for instance at the expense of
the study of films (unlike Louis Delluc) or a reflection on the history of forms
(unlike Gilles Deleuze).
Stemming from such a protocol, a line of artists begins to form for whom art
consists of looking for purely cinematic forms of expression – that is to say, re-
sulting from cinema’s properties regarding one, several, or all cinematic elements
(shot, angle, character development, narrativity). This tradition of great formalists
takes us from Jean Epstein to Philippe Grandrieux, via Stan Brakhage or F. J.
Ossang.
II. The Figurative Stance
But going back to Jean Epstein, why should a central part of cinema be rejected?
Is it simply a matter of taste or does refusing it help establish an enlightening
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perimeter? What does this anti-cinema rejected by cinematography consist of ex-
actly?
Let us first accept a note whose violence is out of place within the sum of Jean
Epstein’s affirmative and lyrical writings. Epstein develops the idea that cinema is
magical because it proves to be capable of getting over certain limits of represen-
tation (it goes “above the resemblance of things” and “this efficiency superior to
forms is the cinematograph’s highest achievement”). He then feels the need to
add that these transgressions and this accomplishment have nothing to do with a
specific avant-garde cinema.
“It would be an ‘absolute’ misinterpretation in the reader’s mind, if he saw
these living images as similar to those of Viking Eggeling, Richter or Man Ray’s
films, which are only forms, and the lowest at that, nothing but the most animal-
like rhythms. Likewise, living words are opposed to the boundless words of Da-
daist works. If this remark appears useless, may my fear of being misunderstood
be excused.”15
Despite his vehemence, Jean Epstein’s hostility toward the avant-garde is no
temporary attitude. At least five other occurrences can attest to it:
1. The cinema of plastic artists is a cinematic pathology.
Epstein, in an interview: “‘In your opinion, do films fashioned according to the
cubist or expressionist taste represent the quintessence of cinema?’ This time, my
answer was even more categorical: ‘No, it is but an accessory of cinema and al-
most an ill-state for this accessory.’”16
2. The cinema of plastic artists is an infantile degree of cinema.
Epstein recounts a visit from Miklos Bandi, a friend and collaborator of Viking
Eggeling. He takes the opportunity to share his feelings about Symphonie diagonale
and Fernand Léger’s films: “If this abstract cinema delights a few, they should
buy a kaleidoscope, a toy for the second stage of childhood, upon which a very
simple device could impress a regular and forever variable rotation speed. For my
part, I believe that the age of kaleidoscope-cinema has passed.”17 And it is not
only a rejection of pure abstraction, but also a refusal to challenge the aesthetic
principles implemented by the Futurists and the surrealists.
3. The cinema of plastic artists is “garbage.”
Epstein begins by attacking the Futurists: “Ah, I fear the futurists, who itch to
replace true dramas with fake ones made out of anything and everything: aviation
and magma chamber, consecrated hosts and world wars.”18
4. Sincere but perfectly useless.
Next, Epstein is invited to assess the standing of silent movies, buried as he has
been since the generalization of talkies in a “time of confusion,” and no doubt
230 nicole brenez
with a certain nostalgia. The report he then gives shows a degree of affability
toward abstract and surrealist cinematography:
Absolute films describe the evolution of more or less complicated geometrical
forms; they show a harmoniously mobile descriptive geometry; they capture
the essence of cinematic pleasure; they represent movement closest to its prin-
ciple; like any abstraction, they quickly create weariness. Surrealist films visua-
lize deep thought, the logics of feelings, the dream-like flux that, without cine-
matic language, would remain hermetically inexpressible. Such films require
from the authors a complete sincerity that is difficult to achieve. The authors
already calculate their chances of communicating their feelings through
images with a Freudian correlation table; a symbolic language comes to exist,
but I believe, as Novalis does, that we cannot understand the hieroglyph.19
Epstein tries to rationalize his rejection; and an interesting paradox emerges from
his reasoning. Let us remember, for instance, the admirable parking lot sequence
in La Glace à trois faces: the protagonist’s car passes each level of the spiral-shaped
building on its way down. Speed increases; the decor becomes blurred and turns
into broad bands of white on a dark background; the sequence shot absorbs the
fast montage; cinema becomes a pure flash of black and white. Another such
visual event could be found in the kinetic treatment of a lighthouse seen from a
feverish conscience, or the reduction of sea currents to their shiny glare in Finis
Terrae (1930), or even in some very blurry shots of the sea in L’Or des mers that
cancel out the motif to retain only the trace of its movement. As a cinematographer,
Epstein reintegrates Walter Ruttmann or Hans Richter’s plastic vocabulary in the
way that, two years later, Eisenstein dialectalizes Malevich’s Suprematism in the
centrifuge sequence of The General Line (1929); for Eisenstein, pictorial avant-
garde represents the negative moment of formal invention, the erroneous form
that has to be reclaimed, integrated, appropriated, and overcome.20 “Instead of
looking for pure photogénie within the mobility of patterns, certain authors found
it much more abundant in nature.”21 As a historian, Epstein divides, splits, decrees
what is incompatible, as if to better separate himself not from what might be
closest to him, but rather from the other aesthetic solution, the one that threatens
the very foundation of his writing – even though the images sometimes prove to
be identical and the preoccupations to be mutual.
5. The cinema of misinterpretation, the unnecessary cinema.
Commenting once again on the cinematic initiatives of Surrealism, Epstein puts
an end to his benevolent digression:
The surrealists were slow to acknowledge that the instrument of derationaliza-
tion they dreamed of already existed well within their field of application; and
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when they finally took notice of cinema, they used it incorrectly in such a lit-
erary, pictorial and artistic way that this experiment was immediately throttled
by its esotericism.22
Cinema’s inherent surrealism, fighting against the “surrationalism” of the social
system, condemns in advance the research of the Surrealists and that of their
“unfortunate cousins,” the Futurists: such initiatives come late and are unneces-
sary, fruitless, and, at worst, come close to being impostures.23 Epstein reserves
one of his most vicious remarks for Buñuel’s epigones: “Trickery made the mis-
take worse in a few films that pretended to be surrealist.”24
Thus, Epstein consistently distinguishes between good and bad avant-garde
and, symmetrically, does not hesitate to defend the legitimacy of a rear-guard in
the form of a future “Cinema Institute” conceived as an “organization that regu-
lates and fixes a multi-faceted art, a ductile language, and an unruly technique”:
“Cinema also needs a rear-guard whose inglorious mission is to conquer nothing
but to cling to the spot and simply die there.”25
Where does the limit stand between good and bad avant-garde? It is as simple
as it is crucial: Jean Epstein’s cinema cannot stand without a referent – and it is
never closer to its own genius than when it has to elaborate this for itself, for
example by exploring the effects of the kinetic sensation produced by modern
speeds in La Glace à trois faces, or the effects of dread produced by the existence of
photography in Six et demi onze. He must demonstrate the real so as to show an
actual break between abstract and Epsteinian cinema, but not between the
modernist writing of Six et demi onze (a demonstration of inner turmoil) and the
harsh, documentary-like writing of L’Or des mers (a demonstration of material and
spiritual poverty). Such an aesthetic imperative simultaneously determines the
double rejection of plastic abstraction (Eggeling, Richter, Duchamp no doubt)
and the metaphoric drift (Man Ray, Surrealism); it opens the field to which Jean
Epstein devotes his energy, in his films and his writing, namely, that of figurative
investigation. What are, then, by contrast, the figurative values invented, advo-
cated, and indicated by Epstein’s work? Even if the term is not often verified, it
seems to us that Epstein offers one of the first, one of the only, overall reflections
on cinematic description, including its three main dimensions: experimentation,
invention of real presence, and consumption, each opening onto a major proposi-
tion in terms of montage.
III. Descriptive Experimentation
On many occasions and in many expressions, Epstein opposes narration to an-
other system of representation that would be more specific to cinematic genius –
we can call it a system of description:
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There are no stories. There have never been any stories. There are only non-
sensical situations; without a beginning, a middle, or an end; with no inside or
out; we can look at them from any direction; right becomes left; without limits
of past or future, they are the present.26
Once Aristotle is buried and the elementary reflexes used in comprehending phe-
nomena are rejected, the work of descriptive experimentation can begin. Like an
artistic protocol, this experimentation unfetters one’s sight: “We ask to see; be-
cause of a mentality of experimentation; out of desire for more accurate poetry;
out of analytic habit, because of a need for new errors.”27
Experimentation thus substitutes to narrative conventionality the power of
scientific reasoning, which it transposes into the aesthetic domain and subordi-
nates cinematography to three vocations: claiming the figurative acuity of analy-
sis; accessing a re-cutting of phenomena by means of figurative synthesis; ac-
knowledging its own genius thanks to the choice of a fertile yet well-defined field
of research – that of movement.
Analytical decomposition
“Analytical force,” “analytical power”28: Le Cinématographe vu de l’Etna makes it the
“original property of the lens” as well as “the inexhaustible source of the cine-
matic future.” Spontaneously, the cinematic apparatus shatters or dissolves
appearances; it grazes, betrays, anatomizes, and unfolds phenomena. To the
“orthoscopic definition” of things, cinema opposes the plurality of its “optical
interpretations…recognizable and unrecognizable.”29 With description, cinema
sides with expolition, namely circumstantial, detailed, and affirmative descrip-
tion; or even with amplification, which is an endless expansiveness of the descrip-
tive element. In practice, it means that the motifs are filmed as serials; one shot is
not enough to present them, at least two are always needed, and narrativity ad-
justs to accommodate many more.
Lability – photogénie – theory of movement
Description has two virtues: it is cognitive (it unveils, it reveals); it is hermeneutic,
it modifies the very notion of knowledge and generates a new mode of thinking;
creating a “descriptive style” is doing “philosophical work.”30 Therefore, the de-
scription will be even more complete in that it is responsible for what relates to
the infra- or the ultra-natural. That is what the term photogénie designates.
In Epstein, the term photogénie refers to three main aspects: the principle of
non-identity, or the referent’s lability, in other words the unstable character of
things that always shy away from definition; the motif’s moral increase by way of
its transposition into an image (or to put it differently: cinema is fetishistic and
engenders divinity); and the typological account of movement by cinema, whose
key function consists in “representing a movement by another movement.”31 In
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“Bilan de fin de muet,” for instance, Epstein enumerates the dynamics implemen-
ted by cinema to grasp the essential mutability of phenomena: evolution, varia-
tion, series of metamorphoses, continuity within change, development, current,
link, flow. As regards the literary description of movement, Epstein’s inventive-
ness proves limitless. He must sometimes resort to rare expressions (the “rupti-
lité” of cinematic time32) or newly-accepted uses of language, as if it demanded to
be altered, deflected, or bent by the fluctuation of phenomena. Hence the unex-
pected use of the verb “experimenting”: “The dunes crawl: minerals flourish and
reproduce; animals get bogged down in themselves and get transfixed; plants
gesticulate and experiment toward the light; water sticks; clouds break.”33
Epstein’s cinematography establishes the measure of its aptitude: namely, it
creates an experimental cosmogony.
Synthetic discovery
Synthetic discovery constitutes the first major event in montage in Epstein’s suc-
cinct reflection. Sometimes, description uncovers dimensions of the real that do
not match any of the standard cuttings within the realm of experience; it exhumes
figurative links and detects “Monsters.”
On several occasions, Epstein mentions an evening devoted to screening family
movies: in the string of films and the vital successivity of individuals, a new form
of entity is revealed, which is family ties, the sense of each one belonging to all –
it is the Angel, the Dynasty, the Monster: “What an enlightenment for the individ-
ual to know the monster whose family member he is, the mother-soul he origi-
nates from and into which he enters.”34
Cinema again asks the question of human community: here again the film dis-
solves the principle of identity. But, while in the case of natural motives Epstein
works on the exchange of substances and properties (“water sticks, clouds
break”), this time the entity itself is affected. The individual no longer exists, he
is but a porous figure, the “vagueness of the fundamental experience of similar-
ity,” an exceptional case within the more essential circulation of analogies that
cinema spontaneously reproduces.35 The automatic elaboration of such figurative
synthesis may constitute the most striking effect of descriptive experimentation,
which, even though the cinematic world is “famously ghostly,” grants access to
the real itself: “Quite curiously, it is the ghosts on the screen that are in charge of
reminding realism of a thought that, out of over-rationalization, divorced the
real.”36
This means that cinema proves more just, more faithful to the real than the way
in which our perceptive physiological apparatus comprehends it. But what hap-
pens, then, when cinema no longer works on resemblance – which detaches phe-
nomena from their contours by throwing them into the channels of metamorpho-
sis – but rather on presence, which attaches the motif to itself? Real presence is
invented.
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IV. “Real Presence”
From Georges Demenÿ to John Cassavetes, from Robert Bresson to Pier Paolo
Pasolini, cinema has often considered its aesthetic horizon to be an ideal of mim-
esis exalted in a claim of presence. Jean Epstein expressed this ideal most beauti-
fully:
“It is the miracle of real presence,
manifest life,
open like a beautiful pomegranate,
its skin peeled off,
easily assimilated,
barbaric.”37
As in Cassavetes, Pialat, or Bresson, real presence obviously does not adopt the
shape of appearances; it is always an epiphany. In Epstein, real presence is subject
to two conditions: descriptive precision or exactitude, and critical intensity, which
presupposes diving into an “inside perspective,” one that attends to the phenom-
enon not in order to show it but to “undo it,” deliver it, and strip away “illusion
after illusion.”38 Real presence is not a given, it springs up from opposition (the
denouement) and must express the dizziness of one’s inner self. As such, cinema
constitutes a revelation of phenomena. Real presence can then be unveiled in
certain privileged locations.
The underground passage
“Like oil potentially exists in the landscape haphazardly probed by the engineer,
so does photogénie conceal itself there, along with an entirely new rhetoric.”39
Real presence exhumes the unconscious of the referent and the effect of its
transposition into a motif; cinema is a “photo-electric psychoanalysis” (the title
of a chapter in Intelligence d’une machine). Hence the tears of dread, the terror of
actresses who see themselves on the screen for the first time and do not recognize
themselves, a primitive experience of photogénie to which Epstein often returns.
The reverse side of transparency
“I would that we were capable of reading in the transparency of the image their
most secret reverse side. This other side of the little story, and the only one that
counts, is called subject.”40
“Pasteur can be a subject,” Epstein concludes. What is the meaning of this
unexpected perspective, this reverse side of transparency strangely reminiscent of
inframince, which Marcel Duchamp developed in the 1930s? Epstein offers a typol-
ogy quite different from the classic arrangement between visible and invisible,
manifest and concealed: a dialectic of transparency and figurativeness (the critical
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denouement). Things are there, but only cinema can see them for what they are.
In other words, it measures itself to their unstable, disorderly, relative, and unin-
telligible nature.41 Real presence requires shifting toward the figurative; the phe-
nomenon – a face, a river, a speed – must be recovered from the perspective of its
strangeness. And this strangeness does not refer to a mystery, to something dark
and shameful (that would be the solution of German Expressionism that Epstein
denounces ceaselessly) but to an essential alteration, to the profoundly unidentifi-
able and impure dimension of things that cinema detects, welcomes, and devel-
ops. Strangeness does not stem from an enigmatic lining of the real but from an
“excess of obvious facts.”42
From a narrative point of view, the lightness, the lack of consistency, and the
affective irresponsibility of the figure of anonymity, elaborated by the protagonist
with faded and whitened features in La Glace à trois faces, testify to the catastrophic
nature of the unidentifiable. We can think of it as a deficiency, an unbearable
loss, a morbid escape – and Epstein’s great pieces indeed are all tales of anxiety.
But each shot in the film debates the plastic splendor of alteration – the Breton
documentaries, by slowing down descriptive speed, find a way to solidify the
ephemeral and only retain from the figurative its monumental beauty. The sea
constitutes the motif par excellence in this study on the divergence of the thing
from itself. All the wave shots in Epstein’s work form the most rigorous figurative
investigative undertaking there may be. The investigation does not focus on nuan-
ces (as in impressionist pictorial series), but truly on differences (the sea is never
confined; it never possesses the same consistency; its status changes from one
shot to the next; no sea can gather all these figurative states; each occurrence
dismisses the whole). Whether it is an analogy, a transfer, or a leap, real presence
may only rise up thanks to an ontological shift.
Prosodic constellation / euphonic montage
With euphonic montage, we are no longer dealing, as was the case with the fa-
mily monster, with a synthesis of similarities. But similarly, we now have to detect
remote agreements and draw another type of figurative link, another connection
between different entities. Real presence reveals the deep harmony between what
is seemingly unrelated. For instance, Epstein relates one of Walter Moore Cole-
man’s experiences on musical synchrony: let there be a crowd making random
movements; suddenly, in one instant, the apparent disorder in the trajectories
between soldiers, children, and animals are part of a musical consonance: “This
is where cinema will one day find its own prosody.”43 (Let us note that Epstein
here brilliantly anticipates a plastic demonstration that Ken Jacobs will enhance
with images in Tom Tom the Piper’s Son in 1969; also, the discovery of a metric order
within chaos constitutes one of the century’s scientific revolutions.)
Thus, the Epsteinian description does not submit to the order of appearances:
in order to express things, it builds the entity of resemblance through accumula-
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tion, the “surreal resemblance” – it is the synthetic discovery; it respects the for-
mal genius of cinematography – it is the difference, the reverse side of transpar-
ency; it detects the agreement where there are no links – it is the prosodic con-
stellation. But, conversely, description asphyxiates standard relationships and
destroys expected correlations: this is the invention of continuity as negativity,
the devouring that is going to restructure not only standard cutting of cinematic
matter, but also the links established between the cinematic image and the gaze.
V. World Devoured by Cinema
Epstein refers to the ordinary link between shots by using the sewing model of
the basting stitch. In needlework, the basting stitch is a rough, indicative stitch
that precariously and imprecisely brings pieces of cloth together while leaving
them as fragments.44 In cinema, the basting stitch refers to a type of agreed-
upon link between things; all in all, it precedes the image’s own work. Against
the basting stitch, Epstein defends the invention of teratological forms of linking
or explosion that “unmask the supposed convention of order within creation,”
that acknowledge the disappearance of the defining principle of identity, and that
divide up the world once again.45
Extreme hapticality
Epstein’s reflection, like his practice, strives to systematically bring back into play
cinema’s most mysterious link, the one going from the eye to the image.
“Never has a face yet leaned upon mine. At best, it is hot on my heels, and I am
the one pursuing it forehead against forehead. It is not even true that there is air
between us; I eat it. It is in me like a sacrament. Maximum visual acuity.”46
Eisenstein had given a lot of thought to the ways in which an image could
come out of the screen and pierce through to its spectator, drill through his
mind, or run him over; but with Epstein’s expression, “I eat it,” the image could
not be taken any further, it admits to its nature as a fantasy conducive to incor-
poration, to euphoric introjection.
From the point of view of the motif, the elaboration of such figurative confu-
sions can be found everywhere: Finis Terrae, for instance, only reaches its conclu-
sion when two antagonistic boys, one sick, the other exhausted, both at the bot-
tom of a boat “forehead against forehead,” end up switching arms. One boy’s
healthy arm is exchanged for the other’s gangrenous limb, or rather, they share
the same one, a big white stump that has become the shape of their common
story. “It is not even true that there is air between us.”
First theory of syncopation
The ultimate link thus becomes perceptive syncopation: “May I look through his
eyes [the character’s] and see his hand reach out from under me as though it
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were my own, may intervals of opaque film imitate even the blinking of our eye-
lids.”47 If the haptic image injects itself into the body like an immaterial host,
under cover of such organic eclipses, the film similarly becomes a body.
With such an invention, Epstein anticipates what will become one of the com-
mon traits of cinematic modernity: fades to black internal to the image. We can
see how those by Jim Jarmusch, Leos Carax, or Gus Van Sant, like the fades to
black in the pool sequence in Cat People (Jacques Tourneur, 1942), confuse rather
than make out phenomena, creatures, and bodies. But Epstein also anticipates the
somatic use of the flicker in Tony Conrad or Paul Sharits, for whom the image’s
perceptive interruption and plastic flickering are directed not only to the eye but
also to the body as a whole; the body has become entirely visible, inside and out,
remodeled by the intensity of intermittent light.
Affirmation of an erotica of continuity
In between phenomena, cinema must not express the rationalized, identity-defin-
ing passages but the sensitive, tactile, libidinal weaving. Negative devouring be-
comes natural; the dynamics of continuity are desire: “In fact, whether we go
from a man’s eye to a woman’s belt, it frankly expresses, but only at the junction
point, a desire.”48
Syntax sways from having to describe the phenomena epicenter, the complex of
attraction and distancing that acts in between creatures in an underhanded man-
ner. For Epstein, only images are capable of conveying the world’s economy be-
cause, contrary to strictly verbal and rational thinking, they always turn out to be
concrete and metal, always factual, dreamlike, exact and surreal at the same time:
Six et demi onze highlights the magical properties of photographic recording. A
woman finds herself destroyed from a distance by the development of her photo-
graphic portraits, while through the same pictures a man discovers his own se-
crets and his own truth. The images are endowed with “affective valences”; pro-
vided that cinema recognizes and goes deeper into such valences, it can reveal
this old dream of humanity: “what would have been necessary was to truly ex-
change, from mind to mind, the images of one’s thoughts.”49 In the same way
that Freud turned telepathy into a prototype to investigate the various states of the
image (from the passing of an image as memory to image as volition, affective
prospecting), thought transmission constitutes for Epstein an archaic model of
choice used to express the symbolic powers of cinema, “this essential, mental
television.”50
This is why one of Jean Epstein’s privileged thinking projects pertains to the
treatment of mental images. In Cœur fidèle, La Glace à trois faces (especially the bril-
liant episode “Lucy” and its white flashes), L’Or des mers and so many others, what
carries through Epstein’s different periods has to do with the invention of mental
images that make it possible, on the one hand, to turn film shots into virtual
elements (they represent an anticipation, an anxiety, a non-linear relationship to
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time, and a non-existing one to action) and, on the other hand, to materialize on
screen the spectator’s mental movements thanks to a montage linked to desire.
Jean Epstein presents the world as a circulation of analogies; the link between
things described in terms of likeness and aversion, telepathy as dream of cinema:
is Epstein’s meditation regressive? Was it necessary to go back to ante-classical
modes of thinking in order to bring cinematography to its achievement? Of
course not: such reflections are part of a more expansive perspective, in which all
the historical propositions regarding the powers of the image serve the cause of
cinema. Since his conception of being is not identity-related, Epstein summons
an analogy: it is a lever used to question resemblance, this foundation of figura-
tive cinema that is no longer the phenomenon’s autonymic resemblance to itself
but a critical wrenching, a vacillation, a transition (“changing all states in transi-
tions”51): “Man needs a powerful poetic antidote to sublimate the wastes of his
individualism.”52 Epstein’s reflection frequently seems already posterior to the
end of Foucault’s Les Mots et les Choses (1966), written twenty years after Esprit de
cinéma. Because his conception of the image is ultra-modern, Epstein absorbs the
archaic: the image captures, reveals, devours; it is capable of more mobility than
the movement of its motifs;53 and this mobility includes the action of dissonance,
eclipse, and disorganization, all the forms of critical denouement that speak in
favor of “the indispensable illogical continuity.”54 Since Jean Epstein’s cinema
operates in the field of description, it does not distinguish between fiction and
documentary, so that between the 1920s and 1930s, between Parisian modernist
essays and modern Breton documentaries, there is no aesthetic break: differences
in motifs and speeds appear, of course, but also the same intention of finding, for
each film, its own form, away from issues of genre or any type of compliance. As
such, Epstein’s main heir is not so much Carax, who owes him much in terms of
visual principles, as Godard. In fact, the latter’s hostility toward experimental ci-
nema – which is resolutely absent from Histoire(s) du cinéma, although his work
often borrows from it – seems to have been subtler since the discovery of Hollis
Frampton’s texts.
According to Epstein, it was necessary to deny plastic abstraction in order to
better engulf it, and to deploy ultra-figurativeness. In other words, it was neces-
sary, in L’Or des mers, to invent these shots of drawings in the sand that prefigure
Cy Twombly. They are like a dream of dancing in which the sole leftovers are the
intervals between gestures, quasi-abstract wave shots that provide further allego-
rical figurativeness, or the moving, heart-wrenching camera gaze of a young wo-
man desperately in love. This camera gaze will have a lasting echo in the history
of forms, which it nonetheless never claimed to represent. Epstein can thus
rightly claim for himself this power with which he credited cinema as a whole.
“Screen love contains what no love had contained until now, its fair share of
ultraviolet ray.”55
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VI. Jean Epstein and Guy Debord, Telepathy vs. Hypnosis
In a piece of writing from 1949 that foreshadows Guy Debord’s La Société du specta-
cle written in 1967, Jean Epstein composed an incredibly violent analysis on “the
methodical organization of repression” that is the cinematic institution.
Cinema is an “emergency palliative and a strong medicine, administered in
doses of one and a half hours of uninterrupted inhibition and hypnosis. […] A
crowd-oriented dramaturgy is necessarily in keeping with an analysis that may
not be the most diverse, but of the most similar individual tendencies. And an
age of general planisme, of typecasting of mentalities, of methodical organiza-
tion of repression, and consequently of popularization and standardization of
mental ills, requires even more critically the same popularization and standar-
dization of the poetic antidote, in order to proportion its effect to that of cen-
sorship. […] The movies with the most profitable reservations in the course of
a given year only give a measure of the collective neurosis and introspection
during that year.”56
Guy Debord:
“As necessity finds itself to be a social dream, the dream becomes necessary.
The spectacle is the bad dream of a fettered modern society that, in the end,
only expresses its desire to sleep. The spectacle is the watchman for that
sleep.”57
If we still doubted the critical and political properties of Epstein’s endeavor to
visually recast phenomena, watching one of his lesser-known movies would suf-
fice to assuage our misgivings: Les Bâtisseurs, produced in 1938 by the Ciné-Liberté
group (an offshoot of CGT, the General Confederation of Labor). It prepares the
ground for a social policy in construction, for instance by questioning Le Corbu-
sier. In the opening of the film, two workers perched on the scaffolding of a
cathedral re-invent the history of religious architecture from the point of view of
the workers, the builders, and the people. Like the model figures that show the
scale on a map, we can mentally superimpose these little characters onto each
one of Jean Epstein’s shots and linking shots. He gives them the responsibility of
clearing any metaphysics within representation, giving us back “this presence of a
body, this mass through which things are thought,” as Philippe Grandieux put it
so well as he was referring to the author of L’Or des mers.58
Translated by Mireille Dobrzynski
This essay is a revised version of an earlier essay, “Ultra-moderne. Jean Epstein
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contre l’avant-garde,” in Jean Epstein. Cinéaste, Poète, Philosophe, ed. Jacques Aumont
(Paris: Cinémathèque française, 1998), pp. 205-21.
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Thoughts on Photogénie Plastique
Érik Bullot
It is said that in 1637, the Jesuit Athanasius Kircher asked to be taken into the
crater of Mount Vesuvius in order to take a closer look at the volcano about to
erupt. In his book of 1665, Mundus subterraneus, Kircher presents a comprehensive
inventory of the geological knowledge of his age, interweaving considerations of
underground water networks, petrifaction, and insect formations, even dedicat-
ing a chapter to fireworks. A phantasmagoria enthusiast who was among the first
to codify the principle of the magic lantern, Kircher saw a relationship between
the sight of the erupting volcano and these proto-cinematic projections of light.
With the rise of the digital film, whether shot on cell phones, distributed on You-
Tube, or exhibited in art museums or galleries, cinema is currently undergoing a
similarly eruptive metamorphosis. The medium seems to exceed its own bound-
aries; but is this medium still cinema? Has the art of cinema stayed the same
through this digital transformation, or has it changed? For me, this question
raises the issue of plasticity. Plasticity: the ability to bestow form on a substance,
but also contradictorily, the resistance of the substance to this very transforma-
tion. Plasticity differs from elasticity, which holds the possibility of reverting to an
original form without retaining the imprint of its transformation. Rather, plasti-
city designates the propensity of a material to undergo permanent deformation,
the capacity to change in response to environmental demands as neurons and
synapses change their internal parameters in response to their experiences, their
memories. Is cinema plastic? Can it transform itself and/or resist deformation?
Contemporary visual art would seem to represent the limits of cinema’s transfor-
mation and plasticity. As a filmmaker, my own work explores these limits. My
films are situated midway between documentary and the installation film. I can
shoot a film for a screening or a museum. Do these possibilities mean cinema has
become a plastic art?
I will put two questions face to face. Is cinema a plastic art? And if so, what
constitutes the plasticity of cinema? It was in the mid-twenties, during the prolific
period of silent cinema, that the plasticity of cinema – the form bestowed upon its
material basis but also the medium’s resistance to its deformation – was most
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often called into question. This line of inquiry is found in two famous remarks:
one from 1922 by the art historian Élie Faure in the aptly-named article “De la
cinéplastique,”1 and the other from 1926 by Jean Epstein in his book Le Cinémato-
graphe vu de l’Etna.2
Faure endeavors to situate cinema within the spectrum of the other arts and,
like a prophet, he defines plasticity as cinema’s distinctive vocation. Not only is
cinema the plastic art par excellence, it also comes closest to its “truth” when em-
phasizing its plasticity. Plasticity, then, is the very essence of cinema. Faure’s text
ends with a description of Mount Vesuvius. Recounting the spectacle of the erupt-
ing volcano, he writes: “I thought I saw in it a formal symbol of this grandiose art
whose seed we perceive, and which the future doubtless has in store for us: a
great moving construction constantly bringing itself back to life under our eyes
from sheer internal force, and which the great variety of human, animal, vegeta-
ble and inert forms help build.”3
Striving to define photogénie as cinema’s peculiar virtue, Epstein’s essay opens
onto a superb description of his ascent of the erupting Mount Etna, which offers a
metaphor for the animistic power of cinema: “As we climbed on our mules’ backs
toward the active crater parallel to the lava flow, I thought of you, Canudo, who
threw so much of your soul into things. You were the first, I think, to have sensed
how the cinema unites all the kingdoms of nature into a single order, one posses-
sing the most majestic vitality.”4
For these two authors, the attraction of the volcanic eruption represents the
ultimate metaphor of cinema’s plasticity. Just as lava fuses different states of mat-
ter, the cinematic image produces dissimilarity without rupturing its resemblance
to its referent. Photogénie hinges upon the existence of a gap between resemblance
and difference. Epstein says that cinema would be useful for justice because it
works like a proof, revealing not truth or falsity but rather producing both truth
and skepticism of truth. Epstein was likewise fascinated by the relationship be-
tween nature and the cinematic image. Cinema’s plasticity is at work within these
tensions. Like photogénie, plasticity designates the capacity of the cinematic image
to achieve a quantum leap, both mimetic and dissimilar. Cinema has the power to
constitute an autonomous language of visual signs, akin to gestures and ideo-
graphs. This is undoubtedly why the debate about plasticity is so closely tied to
the silent cinema, which invented a real alphabet of signs and gestures through
the art of editing.
But exactly what is this plastic attribute of cinema? Faure first notes a particular
tonal or pictorial quality of cinema that revealed itself to him “in a flash”: “The
revelation of what cinema can be in the future came to me one day: I kept the
memory intact, of the commotion I felt at noticing, in a flash, the magnificence
evidenced in the affinity between a piece of black clothing and the gray wall of an
inn.”5 The harmony of muted colors is detached from the things themselves.
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Plasticity is a quality of abstraction. According to Faure, plastic cinema rids itself
of the subject in order to favor the affinities of light amidst masses and volumes.
“The sentimental framework must be but the skeleton of the autonomous organ-
ism represented by the film. It has to wind its way through time under the plastic
drama, as an arabesque circulates through space to arrange a painting.”6 These
visual games, subject to continuous variations, define the plasticity of cinema by
transforming the film through “a system of values ranging from white to black
and constantly combined, moving, changing on the surface and the depth of the
screen.”7 This description already reveals what precipitates the comparison be-
tween cinema and the volcanic eruption: a tremendous power of modulation.
Faure describes the plume of smoke emanating from Vesuvius as a vast, plastic
medium: “Inside this cloud, massive volumes of ash were constantly forming and
deforming, all contributing to the formation of the great sphere and producing
on the surface a forever moving and variable undulation, all the while maintained,
as though by means of a central attraction within the mass, which neither shape
nor dimensions seem to alter.”8 The expression “forever moving and variable un-
dulation, all the while maintained” conveys precisely the plastic virtue of cinema,
its capacity to receive a form while resisting deformation – that is to say, the inter-
play between abstraction and representation, between plastic mobility and a pat-
tern’s rigidity. It is probably the perception of this regulatory principle in cinema
– the tension between constant, undulating movement and the stabilization of a
structure through which the plastic line winds its way – that prompted Faure to
evoke the image of the volcano.
The attraction of an erupting volcano never ceases to fascinate; it offers the
image of an interregnum. Let’s keep in mind that the different interactions of the
various states of volcanic matter (liquid, solid, gaseous) distinguish the eruption’s
dynamic types: the effusive, in which flows of liquid lava predominate; the extru-
sive, in which solid elements abound within a generally dense, highly viscous
lava; the explosive, which give birth to brutal explosions of pressurized gas and
spew ashen clouds into the sky; and finally, the mixed type, with intermediate
characteristics. It is this unstable equilibrium of elements, upon which the lava’s
high or low level of viscosity depends, that models the flow’s morphology. Lava
comes close to complying with the definition of plasticity; it is given a form ac-
cording to the different types of eruptive dynamism, all the while resisting defor-
mation thanks to the explosive mode, which releases the over-pressurized matter.
It is not surprising that this scene – the constant modulation of matter between
the form’s continuous effusion and threat of explosion – should have fascinated
both Faure and Epstein.
Cinema’s plasticity designates its capacity to abstract “in a flash” a distinct
motif within the continuum of forms. For Faure, the harmony of black and gray
exerts a tension – never resolved – between its autonomous visual power and its
role within the diegesis. This tension belongs to plasticity.
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Doesn’t Faure’s description of the gap between the continuous modulation of
form and the discontinuous (momentary) flash of the motif precisely match the
definition of photogénie Epstein provides in Le Cinématographe vu de l’Etna? Photogénie
presupposes an amplification of the cinematic sign. “I will describe as photogenic
any aspect of things, beings and souls that increases its moral quality through
cinematic reproduction.”9 The photogenic leap characterizes both a gain and a
gap between the object and its reproduction. This gap is comparable to Faure’s
plastic perception of film, which consists of isolating a figure within a continuous
framework. But where does this photogenic quality lie? Epstein continually hesi-
tates to ascribe photogénie exclusively to objects, techniques, or spectators. Is it
intrinsic to movement, a gift within one’s gaze, or a process? It at once charac-
terizes a quality of the object (a face can be described as photogenic); the animist
power of the medium, capable of revealing this quality; and a virtue of film tech-
nique. Thus, photogénie belongs to none of these terms in particular, yet conveys
the specificity of each – and their respective gaps. It serves as a regulating princi-
ple.
Based upon photographic resemblance and upon the difference made possible
by the expressive leap, photogénie tries to settle on a mobile and contradictory
point hinging on both surprise and anticipation. This is undoubtedly why photo-
génie allows for reflection upon the plasticity of cinema: it connects in an improb-
able configuration the modulation of forms arising from the continuum of photo-
graphic reproduction with their deformation, which arises from the medium’s
expressive power. Epstein writes that “[s]ight teeters upon similarities.” This
game involving modulation and rupture gets to the very heart of the structural
principle of cinema caught between the continuous impression of movement and
the discontinuous reality of film’s photographic nature.
Defined as the gap between the power of metamorphosis and the threat of
rupture that regulates its excess, photogénie attempts to juxtapose two opposing
propositions, yet without offering a solution. How does one anticipate the photo-
genic revelation? How does one reconcile calculation and surprise? How does one
establish a method from shimmering, intermittent, discontinuous qualities? Such
is the logical and poetic challenge of photogénie. In terms of semantic mobility –
action, quality, state – photogénie performs magically. It internalizes non-contra-
diction in the meeting of opposites, ruins the principle of identity, reveals the
plurality of time and its reversibility, and evinces cinema’s animistic and meta-
morphic powers. In this respect, one can notice the links between photogénie and
the magical force that Marcel Mauss describes:
We are therefore entitled to conclude that the notion enclosing that of magic
power has existed everywhere. It is that of pure efficiency, which is nonethe-
less a material substance that can be located, as well as a spiritual one, which
acts at a distance and yet through direct connection, if not by contact; mobile
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and shifting without any movement, it is impersonal while assuming personal
forms, both divisible and continuous.10
Photogénie, situated between terms that evoke it but do not contain it, acts like a
magic power; it is a variable of time. “Like the philosopher’s stone,” Epstein
writes as a reader well acquainted with the Kabbalah and alchemy, “the cinema-
tograph holds the power of universal transmutations. But this secret is extraordi-
narily simple: all this magic can be reduced to the capacity to bring about varia-
tions in the dimension and orientation of time.”11
If plasticity designates the power to model time, does cinema have the power to
model its own history? Indeed, the perception of cinema’s plasticity is linked in
Faure’s text to the future of the medium. Not only is this perception sudden and
dazzling, but it is also accompanied by a feeling of foreboding for the future of
the seventh art. Plasticity produces a strange confusion, one which suggests that
cinema operates in the future perfect tense. Its plasticity is thought to be in the
making. It remains unstable, uncertain. It is the vocation of cinema to be a plastic
art, but this vocation has yet to come: it must be established and verified. How-
ever, doubts concerning the limits of cinema’s plasticity can be found in Faure’s
text. Specifically, Faure is skeptical of cinema’s capacity to become a collective art.
Without predicting the introduction of talkies (he writes in 1922), he conceives
plastic cinema as a power yet to come that faces growing threats from industry
and commerce. Hence the figure of the volcano, with its unpredictable and un-
timely returns to activity, in which plastic cinema lays dormant; it is a figure that
plays on the contrast between the continuous modulation of forms and their ex-
plosive fate, the promise of art and the threat of its ossification.
For Epstein, the fate of cinema must obey the imperative injunction expressed
by photogénie: “Cinema must strive to gradually and eventually become strictly ci-
nematic, i.e. to use only photogenic elements. Photogénie is the purest expression
of cinema.”12 Still, it is a difficult injunction to grant, for it is whimsical and
unpredictable. “Until today, I have not yet seen pure photogénie lasting a full min-
ute,” Epstein writes.13 Photogénie possesses the same fleetingness as does the plas-
tic power of cinema revealed to Faure “in a flash.” “One must admit,” Epstein
continues,
that it [photogénie] is a spark and an exception by fits and starts. I like the
mouth about to talk yet still silent, the movement swinging from right to left,
the backward step before taking a leap, and the leap before the stumbling
block, the fate, the hesitation, the compressed spring, the prelude, and, even
better, the piano being tuned before the opening. Photogénie operates in the
future and imperative modes. It does not recognize the present state of
being.14
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Epstein likewise perceives a lethal power in the spectacle of the erupting volcano.
Evoking Mt. Etna, he writes: “The place where I reflected upon the most beloved
living machine [cinema] was this quasi absolute death zone that circled the first
craters within a one or two kilometer radius.”15
By locating a tension between effusion and explosion at the heart of cinema,
between the splendor of a revelation and its unstable fate, Faure and Epstein de-
fine a discontinuous temporality polarized by this tension: on the one hand, effu-
sive metamorphosis – expressed by the animism of the close-up, the kingdoms of
nature elapsing in slow motion, the modulation of forms – and on the other
hand, the explosive rupture produced by photogenic splendor. It is a temporality
for which the volcano offers a metaphor, both for Faure’s notion of plasticity and
for Epstein’s photogénie. This plasticity implies a temporality torn between the
creation of modulated forms and their possible disappearance: “[I]f volcanism is
the fastest geological phenomenon to guarantee new terrestrial landforms, it is
also the only one able to annihilate them almost instantaneously.”16 Unstable and
reactive, cinema’s plasticity is a promise and a threat, a virtuality that may not be
actualized. To this extent, we may consider that cinema is a plastic art without
being plastic in itself. Such is its paradox. Its effusive-explosive history is that of a
continuous-discontinuous invention, with the unpredictability of a volcano.
What about the history of cinema as a plastic art? For Epstein, the cinematic im-
age evokes preverbal language, akin to the ideogram, by offering visual simulta-
neity instead of the consecutiveness of articulated language and by developing
contradictory and reversible logics devoid of causality: “All the details simulta-
neously pronounced beyond the words trigger the words at their root, and before
the words themselves, toward the feelings that precede them.”17 For Faure, cine-
plastics is based on a genealogy inspired by dance and pantomime. I will not
discuss at this time the theoretical relevance of cinema as an ideograph, but I will
point out that it is precisely because cinema does not speak that it is said to be of
a plastic quality. Even if Epstein later tried to theorize sound as another plastic
element of cinema, photogénie remains primarily tied to the visual nature of the
cinematic sign. However, this denial of speech is only ostensible, since Epstein
supposes that cinema constitutes in itself a universal language: “In this darkness
said to be favorable to phenomena of telepathy, that is to say the most distant
comprehensions, to the most secretive connections between minds, the surpris-
ing language was born, of an unexpected nature, which can be processed by sight
but not by sound.”18
Photogénie is the name given to the plasticity of cinema and, as we have seen, is
itself reactive and amorphous, belonging to each of the terms defining it. Doesn’t
photogénie thus specify the tension between the plastic nature of the visual sign,
which predates spoken language, and the very possibility of constituting a non-
spoken language? Is photogénie the name for the impossible coexistence of a lan-
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guage formed without speech and yet miming the power of the spoken word? It is
not surprising that Epstein asks these questions in the years immediately preced-
ing the coming of the talkies. Although they triggered a temporary setback for the
theory of cineplastics, talkies would only more concretely materialize the tension
between speech and the visual sign, a tension that silent films (and their critics)
already invoked in the specter of a lost, original, and universal language of which
they would be the ghost. The history of cinema as a plastic art will therefore be
marked by the struggle to overcome speech, as a stutterer stumbles over lan-
guage, tripping over the explosive and continuous series of consonants. Charles
Van Riper, the famous speech pathologist, defines stuttering as “a disorder in the
synchrony of articulatory movements, prompting an impediment in their tempor-
al adjustment during the pronunciation of phonemes.”19 Shouldn’t cinema as a
plastic art be defined, paradoxically, as a “disorder of synchrony” that not only
affects the film itself – subjected to the disparities between its narrative content
and formal construct, between sound and image (the technical definition of asyn-
chronous cinema) – but also describes the history of the medium as an instru-
ment of discontinuous temporality, mediating the dissimilarity between stillness
and movement? Photogénie names this disorder.
The history of cinema confirms this disorder. Cinema as a plastic art falters. Its
history is discontinuous, broken, alternating between ruptures and repetitions; it
proceeds by leaps and bounds. I will not dwell on this transgressive history,
which remains to be written. Instead, I will look more closely at the model of
temporality cinema devises, and the ways in which time can invest cinema with a
future. As an invention with no future, as Louis Lumière famously put it, what is
the fate of cinema today? Can cinema’s unstable powers of effusion and deflagra-
tion even allow for a future? At a time when the digital evolution of the image
shatters the photographic continuum, can we still find a future for the plasticity
of cinema? Or have we moved from a plastic art to a “plasmatic” art? I will take up
a notion put forth by Sergei Eisenstein about Walt Disney’s animated films and
his characters’ continuous transformations. Struck by the parallel between ani-
mism and animation, Eisenstein ponders the variability of forms. How can a
form vary continuously? Eisenstein calls this power of metamorphosis “plasmati-
city,” which he also recognizes in the variations of fire and clouds:
A faculty I will name ‘plasmaticity’ since, here, the being reproduced in the
drawing, the being of the given form, the being having achieved a certain ap-
pearance behaves like the original protoplasm that did not yet have a ‘stabi-
lized’ form but was capable of adopting one, any one, and, one level at a time,
of evolving until it attached itself to any – to all –forms of animal existence.20
If plasmaticity does indeed describe a power of metamorphosis close to plasticity,
it nevertheless presupposes polymorphism without a point of rupture. The ani-
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mated characters’ bodies, even fragmented, abstracted, animalized, and trans-
muted, can still return to their initial forms; they are elastic, but not plastic. Then
again, placing the fate of plastic cinema in the animated film was one of the
prophecies that concludes Faure’s “De la cinéplastique.” A parallel can probably
be drawn today with the digital image. By cutting the umbilical cord between the
image and its referent, the animated film and the digital image move somewhat
away from the explosive pole of plasticity, thereby giving way to a power endowed
with elasticity, much like morphing. If photogénie is defined by a fluid triad of motif,
medium, and process and is not based solely on photographic ontology, can it
make allowances for its own evolution? Can the plastic model express the plas-
matic leap?
We are currently witnessing an unprecedented dissemination of cinema in social
space, thanks to computers, digital cameras, and a wide range of distribution and
exhibition technologies. These media relentlessly mingle image and inscription.
My mobile phone is all at once a camera, a dictation machine, a typewriter, a
calculator, a video monitor, and, sometimes, a telephone. The computer com-
bines and confuses all these functions. This interchangeability between the lin-
guistic and the visual influences my own practice. I have made a video with a cell
phone, Visible Speech, which intertwines two texts: Diderot’s “Lettre sur les aveu-
gles” and a definition of “visible speech” with Alexander Melville Bell’s system of
phonetic notation which illustrates the physical movements that produce the
sounds of language. These texts are read by synthetic voices that serve as “blind
voices.”My documentary, Speaking in Tongues, encourages linguistic speculation by
showing artificial languages from Esperanto to imaginary tongues. It also renders
homage to the Russian poet Velimir Khlebnikov who invented the phonetic lan-
guage Zaum, and to the Canadian artist Michael Snow who performs in a comple-
tely improvised language in the film. In a way, Speaking in Tongues is a “silent
movie,” because language is a plastic material that can be transformed. An old
problem now renewed, my films explore the plastic dimension of cinema between
word and image. The digital complicates not only the interaction of word and
image but also the relationships between abstraction and representation, trans-
formation and stabilization; these are some of the challenges now facing the plas-
ticity of cinema. If, as Jean Epstein reminds us, “death makes its promises to us
by way of the cinematograph,” should we today mourn plasticity?
Translated by Mireille Dobrzynski. This essay is a revised version of an earlier
essay: “Photogénie plastique,” in Plasticité, ed. Catherine Malabou (Paris: Ed. Léo
Scheer, 2000), pp. 194-207.
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Fig. 1: Jean and Marie Epstein, 1905 (Zopott, Poland). Courtesy Cinémathèque française
Iconothèque
Fig. 2: Jean Epstein, date unknown
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Fig. 3: Jean Epstein during the filming of Le Tempestaire on Belle Isle sur Mer, 1947.
Courtesy Mado Le Gall, Private Collection
Fig. 4: A bar fight develops in Coeur Fidèle (Jean Epstein, 1923) © la Cinémathèque fran-
çaise
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Fig. 5: Ivan Mosjoukine as Prince Roundghito-Sing in Le Lion des Mogols (Jean Epstein,
1924) © la Cinémathèque française
Fig. 6: Monumental set in Le Lion des Mogols (Jean Epstein, 1924) © la Cinémathèque
française
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Fig. 7: Behind the scene in Le Double amour (Jean Epstein, 1925) © la Cinémathèque
française
Fig. 8: Les Aventures de Robert Macaire (Jean Epstein, 1925) © la Cinémathèque fran-
çaise
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Fig. 9: La Glace à trois faces (Jean Epstein, 1927) © la Cinémathèque française
Fig. 10: La Chute de la maison Usher (Jean Epstein, 1928) © la Cinémathèque française
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Fig. 11: Finis Terrae (Jean Epstein, 1929) Courtesy of Agnès Berthola and the Musée Gau-
mont
Fig. 12: Life at sea, Mor’Vran (Jean Epstein, 1930) © la Cinémathèque française
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Fig. 13: In quicksand in L’Or des mers (Jean Epstein, 1932) © la Cinémathèque française
Fig. 14: A symphony of superimpositions in L’Or des mers (Jean Epstein, 1932) © la
Cinémathèque française
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Fig. 15: Le Tempestaire (Jean Epstein, 1947) © la Cinémathèque française
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Translations

Introduction: Epstein’s Writings
Epstein’s film criticism is among the most wide-ranging and poetic writing about
cinema; it also constitutes an essential foundation to the history of French film
criticism that mainstream Anglophone film studies customarily assigns to André
Bazin. Almost as soon as Epstein’s writings about literature and then cinema
were published, they were held to be among the most insightful and provocative
in the new criticism – nowadays we would say ‘theory’ – of the 1920s. Contribut-
ing articles to the plethora of newly emerging literary and journalistic venues for
the cinema such as Cinéa-Ciné-pour-tous and Photo-Ciné in France, Epstein also man-
ages several successful entries internationally, for example with articles appearing
in Broom (Rome) and Zenit (Zagreb). There was a wide dissemination of Epstein’s
films and criticism, seen for example in Pudovkin’s mistaken impression that The
Fall of the House of Usher was shot entirely in slow motion1 to a fairly substantial
knowledge of Epstein among the Czech avant-garde of the 1920s and 30s, some
of whom knew of La Lyrosophie.2 Given this international exposure, it is all the
more surprising that Epstein did not immediately rise to the stature his work
deserved in cinema studies as it developed as a discipline.
Epstein’s critical writing covers a wide range of interests and approaches to
cinema. It plays a significant role in developing a language for discussing the
potential of film as an art, for example. Moreover, it arrives as an early entry in
the debate about cinema’s relation to realism. First, Epstein examines the impor-
tance of the relationship of the spectator to the world depicted on screen; a bit
later, after his first encounters with filming in Brittany at the end of the 1920s, he
also develops an understanding of how actors (or inhabitants of the places where
he filmed) function cinematically, as part of the landscapes they occupy. In this,
his work connects to later iterations of the realism debate, for example through
Italian Neo-Realism. While several aspects of Epstein’s notion of cinematic real-
ism are examined in exciting and productive ways within the critical essays of this
volume – Rachel Moore on the Brittany films and Ludovic Cortade on “the basic
ontological problem” taken up in Epstein’s work, for two very different examples
– many more of the implications of Epstein’s notions of realism remain to be
explored.
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As suggested in the introduction to this volume, the earliest formulations of
Epstein’s theories about the cinema develop in relation to literary concerns, parti-
cularly cinema’s affinities with poetry’s temporal and image-making capacities.
Simultaneously, Epstein begins to develop several related concerns, including ela-
borating the concept of photogénie, which marks the early exuberance of his think-
ing about the expressive potential of cinema. This aligns him with later thinkers
like Roland Barthes, whose notion of the punctum seems particularly indebted to
Epstein’s thinking about photogénie,3 or Gilles Deleuze, whose time-image, for in-
stance, bears important relationships with the kind of affect made possible for
Epstein in the cinematic domain.4
Sections of later texts in Epstein’s oeuvre, including L’intelligence d’une machine
and Cinéma du diable, attest to a crisis in Epstein’s thought, perhaps precipitated
by the Nazis’ rise to power, World War II, the Holocaust and the use of atomic
bombs, and culminating in the impossibility for Epstein to make films for several
years. All of these issues suggest a tension between Epstein’s Franco-Polish ethni-
city (French father, Polish mother) and shared Catholic-Jewish heritage, a tension
that manifests itself in the global crises of the age, a crisis between humans and
machines in L’intelligence d’une machine, and between Good and Evil in Cinéma du
diable. While we may note that through his faith in the cinematograph’s transgres-
sive, transformative power, Epstein, on the side of cinema, also tends to side with
the devil, we also marvel at how his negotiation of Manichean cultural values in
these writings involves a remarkably complex set of strategies, none of which
leads him to tidy conclusions or validates strictly dualistic thinking.
Epstein’s thinking touches on enduring concerns for cinema studies and pro-
vides a tool for intervention in current debates about the nature of cinema. His
earlier work anticipates the interdisciplinary, cross-medial approaches to thinking
about cinema’s place within the arts, culture, and history. His later work makes
new media seem if not exactly old, then certainly something with significant ante-
cedents. Epstein is persistently and insistently contemporary because of his “ul-
tra-modern” understanding of the ways cinema participates in the crisis humanity
feels when confronted with the machine (see Nicole Brenez’s essay in this collec-
tion).
As we see it, Epstein’s developing theory of cinema is thus important for a
number of reasons, among which is its modernist intervention. As Christophe
Wall-Romana notes, that intervention is less dystopian than we might imagine
when we see how often he refers to conditions of modern fatigue. In fact:
…in marked contrast to Freud who tends to define the modern condition as a
series of endings, destructions and lacks (spiritual hunger, isolation, aliena-
tion, etc.), Epstein treats it instead as the experience of a new kind of excess –
a nervous condition which he paradoxically encapsulates in “la fatigue.” This
is one of Epstein’s more radical redefinitions: rather than being caused by en-
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ergetic depletion, for him modern fatigue proceeds from an inchoate potential
and desire for expression which leads to a state of restless stimulation. Fatigue
is an un-actualized potential.5
Moreover, in its most salutary manifestations, Epstein claims that cinema serves
an important function within the social conditions from which modernism de-
rives, providing an outlet for the otherwise underestimated, underchallenged
spectator. A similar optimism about cinema marks the full range of Epstein’s
writings.
The comprehensive representation of Epstein’s writing collected here allows us
to remark upon several of these tendencies and important themes in his work,
and to reconsider some that have been understood less well than they might be.
For instance, a rich history surrounds the development of Epstein’s most endur-
ing and possibly most misunderstood concept: photogénie.6 According to Epstein,
photogénie concerns the special quality that photography confers upon that which
is photographed. Laid out in the greatest detail in writings that date from the early
1920s, Epstein outlines the way in which the camera confers “personality,” “life,”
or “soul” upon the things it addresses. He insists upon the cinema as a vehicle to
express this vitality:
[…] The cinema must seek to become, gradually and in the end uniquely, cine-
matic; to employ, in other words, only photogenic elements. Photogénie is the
purest expression of cinema.
What aspects of the world are photogenic, then, these aspects to which the
cinema must limit itself? […] A moment ago I described as photogenic any
aspect whose moral character is enhanced by filmic reproduction. I now speci-
fy: only mobile aspects of the world, of things and souls, may see their moral
value increased by filmic reproduction. […] To things and beings in their most
frigid semblance, the cinema thus grants the greatest gift unto death: life. And
it confers this life in its highest guise: personality.7
For Epstein, the personality of things becoming visible depends upon the mastery
of the camera by the most creative, engaged practitioners of the cinematic me-
dium (e.g., Abel Gance, D.W. Griffith, Marcel L’Herbier); mastery of the medium
consists of both what is shown (selection) and how it is shown. Photogénie de-
scribes the transformative process through which cinema brings out the soul of
objects in motion through the devices of photography and in time.
Notwithstanding the importance of this concept to cinema studies, even a par-
tial story of photogénie has not yet been told in the Anglophone world. The recep-
tion of photogénie has often been monolithic. This owes a lot to those critics who
dismiss Epstein’s theories as inconsistent or unsystematic and contradictory.
American critics have often lumped all the French film critics of the 1920s to-
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gether under a term – Impressionists – which, while perhaps appropriate to
some, does not really apply to Epstein in either its descriptive or prescriptive
sense. That is, Epstein is not merely interested in using technical effects to reveal
the subjective interiority of his characters in hopes of achieving a Romantic rheto-
ric on film. Nor may his work be characterized by the sense of “impressionistic”
as it is used pejoratively to describe a theory devised off the cuff and with little
underlying substance to support it. The concept of photogénie is far more complex
than this: it involves a tripartite psycho-physiological relationship among appara-
tus, object, and spectator; it at once evokes mystical or “revelationist” connota-
tions as well as decidedly modernist ones (that involve, among other things, the
limits and expansions of perception, cognition, and affect).8
Another connection that has not yet been fully explored is the relationship of
Epstein’s sense of realism to the very influential publication of André Bazin’s es-
say on “The Ontology of the Photographic Image.”9 Epstein never explicitly at-
tempts to lay out an ontology of photographic or moving images, but his writings
nevertheless show a persistent engagement with the nature, meaning, and es-
sence of the image. His writings are concerned with the cinema’s relationship to
the world and return again and again to interrogate the photographic basis of
cinema (and, contrary to Bazin, usually to point out its limitations) and the effect
that cinema’s ontology has on the presentation and perception of time. Putting
these works side by side, it seems that Bazin comes off as rather more of a classi-
cist, with Epstein more attuned to the transgressive impulse, as we see especially
in his insistence on reality as a constantly mobile, transformative premise.
Undoubtedly, Epstein’s contributions to theorizing these issues are many and
deserve greater scrutiny, which we hope this collection will inspire. To support
this hope with practical assistance, we have provided a selection from each of
Epstein’s major books – most of them translated into English for the first time.10
In addition to significant excerpts from every period and major publication of
Epstein’s written oeuvre, we include the complete text of The Cinema Seen from Etna
(Le Cinématographe vu de l’Etna), the book that perhaps most persuasively and enter-
tainingly combines serious theoretical arguments, incisive criticism, poetic prose,
dogmatic views, and unrestrained cinephilia.
All of Epstein’s books include excerpts that were themselves first published –
often in slightly or significantly different forms – as articles in journals or given as
lectures. We note this provenance of his collections because it is important to
remember that Epstein was not writing weighty tomes of film theory outside of a
lived film practice and immersion in his contemporary cinematic and artistic mili-
eu. His theorizations were conceived as responses to issues in which he was fully
immersed as an artist and citizen of the modern world. Introducing each trans-
lated work is a brief note that situates the text within Epstein’s oeuvre, cinema
history, or the development of similar concerns elsewhere, providing the reader
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with contexts in order to access better the full range of Epstein’s evolving
thoughts about the condition, practice, and potential of the cinema.
A word on the translations
As we have edited this selection of translations of Epstein’s work, we have tapped
the talents of several translators, many of them contributors to the critical essay
section of this book, and all of them engaged for one reason or another with
Epstein’s thinking. Naturally, each one approaches Epstein’s complex, playful,
syntactically-difficult, inspiring, and sometimes maddening prose with a slightly
different strategy; as the remarkable Lydia Davis commented, after having inti-
mately consulted a dozen previous translations of Madame Bovary in preparation
for her own translation of Flaubert’s novel: “The great variety among the transla-
tions depends, of course, on two factors: how each translator handles expressive
English and how liberally or narrowly each defines the task of the translator.”11
The translations here emphasize different aspects of Epstein’s work by cleaving
more or less closely to the lines by which Epstein’s thought – full of digressions
(often several within one sentence) and extended or abandoned metaphors – un-
folds in the original language. Just as Davis later noted that “Perhaps Flaubert was
mistaken when he believed that the success of the book would depend entirely on
its style – since various of his translators over the years have composed deeply
affecting versions that do not reproduce it,” we sincerely hope that the assortment
of styles within the translations we have assembled here advances their intended
effects and provides ample inspiration for further work on his oeuvre.12
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La Poésie d’aujourd’hui, un nouvel état
d’intelligence
Introduction
Epstein wrote his first book, La Poésie d’Aujourd’hui, in the summer of 1920, and it
was published just after he arrived in Paris in 1921. Focusing mainly on aesthetic
and literary concerns (it was well received as a statement on modern poetry), it
also sketches out several of the issues Epstein would develop over the course of
his writings, including intellectual attention and fatigue; the role of reverie, affect,
synesthesia and coenaesthesia in comprehending one’s relationship to the visible
world; and how literature and cinema mobilize these concepts. He turns explicitly
to the cinema in a late chapter, excerpted here, to demonstrate affinities between
poetic strategies and cinematic ones.
– Sarah Keller
* * *
Cinema and Modern Literature [1921]
Translated by Audrey Brunetaux and Sarah Keller
[Jean Epstein, “Le cinéma et les lettres modernes,” La Poésie d’aujourd’hui, un nouvel
état d’intelligence (Paris: Éditions de la Sirène, 1921), pp. 169-180.]
Cinema saturates modern literature. And inversely, this mysterious art is imbued
with a great amount of literature. It is true that, to date, the cine-literary colla-
boration has mostly produced filmic adaptations such as Le Crime de Sylvestre Bon-
nard [director unknown, 1919] and Au Travail [Henri Pouctal, 1919], films which
would be impossible to criticize too harshly and which have led astray this emerg-
ing, still-hesitant mode of expression that nonetheless stands as the most subtle
one we have ever known, the most attuned to the moment.
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If viewing a second-rate film made by some mindless director who only knows
about literature from the French Academy and its cohorts makes us think of mod-
ern literature in spite of him, or rather without his being aware of it, that’s be-
cause there exists a natural interplay between this new form of literature and ci-
nema that functions on several levels.
First of all:
Modern literature and cinema are equally enemies of theater. Any attempt to
reconcile them is pointless. Like two different religions, two aesthetics cannot
live side by side without coming into conflict. Under attack from both modern
literature and cinema, theater, if not already at the point of death, will progres-
sively grow weaker. It is a foregone conclusion. When even a good stage actor has
to struggle just to exist with the excess verbiage of a forty-line monologue in verse
so regular as to ring false, how can theater hope to compete with the screen,
where every fibril of movement is visible and where I’m delighted to see a man
who does not need to act because, simply human, most beautiful animal on earth,
he walks, runs, comes to a halt, and sometimes turns his face to the voracious
audience.
Cinema and the new approach to literature need to support each other by
superimposing their aesthetics.
a) Aesthetic of Proximity
The succession of details with which modern authors have replaced narrative de-
velopment and the first close-ups generally attributed to Griffith are part of this
aesthetic of proximity.
Between the spectacle and the spectator, no barrier.
One doesn’t look at life, one penetrates it.
This penetration allows every intimacy.
A face is seen under a magnifying glass, exhibiting itself; it flaunts its fervent
geography.
Electric waterfalls cascade into the fault lines of this relief, and collect under
the 3000 degrees of the arc lamps.
This is the miracle of real presence,
life made manifest,
opened like a beautiful pomegranate
and stripped of its covering,
easily absorbed,
barbaric.
A theater of flesh.
No vibration escapes me.
A shift in shots upsets my equilibrium.
Projected onto the screen, I land on the line between the lips.
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What a valley of tears, and how silent!
The lips become agitated and begin to quaver. They tremble, part, slip away,
and flee:
Splendid warning for a mouth set to open.
Compared to the drama of muscles moving in close-up, how paltry a theatrical
performance made of words!
b) Aesthetic of Suggestion
One no longer tells; one shows. This allows the pleasure of discovery and crea-
tion. More personally and without restrictions, the image comes together.
On the screen, the essential quality of a gesture is that it does not come to an
end. The face doesn’t mimic expressions, but, better, it suggests. When laughter
is interrupted, we imagine it from our glimpse of its advent. And in Hayakawa’s
palm, just barely beginning to open, upon such a broad path of gestures, our
thoughts find their bearings.
Why?
Developing an action that begins so skillfully adds nothing to it. We can antici-
pate; we can already foresee the rest.
For anyone who knows their arithmetic, the givens of a problem suffice.
How tedious to read all the way through a simple solution which we could have
discovered more quickly on our own.
And above all, there is the unfilled space of a gesture that the mind, which is
quicker, plucks from its cradle and then races ahead of.
c) Aesthetic of succession
In calling them “movies,” the British have understood that remaining faithful to
what comprises life lies in the representation of its incessant movement. A rush
of details constitutes a poem; and the editing of a film gradually intertwines and
combines shots. The centrifugal process comes later, and from the base we ex-
tract the general impression. Cinema and literature, everything moves. The rapid
angular succession approaches the perfect circle of impossible simultaneous ac-
tion. The physiological utopia of seeing things “together” is replaced by an ap-
proximation: seeing them quickly.
d) Aesthetic of Mental Quickness
It is at least possible that the speed with which we think might increase over the
course of a lifetime or over successive generations. No two people think at the
same speed. Thus the slowness that bothers us in Italian films, where gestures
drag out across the screen like slugs, testifies to Italians’ slowness of thought.
The time spent figuring things out is longer for the Italian brain than for the
French. That which mysteriously interests and deceives the Italian spectator, we,
the French, catch onto in a matter of seconds.
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For this and many other reasons, there will never be an international cinema
for the elite.
Fast-paced films lead us to think quickly. It’s a kind of training, if you will.
In the aftermath of some Douglas Fairbanks films, I may have experienced
some stiffness, but never boredom.
This speed of thought, which the cinema records and measures, and which in
part explains the aesthetic of suggestion and succession, can also be found in
literature. In just a few seconds we have to decipher ten metaphors, and if we
fail, comprehension founders. Not everyone can keep up; slower minds are as
delayed in literature as they are in cinema, and they end up getting on the nerves
of their neighbor with their string of constant questions.
When reading Rimbaud’s Illuminations aloud, there is on average one image per
second.
They come at the same pace in Blaise Cendrars’ Nineteen Elastic Poems, at certain
points a bit slower.
Elsewhere, in Marinetti (in Italian), you hardly come upon even one image
every five seconds.
This is the same difference that exists in films.
e) Aesthetic of sensuality
In literature: “no sentimentality!” – not visibly.
In cinema, sentimentality is impossible.
Impossible because of extreme close-ups and of photographic precision.
What is the point of having platonic flowers when the audience is looking at a
face illuminated by forty arc lamps?
Americans, who have understood certain aspects of cinema relatively well, have
not always understood this one.
f) Aesthetic of metaphors
The poem: a cavalcade of metaphors that rear up.
Mr. Abel Gance was the first to create visual metaphors. If you make allowan-
ces for their being distorted by slowness and disguised by symbolism, this was a
major discovery.
The principle of the visual metaphor is adaptable in dreams and normal life; on
the screen, it is a fixed given.
On screen, a crowd. A car pushes its way slowly through. Ovation. Hats off.
White splashes of hands and handkerchiefs dance above heads. An indisputable
analogy recalls these lines by Apollinaire:
“When human hands were all in leaf”1
and these others:
“The sky was filled with lakes of light.
And human hands flew up like milk-white birds.”2
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I immediately imagine a superimposition that emerges from the fade-in, then
jumps into focus and stops abruptly:
dead leaves falling down and swirling, then a flock of birds.
But:
QUICKLY (2 meters)
WITHOUT SYMBOLISM
(the birds should be neither doves nor crows, but simply birds)
Within five years we will write cinematographic poems: 150 meters of film with
a string of 100 images that minds will follow.
g) Momentary aesthetic
Not many literary critics have failed to claim that a beautiful poetic image must be
eternal. This is silly. First of all, “eternal” does not mean anything. Let us say:
long-lasting. But an image cannot last long. Scientifically speaking, reflected
beauty wears thin: the image becomes cliché when it ages. Racine, in his time,
had to offer his audience numerous and quite stunning images. What remains of
them today? Platitudes. Whereas the success of a performance once depended on
the text, now it is the performance that saves the text. How can a work of litera-
ture withstand such a reversal? All that is left of Racine’s work is its rhythm, half
of what it used to be. An image can emerge from a cliché, provided that it has
been forgotten first. Let’s forget about Racine. Let’s not talk about him for three
hundred years. A new audience will rediscover him and, sincere at last, will take
pleasure in his works.
The written word always ages, but more or less rapidly. Today’s written word
will age very quickly. This is not intended as a criticism. I know that some people
gauge the value of works of art by the duration of their success. They return their
verdict: “This will be a classic,” or “This will soon fade from memory.” They
speak of posterity, of centuries, of millennia, and of eternity as mentioned above.
They despise passing trends. They no more know how to measure their pleasure
than the faded games of generations gone by.
All the same, we should be spared this sentimental blackmail. My great-grand-
father might have loved Lamartine and worn pants with foot straps. Filial affec-
tion doesn’t oblige me to take up foot straps, but am I supposed to love Jocelyn?
Masterpieces aren’t read much anymore, and when they are – oh, tombs! What a
dance on your gravestones! A page from a classic isn’t always a complete page: it
is too general. Certain works are so closely bound to a certain period that once
that time has gone by, there is nothing left but an empty husk. But for fellow
travelers, what a mirror they provide! Same thing in the classroom: that which
the pedant enjoys in Corneille, Corneille justifiably held in contempt. I would not
wish upon my worst enemy to produce a classic and therefore the future makings
of a bunch of hogwash.
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Literary movements hasten their own replacement. Those that are closely tied
to human sentiments observe that, in ten years, both humans and their senti-
ments change. Its very exactitude quickly turns literature into impenetrable brush.
Symbolism has already begun to degenerate into foolishness, but it did offer gen-
uine pleasures. One style doesn’t suffice for a whole generation. In the last twenty
years the path of beauty has reached a new turning point. The quickness with
which we think has increased; fatigue rushes in. That things one wrongly calls
Cubism only last for months, not years, shouldn’t be held against them. People
who came of age fifty years ago sometimes run out of breath trying to keep up.
Most of them criticize. It is the old quarrel of the ancients and moderns, which
the moderns have always won.
Like contemporary literature, film hastens volatile metamorphoses. From au-
tumn to spring, aesthetics change. One speaks of eternal canons of beauty
whereas any two successive catalogues from Bon Marché give the lie to such non-
sense. Nothing appeals to our sensuality with as keen a sense of the times and as
fine an ability to adapt as fashion. From here, film adopts some of the same mag-
netic charms, and it is such a faithful image of our childlike infatuations that five
years later, it is only suitable for the fairground lantern.
Notes
1. Guillaume Apollinaire, “L’émigrant de Landor Road/The Emigrant from Landor
Road,” in Alcools, trans. Donald Revell (Hanover, CT: Wesleyan University Press,
1995), p. 103.
2. Apollinaire, “L’émigrant de Landor Road/The Emigrant from Landor Road,” p. 101.
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Bonjour Cinéma
Introduction
Bonjour Cinéma, published in October 1921, features at its center a set of essays
Epstein had published in film journals earlier in the same year and then revised
for this collection. The first of these articles, “Grossissement,” appeared in Ep-
stein’s own arts journal Promenoir in the February/March issue; “Le Cinéma Mys-
tique” (renamed here “Ciné Mystique”) and “Le Sens 1 bis” appeared in Louis
Delluc’s magazine Cinéa in the spring and summer of that year. Surrounding this
core of essays is every manner of textual, poetic, and graphic play: in addition to
several poems and pithy statements about the cinema, the slim volume includes
pages whose designs derive from the world of movie fandom (posters, programs,
fan magazines, music sheets, etc.) and several drawings both by Claude Dalbanne
and Epstein himself. Bonjour Cinéma simultaneously sketches out several of the
issues that were deeply important to the development of Epstein’s theory of film
– photogénie among them – and pays homage to popular moviegoing through an
exuberant, infectiously enthusiastic approach to cinema.
– Sarah Keller
* * *
Continuous Screenings [1921]
Translated by Sarah Keller
[Jean Epstein, “Séances continuelles,” Bonjour Cinéma (Paris: Éditions de la Sirène,
1921), pp. 13-15.]
Continuous Screenings
In close-up
pale sunshine
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this face reigns
The enamel mouth stretches out
like a lazy awakening
then turns laughter upside down
up to the edge of the eyes
Without good-byes the waltz retreats
I am taking you, cinema,
and your china wheels
which I feel when I embrace
your trembling enduring
skin, so close,
spread out in the arc-light glare
How beautiful this lantern is
which repeats its dramatic light –
I have seen your 1 2 3 step
moving away on the lawns
and your silent laughter
which rushes toward me
full in the face
The gallop of flight
escaping into the cab –
hooves trample,
the auditorium, tango air,
Pursuit in the saddle
driving over the hill
In the dust, the heroine
reloads her gun
Next to a man
I walked through the snow
everything against his back
an eye on his coat
He was running along with great strides
without turning his head
he feared it was getting cold
every moment he pressed forward
my supernatural cinema
The tracks of documentary
come in through my mouth –
the lopsided hill
slips away and lies down
this seasickness is excellent
in the ocean liner cabins
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with tracks for the blowtorch
I congest the earth
In my deck chair
I resign myself to shipwreck
Blocked at every right turn
Tunnel to starboard
Under the belly of a blimp
I slide in by plane
the nose, the propeller in air
I have been to the Belle Hélène theatre
I was well-shaved –
Cinema I am taking you
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La Lyrosophie
Introduction
Epstein’s La Lyrosophie (1922) is a companion piece to his La Poésie d’aujourd’hui, un
nouvel état d’intelligence (1921). Although La Lyrosophie only skirts the question of the
cinema, its philosophical speculations serve as the armature upon which he con-
structs his film theory. In La Lyrosophie, Epstein claims that the general intellectual
fatigue that follows from the speed and telescoping of space in modern life, and a
concomitant increase in the speed of thought, contributes to a mode of subjectiv-
ity he calls lyrosophie. In the lyrosophical mode, the enervation of the control of
reason over the subconscious elicits the projection of subconscious sentiment
onto the conscious intellectual plane. As aesthetic pleasure is a function of – and
analogous to – the stimulation of subconscious emotional associations, them-
selves ineffable, what is elaborated is a theory of poetic language in which the
sign, independent of the reader’s wholly subjective projection of beauty upon it,
is aesthetically inexpressive. But in poetry, in which fresh, disjunctive metaphors
reign, and in play, in which words also function as autonomous sounds, thus
destabilizing language itself, the aesthetic becomes a genuine possibility. Epstein
conceives of the aesthetic effect of cinematic representation in terms analogous to
that produced and experienced in the lyrosophical mode: it is a function of the
investment of objects with an intensified sense of life via their position in an
atemporal nexus of the viewer’s subconscious emotional associations.
– Katie Kirtland
* * *
Excerpts from La Lyrosophie [1922]
Translated by Christophe Wall-Romana
[Jean Epstein, La Lyrosophie, 4th ed. (Paris: Éditions de La Sirène, 1922), pp. 16-20,
31-35, 45-46, 74-77, and 181-182.]
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The Scientific Order Opposed to Feeling
[…]
All the sciences thus endeavor to constitute for themselves a proper domain
from which feeling and its logic are banned. The more exact the science, the
stricter the banishment. The reasons for this rigorous exclusion are easily under-
standable. Any science, any logic, any knowledge rests in the last analysis on the
evidence [évidence].1 Any proof at its crucial point appeals to the evidence. General
geometry rests on Euclid’s postulate, which is evidence incarnate. Evidence, it
stands to reason and almost by definition, is indemonstrable. To demonstrate it
would mean to state an argument more evident yet, which would consequently be
singularly obvious [évident]; and this would therefore destroy evidence. Hence evi-
dence is indispensable and ineffable. Hence evidence is a feeling. And it is a pure
feeling, a feeling that is its own species, such as those we take hold of in dream-
life, for example. All of traditional logic thus has for its unique and indispensable
linchpin what it most despises: an affirmative feeling. This feeling of evidence:
sciences are neither able to, nor do they want to, exclude it; yet, drawing their life
from its pure integrity, they must necessarily ensure its complete isolation. The
same way one refines sulfur, sciences refine their postulates of evidence. How-
ever, we know how rare pure, generic feelings are, that they take place only in
special intellectual or almost a-intellectual states, that they more than easily com-
bine with each other, and that from these combinations there result the mixed
and rough feelings – hatred, pride, lust – that animate us. It is therefore incum-
bent upon the sciences, so as to mine this pure ore, this invaluable radium of the
feeling of evidence, that they should cultivate it in a zone from which all other
feelings are absent. Hence order is foremost the sacrifice of passion. This non-
feeling and pure intellectual state, self-conscious to the utmost degree, is quite
rarefied. While all sciences aspire to it, few truly reach it, and many remain mid-
way in intermediary states – half-feeling, half-reason. And around this part of the
island that has laboriously emerged, this island of pure reason, there lies truly an
immensity of feeling, graspable and thought-dependent at its surface; and lower,
subconscious and unsayable; and lower still, unconscious, unknown, but fecund.
From the depths of this confusion, where everything and nothing can be imag-
ined – nothing, as before the world was created – there gushes to the summit the
most systematized of pure intellectual states, retaining like a geyser the heat-feel-
ing of its depths: the feeling of evidence. But only this feeling, single and pure.
Because if evidence is corrupted, it becomes analogy. Then at a lower depth, ana-
logy becomes metaphor. At this point, science enters a lyrical state. Science is
dead. Lyrosophy is born.
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Particulars of Love
[…]
Let’s take cinema as [an] example. Like mathematics and like the knowledge
that comes from love, cinema is essentially subjective.2 The same way the mathe-
matician demonstrates on paper properties that are not intrinsic to the paper, on
screen you see what is not and cannot be on the screen. Moreover, you see this
unreality specifically and feelingly, with all the particularities of real life. A movie
shows you a man who betrays. You know full well first of all that there is no such
man, and secondly that there is no such betrayal. Yet the movie addressed the
ever-wakeful knowledge that comes to you from love. It created, through the
ghost of a thing, a feeling; and since this feeling cannot live without the thing for
which it was made, and since this feeling too obeys the law of preservation, the
false thing will come alive for you. Or rather there will come to life a thing-feel-
ing, and you will believe in more than a traitor – you will believe in a betrayal. You
now need this very betrayal, since you have the feeling of it – and such a particular
feeling that no other betrayal than this imaginary one will satisfy it.
Experimental Science and the Experience of Feeling
Science is experimental. Feeling is experience [éxperience] itself.3 Nothing in the
knowledge that comes from love can be acquired other than through personal
trial. Such knowledge is therefore closer to the thing and to the object than scien-
tific knowledge, which, as we know, is often indirect, even bookish. Science re-
cognizes a certain faith: even if the experiment fails, you still believe that hydro-
gen can combine with chlorine. That’s because the conclusion is here outside of
the experience, and the conclusion is general, while the experience is particular,
and in order to reach a conclusion you can very well replace one try by another.
For love, the experience, just like the conclusion, are in the realm of the individ-
ual. Experience is its own conclusion. Nothing is truly general. There are as many
conclusions as experiences, and if the experience fails, there is no conclusion.
Hence while science demonstrates, feeling is itself the essence of the demonstra-
tion, that is to say, the pure affirmative. And if it does not succeed in being this
complete affirmation, it is but an absurdity, a nullity. Science progresses; feeling
is immediately everything or nothing.
The knowledge of feeling is a passion. Lyricism takes sides with everything,
and nothing of what it knows leaves it indifferent, for as soon as there is knowl-
edge in a lyrical state, instantly this knowledge is perfect – that is, it becomes
love, passion, possession, and self-forgetting.
Science looks for causes through the study of effects. Lyricism creates causes in
proportion to effect, that is, it invents them.
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The Rule of The Kabbalah Is Such That It Espouses Passion Rather than
Opposing It
The mystical principle is that intelligence, or more precisely spirit, or more pre-
cisely yet, the soul, penetrates things. Representation thereby becomes a phenom-
enon. To a fact there answers within man an indelible philosophy with which this
fact fuses. The word, the exterior sign of representation and the interior sign of
the thing, is identical with the representation and the thing. Thus there are no
longer representations of things, but thing-representations. To designate means
to create. Because the universe is the verb, the verb is the universe. Abstraction is
a general matter. Reality and its metaphysics have the same value for the soul,
because the soul takes hold of the fact and interprets it; interpretation is a second
fact, inseparable from the former, its Siamese twin.
In short, the Kabbalist never considers the world as exterior, located outside of
himself, but considers it always after he has absorbed it within himself. Every-
thing to him is introspection. He does not differentiate between two categories of
phenomena: objective and subjective. All are located for him on a unified plane of
consideration, a subjective plane – that is to say, that of feeling. And in this uni-
fied plane, this network of feelings, the most varied equivalences, associations,
equalities, and correspondences take place. The suppleness of the logic of feeling
allows these to occur while rational logic brutally forbade them to reason.
Through the operation of the soul, the object passes into the state of feeling and,
having become feeling, henceforth lives like one, that is, by associating itself. If,
as the Kabbalist writes, “Twelve letters – he, vav, zain, chet, tet, jod, lamed, nun,
samek, ayin, zade, kaf – he has founded, he has traced, engraved, combined,
weighed, and permuted, and he has made with them the twelve constellations,
the twelve months of the year, the twelve directors of the soul,” it is, in terms of
pure logic, even less than an absurdity: an incomprehensible and null nonsense.4
But in the logic of feeling, such associations between the letters of an alphabet
and constellations or months of the year are perfectly normal and, in terms of
feelings, justifiable by contiguity or similitude (but the similitude of feeling).
Hence a child who sees, while learning her alphabet, as is common, the image of
an angel next to the letter A, might her entire life conserve a feeling of equiva-
lence between the letter A and the representation of an angel, a feeling repressed
by reason, half-forgotten within the subconscious, but capable at any moment, if
the circumstances arise, to emerge within consciousness.5
The Lyrosophical Misunderstanding
The lyrosophy of language thus leads to bestowing a double meaning or rather a
double series of meanings to each verbal expression.6 One of these series con-
tains reasonable, logical, and stable meanings whose individual variations are
rather limited. The other series is formed by affective meanings coming in the
wake of logical meanings. These affective meanings are infinitely more complex,
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more precise – and precise otherwise – and more changing. With them, the
word is plainly much richer and more broadly expressive; it says more things
and, by way of feeling, says them poetically. At the same time, it is exposed to
being fuzzy and favoring misunderstandings. It is more intelligent since it offers
the possibility of having more things be understood, but it runs the risk of not
succeeding in communicating the one thing it most intends, among the things it
can say.
It behooves us to propose here an apology of misunderstanding. To misunder-
stand means to become aware of a meaning until then virtual within the sentence,
which, once corrected, still possesses both meanings. To misunderstand certainly
means first to miss understanding, but also to understand something else, hence
more, since this other thing is in excess of the meaning strictly intended.
Notes
1. Epstein plays on the concept of évidence/l’évident throughout this section. Although
translated as “evidence” or “evident” in all but one case (noted in the text), we should
read in every use of this word both the sense of proof and of the obvious. See note 3
below.
2. In the preceding section, Epstein describes both mathematics and the knowledge of
love as subjective but precise states of being; they negotiate subjectivity and objectivity
at once. For example, in the field of mathematics, Epstein writes: “…other marks of
subjectivism: these figures that have no value other than the subjective. It is subjec-
tively that the line is straight, the circle round, and the angle right; objectively it
doesn’t matter what the line, circle, and angle are.” La Lyrosophie, p. 32.
3. See note 1, above. Epstein here may be speaking equally of human experience and
scientific experiment, as well as possibly a combination of the evidence of the senses
and the (apparent) rules obvious in the world’s natural order (editors’ note).
4. This citation is from the Sefer Yetzirah [Short version], 5:2. The “directors of the soul”
are parts of the human body.
5. Later in the text, Epstein draws an explicit analogy between Kabbalah and cinema:
“The cinema names things visually: as spectator I do not doubt for a second that they
exist, and I link this whole drama and so much love to a few signs made of light and
shadow. Never, even in the Kabbalah, was designation so thoroughly the same as
creation. And, after this creation, I conserve the feeling of a second singular reality,
sui generis and cinematographic.” La Lyrosophie, p. 93.
6. Epstein provides a discussion on the “lyrosophy of language” in the chapter preceding
this one:
If lyrosophy appears in contemporary thought, we can anticipate that it likewise
appears in language. Similarly, the fact is that if today the modification of language
is the most lyrosophical thing we’ve seen for a hundred years, nevertheless, be-
cause there has always been language, it has always lived lyrosophically. Just as
Kabbalah is the intensification of a mysticism which for many a long age already
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contained its rudiments, the germ of lyrosophy, this other kabbalah, which is going
to blossom tomorrow, already exists.
Each word in its adult form possesses two sides: it is intelligible on one hand and
moving on the other. These two qualities generally depend on each other and are
therefore, in this way, contradictory. Furthermore, they are variable, because if the
emotion conferred by a word increases, its intelligibility decreases and vice versa. La
Lyrosophie, pp. 167-168.
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Le Cinématographe vu de l’Etna
Introduction
Le Cinématographe vu de l’Etna was Jean Epstein’s fourth published book and the
second he devoted exclusively to cinema. Many, but not all, of the articles and
lectures on cinema he had published or delivered since 1922 are included, some-
times in augmented or revised form, but none of his other contemporary writings
on literature and the visual arts. Circumstantial evidence suggests that it was
composed and delivered to the printer before the end of 1925 since it fails to
include two short but interesting texts, “L’Opera de l’oeil” and “L’Objectif lui-
même,” both published in the first weeks of January 1926. The seven short essays
extend some of the principal theoretical points first enunciated in Bonjour Cinema:
film as a universal language; the transformative powers of the camera apparatus
that made it as central to the creation of film art as the men who set up the fram-
ing and turned the crank. It is perhaps equally notable for its literary flair. The
loosely organized, meandering meditations on the diverse theoretical topics he
treats are replete with metaphorical turns of phrases and cultural references that
are at once suggestive and elusive, illuminating and frustrating. These strategies
were and would remain a distinctive feature of Epstein’s reflections on the art to
which he devoted his life.
– Stuart Liebman
* * *
The Cinema Seen from Etna1
Translated by Stuart Liebman2
[Jean Epstein, Le Cinématographe vu de l’Etna (Paris: Les Écrivains Réunis, 1926).]
Sicily! The night had a thousand eyes. All sorts of smells shrieked at once. An
unfurled coil of wire brought our car, swathed in moonlight as if surrounded by
mosquito netting, to a halt. It was hot. Impatient, the drivers broke off singing
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the most beautiful love song, striking the car with a monkey wrench and insulting
Christ and his mother with a blind faith in their efficacy. In front of us: Etna, the
great actor who bursts onto the stage two or three times each century, whose
tragic extravagances I had arrived to film. An entire side of the mountain was a
blazing spectacle. The conflagration reached up to the reddened corners of the
sky. From a distance of twenty kilometers, the rumbling at times seemed to be a
triumphal reception heard from afar, as if a thousand hands were applauding in
an immense ovation. What tragedian in what theater ever knew such a thunder-
ous success? The earth, suffering but held in thrall, exploded during the curtain
calls. A harsh shudder suddenly ran beneath the ground where we stood. Etna’s
tremors telegraphed the vast scale of its calamity. After that, a great silence des-
cended in which one could once again hear the drivers’ songs.
The roads at the foot of Etna had been closed as a precaution. At every cross-
road, the black shirts demanded our travel authorization. But these soldiers for
the most part did not know how to read, and the multi-colored brochure which
had covered my tube of aspirin had a greater effect on them than the Prefect of
Catania’s authentic signature.
At Linguaglossa, the mule-drivers waited for us in front of the flowing lava,
black and shot through with purple like a beautiful carpet. The wall of embers
advanced by caving in again and again. Under its impact, the houses, badly pro-
tected by their holy images, exploded, making a sound like nuts cracking. Huge
trees only touched at the bottom of their trunks by the fire instantaneously burst
into flames, from their roots to their tops, and burned like so many roaring
torches. The day dawned. The mules, uneasy, tensed their nostrils and flattened
their ears. Some of the men, feeling helpless, wandered around.
Glorious volcano! I have never seen expressions comparable to yours. The con-
flagration had covered everything with the same colorless color, grey, dull, dead.
In front of one’s very eyes, every leaf on every tree passed through all the colors of
autumn until, cracked, twisted and scorched, they fell into the fiery blasts. And
each naked, blackened tree held itself upright for but an instant during this
scorching winter. There were no more birds, no insects at all. Like the roadway
of a bridge when a very heavy truck rolls across it, the earth, lined with thin cre-
vices, was continually traversed by tremors. The lava collapsed with the noise of a
million plates breaking at once. Pockets of gas burst, hissing as softly as snakes.
The inferno’s smell, an odor without scent, filled with tingling, acrid sensations,
poisoned our lungs to their very depths. Under the sky, pallid and parched, death
truly reigned. The battalions of soldiers, bureaucrats, engineers, and geologists
contemplated this distinguished natural actor, who rekindled in these democrats
an idea of absolute power and divine authority.
As we climbed on our mules’ backs parallel to the lava flow toward the active
crater, I thought of you, Canudo,3 who threw so much of your soul into things.
You were the first, I think, to have sensed how cinema unites all the kingdoms of
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nature into a single order, one possessing the most majestic vitality. It inscribes a
bit of the divine in everything. In front of me, at Nancy, a room with three hundred
people moaned when they saw a grain of wheat germinate on screen. Suddenly, the
true visage of life and death, of a terrifying love, appeared, provoking these reli-
gious outcries. What churches, if we only knew how to construct them, could ac-
commodate a spectacle like this, where life itself is revealed. To discover unexpect-
edly, as if for the first time, everything from a divine perspective, with its symbolic
profile and vaster sense of analogy, suffused with an aura of personal identity –
that is the great joy of cinema. No doubt, there were games in antiquity and “mys-
teries” during the Middle Ages that produced this much piety and amusement at
the same time. In water, crystals as beautiful as Venus grow, born as she was,
replete with the most elusive symmetries, correspondences, and charms. A hea-
venly game, thus do worlds fall – wherefrom? – into a space of light. It is the same
for thoughts and words. All life is covered with ordained signs. In order to grow
and unite, rocks make beautifully steady gestures as if they were meeting beloved
memories. Under the sea, angel fish and those voluptuous organs, the secretive
jellyfish, dance. Insects appear as large as battleships, as cruel as the intellect, and
devour each other. Ah, I fear the futurists who are itching to replace true dramas by
false ones made with whatever is at hand: aviation and central heating, consecrated
hosts and the world war. I fear they will only write some third-rate acting scenes for
the crystals and jellyfish of cinema. Why does one even need to imagine? The woo-
den shoes of our mules pawed the site of a veritable tragedy. The earth had an
obstinate, human face. We felt ourselves to be in the presence of someone lying in
wait for us. The laughter and dazzling shouts of our eight muleteers were all there
were. Wemarched along silently, so sharing a single thought that I felt it in front of
us like an eleventh gigantic person. I don’t know if I can make myself understood
about this, but the figure with whom we were all preoccupied was the cinema. And
what a character it is! It was as if we had come into the presence of an old and
powerful man who rushed around, myopic and rather hard of hearing. You waited
for a response, but you understood him less than he understood you, undoubtedly
because your languages are different and your thoughts unfamiliar to each other. I
once had a friend, a quite Europeanized Chinese man. One morning we were
studying flowers in the botanical garden; suddenly, my comrade got angry for no
reason at all. I was never able to penetrate the insurmountable anger and sorrow
with which he surrounded himself much like the Great Wall does his country.
Thus, quite often the extreme points of human sensibilities are inaccessible to us,
and sometimes an entire soul, full of power and cunning, is forbidden to us. As if
in front of one of these [souls], I stood before Etna.
One of the greatest powers of cinema is its animism. On screen, nature is never
inanimate. Objects take on airs. Trees gesticulate. Mountains, just like Etna, con-
vey meanings. Every prop becomes a character. The sets are cut to pieces and
each fragment assumes a distinctive expression. An astonishing pantheism is re-
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born in the world and fills it until it bursts. The grass in the meadow is a smiling,
feminine genie. Anemones full of rhythm and personality evolve with the majesty
of planets. A hand is separated from a man, lives on its own, suffers and rejoices
alone. And the finger is separated from the hand. An entire life suddenly is con-
densed and finds its most pointed expression in this fingernail which mechani-
cally torments a thunder-charged fountain pen. There was a time not so long ago
when hardly a single American drama was without a scene in which a revolver
was slowly pulled out of a half-open drawer. I loved that revolver. It seemed the
symbol of a thousand possibilities. All the desires and desperation that it rep-
resented, the multitude of combinations to which it was a key. It allowed us to
imagine all sorts of endings, all kinds of beginnings; and all of these endowed
this revolver with a kind of freedom and moral character. Is such freedom, such a
soul, more epiphenomenal than the one we claim to be our own?
When the whole man finally appears, he is seen for the first time ever with an
inhuman eye. The place for me to think about this most beloved living machine
was this almost absolutely dead zone extending one or two kilometers around the
first craters. The most careful surgeons prepare their operating rooms less anti-
septically. I slept on the ashes which were warm and moving like the skin of a
large animal. Two hundred meters away, fiery rapids surged from an almost cir-
cular crevice and rushed down the slope to form a river as red as ripe cherries and
as large as the Seine at Rouen. The vapor covered the sky with a porcelain white-
ness. Little gusts of fetid, angry wind raised eddies of ash which fluttered just
above the ground, strange seagulls living at the edge of the gigantic conflagra-
tion. The mule-drivers held the noses of the mules that wanted to flee and could
not be tied up anywhere. Just like a child who plays too close to a fire and who, it
is said, will have an accident, Guichard,4 my cameraman, shot a lap-dissolve
whose value no one, I think, will fully appreciate. A tall man suddenly appeared
through the fumes, jumping with incredible temerity from rock to rock along the
crater’s edge, like some bizarre guardian angel of a place certainly more propi-
tious than any other to magical transformations. He approached with long
strides. He was old and dry, with ashes powdering every hair in his goatee; the
whites of his eyes were very red, his outfit singed here and there, and he had
about him the general air of a sorcerer. I was not so sure that he was not a real
devil, but he claimed to be a Swedish geologist. While speaking to me he made
gestures with a metal thermometer as long as an umbrella. This man had been
living very calmly for a week solely in the immediate company of this volcano. A
few steps away, he camped under a tent where he could see equally clearly by day
or night and through which the shaking ground stirred a constant current of air.
His pockets were filled with chunks of lava and papers. Taking out his watch, he
noted down the exact time of our encounter. He cupped his hands to form a
megaphone, and his mouth practically at my ear, he shouted some words which I
barely made out: “Today everything looks as if it will remain calm. But yesterday,
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an Italian journalist descended half insane.” I already knew this; as we ascended
we had met his guides as they were coming down, badly shaken and eager to talk.
Where we were, the noise was that of a hundred express trains scorching past a
metal viaduct. After a few minutes, the roaring became like silence, propitious to
the imagination. And all about us lay ashes.
Two days before, as I left the hotel for this trip, the elevator was stuck between
the third and fourth floors from six-thirty in the morning on. The night clerk,
already a prisoner in the cabin for three hours, shook his wretched body, softly
groaning into the carpet. In order to descend, I had to take the large staircase,
still lacking a banister, where workers were chanting insults at Mussolini. This
immense spiral of stairs portended vertigo. The entire shaft was lined with mir-
rors. I descended surrounded by images of myself, by reflections, by images of
my gestures, by cinematic projections. At every turn I was caught from another
angle. There are as many different and independent positions between a profile
and a three-quarter view as there are tears in an eye. Each of these images lived
but an instant, no sooner caught sight of than lost from view, already something
else. Only my memory could hold on to one of their infinite number, and by
doing so, missed two out of every three. Tertiary images were born from second-
ary images. An algebra and descriptive geometry of gestures came to light. Cer-
tain movements were divided over and over; others were multiplied. I tilted my
head and to my right I saw only the square root of a gesture, but to the left, this
gesture was raised to the eighth power. Looking at one, then the other, I acquired
a different conception of my three-dimensionality. Parallel perceptions were in
perfect accord with each other, reverberated against each other, re-enforced each
other and then were extinguished, like an echo, but with a speed far greater than
acoustical ones. Tiny gestures became very large, just as when words spoken as
softly as possible into the ear of Dionysius the Tyrant at the Paradise of the La-
tomies, swell into a booming shout, thanks to the conductive nature of the rock.5
This staircase was the eye of another sort of tyrant, an even greater spy. I des-
cended as if moving across the optical facets of an immense insect. The opposing
angles of other images cut across and amputated each other; reductive and frag-
mentary, they humiliated me. For the moral effect of such a spectacle is what is so
extraordinary. Every glance brings a baffling surprise that insults you. I had never
been seen this way before and I regarded myself with horror. I understood those
dogs that bark and the apes that fly into a rage in front of a mirror. I thought
myself to be one way, and perceiving myself to be something else shattered all
the vain notions I had acquired. Each of these mirrors presented me with a per-
verse view of myself, an inaccurate image of the hopes I had. These spectating
mirrors forced me to see myself with their indifference, their truth. I seemed to
be in a huge retina lacking a conscience, with no moral sense, and seven stories
high. I saw myself stripped of my sustaining illusions, surprised, laid bare, up-
rooted unfeelingly and presented truthfully, exactly for what I was. I would have
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run a long way to escape this spiraling movement in which I seemed thrust down
toward a terrifying center of myself. Such a lesson in egotism in reverse is pitiless.
An education, an entire course of instruction, a religion had patiently consoled
me to be as I was. Everything had to be begun anew.
Even more than this kind of play with tilted mirrors, cinema produces similarly
unexpected encounters with oneself. The uneasiness experienced in front of one’s
own filmed image emerges suddenly and is widely shared. By now the story of the
little American millionaires who cried after seeing themselves on screen for the
first time has become a commonplace anecdote. And those who do not cry are
troubled. One should not understand such an effect as merely the result of pre-
sumptuousness or exaggerated coquettishness. For the mission of cinema does
not seem to have been precisely understood. The camera lens is an eye which
Apollinaire would have called surreal (without any relationship to today’s surreal-
ism), an eye endowed with inhuman analytic properties. It is an eye without pre-
judices, without morals, exempt from influences. It sees features in faces and hu-
man movements that we, burdened with sympathies and antipathies, habits and
thoughts, no longer know how to see. For anyone who even briefly considers this
statement, every comparison between theater and cinema becomes impossible.
The very essence of these two modes of expression is different. Thus, the other
original property of the cinematic lens is its analytic power. Cinematic art ought
to depend on it. Alas!
If the first response to our own cinematic reproduction in front of us is a sort
of horror, it is because every day we civilized individuals lie (no need to cite the
theories of Jules de Gaultier or Freud) about nine-tenths of who we are.6 We lie
without knowing it any more. Suddenly this mirror’s gaze pierces us with its am-
peres of light. The inextinguishable source of the cinematic future lies in its ana-
lytic power. Villiers hardly dreamed of a comparable machine to confess souls.7
And I see very clearly new inquisitions drawing overwhelming evidence from
films in which a suspect is captured, flayed, and meticulously betrayed in an un-
biased way by this very subtle mirror’s gaze.8
* * *
On Certain Characteristics of Photogénie9
Translated by Tom Milne
The cinema seems to me like two Siamese twins joined together at the stomach,
in other words by the baser necessities of life, but sundered at the heart or by the
higher necessities of emotion. The first of these brothers is the art of cinema, the
second is the film industry. A surgeon is called for, capable of separating these
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two fraternal foes without killing them, or a psychologist able to resolve the in-
compatibilities between these two hearts.
I shall venture to speak to you only of the art of cinema. The art of cinema has
been called ‘photogénie’ by Louis Delluc.10 The word is apt, and should be pre-
served. What is ‘photogénie’? I would describe as photogenic any aspect of things,
beings, or souls whose moral character is enhanced by filmic reproduction. And
any aspect not enhanced by filmic reproduction is not photogenic, plays no part
in the art of cinema.
For every art builds its forbidden city, its own exclusive domain, autonomous,
specific, and hostile to anything that does not belong. Astonishing to relate, lit-
erature must first and foremost be literary; the theater, theatrical; painting, pictor-
ial; and cinema, cinematic. Painting today is freeing itself from many of its repre-
sentational and narrative concerns. Historical and anecdotal canvases, pictures
that narrate rather than paint, are rarely seen nowadays outside the furnishing
departments of the big stores – where, I must confess, they sell very well. But
what one might call the high art of painting seeks to be no more than painting,
in other words color taking on life. And any literature worthy of the name turns
its back on those twists and turns of plot that lead to the detective’s discovery of
the lost treasure. Literature seeks only to be literary, which is seen as a justifica-
tion for taking it to task by people alarmed at the idea that it might resemble
neither a charade nor a game of cards and be put to better use than killing time,
which there is no point in killing since it returns, hanging equally heavy, with
each new dawn.
Similarly, cinema should avoid dealings, which can only be unfortunate, with
historical, educational, novelistic, moral or immoral, geographical or documen-
tary subjects. The cinema must seek to become, gradually and in the end un-
iquely, cinematic; to employ, in other words, only photogenic elements. Photogénie
is the purest expression of cinema.
What aspects of the world, then, are photogenic, these aspects to which cine-
ma must limit itself? I fear the only response I have to offer to so important a
question is a premature one. We must not forget that where the theater trails
some tens of centuries of existence behind it, cinema is a mere twenty-five years
old. It is a new enigma. Is it an art or something less than that? A pictorial lan-
guage, like the hieroglyphs of ancient Egypt, whose secrets we have scarcely pe-
netrated yet, about which we do not know all that we do not know? Or an unex-
pected extension to our sense of sight, a sort of telepathy of the eye? Or a
challenge to the logic of the universe, since the mechanism of cinema constructs
movement by multiplying successive stoppages of celluloid exposed to a ray of
light, thus creating mobility through immobility, decisively demonstrating how
correct the false reasoning of Zeno of Elea was?11
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Do we know what radio will be like in ten years’ time? An eighth art, no doubt,
as much at odds with music as cinema currently is with the theater. We are just as
much in the dark as to what cinema will be like in ten years’ time.
At present, we have discovered the cinematic property of things, a new and
exciting sort of potential: photogénie. We are beginning to recognize certain cir-
cumstances in which this photogénie appears. I suggest a preliminary specification
in determining these photogenic aspects. A moment ago I described as photo-
genic any aspect whose moral character is enhanced by filmic reproduction. I
now specify: only mobile aspects of the world, of things and souls, may see their
moral value increased by filmic reproduction.
This mobility should be understood only in the widest sense, implying all di-
rections perceptible to the mind. By general agreement it is said that the dimen-
sions deriving from our sense of direction are three in number: the three spatial
dimensions. I have never really understood why the notion of a fourth dimension
has been enveloped in such mystery. It very obviously exists; it is time. The mind
travels in time, just as it does in space. But whereas in space we imagine three
directions at right angles to each other, in time we can conceive only one: the
past-future vector. We can conceive a space-time system in which the past-future
direction also passes through the point of intersection of the three acknowledged
spatial directions, at the precise moment when it is between past and future: the
present, a point in time, an instant without duration, as points in geometrical
space are without dimension. Photogenic mobility is mobility in this space-time
system, a mobility in both space and time. We can therefore say that the photo-
genic aspect of an object is a consequence of its variations in space-time.
This definition, an important one, is not simply a mental intuition. A number
of films have already offered concrete examples. First, certain American films,
demonstrating an unconscious and highly precocious feeling for cinema,
sketched the spatio-temporal cinegrams in rough outline. Later Griffith, that
giant of primitive cinema, gave classical expression to these jostling, intersecting
denouements that describe arabesques virtually simultaneously in space and time.
More consciously and more lucidly, Gance – today our master, one and all – then
composed his astonishing vision of trains swept along on the rails of the drama.
We must be clear why these racing wheels in La Roue comprise the most classic
sentences yet written in the language of cinema. It is because in these images the
most clearly defined role is played by variations, if not simultaneous at least ap-
proximately so, in the spatio-temporal dimensions.
For in the end it all comes down to a question of perspective, a question of
design. Perspective in drawing is a three-dimensional perspective, and when a
pupil executes a drawing which takes no account of the third dimension, the
effect of depth or relief in objects, it is said that he has done a bad drawing, that
he cannot draw. To the elements of perspective employed in drawing, the cinema
adds a new perspective in time. In addition to relief in space, the cinema offers
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relief in time. Astonishing abridgements in this temporal perspective are per-
mitted by the cinema – notably in those amazing glimpses into the life of plants
and crystals – but these have never yet been used to dramatic purpose. If, as I said
earlier, a draftsman who ignores the third spatial dimension in its perspective is a
bad draftsman, I must now add that anyone who makes films without playing
with temporal perspective is a poor director.12
Moreover cinema is a language, and like all languages it is animistic; in other
words, it attributes a semblance of life to the objects it defines. The more primi-
tive a language, the more marked this animistic tendency. There is no need to
stress the extent to which the language of cinema remains primitive in its terms
and ideas; so it is hardly surprising that it should endow even the most inanimate
objects it is called upon to depict with such intense life. The almost godlike im-
portance assumed in close-ups by parts of the human body, or by the most lifeless
elements in nature, has often been noted. Through the cinema, a revolver in a
drawer, a broken bottle on the ground, an eye isolated by an iris are elevated to
the status of characters in the drama. Being dramatic, they seem alive, as though
involved in the evolution of an emotion.
I would even go so far as to say that the cinema is polytheistic and theogonic.
Those lives it creates, by summoning objects out of the shadows of indifference
into the light of dramatic concern, have little in common with human life. These
lives are like the life in charms and amulets, the ominous, tabooed objects of
certain primitive religions. If we wish to understand how an animal, a plant, or a
stone can inspire respect, fear, and horror, those three most sacred sentiments, I
think we must watch them on the screen, living their mysterious, silent lives,
alien to human sensibility.
The cinema thus grants to the most frozen appearances of things and beings
the greatest gift in the face of death: life. And it confers this life in its highest
guise: personality.
Personality goes beyond intelligence. Personality is the spirit visible in things
and people, their heredity made evident, their past become unforgettable, their
future already present. Every aspect of the world upon which the cinema confers
life is elevated only if it possesses a personality of its own. This is the second
specification which we can now add to the rules of photogénie. I therefore suggest
that we say: only the mobile and personal aspects of things, beings, and souls
may be photogenic, that is, may acquire a higher moral value through filmic re-
production.
An eye in close-up is no longer the eye, it is AN eye: in other words, the mi-
metic decor in which the gaze suddenly appears as a character... I was greatly
interested by a competition recently organized by one of the film magazines. The
point was to identify some forty more or less famous screen actors whose por-
traits reproduced in the magazine had been cropped to leave only their eyes. So
what one had to do was to recognize the personality in each of forty gazes. Here
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we have a curious unconscious attempt to get spectators into the habit of studying
and recognizing the distinctive personality to be seen in the eye alone.
And a close-up of a revolver is no longer a revolver, it is the revolver-character,
in other words the impulse towards – or remorse for – crime, failure, suicide. It is
as dark as the temptations of the night, bright as the gleam of gold lusted after,
taciturn as passion, squat, brutal, heavy, cold, wary, menacing. It has a tempera-
ment, habits, memories, a will, a soul.
Mechanically speaking, the lens alone can sometimes succeed in this way in
revealing the inner nature of things. This is how, by chance in the first instance,
the photogénie of character was discovered. But with the proper, by which I mean a
personal, sensitivity, one can direct the lens towards increasingly valuable discov-
eries. This is the role of the author of a film, commonly called a film director. Of
course a landscape filmed by one of the forty or four hundred directors devoid of
personality whom God sent to plague the cinema as He once sent the locusts into
Egypt looks exactly like this same landscape filmed by any other of these film-
making locusts. But this landscape or this fragment of drama STAGED BY some-
one like Gance will look nothing like what would be seen through the eyes and
heart of a Griffith or a L’Herbier. This is how the personalities of certain men, the
soul, and, finally, poetry erupted into the cinema.
I remember still La Roue. As Sisif died, we all saw his unhappy soul leave him
and slip away over the snows, a shadow borne away in angels’ flight.
Now we are approaching the promised land, a place of great wonders. Here,
matter is molded and set into relief by personality; all nature, all things appear as
a man has dreamed them; the world is created as you think it is; pleasant if you
think it so, harsh if you believe it to be. Time hurries on or retreats, or stops and
waits for you. A new reality is revealed, a reality for a special occasion, which is
untrue to everyday reality just as everyday reality is untrue to the heightened
awareness of poetry. The face of the world may seem changed since we, the fif-
teen hundred million who inhabit it, can see through eyes equally intoxicated by
alcohol, love, joy, and woe, through lenses of all sorts of madness: hate and ten-
derness; since we can see the clear thread of thoughts and dreams, what might or
should have been, what was, what never was or could have been, the secret forms
of feelings, the startling face of love and beauty – in a word, the soul. “So poetry
is thus true, and is as real as the eye itself.”
Here poetry, which one might have thought mere verbal artifice, a figure of style,
a play of antithesis andmetaphor – in short, something next to nothing – achieves a
dazzling incarnation. “So poetry is thus true, and is as real as the eye itself.”
The cinema is poetry’s most powerful medium, the medium most capable of
realizing the unreal, the ‘surreal,’ as Apollinaire would have said.
This is why some of us have entrusted to it our highest hopes.
* * *
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Langue d’Or13
Translated by Mireille Dobrzynski and Stuart Liebman
Almost as much as they hate one another, human beings love one another. And
they dream of a prodigious universal tongue that would facilitate their monetary
and emotional exchanges. But if the tenacious will to understand each other
which led to the development of Esperanto was not checked by the vertigo that
stopped Babel’s expansion as the tower tapered off in the clouds, that desire was
nonetheless in vain. A methodical framework alone is not enough to build the
quivering architecture of speech. Patient in their work, facile in their ability to
imitate, and logical in their efforts at synthesis, scholars [of Esperanto] succeeded
in coining words: leaves without trunks or roots. They also developed a grammar,
but without having to incorporate thousands of generations of a hundred thou-
sand living hearts. Artificial and lacking in inspiration, their lingo ended up being
forgotten, after having amused a few sufficiently uneducated anarchists; one can-
not even say that it died, since, strictly speaking, it was never born.
But, springing forth from the dense mass of things, a spark was struck from
the tragic friction between peoples; the universal tongue, reigning over the six
thousand idioms of the world, was meant to be. It came into being. So many ears
pricked up to record its first syllable. And the first syllable emerged without
breaking the silence, so that many who were listening too hard still haven’t been
able to hear it, although it has been speaking for about ten years. In the darkness
said to be favorable to telepathic phenomena – that is, to the comprehension of
the most remote things and the most secret correspondence between minds – the
surprising language was born; its nature was unexpected, easily assimilated
through the eye but not through the ear. It isn’t read, it is seen, and this act of
“seeing” is truly the most nuanced exercise, the most subtle, the most exacting,
and the most specialized of all visual exercises. The cinema, both popular and
high-brow, familiar and spectacular: a universal language. Its undeniable share
of requisite vulgarity produces deep roots that sustain its life. A modern machine
of frightening complexity. A golden language, much more expensive than was
silence in a time long ago when speech was silvery. Each celluloid word con-
sumes dollars, marks, francs. And it cannot be pronounced except upon the say-
so of bankers, pregnant with capital, after signing contracts in which hundreds of
thousands are pledged, exchanged, won, promised, lost, divided, and multiplied.
Each word must pay for insurance and customs duty, be amortized and rake in a
lot. For this word to be pronounced properly – that is to say, to be pronounced in
a way that pays, amortizes, rakes it in – some curt, tough, buttoned-up men in
black who represent gold, who think gold, who give, protect and recover gold,
have decreed and applied a cinematic canon more meticulous and more author-
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itarian than the classical rule of the three unities.14 Something upheld to a greater
extent than this rule, probably.
And I can only clumsily express just how difficult this language is. It is agony,
like a nightmare in which one fights against sleep, finally to pronounce a syllable
in a faltering, liberating breath. The world is made up of four simple elements;
film is composed of all the others acting for or against each other, accumulating
straightforwardly in sums, and collapsing into pyramids of secondary elements.
The human face, so soulful, attacked by electricity. Light, a shower of fire, cooks
and reheats the face, corrodes and ripens it, gives it luster, coats and paints it in
the colors of passion. The face cracks, is peeled apart, splits in half all the way to
the bottom, suffers and laughs, then rises like a revered sun. The touch of am-
peres inscribes thoughts on the forehead. The arc-light bears the shadow of
memories into the eye that it frames, pins to the star’s gaze a strength of will,
and blows, like God, onto the clay of mouths so that even the saddest feelings
about love might appear as a smile. But if the arc-light should blink, farewell to
profound perspectives of feeling! May the actor, yielding to the storm of clarity,
cease to forget himself and thus reclaim the soul being torn from him. The lens is
quarrelsome. Do not think for a moment that it is taking photographs. It displays
what is hidden, hides what is displayed, first wants something, doesn’t want it the
very next moment, composes and recomposes, then resolves its very personal
vision despite all the blinkers in ways contrary to any expectations. And, male
that it is, it impregnates the film, until that moment said to be virginal, even
more unpredictably than human beings are born. Film is also reticent. One eve-
ning, we all had to turn our backs on it so it would stop its cruel whims. Our
gazes disturbed it: who knew?
And from so many fevers and burns, from so many sweating hands and hearts,
from work that wears one down like love itself, what is left? A film image, a
reflection of what we wanted, filtered a hundredfold, weakened, faded, wounded
a hundred times by the one hundred adverse realities it had to overcome, almost
dying, born after at least five months of effort for a life lasting but sixty-five min-
utes, then, dream that it is, forgotten.
Because it is so complex, this language is also incredibly subtle. All the details
pronounced – expressed without recourse to words – simultaneously trigger the
words that lie at their roots as well as the feelings that precede them. Then the
screen turns on its silent loudspeaker sky. The atmosphere of Swedish films, cold
as reformed religion, is unloaded on foreign hearts at the speed of light. Hayaka-
wa’s gaze, as heavy as an oath, crushes us white men, who do not know what
honor in the East is, or a love without kisses, a fire under ashes, or a fifteen-year
betrothal. A wordless telegraphy teaches us the precise meaning of peoples’
souls. All around the earth are roads upon roads along which we love and kill
each other; seas and still more seas, on whose shores people sit, their chins on
their fists, waiting; and cities forty stories high where men fall asleep on their
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phone every night and die one day, finally happy, having had no time to notice it.
There is an album of the world’s hearts, in sarcophagi made of gelatin.
And this is even more beautiful: in the same way that pleasure and pain in
living things only express the instinct of self-preservation, the film’s financial ne-
cessities similarly determine its moral qualities (I dare not speak of artistic quali-
ties; it is obvious that cinema is already more than an art). In order to satisfy its
need for capital, films tend to extend beyond the borders of the country that pro-
duced them. This is not necessary; it could be cut. It is a vital necessity. Cinema
will either be a global form of writing, or it will be nothing more than a kind of
theater made worse by photography. For a long time now, the first American
images have flown above our heads with the lassos of the Wild West. Then we
got to know Ince and his rustic dramas. Today we like Griffith – a brutal Jew and
restrained Protestant – who is the very incarnation of passion. They know little
about the five or six films we could show them. Thus far, Gance, your J’accuse
alone fell from so far high up and down into American hearts that they became
heavier.
* * *
The Photogenic Element15
Translated by Tom Milne
The cinema is at that happy period when new forms of expression for thoughts
and human emotions meet with misfortune. If I said that the young arts, the
young sciences, the young philosophies waxed strong on easy successes, you
would not believe me. Their successes were always difficult, blended with the
measure of failure that tempers character. I mean that cinema is in its apostolic
period, an era corresponding in the history of religions to their militant days. And
if I call them happy, very happy, these difficult times cinema is going through, it
is because they alone, through their very difficulty, permit the explosion of great
enthusiasms. Above all, they alone conjure the will and the talents that are the
most valuable, the individual aspect of these enthusiasms. These pioneering indi-
viduals are missionaries sent by the Cause to prepare its triumphs and convert the
barbarians.
Tonight my thoughts cannot but turn to memories of two of these missionaries
for the cinema: Canudo and Delluc. And there must certainly be some of us who
will admit to having been converted to the cinema by one or the other, or possibly
both, and to owing them heartfelt thanks.
Canudo was the missionary of poetry in the cinema; Delluc, the missionary of
photogénie.
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As early as 1911, Canudo published an essay on cinema so farseeing that one
cannot reread it today without being astonished. In 1911, when cinema for years
to come was to be, in both theory and practice, no more than a holiday diversion
for schoolboys, a darkish place of assignation, or a somewhat somnambulistic
scientific trick, Canudo had understood that cinema could and should be a mar-
velous instrument for lyricism. And although this new lyricism really only existed
then as a prophecy, he immediately foresaw its limits and possibilities, its deter-
minate and indeterminate qualities.
The concept of painting was born on the day when color sprang as an abstrac-
tion into the minds of our very remote ancestors. Similarly, the concept of sculp-
ture or architecture was born the moment the notion of volume emerged in the
human mind. In 1919, Delluc formulated and wrote of this word which for a time
seemed magical, and to this day retains its mystery. With the notion of photogénie,
the concept of cinema as an art was born. For how can one better define the
undefinable photogénie than by saying: photogénie is to cinema what color is to
painting and volume to sculpture – the specific element of that art.
If Canudo quickly scanned the reaches of cinema’s horizons, Delluc discovered
this photogénie which is a sort of refractive moral index to this new perspective.
It was Canudo, in those sessions at the Salon d’Automne, who first thought of
publicly presenting selected extracts from films, of building up an anthology of
cinema. This notion of a cinematic anthology was extremely valuable because,
through these fragments of film, it drew attention to cinematic style: it isolated
style from narrative. This attempt to analyze cinema’s resources should be pur-
sued even more rigorously: by taking not extracts from various films, but images
in the strict sense. And not images from various films, but images in a quality of
style, a photogenic quality. Those programs at the Salon are in fact still very much
in the flow of evolution and refinement today. It is this classification of cinema’s
resources that I propose should be undertaken more in the spirit of a grammarian
or a rhetorician.
An army commander should, I presume, know exactly what armaments he has
at his disposal, the range and caliber of the guns with which he is to fight. A
writer should know the value of the word combinations he will employ in writing.
And to understand this art of writing, he learns grammar and rhetoric, both con-
sciously and unconsciously. But we filmmakers, who should have a detailed
knowledge of all the elements of cinematic expression, find any such grammar
or rhetoric totally lacking. My aim is to attempt to establish the premises for a
cinematic grammar.
We must not, however, yield to facile and misleading analogies. It would be
convenient to say: a long shot is like a substantive phrase, and the close-up stres-
sing a detail in the overall view is comparable to an adjective which underlines
some quality in the substantive. This would be easy but erroneous, because a de-
tail shot is often more important, more substantive than the long shot, which
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exists only in relation to the detail. And where repetition, for example, is often
used as a means to reinforce expressiveness in writing, repetition of the same
images in a film weakens their effect.
The grammar of cinema is a grammar uniquely its own.
Unattended, without words, an air of conviction alights from the screen on
eighteen hundred pairs of eyes. Words slither like wet cakes of soap around what
we try to say. This evening a friend, trying to put everything too precisely into
words, suddenly shrugged twice and said no more. I believed him, as others
might have been persuaded verbally, on the strength of this wearied silence. And
when a scientist takes pains to use words with precision, I no longer believe. I
know his words respond to definitions not within him or me, but outside and
between us, in some lecturer’s diplomatic, imagined nowhere. There are, too, at
least twelve words for each thing, and at least twelve things for each word; strictly
speaking, therefore, no word is the word for a thing, and no thing is the thing for
a word. On the line of communication by speech we are interrupted by an unex-
pected static of feelings. Everything remains to be said and we give up, exhausted.
Then the screen lights up its silent loudspeaker sky. How convincing is this lan-
guage dispensed by a square, sputtering eye. The screen captures a theft of auto-
mobiles. Above these heads, between the arc lamp and screen, Babylon passes,
intangible as smoke, reconstructed in flashes of light.
All details that are expressed without recourse to words simultaneously trigger
the words that lie at their roots as well as the feelings that precede them. Just as
the mathematician indubitably demonstrates on paper properties that are not
there, so a thousand eyewitnesses in front of a cinema screen would swear on
their lives to what cannot be there. The film shows a man who betrays; neverthe-
less there is no man and no betrayer. But the ghost of something creates an emo-
tion which nevertheless cannot come to life unless the thing be for which it was
created. So an emotion-thing is born. You believe in more than a betrayer, you
believe in a betrayal. Now you need this betrayal; because you feel it, and feel it
so precisely that no other betrayal but this imaginary one will satisfy you.
In this unreality, validated by emotion, authenticity is absurd and universal. If
conventions seem so very out of place here, it is not that they are insufficiently
plausible; on the contrary. These limitations – obstacles so stimulating to the
theater – cannot be permitted by a form of imagination that casts them all aside
from the outset. Whereas in grammar the part – not without effrontery – replaces
the whole, here the whole is substituted for by the part which is better equipped
to excite emotions. “In those times, it was…” says the storyteller; here, instead of
having been, things are, and the time is always today, a continual today in which
yesterday collides with tomorrow at a speed of 3,600 seconds per hour, bringing
past and future into the present.
Already this is more than an art. So it is no longer an art just when the herd of
critics, journalists, artists, actors, orchestra leaders, and pyro-engravers, all regu-
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larly twenty-five years behind the times, finally admit that among the arts, cinema
is one. Is it already a language? In the absence of words, it has the chance to
discover a profound precision. But will cinema ever secure seekers of its stable,
unimpeachable, universally perceptible elements?
* * *
For a New Avant-Garde16
Translated by Stuart Liebman
I just want to say this: you have to love it and hate it at the same time – and love it
as much as you hate it. This fact alone proves that the cinema is an art with a very
well-defined personality of its own. The difficulty lies above all in the choice of
what is right to hate about it. And if this choice is difficult, it is because it must be
revised at extremely short intervals.
Indeed, the best friends of an art always end up becoming infatuated with their
ideas. And because art as it evolves goes beyond its rules at every moment, these
best friends of yesterday become the worst enemies of tomorrow, fanatics devoted
to shopworn methods. This continual overturning of friendships is characteristic
of the slow evolution of all the arts.
Thus it is that today at last – at last, but a little too late – some methods of
cinematic expression, still considered strange and suspect a year ago, have be-
come à la mode. Being fashionable has always signaled the end of a style.
Among these methods we can chiefly include the suppression of intertitles,
rapid editing, the importance accorded to sets and to their expressionist style.
The first films without intertitles were made almost simultaneously in America
and in Germany. In America it was in a film by Charles Ray, La Petite Baignade [The
Old Swimmin’ Hole, 1921], distributed and titled here, though only after consider-
able delay. Retreating from its novelty, the distributors were careful to add about
fifteen intertitles to the film. In Germany, it was Le Rail [Scherben or Shattered, 1921]
by Lupu Pick. I haven’t come here to justify the so-called “American” title – incor-
rectly named, for it is, alas, often French too – that beforehand first explains to
the spectator what he is about to see in the next image, then afterwards tells him
a second time in case he either wouldn’t see or understand. Certainly, the sup-
pression of the title has had its value as a new method, not entirely in and for
itself, but as a useful one among others. And Lupu Pick, who must be considered
the master of the film without titles, last season presented us with a kind of cine-
matic perfection, that is, Sylvester [New Year’s Eve, 1923], perhaps the most filmic
film ever seen, whose shadows conveyed the extremes of human passion on film
for the first time. And the theory that is the basis for the film without titles is
obviously logical: cinema is made to narrate with images and not with words.
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Except that one should never go to the limits of theories; their furthermost extent
is always their weak point where they give way. For one can’t deny that watching a
film absolutely free of intertitles is, for psychological reasons, depressing; the
subtitle is above all a place for the eye to rest, a punctuation point for the mind. A
title often avoids a long visual explanation, one that is necessary but also annoy-
ing or trite. And if you had to limit yourself to films without titles, how many
otherwise beautiful scenarios would become unrealizable. Finally, there are var-
ious kinds of information that I still believe are more discreet to provide in a text
than through an image; if you must indicate that an action takes place in the
evening, maybe it would be better simply to write it than to show a clock face
with the hands stopped at nine o’clock.
Obviously, in a good film an intertitle is only a kind of accident. But on the
other hand, advertising a film by stating that it has no intertitles, isn’t that like
praising the poems of Mallarmé because they don’t have punctuation marks?
Rapid editing exists in an embryonic state in the gigantic work of Griffith. To
Gance goes the honor of having so perfected this method that he deserves to be
considered its inspired inventor. La Roue is still the formidable cinematic monu-
ment in whose shadow all French cinematic art lives and breathes. Here and
there, attempts are being made to escape from its hold and its style; it is still
difficult. And if I insist on this point, it is so that what I am going to say in a
moment cannot in any way be construed as a criticism of La Roue. It contains,
moreover, elements far more noble, more pure, and more moral than the discov-
ery of the rapid editing technique, which seems to me nothing more than an
accident in the film. But if in La Roue this is a very fortunate accident, how dis-
agreeable it becomes in so many other films. Today, rapid editing is abused even
in documentaries; every drama has a scene, if not two or three, made up of little
fragments. 1925, I predict to you, will inundate us with films that will precisely
correspond to this most superficial aspect of our cinematic ideal in 1923. 1924
has already begun, and in a month four films using breakneck editing have al-
ready been shown. It’s too late; it’s no longer interesting; it’s a little ridiculous.
Wouldn’t our contemporary novelist be ridiculous if he wrote his work in the
Symbolist style of Francis Poictevin17 where, invariably, he uses the word “re-
membrance” [resouvenance] for “memory” [souvenir] and “disheartenment” [désés-
perance] for “despair” [déséspoir]?
If you must say about a film that it has beautiful sets, I think it would be better
not to speak about it at all; the film is bad. The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari is the best
example of the misuse of sets in cinema. Caligari represents a serious cinematic
malady: the hypertrophy of a subordinate feature, the great importance still ac-
corded to what is an “accident” at the expense of the essential. I do not want to
talk primarily about Caligari’s shoddy, “ready-made for thirty francs” expression-
ism, but about the principle of a film that is hardly anything more than photo-
graphs of a group of sets. Everything in Caligari is a set: first, the décor itself; next,
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the character who is as painted and tricked up as the set; finally, the light, which
is also painted – an unpardonable sacrilege in cinema – with shadows and half-
tones illusionistically laid out in advance. The film is thus nothing more than a
still life, all its living elements having been killed by strokes of the brush. Along
with a thousand other things, cinema has borrowed sets from the theater. Little
by little, if it is independently viable, cinema will pay back its debts and this debt
as well. No more than it revived the theater, the work of painters will not succeed
in reviving cinema. Painting is one thing, cinema something else entirely. If the
“Théâtre d’Art” declared at its birth: “The word creates the décor as well as every-
thing else…,” the “Cinéma d’Art” now being born declares: “The gesture creates
the décor as well as everything else.” In cinema, stylized sets ought not and can-
not be. In the fragments of those few films that are almost true cinema, the sets
are anatomical, and the drama played in this intimate physical arena is superla-
tively ideal. In close-up, the eyelid with the lashes that you can count is a set
remodeled by emotion at every instant. Beneath the lid appears the gaze which is
the character of the drama and which is even more than a character: it is a person.
With its imperceptible movements whose religious secret no emotional micro-
scopy has yet been able to reveal, the circle of the iris transcribes a soul. Between
the tuft of the chin and the arc of the eyebrows an entire tragedy is won, then lost,
is won anew and lost once more. Lips still pressed together, a smile trembles
toward off-screen space, within those wings that are the heart. When the mouth
finally opens, joy itself takes flight.
If I criticize three techniques especially misused by modern cinema, methods
that now enjoy a belated vogue, it is because these methods are purely material,
purely mechanical. The mechanical period of cinema is over. Cinema must
henceforth be called the photography of delusions of the heart.
I remember my first meeting with Blaise Cendrars.18 It was in Nice, where Cen-
drars was then assisting Gance in the production of La Roue. We were speaking
about cinema and Cendrars told me: “Photogénie is a word…very pretentious, a bit
silly; but it’s a great mystery.” Gradually, much later, I understood how great a
mystery photogénie is.
Each of us, I assume, may possess some object which he holds onto for perso-
nal reasons: for some it’s a book; for some, perhaps a very banal and somewhat
ugly trinket; for someone else, perhaps, a piece of furniture with no value. We do
not look at them as they really are. To tell the truth, we are incapable of seeing
them as objects. What we see in them, through them, are the memories and emo-
tions, the plans or regrets that we have attached to these things for a more or less
lengthy period of time, sometimes forever. Now, this is the cinematographic mys-
tery: an object such as this, with its personal character, that is to say, an object
situated in a dramatic action that is equally photographic in character, reveals
anew its moral character, its human and living expression when reproduced cine-
matographically.
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I imagine a banker receiving bad news at home from the stock exchange. He is
about to telephone. The call is delayed. Close-up of the telephone. If the shot of
the telephone is shown clearly, if it is well-written, you no longer see a mere tele-
phone. You read: ruin, failure, misery, prison, suicide. And in other circum-
stances, this same telephone will say: sickness, doctor, help, death, solitude,
grief. And at yet another time this same telephone will cry gaily: joy, love, free-
dom.19 All this may seem extremely simple; they may be regarded as childish
symbols. I confess that it seems very mysterious to me that one can in this way
charge the simple reflection of inert objects with an intensified sense of life, that
one can animate it with its own vital import. Moreover, I confess that it seems
much more important to me to concern ourselves with this phenomenon of cine-
matic telepathy than to cultivate two or three almost purely mechanical methods
too exclusively.
M. Jean Choux, the film critic of the newspaper La Suisse, has written apropos of
Coeur fidèle the lines that I reproduce below and they do not apply solely to this
film.
“How close-ups deify. Oh, these faces of men and women displayed so harshly
on screen, solid as enamel and more powerfully sculptural than the Michelange-
lo-esque creatures on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel! To see a thousand immo-
bile heads whose gazes are aimed at and monopolized and haunted by a single
enormous face on the screen toward which they all converge. What an excruciat-
ing conversation. An idol and the crowd. Just like the cults in India. But here the
idol is alive and this idol is a man. An extraordinary meaning is emitted from
these close-ups. In them, the soul is extracted in the same way one isolates ra-
dium. The horror of living, its horror and mystery, is proclaimed. This pitiable
Marie, this Jean, and this Petit-Paul, have they no other purpose than to be this
Marie, this Jean, and this Petit-Paul? It’s not possible! There must be something
more.”
Certainly there is something more.
Cinema is its herald.
* * *
Amour de Charlot
Translated by Jennifer Wild20
All critics, today, from all journals all over the world marvel at Charlot. He de-
serves perhaps a bit more than that.
In England – August 1914 – I saw one of his first films. Laughing entirely too
loudly, I endured my neighbors’ discourteous remarks. In those days I would have
been stupefied that some might find a sad genius in Charlot. One critic from
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L’Opinion – I have completely forgotten his by-line – had not yet recognized the
Bergsonian essence of this comic. Stockpiles of cream pies smacked laughter
right on his face. No sooner had twenty-eight shots of a revolver at point-blank
range created a sense of malaise than a dive with both feet over the piano dissi-
pated it. In those days Charlot was often drunk and always unrefined. He wasn’t
very honest, or courageous, or truly agile. He was a fiery man, deceitful, and
sensuous. Just as in the Gospels of Childhood, playmates dropped dead as pun-
ishment for a practical joke. A drunken hiccup disrupted romantic meditations.
With love in his heart, a bum no sooner lifted the skirt than mallet blows on the
head settled into a series of fainting spells. There were quite a few dead men and
a broken whiskey bottle. There was neither pity nor heroism. Drownings and
betrayals, wicked deals where everyone was fooled, failed schemes, the right of
the strongest, owners of overly strapping ladies, kisses that Charlot landed as
knock-out blows. Ordeals, too.
This ordeal was entirely ridiculous. Everything backfired. We roared. It wasn’t
even sad, since it was well done. And Charlot was so crudely common that he
didn’t even garner admiration. Women, as I recall, loathed him. I loved him like
a vice. It was a beautiful time.
Charlot has become resigned. He is less unhappy and much sadder. Since he
hardly drinks, he is not able to forget the grief he has endured. Without alcohol,
he is at the mercy of the worst affairs of the heart. Almost honest, devoted and
unhappy, he now uses the mallet and the brick to pave his way to a love life, and
these crude instruments poorly serve a passion that is almost speculative. But he
has learned how to raise his eyes so sorrowfully that the hearts of beautiful girls
capsize like small, over-loaded boats. The women catch him by surprise and vice
versa. Then he is naïve and even dopey, each time a bit more so. Having fre-
quented only disreputable bars and shady pastry shops for six years, his seduc-
tiveness is now that of a virgin. He can’t even be accused of inspired love. Every-
thing happens by chance. But if it’s about goofing off or eyeballing something, he
immediately regains his powers, becomes transparent and invisible, splits himself
in two, displays tails when the coin shows heads, smiles and passes out. The
chase goes haywire in the stairway. Three wrong directions converge under a ta-
ble, leaving a total of three individuals blacked out. Except him, everyone takes
the wrong door, picks the wrong pocket or opponent. Policemen run into each on
the stairway landing. Saved by a ruse, Charlot’s face indulges a sumptuous melan-
choly that is the luxury of safety conquered. The respite after battles leads to
heartache. A distracted and desolate solemnity falls like the night. Iris. End.
Your people, o fair king, are not made up of critics who admire you. O doleful
prince of a celluloid tale, we are three hundred million who love your heart swim-
ming in the throes of passion.
* * *
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Amour de Sessue
Translated by Mireille Dobrzynski and Stuart Liebman
“The will generates minds of a kind with which reasonable minds have nothing in com-
mon.”
– Paracelsus
As foreigners, it would be a sacrilege if we could understand this notion of honor
swathed in silk. In decent films in which kisses are implied, what do we under-
stand? And what do we understand of you, dancer, waiting in the teahouse for
five years, faithful to the postcard sent by your fiancé, a servant in Frisco, who is
saving unheard of sums? The sweetness of honorable words and genuine man-
ners, both thoroughly out of place in New York. Young girls kneel to read, verti-
cally and from right to left, the great misfortunes that ocean liners import from
across the Pacific. There, life is pitched in white contempt, and sometimes one is
lucky enough to hold a boxer prisoner by just his little finger. And there, too, is
the even paler laughter of American women who would never marry a man of
color. As a student, it is about learning medicine without forgetting the ancestral
gods and, just because it is termed a suicide, not losing the strength to perform
hara-kiri after lighting the candles and carefully laying out the mat. So faithful is
he to such a conception, stabbing himself if he fails, can we understand the na-
ture of his vengeance?
This is beyond us, and yet so cornélien, if cornélien were not so closely associated
with the baccalauréat.21 Hayakawa, the Japanese actor long associated with Forfai-
ture [The Cheat, Cecil B. DeMille, 1915], alone lives according to what he ought to
be. This excessive probity surprises us, kind and fun-loving daredevils that we are.
His pride in the purity and pedigree of his style aims at a poetry that, without him,
we are no longer capable of.
If comparisons are to be made with such a face, other actors, with the possible
exception of Nazimova, do not fight with equal weapons. They begin from noth-
ing, he from a repose that is already at the point of revealing everything. So much
so that if he speaks, his words simply contribute to the breakdown of an immobi-
lity that is in itself expressive. Tragic, and like the symmetry of snow crystals, this
eloquent stillness by nature yields to the thawing of an emotion that then be-
comes surprise, excess, relief from expectations: spring in the midst of ice. He
hasn’t performed yet and he has already dispensed with grand gestures. With
this spontaneous expression, a blank check for unlimited amounts of sadness, he
appears among extras who are suddenly swept away by his violent, forlorn silhou-
ette. And he cannot shoot some pool or walk across a bedroom without our being
deeply moved. What is strictly necessary and sufficient in a determined expression
is reflected in his natural dramatic performance, which takes on a surprising per-
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spective – indirectly and by chance – if not to say two things at once (or at least to
speak vaguely).
He calls the young girl, and before leaving he gives her the god who has died
for love as a keepsake. He extends his hand, halfway between the two of them;
and he pulls it back, having torn through the distance between them with his
twisted fingers. One leaves something. One takes something away. He closes a
door. In the garden – even though the lawn lies between us – he listens to a voice
with all his might, but not to any of the words. For him, when it stops, everything
will be over. Then the close-up flares to challenge us; an eyebrow is raised, but it
is still a part of the episode, the anecdote, and the game. A prodigious sense of
persuasiveness comes over the room in question. Over and above a dramatic
screenplay, the screen violently conveys a colossal horde of burning desires and
continual worries, of spiritual things, that photogénie graces with holiness and
poetic personality.
Neither comprehensible nor reasonable, it is sympathy itself.
Notes
1. The editors wish to give special thanks to Stuart Liebman for his careful reading of
this translation and for writing the notes, with the exception of notes 9, 13-15, and 19-
20, which were provided by Sarah Keller.
2. Material added at the end of the essay has been taken from the version of the last part
of the Etna essay that was originally published as “Le Regard du verre,” in Les Cahiers du
mois, nos. 16/17 (1925): 9-12. These additions will be placed in footnotes.
3. Ricciotto Canudo (1879–1923) was an Italian poet and film theoretician active in
France from the early 1900s. His manifesto, The Birth of the Sixth Art, published in 1911,
argued that cinema was a synthetic “Seventh Art,” “a superb conciliation of the
Rhythms of Space (the Plastic Arts) and the Rhythms of Time (Music and Poetry).” In
Paris, he established an avant-garde magazine La Gazette de sept arts in 1920, and one of
the first independent film clubs, CASA (Club des amis du septième art) in 1921. L’usine
aux images, a collection of his essays, was published posthumously in Paris and Geneva
in 1927.
4. Paul Guichard served as Epstein’s cameraman for his Etna documentary, La Montagne
infidèle, as well as for several of his other films including Coeur fidèle (1923) and La belle
Nivernaise (1924). He also filmed Germaine Dulac’s shorts L’Invitation au voyage (1927)
and The Seashell and the Clergyman (1928).
5. Epstein is referring to a famous quarry site near the Sicilian city of Syracuse where the
rock formations, named after a legendary tyrannical ruler, amplify whispered sounds.
6. Jules de Gaultier (born 1858; died 1942) was a French philosopher and essayist, known
especially for his theory of “bovarysme” (the name taken from Flaubert’s novel), by
which he meant the continual need of humans to invent themselves, to lie to them-
selves.
On page 11 of “Le Regard du verre,” Epstein introduced this paragraph in a slightly
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different way: “The lenses of the cinematographic eye possess two major original
properties on which all cinematic art should depend. The first of these qualities is its
analytic or psychoanalytic force (without any need to bring in Freud or Jules de Gaul-
tier).”
7. Jean-Marie-Mathias-Philippe-Auguste, comte de Villiers de l’Isle-Adam (1838–1889)
was a French Symbolist writer and close friend of the poet Stéphane Mallarmé. He
was perhaps best known for his novel L’Eve future (1886).
8. On page 12 of “Le Regard du verre,” Epstein concludes this part of the essay as fol-
lows: “But I do not wish to say that one ought to work in cinema by following certain
theories, neither these nor any others. The symphonies of movement that have lately
become à la mode, are now very irritating. Caligarism only offers photographs neither
better nor worse than those in the Salon des Artistes Français. Pretentious styles ap-
pear as soon as inventiveness ceases, in cubism as much as in ‘rapid’ montage, or in
the sort of cinematic subjectivism that has become ridiculous because of its use of
superimpositions. One can only write if you yourself feel and think. I would like to
board each of my films the way a traveler does who arrives at the next to last minute
with six trunks still to register, a ticket to buy and a seat to locate. He leaves, but does
he know where he is going? God’s grace is the sole timetable without slip-ups. He
arrives in the country of surprises. It is the land that has been promised to us.”
9. This chapter first appeared in translation by Tom Milne as “On Certain Characteristics
of Photogénie,” Afterimage, no. 10 (Autumn 1981): 20-23; it was reprinted in Abel1, pp.
314-318, and appears here with minor changes by Stuart Liebman.
10. Louis Delluc (1890-1924) was one of the first film critics in France to publish a daily
column, as well as collections of his essays on the cinema. By 1920, he turned to
scriptwriting and directing. Epstein served as his assistant on the film Le Tonnerre
(1921).
11. The pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Zeno (490-430 B.C.) was famous for creating
paradoxes about, among other things, motion, distance, and time.
12. Epstein uses the term cinégraphiste, a synonym for a film director, but one very aware of
the graphic dimension of cinema, which was often used in French critical discourse
during the late 1910s and 1920s. He thereby establishes a parallel between a cinema
artist and the “draftsman” (dessinateur) in the first part of the sentence.
13. Literally this title is translated as “Golden Language,” which Epstein takes up in the
essay; it also echoes Langue d’oc (a dialect associated with southern France) and its
counterpart of Langue d’oïl (the dialect from which modern French is derived), sound-
ing out Epstein’s interest in the localizable facets of a global/universal language.
14. The so-called “law of three unities,” – it regulates a play’s action, place, and time –
was first sketched by Aristotle in his Poetics, and ultimately received its most restrictive,
“neo-classical” form in seventeenth-century France in the works of Molière and Ra-
cine. The concepts held that a play should have one main action, with no or few sub-
plots; it should be staged in a single physical space and not represent more than one
place. Finally, the action should occur over no more than 24 hours. Epstein’s own
cinematic practice, as well as that of many of his contemporaries, radically contested
this “law.”
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15. This chapter first appeared in translation by Tom Milne as “The Photogenic Element,”
Afterimage, no. 10 (Autumn 1981): 23-27, and is reprinted here with minor corrections
by Stuart Liebman.
16. This chapter first appeared in translation by Stuart Liebman as “For a New Avant-
Garde,” in The Avant-Garde Film: A Reader of Theory and Criticism, ed. P. Adams Sitney
(New York: New York University Press, 1978),pp. 26-30; it was reprinted in Abel1, pp.
349-353, and appears here with minor corrections by Liebman.
17. Francis Poictevin (1854-1904) was a minor French Symbolist writer and notorious dan-
dy who served as the model for the character Des Esseintes in Joris-Karl Huysman’s
famous novel. À rebours (1884), translated into English either as Against the Grain or
Against Nature. http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joris-Karl_Huysmans.
18. The Swiss francophone poet and novelist Blaise Cendrars (1887-1961), Epstein’s early
mentor, helped him publish his first books on French poetry (La Poésie d’aujourd’hui,
1921) and the cinema (Bonjour cinema, 1921) with the avant-garde Parisian house Édi-
tions de la Sirène. Cendrars also wrote several early essays on film in the late 1910s
and early 1920s that were eventually published in his L’ABC du cinema (Paris: Les Écri-
vains Réunis 1926).
19. Epstein is here outlining an intuition of what Lev Kuleshov and Vsevolod Pudovkin
demonstrated in their “Mosjoukine Experiment.”
20. Special thanks are due to Anne Magnan-Park for her insightful assistance.
21. The French adjective cornélien refers to a situation in which love and duty conflict. The
term derives from the French dramatist, Pierre Corneille (1606-1684), whose works
famously stage dilemmas that force characters to choose between passion and honor,
and then to suffer the tragic and inevitable consequences of their choice. Epstein dis-
parages the term’s superficial popularity among the French baccaulauréat exams.
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L’intelligence d’une machine
Introduction
L’intelligence d’une machine was published in January 1946, after more than a ten-
year hiatus due to the war, when Epstein had to go in hiding. While the topic
reflected in the title of the book had been a constant preoccupation throughout
Epstein’s previous writings, this text pursues in depth topics that will remain cen-
tral to all his later publications. He here approaches cinema as a philosophy of
time and space more consistently than before, and methodically construes argu-
ments in the field of physics, mechanics, and thermodynamics. The concept of
photogénie loses much of the importance it had in earlier writings, and references
to film examples are almost absent. Instead, he searches in cinema for an intelli-
gence and a philosophy of time other than those based on our brute sense im-
pression. Because this discourse is far away from that of most “Impressionist”
and avant-garde theory, his later writings have often been overlooked in France
as well as abroad, where few of the post-war publications have been translated
until now.
– Trond Lundemo
Excerpts from L’Intélligence d’une machine [1946]
Translated by Trond Lundemo
[Jean Epstein, L’Intelligence d’une machine (Paris: Éditions Jacques Melot, 1946). Se-
lections reprinted in ESC1: pp. 310-16.]
The Philosophy of the Cinematograph
Cinema is one of these intellectual robots, still partial, that fleshes out representa-
tions – that is to say, a thought – through photo-electrical mechanics and a
photo-chemical inscription. One can here recognize the primordial frameworks
of reason, the three Kantian categories of space, duration, and causality. This
result would already be remarkable if cinematographic thought only did what the
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calculating machine does, to constitute itself in the servile imitation of human
ideation. But we know that the cinematograph, on the contrary, marks its repre-
sentation of the universe with its own qualities, with an originality that makes this
representation not a reflection or a simple copy with conceptions, of an organic
mentality-mother, but rather a system that is individualized differently, partly in-
dependently, which contains the incitements for a philosophy so far from com-
mon opinions, the doxa, that one should perhaps call it an anti-philosophy.
* * *
Quantity, Mother of Quality
Indivisibility of space-time
The fundamental difference between the human intellectual mechanism and the
cinematographic mechanism of apprehension and expression is, in the first case,
that notions of space and time can exist separately, and that the human mecha-
nism even demands an effort to conceive of their perpetual union. And in the
second case, every representation of space is automatically given with its dimen-
sion in time. This means that space is inconceivable outside of its movement in
time. Consequently, man can keep the image of a posture or the memory of an
utterance present in the mind for several seconds or longer if his attention
doesn’t get tired, as if its duration didn’t exist. The cinematograph, however, can-
not furnish the same image or sound without a temporal rhythm, usually adjusted
to twenty-two or twenty-three images per second. In human comprehension,
there is space and there is time, out of which a synthesis of space-time is hard to
construct. In the cinematographic comprehension, there is only space-time.
Absolute relativism
We know that cinematographic time is essentially variable, while temporal
rhythm as normally perceived by man is, by contrast, constant: yet another differ-
ence between the intellect of the living being and that of the mechanical being,
which remarkably reinforces the former. Against static space and invariable time
– usually considered independent from each other and, as such, forming the two
primordial, classical categories of human understanding – is opposed space-time,
which is always mobile and changing, the unique frame within which the cine-
matograph inscribes its representations.
The variation of cinematographic time and the interdependence that connects
it with its space bring forth continuous transformations correlative to all the
shapes located in this four-dimensional continuum. This most general relativity
is conveyed by the rupture and confusion of all the seemingly fundamental and
solid classifications of the extra-cinematographic universe. According to the var-
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ious momentary forms taken by the space-time dimensions, discontinuity may
become continuous or continuity discontinuous, stillness produces movement
and movement stillness, matter may acquire a mind or lose one, the static may be
animated or the living frozen, chance may be determined or what is certain may
lose its causes, ends may become origins, and evident truths may be immediately
perceived as absurdities.
These changes in primordial qualities depend on variations of the duration and
size of the observed objects in relation to their point of reference, which is the
one closest to the observing subject – the human scale. Quality is a consequence
of measurement, of numbers. Quality results from quantity. Quantity and quality
become correlative and interchangeable notions, which must be able to merge
with each other in a quantitative-qualitative continuity, co-variable with the con-
tinuity of space-time. Accordingly, the philosophy of the cinematograph only sees
one principle in Aristotle’s second and third attributes.
[…]
Man, the only measure of quantity in the universe
If, at the root of things, every differentiation only has a quantitative signification,
only some idea of the size of phenomena remains as the foundation of their dis-
tinction, classification, and knowledge. An object, being, or event is positioned in
its qualitative realm of space, time, and logic according to its dimensions. Actu-
ally, space is straight or curved, matter is continuous or discontinuous, the me-
chanical is determined or given to chance, laws are causal or probabilistic, depen-
dent upon whether one studies [these things] on a scale that is medium, infinitely
small, or infinitely large.
However, this immensity, or happy medium, or smallness of things – these are
all always evaluated with reference to man. It is the scale of man and the dimen-
sions immediately useful to him that decides the measurement, according to
which one values every size, number, and quantity. It is only the distance applied
to a phenomenon, departing from human dimensions, that makes it small or big,
and which determines the spatial, temporal, and logical areas where it takes
place. Consequently, the complete relativity of every aspect of nature has only one
point of departure, only one point of reference, only one judge: man, or rather,
the height, weight, and shape of man, the length of his extremities, the orienta-
tion of his vision and hearing.
All our systems of knowledge, all our science and all our philosophy, all our
convictions and doubts, all our eternal truths and ignorance are exactly adjusted
to this average height of one hundred and seventy centimeters at which we carry
our foreheads above the ground. One may doubt that the disposition of Cleopa-
tra’s nose has changed the face of the earth, since love is not always oriented
towards beauty. But surely other theodicies and cosmogonies, a different mathe-
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matics and logic could function with a human race reduced to the size of bacteria
or inflated to the size of the Himalayas.
All constructions of thought only admit as their final criterion the human di-
mension, of which we feel the episodic and precarious character. This shows the
scandalous vanity of our pretensions and the impotence of our need to hold on to
a stable ground outside of us, to a small scrap of absolute certainty, to a hint of
the presence of stable existence. All the efforts of the intelligence to escape the
relative are as embarrassingly futile and absurd as the attempt of someone who is
drowning in quicksand to pull himself up by his hair. Man is the only measure-
ment of the universe, but this measurement is itself measured by what it purports
to measure: it is the relative of relativity, an absolute variable.
Relativity of Logic
The incredible reversibility of time
The reversibility of time is a possibility confirmed by cinema’s representation of
the universe and constitutes a major difference in relation to the properties of our
usual universe. This reversibility appears so rarely and is so completely foreign to
all our exterior experiences that it seems incredible to our mental faculties. It
seems a pure game of the machine, an artificial and comical appearance without
any real significance compared with the invariable order of succession observed
everywhere else. Still, whether one likes it or not, temporal reversibility takes
place in cinematic representation with a regularity that makes it a principle of
this system, as certain as any principle may be. We have difficulties in under-
standing that the principles of identity and rigorous causality cease to be appli-
cable in the world of atoms. Still, we listen to the arguments of physicists, no
matter how subtle their theories are. By contrast, even if the cinematograph vi-
sually proves to us, with a much stronger evidentiary force, the ambivalence of
the order in which phenomena happen on the world of the screen, and even if
this world is closer and better known to us than the world of atoms, we hesitate
to devote the slightest attention to the reversibility of filmed actions. The cine-
matic world – one says with contempt – is only a fictional world.
Legitimacy of fiction
However, fictional doesn’t mean false or nonexistent. Nobody could deny the
practical usefulness of the work of the imagination. “Everything one invents is
true,” Flaubert affirmed. Even if everything one invents weren’t true, it would
become so. Today, most psychologists and psychiatrists, be they supporters or
adversaries of Freud, recognize that the imaginary world par excellence – the dream
– holds a superior psychological truth compared to objectified and ostensibly rea-
listic extroverted and rationalized thought. When freed of most of the logical and
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moral limitations of outer life, the personality of the dreamer can actually mani-
fest itself more freely and reveal its intimate nature in dream-images.
The cinematograph, machine of dreams
The procedures employed by the discourse of the dream, allowing for a profound
sincerity, have their analogies in cinematographic style.
One very common kind of synecdoche, where the part stands for the whole,
works this way. A detail, in itself minimal and banal, is magnified and repeated,
and becomes the center and the driving force of a whole scene as it is dreamt or
seen on the screen. This could be, for example, a key, a knotted ribbon [nœud de
ruban], or a telephone, which the dream or the screen shapes into a close-up, and
which is charged with immense emotional force as well as all the dramatic signif-
ication attributed to this object when it was noticed for the first time in waking
life or at the beginning of the film.
Further, and consequently, in the language of dreams as in the language of
cinema, these image-words undergo a transposition of meaning, a symbolization.
It is no longer a matter of key, ribbon, or telephone. The key could more correctly
be translated as, “Do I dare to commit this indiscretion required for my rest?”; the
ribbon as, “She loved me so!”; the telephone as, “By now he must be out of dan-
ger.” But the real truth is that these signs are scribbles [grimoires] summing up a
whole universe of impressions, lived, living, and to be lived, that no verbal expres-
sion could convey in their entirety.
Finally, the action of the dream, like that of the film, unrolls each at its own
pace, cut up and reconnected again ad libitum, where the simultaneous can be
drawn out to succession, and the successive can be compressed and happen at
the same time, to the extent that the difference from exterior time may go all the
way to inversion.
The prejudice against the dream of a machine
The magnification and allegorization of details, the growth and transformation of
the signification value of these symbols, the particularity of time: all these analo-
gies between the language of dreams and the language of the cinematograph
should lead us to believe that the two are constitutionally predisposed to express
highly faithful psychological truths with a deep exactitude in the figuration of
mental life.
But, on the contrary, this is perhaps what causes or strengthens the general
skepticism one can see towards the philosophical disposition of cinematographic
images. The completely introverted dream life, in spite of it being infinitely richer
in emotions and sincerity, is seen as dangerous, damned, and inferior to mental
waking life, which after all is only a quite banal, extroverted schematization of the
former.
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Le Cinéma du diable
Introduction
Epstein discusses film in light of great technical discoveries that have been ques-
tioning political institutions, scientific and religious dogmas since the Middle
Ages. Celebrating the rebellious spirit which lies at the crux of the printing press,
the astronomical lens, and medical dissection, Epstein provocatively states, “Evil
should be considered a benefactor to humankind.” In the wake of these break-
throughs, the cinematographer sets the base of a libertarian philosophy inspired
by evil, for the optical device magnifies movement in its slightest variations and
reveals photogénie. Cinema exerts a subversion of literature, reason, and logic alike
by exposing the viewer to a new universal language. Influenced by the latest de-
velopments in quantum physics, Epstein devises a conception of cinema that ex-
presses the relativity of space and time through the use of editing, close-ups, slow
motion, and time lapse. The last section of the text develops a contrary stance:
despite its “evil” nature, cinema should also be regarded as a cathartic experience
for the masses. According to Epstein, the cinematic spectacularization of violence
and subversion is necessary because it neutralizes the viewer’s negative impulses
and therefore reinforces the stability of the social body. Le Cinéma du diable thus
poses a challenging paradox: while the film medium is intrinsically and histori-
cally subversive, it should also be used as a conservative device that aims at social
control.1
– Ludovic Cortade
* * *
Indictment
Translated by Franck Le Gac
[Jean Epstein, “Accusation,” Le Cinéma du diable (Paris: Éditions Jacques Melot,
1947), pp. 11-20.]
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Up to the years 1910 to 1915, going to the cinema constituted a somewhat shame-
ful, almost debasing act, and no person of quality ventured into it until pretexts
had been found and excuses made. Since then, the spectacle of cinema has un-
doubtedly earned a few titles in nobility or snobbishness. Meanwhile, to this day,
the arrival of a fairground cinema stirs trouble and disapproval among honorable
people in some counties. There are even some small towns whose scarce and
struggling theaters remain disreputable places where the local reputable citizenry
would not be seen without embarrassment.
In truth, in this mid-twentieth century, few people even among believers dare
speak the Devil’s name, so deft has the trickster been at exploiting the blunders of
both his enemies and followers in order to shroud himself in a thick veil of ridi-
cule – not unlike the way hands have to dabble in ink to get to the cuttlebone. Yet
how many moralists, even non-believers, loudly claim that cinema is a school of
stupefaction, vice, and crime! In Christian terms, what does that amount to, if not
the idea that the phantasmagorias of the screen are inspired by the devil to defile
humankind?
Should it come as a surprise, in fact, that the Devil is taken as the instigator of
the moving image, since he has so often been held responsible for other achieve-
ments of human ingenuity? Diabolical, the invention of the telescope which, as he
foresaw, caused Roger Bacon to be thrown in jail for twenty years; which exposed
the old Galileo to the severity of the ecclesiastical court and to imprisonment; and
which terrified the cautious Copernicus to his deathbed. Diabolical, the invention
of printing, whose pernicious use religious authorities and their secular counter-
parts rushed to control immediately – for long centuries and counting. Diabolical,
the study of the human body and medicine, condemned by St. Ambrose; anatomy
and dissection, banned and punished with excommunication by Boniface VIII.
Diabolical, da Vinci’s secret plans and his dreams for a machine that would rise
up in the air. Tricks of the demon, automatons, be they the work of a saint, shat-
tered to pieces by another saint; the first steamboat, which Papin could not spare
from the terrified wrath of a fanaticized people; the first automobile, Cugnot’s
fardier, a steam car which met with a similar fate; the first hot-air balloons, which
pious countrymen tore to shreds with their pitchforks; the first railroads, which
illustrious scientists accused of spreading plague and madness; and finally – to
put a stop to an enumeration that may go on forever – the cinematograph.
In this medieval mindset, which has not completely disappeared, the Devil ap-
pears as the great inventor, the master of discovery, the prince of science, the
toolmaker of civilization, the master of ceremonies for what is called progress.
Thus, since the most widespread opinion holds the development of culture as a
notable benefit, the Devil should mainly be considered as a benefactor of human-
kind. However, faith has not yet gotten over the divorce that separated it from
science, which remains suspect in the judgment of many believers and is often
cursed as the impious work of the rebellious spirit.
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In primitive society, priest and scientist at first were one. Then, as religion
froze its doctrine into dogmas allowing for little variation, science evolved by for-
mulating propositions farther and farther apart from the traditions of theodicy.
The disagreement came to tear the spirit into two enemy parts. Through force or
persuasion, through the authority of revelation or the subtlety of reasoning, hu-
mans long tried to re-form the original unity of their knowledge, both superna-
tural and natural, either by seeking to subject science to religion, or by trying to
reconcile the two harmoniously. That was in vain. Faith repudiated science;
science excluded faith. And who, over the course of centuries, enticed a number
of orthodox magicians onto a heretical path, turning them into black sorcerers
with obscure alchemists for students, the forerunners of lucid scientists? Who if
not God’s enemy, Satan?
More specifically, the Devil found himself accused of continuously renewing
human instruments. In fact, tools have exerted a decisive influence on the evolu-
tion of thought that saw cosmogony rise up against theology. As a general rule,
each time humans create an instrument after their own idea, the instrument in
turn and in its own way reshapes the mentality of its creator.
If, with the help of the Devil, humans invented the telescope, the telescope
invented the images of the sky, which compelled Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler,
Newton, Laplace, and so many others to think in a certain way rather than an-
other: after these images and not after others. Without a telescope to animate
and direct their intelligence, these discoverers could not have discovered any-
thing, nor could they have produced any of their grand theories; and most likely,
we would still imagine the earth as immobile, set in an inextricable entanglement
of stars revolving around it. In equal measure, the optical mechanism of lenses
and the intuitive and deductive organism of humans have played a role in estab-
lishing the Copernican system, the laws of Kepler, and a whole magnificent
movement of thought that resulted in the current Einsteinian relativism, beyond
which it will probably keep expanding.
This scientific and philosophical movement – one of the most important in the
history of culture – has mostly been fueled and guided by constantly new appear-
ances collected by telescopes in the peripheral, astronomical universe since the
fifteenth century. This effort aims to explore the realm of the infinitely great, and
has given rise to a vast metaphysics which should be called a metaphysics of the
telescope, for telescopic and macroscopic instruments of this kind play the role of
primordial operators in it. Indeed, the existence and use of an instrument is at the
root of the immense, immeasurable difference between stages in the general phi-
losophical, religious, and psychological development of a contemporary of Ptol-
emy and a contemporary of Einstein (a difference that exists from a certain point
of view, which encompasses a very wide range of the mind).
A second, large body of scientific and philosophical doctrines originated in
another type of instrument – the microscope. Without the microscope, for in-
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stance, there would probably not have been any microbes or microbial theories:
no pasteurization or glory for Pasteur. There again, lenses provide – that is, they
produce – images, select them in order to make them visible within the invisible,
separate them from what will remain unknowable, suddenly raise them from
non-appearance and non-being to the rank of perceptible realities. And this first
selection, on which the whole ulterior development of thought depends, is the
product of the instrument alone, according to the arbitrary law of its particular
similarities and receptivity. A given magnification and a given coloring make a
given form appear, a form out of which a new conception will emerge. If obser-
vers did not have this magnification or this coloring at their disposal, the form
they derive from formlessness would never be promoted into existence, nor
would its theory. And another magnification and another coloring would present
a different appearance, leading to a different medicine, to other cures perhaps.
The instrument, which in time may more or less be controlled, at its inception
involves a completely random empiricism that directs thought according to the
data it does or does not provide.
Stemming from the examination of the microcosm, an ideological current de-
veloped later but at a phenomenal pace, yielding today’s quantum physics and
wave mechanics – both systems which will manifest their force of expansion for
a long time to come. This movement of thought receives its impetus and its pri-
mary orientation from perpetually renewed appearances, which have been for
scarcely a hundred years collected by microscopes, ultramicroscopes, electronic
hyper-microscopes, spectroscopes, etc., from the so-called central universe: cellu-
lar and nuclear, molecular and atomic. In this instance, the goal is to discover the
infinitesimal, and multiple biological and ultraphysical speculations have come
out of this in-depth exploration. They constitute the group of what should be
referred to as the philosophies of the magnifier, since this type of instrument is
their main operator.
There is a hierarchy in the world of machines. Not all of them are key instru-
ments such as those of enlarging or magnifying optics, whose influence stimu-
lated and transformed the life of ideas as a whole. But there are no tools, as
humble as they might be, whose use has not more or less marked our mentality
and our customs in the long term. Undoubtedly, the cinematographic instrument
itself reshapes the mind that designed it. The question in this case, rather, is
whether the reaction of the creation to the creator has a quality and magnitude
that justify a suspicion of participation in the diabolical work perpetually opposed
to traditional permanence.
In this instance, it is not only about the superficial mischief denounced in ac-
cusations of immorality against such-and-such film restricted to audiences six-
teen and older, which has nothing specifically cinematographic to it. The genuine
trial of the moving image introduces problems of a more general scope. Does the
cinematograph belong in this category of machines, of operators that, like the
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telescope and the microscope, discovered vast original horizons in the universe,
of which we would know nothing without these mechanisms? Is it able to bring
within the range of our perceptions domains so far unexplored? Are these new
representations bound to become the source of an intellectual current so deep
and wide-ranging that it could alter the whole climate in which thought moves,
that it could deserve the title of philosophy of the cinematograph? Finally, if the
screen truly announces its advent, is this philosophy part of the anti-dogmatic,
revolutionary, and libertarian – diabolical, in a word – lineage already comprising
the philosophies of the telescope and the magnifying glass?
The answers to these questions are not self-evident, as the cinematograph is
only fifty years of age and has wasted three quarters of this half-century, in a
sense, providing public entertainment, believing it was just an art of spectacle,
duplicating the novel and the theater, becoming an industry and a commerce,
neglecting the development or even the plain acknowledgment of all its other,
less lucrative powers. This gilded make-up and the moving eloquence of the “sev-
enth art” were not able, however, to completely conceal a few signs that let us
know that the ghosts of the screen may have something else to impart to us than
their fables of laughs and tears: a new conception of the universe and new mys-
teries in the soul. The reprobation of professional virtue-mongers with their petty
scandals conveys an immense, deep-rooted anxiety in the style of the common
morality – yet one whose signification can no longer find its full expression. Still,
a few of these upholders of the present order know that their tremor of fear and
indignation does not only owe to a richly sensual image. Their fear comes from
farther away and encompasses more: it can sense the monster of novelty, of crea-
tion, pregnant with all the fast-transforming heresy of a continuous evolution.
Let us open the proceedings. The cinematograph pleads guilty.
* * *
To a Second Reality, a Second Reason
Translated by Sarah Keller
[Jean Epstein, “A seconde réalité, second raison,” Le cinéma du diable (Paris: Édi-
tions Jacques Melot, 1947), pp. 219-233]
That the senses deceive is the most clichéd platitude. It implies that reason –
which one also calls common sense – can in unreliable data discover and correct
errors committed by five or ten other deficient senses. If the lesson we have been
taught by the cinema had to be boiled down to one sentence, it would be this: in
its own way, reason deceives us as much as the senses. Our conclusion, itself
powerfully logical: how can reason, which works with the results of a deceived
le cinéma du diable 321
sensibility’s experience, yield anything other than a quintessence of misconcep-
tions?
Behaving like a complex, sensorial super-organ, the cinematograph provides
new images of the world, which reason suspects at first of falseness, even more
than it would with organic and natural data. Nevertheless, though working with
information received secondhand, as a sub-part of the brain, reason likes to pre-
sent itself as some manner of super-reason, with the authority to overturn the
judgments arrived at by simple reason on the grounds that, because they are ill-
informed, they are therefore incorrect.
Thus, in the most general way, thanks to the photogénie of movement, the cine-
matograph shows us that form is only one unsettled state of a fundamentally
mobile condition, and that movement, being universal and variably variable,
makes every form inconstant, inconsistent, fluid. Solids suddenly find their su-
premacy threatened; they are but one particular genre of appearances within sys-
tems of ordinary experience on a human scale, which are either in constant mo-
tion or only slightly and uniformly varying. Fluidity – the reality of the
cinematographic experience – is also the reality of a scientific outlook, which
sees in every substance a gaseous structure.
Another important difference between the notions of first reason and second
reason is due to the extreme manner in which the cinema mobilizes spatial rela-
tions, which is another aspect of the photogénie of movement. On the screen, the
part can be equal to or greater than the whole. This seemingly absurd correlation,
inadmissible to common sense, must nonetheless be admitted as valid, not only
in the cinematographic domain, but also in the realm of the greatest mathemati-
cal generality, that of set theory.
A third, critical difference between the reality that is directly perceptible and the
reality of the screen, and between the two corresponding kinds of reasoning,
again stems from the photogénie of movement when it functions in a temporal
perspective. As is its custom, the screen presents events in a rhythm of succes-
sions more or less rapid than that of normal observation. The ability to discern
either the acceleration or slowing of one world in relation to another presupposes
a constant speed of movement, common to both, which allows us to establish a
comparison. Indeed, this constant does exist: the speed of light. Moreover, this
speed – because we don’t know any greater velocity and because it guarantees
practically instant transmission of every signal – universally serves to mark the
present as the starting point for every series, the zero coordinate of time. When
an electric discharge occurs in a stormy atmosphere, we know it first by light-
ning, then by thunder, because the light travels through space faster than sound.
It is this quantitative difference in the speed of travel that separates the lightning
from the thunder, creating a separation, an interval, a relief, a perspective which
we call time, which we believe to be time. If every message that reached us con-
strued the spatial distance in exactly the same way, we wouldn’t be able to identify
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a notion of time as distinct from space. Between the sight and the sound of a
soccer ball bouncing beside us, we note no passage of time. Between the sight
and sound of the same ball falling a few hundred meters from us, we already
observe a slight lapse in time. This can only be the result of what is different in
the two experiences. And yet what has changed is simply a spatial distance.
It’s not that, from this perspective, time doesn’t exist; rather, it’s the allegoriza-
tion of a certain way of negotiating distance, of a certain action in space, which
we estimate by comparing it with the displacement of light. And if the cinemato-
graph manages to create new temporalities, it is precisely because it knows,
through acceleration and slow-motion, how to modify the relationship usually
observed between the natural movement of people and things and the standard
displacement of rays of light. Here, too, time amounts to being only the space
consumed, through a quantitative difference with the consumption of space by
light. However, in this case, there isn’t a virgin space, a place of nothingness
where no thing resides, nothing happens. The expanse exists only insofar as it
has been traveled; it is space that has been acted upon, traveled through, nego-
tiated; it exists only if it is also time.
In both reality and in classical models, space and time constitute two separate
frameworks, where things coexist or occur in series following an unchanging
order. Here, phenomena can be localized and assessed with certainty, through
means of a system of fixed sizes linked to an absolute standard. This absolute
determinism, this fixisme, stems from the fact that here, space and time, which
constantly remain as they are, condition a continuity or a discontinuity always
equal to itself in all its points, in all its moments. When there is movement in
this homogenous domain, it can only be uniform movement or uniformly accel-
erated or slowed down. As a result of the limited degree of these variations and
the slowness with which they occur, this movement grants forms a relative per-
manence and gives the field in which they exist an apparent symmetry. There
derives from all of this an ideology whose multiple branches, while they may con-
tradict each other on a host of points, are all in agreement as to being, in general
terms, philosophies of solidity and permanence.
For example, in matters of religion, there is but an immutable God, which is
the ultimate conceit, but a conceit to which everything relates and from which
everything receives its prize of being unvarying for all eternity. Mathematics, at
this stage, is the science of finite numbers only, wherein the Greeks endeavored
to exclude any suspicion of the infinite with a trepidation that still resurfaces
among many of our contemporaries when confronted with anything that doesn’t
calculate precisely. Euclidian geometry isn’t conceivable anywhere other than in a
solid world, in the experiential framework within which it was born. If our habitat
were not on terra firma, but were liquid or gaseous, if a Euclid of fish or bird
intelligence had composed works of aquametry or aerometry, we wouldn’t have
such rigorous notions about sea swells or the symmetry of the winds. All physics
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taught in the schools – even when it deals with liquids or gases, to say nothing of
radiation – takes the law of solids both as its point of departure and its culmina-
tion. Moreover, the very concept of laws implies permanence and rigidity. All
science is but a search for this permanence, for an invariable law of relations
bridging the changes in things, and that remains immutable at the very heart of
that which isn’t stable.
In cinematographic representation, space and time indissolubly unite to make
a space-time framework in which things coexist or succeed each other in an order
and at a pace that can be variable to the point of reversibility. There, in order to
define phenomena, there are only systems of shifting relationships that cannot be
linked to any fixed value. This nearly total mobility, this general relativity, defines
a domain that does not always remain as it has been. Continuity on screen is
heterogeneous, because the movement that reigns there is not only variable but
variable in an unpredictable fashion, variable with inconstancy, variable to the
point of being able to reach relatively enormous accelerations and decelerations
that can profoundly alter the nature of first reality. In such a domain of move-
ment, the form is not retained; symmetry disappears. Two instantaneous, succes-
sive shapes of the same object cease to be super-imposable. From this is born an
ideology that cannot be based on the experience of a world of solids: it is rather a
philosophy of the fluid, where nothing and no one are what they are, but become,
rather, whatever they become. In this sense, one could say that the cinemato-
graphic universe is Sartrean, but its existentialism isn’t limited to psychology and
morality; it is also and foremost physical, geometrical, mathematical, and logical.
In a universe where everything moves and changes, one risks losing all sense of
rule, apart from those laws defining this mobility and change. This may explain
why one already sees some slack in the defining relations of ultra-physics and
ultra-mechanics, which have become more flexible. In the infinitely small, as in
the cinematographic universe, the invariable has been eclipsed, which may point
to its uselessness and portend its disappearance. The scholar, the philosopher,
and the cineaste all wonder with deep worry what the power of the mind will be
in worlds where permanent structures that seem necessary to any kind of knowl-
edge are loosening, dissolving, and fading away. Probably, like a last haven of
limited security, there will remain the law above all laws, the law of large num-
bers: probability. Except that this is not a true invariable, but a substitute, or ex-
pedient, presented in the form of a limit that is more or less problematic in terms
of variance. It is not a law that characterizes an order; instead it is an indication of
the failings of the absence of laws, which reveals the deficiencies that prevent us
from perfecting disorder.
It isn’t surprising that people are anxious as they realize the importance of
change in their own experience and thought. Again, so long as the new reality
seemed destined to remain a rarity, one limited to laboratories where it was pro-
duced at great cost and effort, its revolutionary influence seemed interesting only
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to a small number of the most learned speculators, whose theories could hardly
have an appreciable impact on practical life, on common sense. But all of a sud-
den there is Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the Bikini islands, with the splitting of atoms
suddenly emerging in human customs and morals, bringing far more than the
power of a weapon of war – the proof that all we have imagined of the strange
organization of the infinitely small is not an utterly wild dream. And then there is
Freudian therapy affirming, through the criterion of usefulness, the existence of a
deep soul in which the eccentricities of behavior are no longer imaginary, either.
And finally there is the cinema, which, playfully it sometimes seems, publicly
translates the universe through forms even more confused, more preposterous
than all those that scholars managed secretly to guess. Atom-splitting, psycho-
analysis, cinema – this grouping, though disparate in appearance, combines three
methods of accessing a second reality where rational logic may well not suffice.
It is necessary, however, to point out that this irrationalism now appearing on
the cultural horizon is in fact excessively rational and, in a sense, even more ra-
tional than the Cartesian method of blind and exclusive faith in the infallible
rightness of rational judgment. It is reason itself, in fact, that warns us of its own
disadvantages. It is the critique effected by the second reason that reveals the gaps
and abuses of the first reason. If a certain public acutely feels the development of
irrationalism in the contemporary mentality as a danger, we must also recognize
that the despotic expansion of logic that has characterized thought in the preced-
ing centuries has also been fraught with peril.
Though necessary at first, it is misguided to try to rationalize everything, to
analyze everything and reduce everything to an abstraction; to attempt everywhere
to separate the thing from its attribute, the form from movement, the object from
its number; to coerce the mind into valuing only that part of itself formulated
according to the classical rules of spoken and written expression. Vocabulary,
grammar, and syntax are the machinery with which we translate ideas, which are
above all images. But this machinery cannot function without betraying the
thought-image: without misrepresenting it; without either impoverishing it or
weighing it down; without simplifying it or overloading it, alienating its original
sense and sincerity. The more a sentence is a sentence, the more beautifully
formed it is, the more it risks being a thick accumulation of lies. From Racine to
Valéry, the great art of the writer is the game that has become increasingly diffi-
cult in which, according to the rules, he requires the reader to guess the emotions
the text hides while claiming to express them. That in the end, nine out of ten
readers may not understand anything, or understand whatever comes to their
minds, is the ultimate achievement of this style. The author’s thought and the
psychology of his characters are just word games.
Thus language transformed that wild and shadowy habitat for feeling that is
poetry into a French garden, drawn geometrically, fallaciously clear, and then led
it to degenerate into a fallaciously obscure labyrinth just as much as a perfectly
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ordered masterpiece, and definitively purged of all sincere emotion. In scientific
and philosophical domains, where the sentimental trend develops with less force,
rational thinking has made out even better. Words have proliferated like a cancer,
spreading a Taoist nominalism, casting a veritable magic through which it is en-
ough to name a thing to bring it into being. The first concrete reality is nothing
more than a memory of a distant starting point for so many systems that reason
derives from itself, and, having never met its own image, it takes this reflection as
if it were a certified copy.
All of this is too specious for it to last indefinitely. Over the last few dozen
years, there have emerged islands of another, scandalous reality – a reality that
refuses to conform precisely to a rational framework. There, logical thought finds
itself disoriented and at times impotent. The game of induction and deduction
misfires, fails. To understand the innovation in the structure of things, we need
innovation in the nature and organization of our thought processes as well. In
returning to the concrete – but to a second form of concreteness – we develop
and restore to favor an ancient mode of thinking through images and analogies,
through visual representations and metaphor, which had fallen nearly into obso-
lescence. This analogical and metaphoric order pervades the more narrowly
rational order, adding to it but not necessarily destroying it, much as a knight
on a chessboard, with its indirect, bounding progress, makes its way rectilinearly
through other pieces that advance in straight lines, and joins with them to com-
plete an overall strategic position.
The majority of the islands of the new reality are difficult to access. Only
shrewd physicists and audacious psychiatrists manage to get to them – and only
by breaking in. Only cinema invites the general public in. To even moderately
attentive viewers, the screen shows at least a hint of the fluid and metalogical
universe, of a mobility with four variables, of a becoming that conforms to no
standards, of a reality that is just an inconstant association among numerous
movements. And even the inattentive spectator receives from film a mental orien-
tation that encourages him to think outside of rational, grammatical, and syntac-
tic rigor, estranged from and on the margin of words, beyond and before them, to
think according to the sentimental and magical mystique of images.
If this mystique is dangerous because it draws on what is deepest and most
human in mankind, because it stirs the best and the worst of the soul’s secret
powers – well then, the cinematograph is dangerous and it’s high time people
began reacting. Already, the book – that ultimate synthesizer of classical language
– let itself get contaminated: it is now ashamed of an overwritten, overly correct
text, as if this were equivalent to lying. Already, the newspapers present their
accounts rendered like “films” of this or that, composed in a telegraphic style, in
which, moreover, as many words as possible are replaced by pictures. Already,
walls abound with posters meant to be understood by passers-by who don’t have
to stop or slow down, and which employ all methods of the moving image: close-
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ups, superimpositions, parts bigger than the whole, etc. In frequenting the cine-
mas, the public have unlearned to read and think as they read or write; it grows
accustomed to looking and thinking as simply as it sees. Among producers of
films, the word “visualizing” became fashionable for some years. In fact, there is
no better way to characterize film than by saying it visualizes thought. Thus, after
the craftsman and the scholar, one sees the spectator appearing, a new sub-vari-
ety of reasoning being. The knowledge acquired through slow, abstract, rigorous
reasoning has been pervaded by knowledge gained directly through feelings, one
that is immediate, practical, and supple – a kind of poetry that we acquire above
all through what we see. Paradoxically, the return to the concrete is also a return
to the mystical, to the mystique of a beauty, a goodness, a truth that is no longer
immutable but perpetually moving, always relative, and infinitely transformable.
The old battle between the Ancients and Moderns ceases to be undecided. The
new man of the street, the new average French person, has taken the side of mut-
ability over fixed forms, of becoming over permanence. And, certainly, the cine-
ma has played a role in this. If this is a work of the Devil, well then, cinema is
diabolical, and it’s already too late to declare holy war against it, for that war has
already been lost.
Note
1. For a detailed examination of Le Cinéma du diable, see my article, “Cinéma du diable: Jean
Epstein and the Ambiguities of Subversion,” SubStance 34, no. 3 (2005): 3-16.
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Later Works
Introduction to Esprit de cinéma and Alcool et cinéma
These last two books of Jean Epstein were published posthumously in 1955 and
1975 respectively. Esprit reprises a number of articles Epstein published in journals
in the years 1946-49 (with one short text from 1935), and Alcool may be considered
in part a variant of Esprit, since half of it recapitulates sections of that book almost
verbatim. Taken together, these works represent a last summation of Epstein’s
thoughts about cinema. They echo central themes and ideas found in two of his
other synoptic efforts, L’Intelligence d’une machine (1946) and Le Cinéma du diable
(1947), notably the insistence that cinema as a mechanical apparatus discloses
our universe anew. Photogénie, close-ups, reverse and slow motion, and a loosen-
ing of cause and effect, display a different face of nature which paradoxically
accords both with certain discoveries of modern physics and aspects of pre-So-
cratic, pagan, and materialist thought.
The fundamental dualism of Epstein may be seen in the parallel oppositions of
‘intelligence’ and ‘evil,’ and ‘spirit’ and ‘alcohol’. On the one hand, we find an
Apollonian tendency to understand cinema as an idea, a development in the realm
of the mind and science, while on the other hand, cinema directly and challen-
gingly reconnects modern viewers to a Dionysian embodiment, to art and poetry.
Since Epstein rarely cites Nietzsche, we might do better to point to Charles Bau-
delaire’s duality of le moderne, which combines a deeply material belonging to the
present moment with a much more ethereal relationship with the past and the
eternal. While Baudelaire is cited scarcely more than Nietzsche, Epstein’s rever-
ence for Poe together with his apology of evil, alcohol, and corporeal experience
are unmistakably Baudelairean.
But Esprit and Alcool also contrast with L’Intelligence d’une machine and Le Cinéma du
diable, the latter two centrally concerned with time and temporality and written in
a taut lyrical-philosophical style. Both compilations of articles published in main-
stream journals, Esprit and Alcool display a register akin to cultural chronicle –
indeed close to our current cultural studies – more so than philosophical critique.
As for content, they focus on four main aspects, two of which are new to Ep-
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stein’s thought. The old foci are cinema as an alternative to – yet also a form of –
language; and cinema as ‘surreal’ in a way that contrasts with Surrealism. In both
cases Epstein deepens previous reflections started in the 1920s. The main new
conspicuous interest is sound, as attested by the development of the notion of
phonogénie as a sonic parallel to photogénie, and illustrated in the beautiful Le Tem-
pestaire (1947). Second, more than the rest of his oeuvre, these two books look
backwards as much as forward, probing the history of silent film and cinema at
large, and mulling over moviemaking as a specific craft, with specific techniques
worth addressing as such. This makes them possibly the most approachable of
his theoretical works from the viewpoint of contemporary film studies, even
though they display less of the incisive, tonic, and poetic verve of his best books
such as Bonjour Cinéma (1921) and Le Cinéma du diable.
– Christophe Wall-Romana
Esprit de cinéma
“The Logic of Images”
Translated by Thao Nguyen
[Jean Epstein, “La Logique des images,” Esprit de cinéma (Genève: Éditions Jeheber,
1955), pp. 37-41.]
Every novice screenwriter knows that no film character can simply put his um-
brella somewhere in the middle of a scene without such a gesture leading to con-
sequences that need to appear in the film’s conclusion. This captious finalism
flourishes with utmost wealth in the most faux, the most arbitrary genres: those
of melodrama and detective stories. But, truth be told, no author who seeks a
certain amount of success dares stray too far away from this rational order and
dares give in to sentimental illogicality, which more closely characterizes the be-
havior of real beings. So, at first view, it seems to us that filmed narration docilely
obeys all rules of formal logic.
These rules, however, have been conceived to assemble words according to
grammars that constitute as many little codes of an abridged and common reason
that are available to all: speaking and writing correctly means reasoning soundly,
in the classical sense. Yet, even though cinema is now talking, film also and pri-
marily uses images. And one can ponder if verbal logic truly applies to image
groupings – if it is legitimate to extend, as we often try to do, the value of syntac-
tic principles and rhetorical techniques, be they oratory or literary, to visual dis-
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course. A fairly sure answer should arise from the comparison between the laws
of grammar that direct the order of sentences, and the rules of editing, in which
filmed sequences appear. Without a doubt, cinematographic language has not
found its Vaugelas or its Littré,1 but it already possesses well-established customs,
whose broad lines have been inventoried. And, already, an important difference
appears between word and image constructions.
From one idiom to another, grammar varies more or less; thus does logic as
well, and sometimes in a very subtle manner. Until now, philosopher after philo-
sopher has tried, in vain, to draw, through those differences, a grammatical dia-
gram shared by all languages in order to paint a minimal portrait of a humanly
universal logic. On the other hand, at this time, editing and montage techniques
only offer completely negligible national variations; thus, such techniques pretty
much embody the very architectural constant of the human spirit that grammar-
ians fail to isolate. We do not know how Eskimos, for example, would conceive
the cinematographic treatment of a subject, but we know that they easily under-
stand films of any origin that depict a simple life. However, it remains to be seen
if such a general form of visual language can be considered logical.
Admittedly, a scenario usually appears as a kind of great syllogism, conforming
to the scholastic rule: Omne praedicatum est in subjecto. That is to say that, the drama
having been set, one no longer needs to innovate but rather needs simply to in-
ventory drama’s elements and characters in order to see the inevitable denoue-
ment which was already and completely present in the primary data. The crime
bears the trace of a left-handed, poor-sighted culprit who wears espadrilles. Now,
Paul is left-handed, poor-sighted, and he wears espadrilles. Therefore, Paul will
be hanged. Such dramaturgic logic, completely similar to the grammatical one, is
incapable of inventing, of creating something new, something true, something
real. It only knows how to abstract, in the form of a hypothesis, the attributes of
the subject and to isolate, in order to make it more apparent, a conclusion that
existed beforehand – as is – involved in the knowledge of the starting point. If this
analytical process has followed certain principles that we shall study later, its re-
sult gives the impression of being something true and real, whereas it is only
correct in relation to a rule of the game, like a checkmate that is brought about
correctly, but to which we cannot lend any character of truth or reality.
However, visual language proves resistant to abstraction, and with difficulty
separates qualities from their object. The image remains a symbol that is close to
concrete reality, infinitely richer in knowable content than the word that constitu-
tes an already very refined diagram. Moreover, the cinematographic image lives
quickly. It modifies its content, it changes meaning every second, whereas the
content and the meaning of the word vary slowly, sometimes from one year to
another, sometimes from one century to another. The animated image, which
would require a lot of time to be broken down into its elements in fact because of
its richness, eludes, through its instability, the kind of analysis that has ample
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time to dwell on the permanence of the word. So, because of the very nature of its
elements that only capture, when it comes to forms, those related to movement,
cinema does not lend itself well to the analytical, deductive, syllogistic type of
exposition and understanding, and film tends to reject any stationary logic, of the
grammatical type, that we seek to force upon it.
In movement, which is the essence of cinematographic representation, funda-
mental principles of formal logic are mobilized, relaxed, wrecked, reduced to a
very relative validity. In the screen world, where things never remain what they
are, how would the principle of identity keep its rigor? The principle of identity
presupposes a homogeneous space-time continuum, in which figures remain
superimposable onto themselves. In a space-time that is variable at will, as con-
ceived by the cinematographic tool, each object continually becomes an endless
number of aspects-objects that oftentimes cannot be compared. When all forms li-
quefy in a perpetual mobility, the principle of identity becomes as unsuitable to
them as it is to ocean waves.
As a result, a corollary principle, the law of the excluded middle, crumbles as
well. Either – as we think outside of the screen – Pierre and Paul are not the same
height, or Pierre is shorter or taller than Paul. But, on screen, Pierre can some-
times be shorter, sometimes taller than Paul, and it is not impossible that both
are the same height. The non-contradiction ceases to be a valid criterion of truth.
Zeno’s arrow, which is immobile in flight, does not surprise us anymore.2 Any
being combines movement and stillness, solidity and fluidity, languor and preci-
pitation, tininess and immensity according to time-space conventions, where the
lens arbitrarily places that being. Had the neurotic Pascal seen a few films, he
would have had to find a new support to his anguish other than the size differ-
ences between mite and man – a difference that cinema can cancel or reverse at
will, like the most banal optical illusion.
Two other fundamental notions of logic – those of non-ubiquity and of simul-
taneity – crumble into a strange confusion when we try to transpose them onto
the world revealed to us by the screen. According to our usual idea of a four-
dimensional continuum, it seems obvious to us that an individual cannot be at
two different locations at the same time, nor can this individual, should he move,
be at the same location at two different moments. But, in the discontinuous and
fragmentary cinematographic concept of a time-space made up of autonomous
cells, each holding its own references, the terms “the same place” and “the same
moment” often lose all meaning from one cell to another. Let us consider the race
between the hare and the turtle, filmed in double exposure, at two different
speeds: one for the hare, the other for the turtle. Where and when can we possibly
say that the hare and the turtle are either at the same location, or at the same
moment? At the end of the race, in the heterogeneous time-space created by cine-
ma, the fable’s moral could find itself turned upside down. This also shows that
moral sense is a sense of logic.
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Finally, we believe that two events that uniformly follow each other are linked,
one to the other, by a mysterious quality of causality. However, in a reverse film,
we may see time and time again the explosion come after the smoke, but we
refuse to accept that smoke caused the explosion. Rather, we seek and we find –
because one always ends up finding or inventing what one seeks – a complicated
series of direct causes that explain and correct a relation screaming of contrary
causality. However, a doubt can linger in our mind: is normal causality (which
constitutes one of the items – not least among them – of our daily, logical act of
faith, and that physicists already repudiate to replace it with statistical laws) an-
other trompe l’œil, just like the absurd causality of the film recorded in reverse?
Thus, cinema shows us that classical logic, no matter how great its usefulness,
is not an absolutely universal tool completely valid in all knowledge domains. In
the discontinuity and heterogeneity of cinematographic time-spaces, logic itself
takes on a discontinuous and heterogeneous aspect; it cannot always be extended,
such as it is, from one spatial-temporal cell to any other one. We are led to think
that several logics may exist, which in the end are parochial. Such plurality is
already well known to scientists, various sciences being in the process of devising
specific analysis and deduction methods in relation to certain orders of phenom-
ena. Microphysicists do not reason quite in the same fashion as do physicians
or geologists. It is therefore natural that cinematographic phenomena, those
events that unfold on screen, fit into a special logic of which we can only catch a
glimpse. What already appears at the conclusion of the acquired knowledge,
thanks to the popularizing power of cinema, is the notion, most certainly impor-
tant, of the relativity of logic.
* * *
Rapidity and Fatigue of the Homo Spectatoris
Translated by Franck Le Gac
[Jean Epstein, “Rapidité et Fatigue de l’Homme Spectateur,” Esprit de cinéma (Gen-
ève: Éditions Jeheber, 1955), pp. 59-68.]
It is readily admitted, following Quinton, that the relation between the successive
capacities of intelligence and the products of this faculty at every moment of his-
tory form a specific constant in terms of effort and yield; that nowadays a mathe-
matician using tensor analysis experiences neither more nor less difficulty than
did a disciple of Pythagoras using the table of the first numbers. Yet it is not so
much in the occupations of intellectuals as in the conditions in which any man,
including the most average, must live and accomplish his daily work that the
difference appears between cerebral tasks from one period to another.
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Today the general acceleration of life, through the speeds of means of manu-
facture and communication; the monitoring of the economy, made necessary by
the increasing population of the earth; the more and more meticulous measure of
production as well as consumption; the increasingly precise bounding of any ac-
tivity, in space and time; the efforts towards a more and more accurate adjust-
ment of all gains and all expenses to standards of rational value; all these factors
and many other corollaries force the clerk, the factory worker, the housewife, the
stallholder, and even those who stroll around into constant attention: at the of-
fice, in front of the machine tool, at the market, at the family home, and in the
street.
This tension has made the reduction of working hours and the institution of
paid vacations necessary. However, while the working day is eight hours long
rather than ten or fourteen, this does not imply that we work less today than
before, but that we work faster and, as a consequence, that we get tired sooner.
Even outside their professional occupations, from the moment they get up to the
moment they go to sleep, industrialized and commercialized humans enjoy little
leisure time, which has become a sin punishable by at least a fine. A lapse in
concentration appears as a damning vice, subject to a whole array of penalties:
limitation periods and surcharges, loss of earnings and loss of living, premedi-
tated eliminations and automatic accidents. The law of civilized selection has it
that those incapable of a life always on the watch waste away and die. Accord-
ingly, besides the acute intellectual fatigue of every evening, which sleep dispels, a
muted chronic weariness has settled in, which the relative rest of the five-day
week or the summer break can alleviate but only provisionally.
Intellectual fatigue – as psycho-physiology teaches us – acts upon the subordi-
nating center which lies at the base of the brain and regulates the oscillations of
mental life between states of wakefulness and states of sleep. In wakefulness, this
center maintains the cerebral cortex in a state of effective communication with
sense organs, in a state of peripheral receptivity and extroverted activity whose
associative channels correspond to thought in its logical organization. The longer
and the more intensely nerve cells work this way, the more they charge up with
toxins. The subordinating center responds to this poisoning by more or less sus-
pending the relations between the outside environment and the cortex, freeing
the latter from ceaseless stimulation by the senses and the rational habits these
messages have established. At all the stages of sleep and wakefulness, thought
becomes more or less illogical, as can be observed in the dreams and reveries
featuring other, irrational types of sequences strongly marked by affective paralo-
gics. Indeed, the inhibition of an extroverted and reasoning cortical activity is
accompanied by an increase in the influence of other zones at the base of the
brain, considered the centers of affective life.
In general, the cerebral cortex and base may react as stimulants, just as they
may mutually inhibit each other, in a rhythm of always unstable equilibriums and
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alternating predominancies under the control of a – probably complex – center
that regulates the state of wakefulness or the state of sleep. This center functions
as a center of poetry when it introduces intermediate states between the full exer-
tion and the total eclipse of logical intelligence. And intellectual fatigue, in its
moderate degree, in its chronic form, evidently opens the door to half-dreaming
and calls for the transformation of reasoning-thought into poem-thought.
Seen from this fundamental psycho-sociological angle, rational activity and ir-
rational activity appear as the inseparable, contradictory, and complementary con-
stituents of a dialectic – to speak Hegelian – which is the life of the mind itself.
The excess of one of these mental activities necessarily leads to an exhaustion and
intoxication that allow and invite the other to a more vigorous and manifest devel-
opment. Cast in this light, which is also the light of medicine and hygiene, one
can see that organizing a too-strictly rationalized life would amount to creating
states of affective need or romantic crises, sooner or later.
Because as a language-spectacle it appeals more to emotions than to reason,
because it is the creator of the most prefabricated, digestible, massive, intense,
popular poetry, cinema remedies so well some of the ills of rationalist civilization,
in which it thus becomes an essential provision. Intellectual fatigue has created,
on the scale of the whole of humankind caught up in progress, a need for facile,
crude poetry and a receptivity to it which are only increasing. This need and this
receptivity have hung on to cinema as to a mainstay, a soft, heroic drug, a staple
food.
Thanks to speech, writing, and printing, which propagated the reasoning
method, the Craftsman had become the Scientist. Yet following the law of evolution
of animal species, which die away through an excess complexity in the makeup of
some of their organs, this human variety, characterized by a highly logical beha-
vior, feels today that it is tangled up in the profusion of its own reason, over-
whelmed with this system as with huge boughs, and whose upward spiritual
movement does not make it any less bulky, heavy, or awkward.
The excellence of his reason – probably – raised man above animals. However
– and though the reasons for this are not known – there are limits to every good,
beyond which it becomes a wrong. These limits in their development were
reached, for instance, with the shell of lamellibranchia in the Secondary Era, the
carapace of the radiated tortoise, the tusks of mastodons, the giraffe’s neck, the
genitalia of copepods and, from a functional standpoint, the higher brain of man.
At a certain level of hypertrophy, rational thought tends to become paralyzed
and disintegrate as an effect of organic fatigue: this effect is both direct, exerted
by this thought upon itself, and indirect, a result of the obligation to think ration-
ally ever more, so as to be able to live life as it has been conceived and organized
materially by reason. A vicious circle if there is one, where intelligence strains
itself in the creation of machines and regulations, which themselves create intel-
lectual fatigue. In this, one could see something like an ingenious process for the
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obscure will of the species which, aware of the danger of rationalization, would
have fitted it with an automatic braking system.
It thus happens today that man no longer has the taste – nor the time, in fact –
to read for the sake of reading. While he has to ingest his daily newspaper in
haste, he only scans the page, which lends itself quite well to this, half of which
involves headlines and titles designed to be read at a glance. Often, illustrations
make the knowledge of the little text that remains optional or even are a substi-
tute for the article itself. Photographs, diagrams, posters make it possible to learn
an enormous amount of required knowledge without exacting the effort of atten-
tion and logical thinking needed for a somewhat coherent reading. Journalists,
publicists, and many men of letters now know that they need to have considera-
tion for the intellectual fatigue of their contemporaries, who can no longer be
diligent readers; who no longer find themselves in a state to do anything but to
watch, and to watch quickly at that, while passing, running, driving, eating, tra-
veling, and thinking about something else to boot.
Indeed, the movement and the haste, the cramming and the cumulation char-
acteristic of modern life add to cerebral fatigue and, just as directly, to the reper-
cussions of this fatigue: laziness when it comes to reading, aversion to reasoning
more still while reading. Little by little, the learned man and logician, but weary
of being so, develop the attributes of a new mental variety which could be named
Homo spectatoris.
As it happens, this spectator, a spectator always in movement, discovers cine-
ma – a universal spectacle, a spectacle always in movement. The film brings with
it the means to say and learn everything through images that just need to be
watched and, to a degree, heard. The most cursory survey – and one may wonder
at the fact that a more comprehensive investigation has not yet been carried out –
already shows that the audience is much more inclined to be spectators than lis-
teners. The majority of theater patrons hear or understand well often only a slight
part of the dialogue. The rest goes unheeded or is misinterpreted, which still does
not prevent the film from producing the effect intended by the author, thanks to
its visible content.
If this spectacle suits so perfectly the new spectatorial mentality, it is first of all
because intelligence, the effort of the higher brain – which, precisely, wants to
rest – is little called upon in the comprehension of its visual symbolism, while
the sentimental and irrational activity of the base of the brain, of the lower brain,
by contrast seeks to be put to work. Yet this is also because the images on the
screen essentially constitute a spectacle of mobility, and the pace of such mobi-
lity, which reflects the exterior pace of life nowadays, accords with the momen-
tum in which souls live, carried and hurried along as they evidently are by the
same movement of events around them. The photogénie of movement, the funda-
mental law of the whole cinematographic aesthetic and dramaturgy, thus reveals
a deep signification.
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The increasing frequency in human activity constitutes one of the most striking
exterior characteristics of our time, on which it puts its imprint in a manner both
very visible and very intimate. Acceleration – which may well be a general law of
life for immense periods of time and which, from one century to another, is in
fact perceptible in history – has now become palpable in terms of personal experi-
ence, as everyone can already attest in the course of one’s own existence. Our
contemporaries need only compare their memories, from decade to decade since
their childhood, to acknowledge that man acts and is acted upon faster and fas-
ter, and therefore more, from the outside.
The ever higher speed which mechanization imparts to all movements, all rela-
tions, all realizations, allows and leads to an increase in the number of all these
acts, each of which is a set of movements. The rush of activity thus keeps multi-
plying, and there is one secret for this acceleration of acceleration, for this expo-
nentially increasing speed which drives civilization – possibly to the brink of dis-
aster. For it is difficult to imagine how the organism could indefinitely resist and
adapt to the ceaseless hardening, the tension pushed to the extreme, the jam-
packing of a life passing in a flash whose fractions of a second will come to be
counted, and which in the end will be examined and will have to be lived like a
record-setting raid of efficiency.
This exterior acceleration of work is evidently not without equivalent in mental-
ities. These high school students, who after class may be heard engaging in pas-
sionate discussions on the performances of the latest jet plane hitting the sound
barrier, certainly share a new, vivid faith quite opposed to the tradition of the
Eleatics.3 For young generations, speed – the aristocratic symbol of movement –
has become an elegance, a snobbery, an abstract good, an ideal. At last, the old
pretensions of philosophies of permanence, in which man proclaimed his mas-
tery over a universe frozen in a reassuring solidity, meet with the consciousness,
the pride, the glory of another conquest: that of the mobile world, understood in
its turn, forced into its most dangerous uncertainties.
In the interest the public has started to show so keenly for all forms of move-
ment, and especially for improvements in movement, one may see the evidence of
a capital reorientation of the mind, which is beginning to look less for aspects of
the greatest constancy than for those of the greatest mobility. Among other rea-
sons for the current vogue for sports, there is the concurrence between these
games, bringing into play and making a spectacle of movements as they do, and
the new intellectual and sentimental – and in the end, aesthetic – trend to have
appreciation for everything. And the dithyrambs published on a locomotive mak-
ing the Paris-Bordeaux trip a few minutes shorter or on a swimmer gaining a few
seconds over his rival over the distance of a pool no longer appear ridiculous
when they are thought of as the signs, coming from an unknowing writer, of a
revolution which does not leave any knowledge unreached in the soul.
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This new intuition of mobility, this new sense of the world in movement, how-
ever, also begs to be expressed in a less abstract aesthetic than that of philosophy
and mathematics, and in forms of art less fleeting than that of a scrum in rugby
or a skier’s jump. Engravers were probably already faced with the issue of repre-
senting movement during the Neolithic Age, and the progress of sculptors in
ancient Egypt and Greece may be measured by their increasing skill at figuring
torsos and limbs that are not as stiff, faces not as numb, clothes not as straight.
All such statuary aimed at providing, by way of solution, portraits as exact as was
possible, fractions as small as could be captured, and a movement that to this end
had to be broken down into a series of punctual freezes. This was a method, a
calculation in infinitesimal or differential art, which was reused in painting and
countless minor graphic instruments, and which was generally and exclusively
practiced until the beginning of this century. Of this system instant photography
represents a state of perfection, at least when it comes to the fineness and the
comprehensiveness of the analysis.
Yet the real problem, that of reproducing a movement in the integrality of its
nature, in the continuity of its evolution, remained unsolved and appeared insolu-
ble. Was it not absurd, indeed, to seek to interpret a mobility through an immo-
bility, a fluidity through a solidness, a becoming through a permanence, a white
through a black? Certainly, some thought of animating statues, and the strong
appeal, the mix of curiosity and anxiety, past and present, exercised by automa-
tons, homunculi, robots, artificial Adams and Eves – whose fabrication is attribu-
ted to great alchemists, great saints, great philosophers and scientists – may be
partly explained by the fact that man can imagine the efforts behind them, wishes
for and fears the success of a perfect art which he had come to think of as forbid-
ding. However, the attempts that were not only imagination and dupery produced
only results which, poor as they might have been, already required a daunting
mechanical complication.
At the same time that the use of railroads, bicycles, autos, the telegraph, the
telephone, the plane, the radio, and all the instruments designed to beat and beat
again speed records became widespread, the problem of the representation of
movement, which seemed like a closed matter, came back to the forefront of pre-
occupations in plastic arts and literature. Literature did the best it could to pick up
the pace, shortening its narratives, adopting the telegraphic, spoken style, multi-
plying contractions, summaries, ellipses, forcing writing into a shorthand that
could keep up with the fastest thought.
Sculpture, which could not really model fluids, invented the blur, which at least
produced a certain impression of inconsistency. Hands, breasts, masks were seen
half emerging from a wave of heavy foam of which they seemed to be made, but
for a moment only, ready to disappear again in this swell of marble.
In painting, Cubism and its imitations proposed a projective figuration of the
object, on several planes and from several different angles. This complex perspec-
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tive, the assumed result of shifts in the pictorial point of view, was to give rise to
an impression of movement in the spectator’s mind, who was also invited to tra-
vel in imagination.
Draftsmen began to copy, as symbols of such movement, the flaws of snap-
shots, at the extreme limit of the power of photography to intercept the appear-
ance of an almost immobile particle within mobility. Thanks to dotted or shaky
lines, this resulted in images of stretched autos, fitted with streaks of hatching
and with wheels flattened in ellipses.
All these expedients suffered from the same fault, which seemed without reme-
dy: the impossibility of figuring a movement through another movement, as long
as no mobile media existed, a media with fluidity, in which the movement of a
form could still be imprinted, and which could keep this form of movement intact
so as to repeat it indefinitely; the impossibility of integrating all the fragmentary
and seemingly immobile appearances of a mobility in the continuity of their evo-
lution, reconstructed by some system, some calculation of integral art.
This is the impossibility cinema has solved, precisely by adding a series of in-
stantaneous and discontinuous photographic infinitesimals into their integral
and continuous sequence, which is movement. In this light, the cinematographic
camera is first and foremost an integrating, calculating machine. In any case, this
machine enabled the most difficult expression, pursued for ages and demanded
all at once and urgently by a civilization to which Romanticism and the tyranny of
speed had just revealed the paramount value of movement.
The representation of movement made possible by cinema was at first under-
stood in a quite superficial manner and employed in overabundance in this sim-
plicity. The first scenarios never seemed to feature enough accidents, encounters,
battles, chases. The art of movement was at first of stereotypical imagery, whose
production does in fact continue to this day: there is always a need, in order to
satisfy a certain public, for films that respond to a very macroscopic and naively
romanced conception of things to come.
However, the camera – learning that, while recording the movements of others,
it could also move – approached characters and made close-ups. What was then
discovered, in the expressions of a face filling the whole screen, was the world of
a much finer mobility. This was still a physical mobility, but it translated in min-
ute detail the mobility of a soul. The close-up thus was a step of enormous scope
for the cinema, inaugurating the microscopy of exterior movement and extending
the power of figuration of the new language to the realm of interior movements,
spiritual movements. Thanks to the close-up, films were no longer limited to the
storytelling of obstacle courses and gained the ability to depict a psychological
evolution as well.
Slow motion later pushed the microscopy of outer movement to a prodigious
degree of sophistication, which begged to be used to the end of a no less pene-
trating analysis of thought and feeling. Speeded-up motion has created a tele-
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scopy or a tachyscopy of movement.4 And both slowed-down and speeded-up
motion have thus caused a new world to emerge suddenly, next to the three al-
ready known, more or less – the human scale, the infinitesimal, the infinitely
great – a fourth universe that in fact encompasses the three others: that of the
infinitely mobile, infinitely slow, or infinitely fast and, in a psychological sense,
of the infinitely human.
Cinema thus accords with a civilization that is becoming conscious – and pain-
fully so – of the acceleration of life, not only because it brings the representation
of movement in a form that may be used in art as in science, but also because it
constitutes, through its images, music, and noises, a language whose under-
standing may be extremely swift, much swifter than that of spoken or read lan-
guage. This high speed of absorption by the mind cinematographic discourse
owes to its irrationality. Such speed suits civilized mindsets because it rests them
from their overworked reason.
* * *
Ciné-analysis, or Poetry in an Industrial Quantity
Translated by Sarah Keller
[Jean Epstein, “Ciné-analyse, ou poésie en quantité industrielle,” Esprit de cinéma
(Genève: Éditions Jeheber, 1955), pp. 69-76.]
Our scientistic civilization tends to create an order of humanity perfectly suited to
the technical and social uses it is to serve. The result is normalized, typified and
extroverted to the extreme – and might well be called superhuman, since here the
superego, civic and professional, must peremptorily control the individualist fan-
tasy of the ego. The superego, itself as unified and aligned as possible with group
averages, allows the formation of homogeneous groups, within which behavior
and productivity are certainly predictable. Probably the conjunction of food
shortages, economic restrictions, and policing – generally totalitarian mindsets –
promote this psycho-technical and psycho-political human autoplanisme5 by con-
tributing in a hundred ways toward diminishing the original spirit of the individ-
ual. However, this temperament is not yet so submissive that it does not suffer
and complain about the excessive repression imposed on it by the methodical
censoring of thoughts, actions, and accomplishments that are useless or even
detrimental to communal activities. The permanent controversy, the incessant
transactions – the dialectic, if you will, between the rationality demanded by the
environment and the irrationality of feelings that animate individual beings – thus
seem to have reached the instability and the intensity of a crisis.
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In poetry, people have always found the first relief for troubles resulting from
external forces that rebuff their true tendencies, poetry being understood in its
general sense of sublimation. Thus for example, the Stakhanovist ideal6 is above
all a poetry of forced labor: a transfiguration of the mortifying pressure to strug-
gle until a fixed norm has been reached, into the glorious liberty of voluntarily
exhausting oneself beyond that norm; a transference that allows the realization
of transcendence within deprivation, with an eye toward the social good. In addi-
tion to such methods of heroic poetry in action, other means – traditional and
benign, which one includes under the heading of art – remain in use.
Literature, theater, painting, music, sculpture, etc. can probably still bring
readers, spectators, listeners into a state of sublimation through resonance with
the poetic state expressed by the creator. But, when it comes to interesting a large
audience, these diversions often exert too narrow and too particular a liberating
effect. In contemporary French letters, there is not a writer who may be called a
great popular poet, and it’s not that anyone lacks inspiration: it’s that literature
has ceased being able to serve as a medium for poetry, given to the mass audi-
ence, massively riddled with prohibitions, which has to be compelled to self-ana-
lyze. For the man of the street – incapable of counting the thousands of orders he
is given forbidding him to do and destroy, love and hate, feed himself and expend
his energy, cry and wear himself out as he pleases – it is of course necessary, in
order even slightly to overcome so many suppressed desires, to have an outlet and
a sublimating agent endowed with efficiency proportional to the task: an intense,
simple producer and transmitter of poetry in a mass quantity.
It is the cinematographic spectacle – the inventors of which predicted neither
its utility nor its success – which rather quickly and as if spontaneously revealed
itself capable of making a huge, quasi-global public forcefully participate in mov-
ing fictions, where it could consume the excess and wreckage of a prohibited
affectivity.
The active power of the cinematographic automaton can be explained first of
all in that the discourse of this machine is made principally through animated
images, which, by their visual and mobile character, resemble mental images en-
ough that they can imitate those images in their modes of physical structuring,
association, and transition. Naturally, the style proper to cinema has defined itself
in its use of magnification and isolation of objects in shifting, incommensurable
dimensions; in its indefinite or lightning or infinitely sluggish durations; in the
impressions of ubiquity it produces; in its symbolism of identity transpositions
and emotional transference; in its sequences made by linking up elements after
their actual order. All of this in the manner of this old and profound visual
thought that dreams and certain daydreams bring forth. Thus the film is found to
be particularly apt at both enriching and setting directly into motion the memory
and visual imagination of spectators, without having to pass through the opera-
tions of crystallization and dissolution of a verbal intermediary.
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And yet, all the elements of this visual thought, rooted in the subconscious, are
prodigiously rich in affective values, governed by and also governing them. The
film proceeds therefore especially by working with emotional evidence and, at
that very moment, receives the irresistible power of conviction from it. Because
visual thought is fundamentally instinctive, sentimental, and moving, it is well
suited to a poetic use and, in the majority of mentalities, indispensably so. There-
fore, more than any other means of expression, film seems constitutionally de-
signed to serve as a vehicle for poetry.
Moreover, cinematographic poetry is always administered in circumstances
that facilitate contagion. The cinema’s darkness, forced immobilization, and ex-
clusion of all other shocks to the sensibilities except that which derive from the
film put the spectator in a state of rupture from exterior contingencies and sus-
pension from superficial activities, which is the condition of all reverie. Usually,
the creator, the reader, the spectator, or the person listening to poetry have to
isolate themselves with effort from their company and forget their routine; and
often they are unable to reach that state easily, since a strong facility for suppres-
sion is rather rare. However, cinema’s spectator, for whom nearly every distrac-
tion is eliminated and whose attention is directed toward a sole center – the
screen – finds that hypnosis and poetry are generated at the same time.
And it is not irrelevant that this hypnosis is collective. First of all, because the
communion of a little crowd feeling the same way provides a sense of its own
reality and legitimacy and creates, among individuals, an amplifying current of
sympathy. Further, because the use of poetry assumes a social role that can be
understood as at least a partial rehabilitation, for a recognition of the right to an
existence at least ideal in these tendencies that the self perceives as most its own,
as the most original and all the more precious as they are unhappy: sentenced to
relegation, devoid of real gratification.
Plato, who exiled poets from his Republic, would a fortiori have forbidden cine-
ma as a high-performance poetry machine. But wouldn’t the constraint that de-
prives the most private passions of imaginary satisfaction be more dangerous for
the public order, incompatible as those passions are with state norms expressed
under check by the superego? Wouldn’t such a constraint make the consciences
of citizens guilty, anguished by their ignorance of and contempt for themselves in
spite of themselves, neurotic through their private disaccord and, in the end,
cause them to rise up against the oppression of an overbearing patriotism?
At the cinema, as elsewhere, there can be no productivity without modifying
the quality. Since the poetic function of cinema is useful to the masses, film must
treat affective themes of sufficient generality to respond to the needs for sublima-
tion in the greatest number of spectators. According to this rule, the choice of a
scenario can be among only a few highly banal types with little variation in their
dramatic evolution. Originality happens only to be wanted or acceptable in a sec-
ondary position, to disguise the obligatory monotony in the content. Books and
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theater allow the adoption of much more particularized, diverse subjects, as they
seek to satisfy a more limited public. But on screen, every exceptional psychology
(for example, the genius or the simple-minded) and all heroes not personifying a
very widespread ideal (for example, the simple peasant or the paragon of virtue)
are usually doomed to failure. The rule for commercial success, while much mal-
igned, is in fact a poetic law, which is to say a psychoanalytic law: for with its
millions of souls, the public can truly subscribe to a dramatic fiction only insofar
as this fiction responds to agencies sufficiently and commonly present in all of
those souls.
This need to adapt cinematographic poetry to the most common agencies pro-
hibits film authors from expressing things profoundly and meticulously in their
works; in becoming too particular, the works would prove unprofitable. Hence
the impossibility for the spectators to calm their frustrated appetites with deli-
cacy, while precisely discovering themselves through perfect alternative satisfac-
tions. It needs to be confessed: the sincerity that carries the film and which drives
it is most often heavy and narrow. These one hundred percent magnificent lovers’
kisses, this machine-gunning of bloody and bloodthirsty gangsters, these shifting
fortunes – passions, wretchedness, and glory happening to deified typists, to me-
chanics transformed into billionaires, to athletes revived ten times over; all the
most popular themes on the screen are only meager sustenance for tricking that
great hunger of a sedentary and civilized people, patiently laborious, tormented
by old desires – always vibrant, always thwarted and dismissed – for violent ac-
tion, for resplendent tragedy, for personal triumph, for impossible love. This is an
emergency treatment or drastic remedy for prohibitions: uninterrupted inhibition
and hypnosis, as they say, administered in one hour and a half doses. And, leav-
ing their weekly treatment [séance de cure], spectators remain dazed, exhausted, for
believing so hard they actually battled, suffered, loved, and vanquished, relieved
as when piercing an abscess, as when fever drops after frenzy.
Thus, that which cinematographic poetry must neglect in the finesse of its ef-
fects it compensates for in its general efficacy; that which cine-analysis cannot
achieve in particulars, it exchanges for the intensity of liberating action. To a
dramaturgy destined for the crowd, an analysis – not of the greatest diversity but
with the strongest similarities among individual tendencies – necessarily corre-
sponds. And an epoch given to general planisme – with its typifying of mentalities,
methodical organization of repression, and by consequence popularization and
standardization of psychical maladies exacts even more imperiously the popular-
ization and standardization of the poetic antidote as well, to adjust its effect to
that of censorship. As limited as the degree of individual characterization reached
by cine-analysis should thus be, it represents on the level of greatest common
factors the average term of the greatest collective efficiency; and this term surely
finds itself defined by the best commercial success.
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This does not at all mean that this psychological limit and the commercial
index of it are immutable, that it is not necessary to work to move them in the
direction of an increasingly more advanced judgment, an increasingly profound
curative effect. The most profitable film bookings in the course of the year only
provide the measure of neurosis and collective introspection over the course of
that year. That this measure constantly changes can well be seen through the
effect of puerility that one feels in seeing old film strips, or the disappointment in
production companies that imagined they would find the same enormous profits
by revisiting two or three times the same subject that succeeded for them the first
time.
In certain aspects, the evolution of cinematographic dramaturgy and poetry
develops slowly and continuously; in other cases, it proceeds through sudden
transformations. But the technical and artistic transformations of profitable films
follow a path already paved by either knowingly or unwittingly daring trials; it is a
path already marked out by an avant-garde whose works alarm the public in pro-
portion to how much they announce the unknown that will become knowable,
the captive that will escape from the unconscious. There are commercial failures
that are the pilots for commercial success because they lead by accident or experi-
mentally show the way to develop the cine-analysis from one optimal profit to
another.
The cinematographic spectacle first blossomed on the poetic level of serial no-
vels, light-hearted songs, postcards. And the immediate decline, nearly the extinc-
tion, of the popular melodrama at the theater confirms the superior force and
efficacy with which cinema finds itself capable of stimulating, satisfying, divert-
ing, and using the need for emotion in the greater public. Cinema limited theatri-
cal dramaturgy, even as it encouraged it to propose a finer, more profound, more
idiosyncratic psychology on the stage.
But today, the need for cine-analysis and the perfecting of it, developing con-
jointly, allow films to represent less common, less schematic conflicts. The clien-
tele of the cinema is extended, by way of also interesting minds more prone to
introspection – minds to which, until now, dramatic and literary dialogue merely
provided explication and a decline in bothersome mental appeals.
And, to keep its proper utility, on which its existence depends, the theater must
tend more and more to represent of life that which the cinema finds itself eco-
nomically impeded in providing, even though technically it is perfectly capable:
the subliming idealization. Theater must cultivate a psychology, either of the ex-
ceptional case or of an altogether normal, individual case, but analyzed with a
meticulousness that in the end reveals the anomaly in every genuine particular. It
is in this orientation toward the singular that the current proliferation of little
theaters responds, planned for small audiences with singular tastes; these venues
present plays that are simply clinical studies of singular neuroses.
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This is in no way a negative criticism. The social role and the individual effect
of the cinematic as well as theatrical spectacles are like an amusing psychoanaly-
tic lesson and cure where spectators have to become familiar with the natural
mechanism of certain troubles of the soul so they will not be frightened by them
or suffer from them as from shameful, monstrous diseases; where the mind must
be purged of an excess of sentimentality – available for actual use or impossible to
use in actuality – through the consummation of this superabundance in a fantasy
of passion. Cinema and theater, each in its own way, lead people to know them-
selves better, in a setting free from mental anxiety. Though they are often called
rivals, theater and cinema can nonetheless be considered as equals in their com-
mon zeal to invite the spectator to return to the self. If the power, breadth and
increasing depth of cinema’s action constrains the theater to evolve ever more
towards singularity and finesse, there is – in these two processes, one of which
pushes the other – a general movement of the mind by which a man endlessly
tends to approach, seize, and disarm the dreadful sphinx, which he ceaselessly
becomes for himself.
* * *
Dramaturgy in Space
Translated by Audrey Brunetaux
[Jean Epstein, “Dramaturgie dans l’espace,” Esprit de cinéma (Genève: Éditions Je-
heber, 1955), pp. 120-124.]
Recently, a producer observed that the bigger, the more complicated, the more
beautiful, the more expensive the decors on the set are, the less often we show
them on screen. It is true that long shots have become rare, maybe even rarer
than close-ups. The editing condenses the action in close-shots that only unveil
what is necessary for our understanding of the characters and objects and what
helps our comprehension of the film. Far from being just a temporary trend, this
economy shows a tendency characteristic of cinematographic dramaturgy.
Silent film had already showed this tendency, applying it even more, multiply-
ing extreme close-ups through which facial expressions could replace words and
subtitles. Then, the emergence of feature-length sound films marked a decline in
this approach at first due to the difficulty and the danger of moving the imperfect
soundproof cabins closer to the microphone, cabins where the camera remained
locked for a while. However, as the leopard cannot change its spots, soon enough
the movement of an approaching camera resumed, without constantly necessitat-
ing the use of close-ups, a technique that had taken over as a result of the easy use
of dialogue. Finally, after its failure with the first great expansion of color and
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depth in cinema, the evolution of close-ups, maybe, will soon repeat itself when
the audience grows weary of vast shots in polychromatic stereoscopy that will
cease to surprise.
On the one hand, it is evident that a film moves us even more when the images
are closer to us; on the other hand, the ability to bring and move the spectacle
closer to the audience, in space as well as in time, so as to situate the action at the
best possible distance and in the best possible duration to obtain the dramatic
effect, is an essential quality of the cinematographic instrument. As a result, a
cinematographic dramaturgy is one of proximity and more specifically of variable
proximity, in opposition to the theater, which can represent an event only at a
fixed distance, at a constant pace. Thus, we can say that theater only admits a
planar dramaturgy while cinema allows a spatial dramaturgy.
This spatial diversity in the on-screen spectacle significantly determines its psy-
chological nature. A camera lens and a microphone that can approach a face to
the point where it captures the smallest movement, the slightest murmur, can and
thus must describe tragedies of a great intimacy and of a detailed human truth.
For instance, a text by Giraudoux that sounds prestigious when performed by
characters standing on stage and heard from a three to five-meter distance – a
distance for which the text was written – becomes extravagant when it is recited
in a close-up and listened to within a one-meter proximity. This does not mean
that cinematographic dramaturgy pretends to exclude all artifice, but it requires a
certain capacity for falsehood that is more internalized and natural than externa-
lized and decorative. On screen, as lies are subject to the spectators-listeners’
scrutiny due to their proximity, they are themselves forced to become true. There
is something of an appetite for documentary in this psychological realism that
governs the whole aesthetic of the filmed drama – an aesthetic that represents an
immense and endless subject whose logical preface must specify the way, charac-
teristic of cinema, to situate a dramatic action in the spatial frame.
In general, the current technique of the mise-en-scène only gives us a discontinu-
ous, fragmentary, and disparate view of a place and décor – closer here, farther
there; in terms of perspective, sometimes normal, sometimes plunging, some-
times even tilting the verticals. We can see the surroundings of an action not with
our unique pair of eyes, but with a multitude of eyes equipped with all sorts of
magnifying lenses and eye glasses that we would sometimes hold at knee-level or
at the tip of our fingers, sometimes way above or beside our head. This view
would definitely be more intricate than that of the compound eyes found in in-
sects.
However, we are used to mentally re-working the data obtained through our
normal vision range, to correcting what we call our innumerable optical illusions
so as to build a notion of a sound, straight, homogeneous space where we can
orient ourselves following Euclidean rules. Transposing this habit, as different
fields materialize on the screen, we automatically and unconsciously try to re-
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group them into a coherent whole within our classical space, thus solving the
puzzle that the filmmaker brought to us out of a legitimate concern for concentrat-
ing our attention on a “detoured” drama.”
But if, on the one hand, it is necessary for the film director to sacrifice the
description of the décor for the narrative of the action, on the other hand it is
necessary for the audience to locate quite precisely the elements of this action,
risking otherwise neither to understand it, nor to be convinced or moved by it.
Our brain works in such a way that the localization of an object is essential to our
acceptance of its existence. A thing found nowhere would, of course, not exist,
and an event is all the more real, believable, and able to capture our interest if we
know where it takes place. Thus, we notice a contradiction between the move-
ment of increasing approximation in cinematographic dramaturgy and the gener-
al law of credulity in dramatic fiction.
When the fragmentation of shots makes the localization of an event very diffi-
cult, the search for it becomes conscious and disturbing, disrupts the attention,
and tends to break the spell of even the most touching film. For instance, in some
film from the past season, a few scenes represented limit cases where the diffi-
culty of precisely situating the dramatic effect reached a degree capable of coun-
tering the emotion born from the narrative. When a German patrol visited the
place where an escaped prisoner was hiding, the spectator’s anguish remained
uncertain while he was unable to find his way through the décor – a small space
yet filmed in discontinuous bits – which wasn’t enough for understanding where
the hideout was. Throughout the scenes in a prison cell, one felt equally disturbed
due to the lack of localization because the décor, though easy to imagine, was
never made explicit through the images. Finally, during a long shot in which
people condemned to death were rescued thanks to the Royal Air Force bomb-
ings, the discomfort came back like slight dizziness due to a loss of spatial orien-
tation, because it wasn’t easy for the spectator to piece together all the partial
shots of the prison and its whereabouts according to a logic of space following
the logic of the dramatic order of events.
But these remarks are not only and necessarily critiques. Among many other
lessons, the one surpassing all others is that cinema offers a notion of space
more flexible and more diverse than that of the old Euclidean space. Most of the
time, films make their philosophical propaganda in such a discreet, patient, and
disguised way that the public assimilates it without ever noticing it. Only some-
times a few innovators go against this caution, more or less overdose, and pro-
voke a reaction that forces us to ask questions and to face the fact that we are little
by little modifying our way of thinking. In a very large sense, what makes a film
shocking is often what makes it worthwhile. The scandal and doubt arising from
an image can remind us that cinema leads us to the difficult loosening of our
brain’s imperious demand to anchor every single reality in a simple space that is
rigorously equal everywhere.
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In this space, as we knew it before the filmmaker and as we have insisted on
representing it since the Renaissance, horizontals form lines of convergence,
whereas verticals remain parallel. This is not really a Euclidean space anymore
but a hybrid space, half curved and half straight, horizontally curved and vertically
straight, where indeed the absurd dream of parallelism hides. In space such as it
appears on screen, vertical lines converge as much as horizontal lines, as one
would know by looking at a full shot of a cathedral. The cinematographic space
thus appears like a fully curved space where any strict parallelism is impossible.
On the one hand, we see our usually semi-straight space as a homogeneous con-
tinuum. On the other hand, we see the elliptical space represented on screen as
discontinuous and heterogeneous. Each different shot constitutes a cell of space
that has its own system of references and its own standard for size. From one cell
to the other, faces are neither superimposable nor similar. Each shot has its own
geometry that works only in this very context. Similarly, Euclidean geometry, also
relative, works only in the context of a direct and short-range visual experience.
We could spend more time on these remarks from which ensues, first, the
following conclusion: cinema shows the general relativity of notions of space.
Space has no absolute reality whatsoever; it is only a more or less precise, more
or less facile point of reference, depending as much on the conditions in which
vision operates, either through the eye or through a camera lens, as on the skills
and habits of the brain that uses it. Searching for the superiority or inferiority of
authenticity between classic Euclidean space and elliptical cinematographic space
does not make any more sense than wondering whether or not, on a piece of
paper, a grid in millimeters is more or less correct than a grid in centimeters.
The important thing to know is that all conceivable structures of space are ima-
ginary.
* * *
Dramaturgy in Time
Translated by Audrey Brunetaux
[Jean Epstein, “Dramaturgie dans le temps,” Esprit de cinéma (Genève: Éditions
Jeheber, 1955), pp. 125-129.]
We automatically tend to consider space and time as two distinct categories, as
our teachers (even the most eminent ones) have taught us. Our mental represen-
tation of a cubic meter is thus perfectly separated from our notion of a second
because it seems to us that we could indefinitely keep in mind the image, for
example, of a meter’s worth of wood. However, in the cinematographic represen-
tation, montage necessarily assigns a certain duration of two or three seconds, in
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other words a temporal dimension, to this image. Film cannot represent spatial
dimensions devoid of temporality. Our mind dissects phenomena according to
the Kantian analysis of space and time. The world that we see on screen shows
us volumes-durations in a perpetual synthesis of space and time. Cinema presents
to us space-time as something obvious.
Somehow, we ended up connecting all the various times of our different ex-
periences – psychological, physiological, historical, cosmic, etc. – to solar and
astronomical time, which appear constant. Before the invention of the cinemato-
graphic time-lapse, slow motion, and reverse motion, we were unable to conceive
what the face of our universe becomes through the modification of its temporal
rhythm. But as it plays out, cinema creates these seemingly unimaginable worlds
where time speeds are twenty times slower or fifty thousand times faster than
those of our clocks. In a documentary about dance or the life of crystalline or
botanical species, the screen shows us a partial world endowed with its own par-
ticular time that is not only different from ours but also variable with respect to
itself: evenly or variably accelerated or slowed down. Between the events of one of
these worlds and the events of our reality, we realize that looking for any simulta-
neity is illusory. In this way, through a visual experience and through obvious
facts, the film introduces us to the comprehension of an extremely general rela-
tivity.
Here, this relativity presents itself not in the form of a difficult mathematical
expression but of an often embellishing, always interesting and instructive meta-
morphosis of all forms of movement. The rider, the horse, the dancer receive an
admirable amount of grace from slow motion. Through fast motion, minerals
become alive, plants start to move, clouds explode and blossom in the sky like
fireworks. These are the effects we get when enriching the image with a sort of
temporal dimension, effects both deeply aesthetic and of an important philoso-
phical meaning.
This discovery of temporal perspective corresponds with the comparison that is
suddenly possible to make between several speeds in the sequence of an event,
which the cinema creates and sets against the standard of human time in the
same way an architect puts a figurine in the model of a monument to evaluate its
proportions. Because we only know things through their differences. In a mono-
chromatic world where everything is red, there would not be any color, any red.
In a system maintained at a constant temperature, there would not be any detect-
able and measurable temperature. In a world with a unique speed, time would
disappear. If we have a notion of time, yet a confused one, it is because, on the
one hand, the elements of our world move at different speeds and, on the other
hand, the relationship between these speeds and the main movements of light
and earth remains constant. But cinema succeeds in altering this constant which
seemed to be an intangible operator of the creation; cinema divides and multi-
plies a rhythm that was thought to be unique and inoperable; below and beyond
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the only value that we viewed in absolute terms, cinema shows a time scale tech-
nically limited by photographic and mechanical conditions, yet already large en-
ough to add new possibilities of existence, maybe in the most original and the
most exclusively cinematographic ways, to the film’s aesthetic and dramaturgy.
By its ability to move through space, the cinematographic spectacle already
contrasts, in a way, with the theatrical spectacle, which is forced always to situate
the action at the same distance from the audience. By its power to describe events
in various temporal rhythms, cinema is ready to surpass theater in another way.
One will probably object that for a long time, since the mystery plays performed in
the Middle Ages, the notion of time in drama has differed from historical time;
that classical tragedies already condensed twenty-four hours of real time in three
or four hours of spectacular time; that today a man’s life can be summed up in
three acts of forty minutes each. However, this is not actually an acceleration but
a discontinuity, of interruptions in time. These chosen portions of time that each
act represents always go on at a roughly steady pace. The implied, purely fictitious
acceleration happens only during intermission. Regarding slow motion, drama
can only give a sense of it in a very boring way. On stage, we can never see what
beings and things become within a faster or slower time than our own. The thea-
trical dramaturgy that can only use a spatial distance functions with only one time
speed. Only cinema can quite freely make use of a multiplicity of perspectives
with four dimensions in space and time.
Is cinema taking advantage of this talent? That is another question. Through
the most common life experience and through the use of a hundred graphic
means of expression we have been accustomed to understanding the most diverse
and the boldest representations according to the three spatial dimensions. Also, a
great mobility in the camera now represents an inherent characteristic of the tech-
nique. However, due to its mono-rhythm, time has remained both a blurry and a
rigid notion whose transformations are foreign to us. Here, cinema that imitates
theater and other domains as well has made particular use of implicit time-lapses,
through a subtitle or an answer informing the audience about the twenty years
that surreptitiously elapsed between two sequences. Filmmakers have rarely
made the effort to designate a temporal gap with a shot in which a landscape in
bloom would be covered with snow little by little, in which a garden would, in a
few seconds, come back to life after its winter death.
Already in 1910, cameramen probably knew to turn faster to better show and to
slow down the exploit of a stuntman on screen, or to hold back on the crank to
intensify a chase and show the comic in it. With very few exceptions, this is how,
so far, the dramatic use of time variations has been limited, even though its amaz-
ing aesthetic and psychological value has been demonstrated by quite a few doc-
umentaries. In The Great Dictator, Chaplin used slow motion, time-lapse, and even
reverse motion to add a graceful and eerie touch to the scene of the globe dance
at the end of which he climbs, with an unreal agility, if not the walls, at least the
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window drapes. In this scene, the technique used to insist on the character’s
madness obviously has a dramatic implication. The only criticism we can make
about it is that this technique was used sporadically, clearly breaking with the
rhythm of the entire film. If one were to pick one instance of a continuous use of
dramatic slow motion, The Fall of the House of Usher – and I apologize for this – is
the only one that comes to mind. This film best captures its tragic and mysterious
atmosphere through the systematic use of a subtle slow motion and through the
ratio of 1.5:1 or 2:1 that not only allows for a precise reading of gestures and
expressions, like through a magnifying glass, but also automatically dramatizes,
prolongs, and holds them in suspense as if waiting for something to happen. The
actor can usually perform anything: he comes in, sits down, opens a book, flips
through the pages; only the camera gives him a profound gravity, burdens him
with an inexplicable secret and makes him a fragment of tragedy through the
simple reduction of the temporal ratio of this performance.
One will object that with shots of dialogues, actors cannot move away from the
normal rhythm. Indeed! When handling a Moviola, everybody could see that
subtle slow motion dramatizes the voice even more powerfully than it does the
image. One can use this effect, if not with a direct recording, at least through the
re-recordings.
Besides, our reluctance to use the power of cinema to create something beauti-
ful, strange, and dramatic through the variation of the temporal rhythm is not at
all triggered by insurmountable technical difficulties. The real reason for this dis-
interest is a lack of experience, a laziness, an inadequacy of our mind that is a lot
less flexible than the cinematographic instrument in conceiving modalities of
time different from those we are used to and constrained to live in. In this case,
the powers of a machine surpass those of any organism and appear superhuman.
This instance is far from being unique in light of, among others, eye glasses,
microscopes, sensors, gauges, electron exhibitors that offer us figures of space
that we were obviously unable to imagine with our vision as it is. But since Gali-
leo, scientists have been trying to relax, diversify, and enrich our idea of space by
bringing into use an infinite number of visual schemas for five centuries. But
cinema, at just fifty years old, is the first system that attempts to make us see
time differences not transposed into values of space but represented in values of
time itself. This is without any doubt the most important aspect in the originality
of this mechanism for animated images. But more years will be needed before we
get accustomed to use it more commonly, so that our brain can learn how to use
time as easily as space. Humankind will owe to cinema this acquisition that will
transform our cultural knowlegde.
* * *
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Visual Fabric
Translated by Franck Le Gac
[Jean Epstein, “Tissu visuel,” Esprit de cinéma (Genève: Éditions Jeheber, 1955), pp.
130-136.]
Any novel, any poem, any work of art in fact, and any film is fundamentally just
organized dreaming. Still, film remains – hence its power – the most similar to
the original dream, whose mostly visual form it retains. Vision by vision, the
shooting script describes, according to the directing technique, a guided reverie
during which the author, in some way, mentally projects to himself the film to
come – a reverie as precise, a description as meticulous as the sketch in geometry
that we also call projective, out of which the engineer foresees the machine to be
built.
Like any reverie, the filmed reverie follows a logical course, a perfunctory one
in fact, which evokes the order of spoken and written language – that is, the gen-
eral rational schema of the mind. To depict and group together events based on
their order of coexistence or succession, the shooting script is divided into punc-
tuated sequences, each of which corresponds to a chapter, or a paragraph, or a
stanza. In turn, sequences are subdivided into shots which have the richness of
sentences or clauses, for each bears the expressive value of twenty, fifty, or a
hundred words, taken in their complex and particular sense that results from
their combination in the group. The spectator grasps this complex signification
of the image immediately – without having the need or the time to dissociate and
then readjust its elements – and much more through intuition and emotion than
logical analysis and deduction.
If it so often happens that a very simple audience perfectly understands every
shot of a film while being incapable of following the thread of the narrative, it is
precisely because almost no reasoning is needed to read an image taken in isola-
tion, whereas some, even just a little, is necessary to be aware of the connections
existing between different views. This is especially the case when these connec-
tions belong to a higher logic than that of mere apposition, as happens every time
they assume, from one shot to the next, a relation – direct or indirect – of cause,
of purpose, of circumstance, whereas in cinema no conjunctions-guides exist that
could indicate with precision the relation at stake. Admittedly, there are means of
conjunction for the screen – dissolves and wipes in a thousand forms – yet each
of them may be subject to almost all imaginable significations of coordination
and subordination, to choose among which only the context can settle. Indeed,
how could these links even have become specialized since, just as an image accu-
mulates the value of masses of words, an adverbial shot generally conveys a multi-
ple meaning: of time and place, addition and exclusion, consequence and man-
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ner, etc. The wealth of terms in visual language is the result both of the extraor-
dinary concrete precision of this mode of expression and the difficulty it meets in
abstracting general signs capable of ordering themselves without polyvalence,
without vagueness, unequivocally, following a somewhat subtle logic.
It is therefore important, first of all, to rigorously limit the image (as it always
tends to say everything and too much at the same time, both that which is useful
and that which is useless) so that it shows only what is necessary and sufficient in
eliciting the wished-for emotion and so that it allows understanding of the dra-
matic development. Second, the same strict economy (which will become clarity)
is needed between the shots in order to establish syntactical connections as uni-
vocal as possible. It is thus through a measure, not of impossible abstraction but
of filtration of the meaning of each image (stripping it of its superfluity), and also
through a rule for organizing things according to rudimentary logic, that one can
fight against the great congenital flaw of visual language: its confusion due to an
excess of data and to overdetermination, leading to a multiplicity of dubious and
uncertain interpretations, as in dreams.
Truth be told, up to this point the organization of shooting scripts has only had
to conform to a kind of prelogic or superlogic, much more simple and general
than grammatical logic; to a set of universal algorithms more related to logistics,
to Leibniz’s “combinatorial art,” which checks the reasonable legitimacy of any
succession of ideas against an elementary calculation.
The rule according to which the image should only present dramatically or
poetically significant elements brings with it a first spatial determination of the
shots (distance and angle of the views). Aesthetics alone, photogénie, can only in
exceptional cases justify the presentation of a character or an object in unusual
perspectives or dimensions. Even more in cinema than in literature, the style that
may be called ‘normal’ is an impersonal, objective style showing the world in its
most frequent appearance, at eye level, within the limits of sharpness bounded in
a healthy range: an average vision in which any extraordinary glimpses shed their
differences, and which least fatigues the mind by sparing it the deciphering of old
resemblances hidden under strange distortions. Few spectators accept being
forced out of this idleness to see an image which most will simply deem bizarre
if they do not sense at least a vague, practical usefulness in it.
As it happens, however, this usefulness can and must appear, and even become
a necessity, when for instance the lens gives a cut-out of the phalanx of a finger
leaving an incriminating print in an extreme close-up, or, at ground level, the
arrival of a locomotive wheel on a rail whose bolts have been removed. The ten-
dency to show only what must be shown, and to show it in the best possible way,
constitutes an indisputable justification, and makes possible – even draws images
towards – the greatest variety. An additional license, no less determined though
more dispensable, may be granted in the case of a concern for accuracy – in itself
a subjective notion – when a world is figured on the screen, not as it is seen by an
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anonymous, neutral optical system, by a standard eye, but as it appears to the
look defined in personal terms, either that of the author or that of one protagonist
or another. In the eyes of a moving traveler, landscapes are mobile; in those of a
drunkard, houses lean; in those of the loser, the victor becomes a gigantic Her-
cules.
All these justifications for the differentiation of images are themselves justified
by the fear that an arbitrary action, not by the prince, but by the director, may
suddenly become a reminder of the existence and the activity of the camera, inter-
posed between spectators and reality, and that it may disrupt the decisive magical
operation of the make believe,7 of being deluded into believing. Yet the impersonal
style, through its monotony and the fixity of its anchorage point, may just as well
betray the lie about the instruments used. To the judgment of a public accus-
tomed to a more flexible technique, a long sequence of ordinary images or the
intrusion of an impersonal shot in a dialogue alternately seen from the points of
view of the two participants will signal the presence of a cameraman as strongly
as could the most daring interpretation.
Subject on the surface and in its broad articulations to a certain logical formal-
ism, the living substance of the film still appears as a dreamlike and poetic fabric
whose intimate cohesion is not really of a reasonable nature. A hybrid being,
cinema is a game for grown-ups analogous, in its core principle, to children’s
games: it transfigures aspects of reality and uses them, poeticized and drama-
tized, to stimulate and wear out a superfluous sentimental dynamism. Literature
and theater are equally useful games but, because they play out more in the logi-
cal domain of speech, they can set reverie in motion less directly – a reverie that is
the natural outlet for unspent passions. Film, by contrast, when it proceeds
through images, sounds, and musical noises rather than dialogues, speaks al-
most immediately, thanks to its own illogicality, to the illogicality of affective life
– to arouse and absorb its activity.
This illogicality of cinema surfaces in analogical connections, which must dou-
ble logical relations between sequences as much as possible. A shooting script
always seeks to match the final image of a sequence and the initial image of the
following one (or, if not images, then sounds, or another image and sound). It
does so through any kind of resemblance or opposition in image or sound,
through contiguity from the memory, through symbolization, through any chance
association of feelings. Indeed, in the rigidity of a purely logical transition, the
reverie of the spectator (put by the film in a state close to hypnosis) may be de-
railed and broken if the bend is not protected by a guardrail suited to dreaming,
by a dream-guard.
Thus there exists a paralogical continuity, a visual or visual-sound image,
which demands to be followed, and not only in the passage between two se-
quences, but also within each of them. Such unity – the only one, to tell the truth,
a film cannot dispense with – is both a matter of meaning and feeling. In order
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for the spell within which the spectator lives another existence to persist, unbro-
ken, the look should be allowed to move from one image to another smoothly,
without even being aware of the cut. It is a question of harmony between the
dimensions, angles, directions, and speeds of juxtaposed movements. And any
shared form – a memory of the shot in the reverse shot, even just the smoke of a
cigarette – acts as a bridge on which the eye glides from one shot to another
without feeling disoriented. When it turns out to be impossible, the hyphen is
given to the ear in the form of overlapping sounds. Here as in dreaming, a hiatus
in the fabric of representations constitutes a prodrome, the threat of waking.
The other aspect of this indispensable illogical continuity, connecting all the
shots in a series to one another, is that it is sentimental. This emotional connec-
tion dominates all others and, if need be, can replace them. So well does it con-
stitute the cement par excellence of any dramatic assembly of views that it makes
a sequence of shots appear perfectly ordered and homogeneous, even when they
would be a non sequitur had they not exactly communicated the same quality of
emotion to spectators and maintained it in them. Accordingly, images (sparrows
pecking at crumbs on the ledge of a window, an embroidery frame, hands spread-
ing jam on a slice of bread, a dusty piano with the fall board closed, etc.; or
women gossiping at the washing place, a door being double-locked, children
catching and tormenting a cat, a mailwoman examining a letter with a suspicious
look, an empty pew at church, etc.) cease to seem disparate, as their sentimental
concordance is grasped (a deceased woman being missed or the hostility of a
village towards one of its inhabitants). There again, the film is built according to
the architectural principle of the dream, whose representations have value and
come together less because of their literal than their figurative sense, as the latter
finds itself attached to a given affective climate.
This sentimental idealization of the image is not a general abstraction but a
symbolization peculiar to each case, each scenario. This symbolization makes it
possible to push the photographic interpretation of common aspects of reality
much farther than the logical rule alone would allow, defining the shot as the
necessary and sufficient figure, formed by a given eye in a given physical position
and operating state. However, a distortion of appearances may also be done away
with altogether. Even photographed in the most banal way, an object may receive
from the context an entirely singular meaning: slice of bread and jam = grand-
mother. Any allegorization will in general be accepted all the more readily when it
appears more as a spontaneous, unexpected product of the existence of some
preceding images. And it would be quite difficult to use without falseness or ridi-
cule older, all-purpose emblems (heart for love, anchor for hope, skull for death,
etc.) incompatible with the realism of the cinematographic image.
The wide-ranging analogy that surfaces between the arrangements of a film’s
shooting script and the organization of a dream or a reverie may expose the lan-
guage of the screen to accusations of extreme deception and lying. Rather, this
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analogy shows the scope of cinematographic realism, which is extroverted and
introverted at once and which, better than any other, can provide convincing de-
scriptions of both worlds, exterior and interior. For there also exists a psychic
reality, more surely even than a physical one. It is out of faithfulness to mental
realism – perhaps the more real of the two – that film so widely dares to transpose
the significations of forms, to substitute people for things and vice versa, to use
the part for the whole, making the whole less than its fraction, to make the object
palpable and active, to represent any fragment of the universe in a deeply melo-
dramatic light.
Certainly, spectators – who for so long have been trained to make the illogical-
ity of their most intimate life subservient, and even to stifle it, to the benefit of the
logic needed for their exterior relations – sometimes find themselves surprised as
they feel the screen taking them back to their oldest, most natural, and most
powerful ways of being moved and of thinking. As engaging, as easy as the path
opened by cinema might be, through which the mind currently experiences the
probably salutary need to extricate itself from an excess of rational habits, the
director should still be careful in striking a balance between archaic elements
and romantic renovation. Still, this renewal of the soul, reoriented for a time to-
wards its primitive functions, certainly constitutes the essential goal of cinemato-
graphic art, and a shooting script shows an understanding of this end insofar as it
straightforwardly uses the linking and interpretation of images according to what
is called the logic of sensibility.
* * *
Pure Cinema and Sound Film
Translated by Franck Le Gac
[Jean Epstein, “Le cinéma pur et le film sonore,” Esprit de cinéma (Genève: Éditions
Jeheber, 1955), pp. 137-141.]
People often believe that pure cinema is now just something for cinematheques, a
relic of the silent era. And yet, in fact, there never did and never will exist any but
one problem (more or less apparent, more or less close to its solution) in cinema:
the expression of any thing, from the outer world as well as from the inner world,
in cinematographic terms, that is, in terms of movement. Which is exactly the
object of pure cinema.
In the silent era, cinema could only represent the visual aspect of movement.
The stake was then to express everything, the objective and the subjective, as
much as possible through the image alone. Subtitles thus became the main en-
emy that had to be excluded from films because they were not a view, strictly
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speaking, and because they introduced words, the elements of another mode of
expression, of another language, set to the much lower speed of another system
of thought than thought through visual representations. In a few seconds of pres-
ence on the screen, a moving image shows as though simultaneously a hundred
qualities of a thing and the action of this thing, as well as the cause, the goal, the
result, the circumstances of this action. To describe this almost instantaneous
spectacle, speech – which has to make analytical choices between substantives,
verbs, adjectives, and has to assemble them logically into subjects, direct, indir-
ect, defining objects, or adverbial phrases; into main, coordinated, parenthetical,
relative clauses – uses at least a few minutes, that is, at least sixty times as much
time. Even then, this verbal description always proves to be marred by mistakes
and gaps, inaccuracies and aloofness. An image, even with few events, kindles a
much richer and quicker mental life than a cluster of words might fuel in the
same amount of time. Hence this impression of slowness, which surprised us in
the first sound films around 1928.
Verbal thought is slow because it consists of a complicated symbolic system
formed of abstract elements, which have to be matched to the data of perceptible
reality through an analysis, grouped according to grammatical logic, and on that
basis deciphered by the listener or the reader. Not only do these logical opera-
tions of abstraction, analysis, and construction take time to be performed, they
also interpose, between a spectacle and the emotion this spectacle may arouse, a
network of transmission that runs through reason, where criticism may find a
place to exert itself and act as a resistance decreasing the intensity of the stream.
Everyone knows that the sight of an accident on the street may be deeply moving,
even when the account in the newspaper would not have caused the bat of an
eyelid. The image corresponds, therefore, to a type of thought both faster and
more moving than the thought corresponding to words.
The affinity between image and feeling is an affinity of rhythm. These few sec-
onds during which an image remains on the screen, which are not enough for the
reasonable language of words to capture, are more than enough for the spectator
to be moved by it, to gain a complete and effective sentimental knowledge of it.
Indeed, in the domain of feelings, variations take place at a much faster pace than
how quickly the transformations of reasoned thought are formed. And a specta-
tor’s emotionalism finds itself capable of immediately using dramatic hints pro-
vided by the film as it unfolds, before these may be intercepted by the brake-filter
of reason. Hence the prodigious power of conviction issuing from the screen.
These are, very basically, the justifications for pure cinema within the category
of silent cinema. And certainly, if like cinema one could design a visual language
for universal individual use, if everyone carried in their pockets, instead of a pen,
a small device that could record and project immediately all the images of
thought, humankind would have at its disposal a means of mutual understanding
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so miraculously precise and fast, subtle and comprehensive, that next to it speech
and writing would appear as barbaric relics.
However, the image suddenly found itself capable of making itself heard as
well. The sound of film was at first used mostly musically, which only improved
on the established usage of accompanying every projection with an orchestra or a
piano player. In fact, the music of the image, like the image itself, is addressed
almost exclusively at the feeling of the listener-spectator, and the union of these
two agents of expression, which are minimally rational, constitutes a balanced,
synchronous couple in action. This balance and this synchronism found them-
selves destroyed when film became “100% talkie” in the enthusiasm the cinema
felt when suddenly cured of its silence. This resulted in a strange and ill-assorted
vehicle of thought, one of whose wheels – speech – spun some sixty times slower
than the other, image. These two rhythms evidently had to harmonize with each
other as much as possible eventually, with one subordinated more or less to the
other. The heavy spiritual legacy of classical rationalism, the old influence of spo-
ken and written culture, the ease and the benefits which the imitation of the novel
and the theater brought to directors prevailed over the little-apparent practical
usefulness, the inexperience and lack of organization of the young visual lan-
guage, suspect of being suitable only for very subtle poetry, akin to dreaming,
this enemy number one of our extroverted civilization. Allowing for exceptions,
the image was reduced to the role of mouthpiece, connective tissue, responsible
only for ensuring the connection between words.
After 1930, pure cinema thus seemed bound to disappear completely. Words
came aplenty to spare the illustrators of film any effort of invention. As to this
profound and fleeting unspeakable quality, which the image had sometimes suc-
ceeded in capturing, it was crushed by the slow, heavy, and rigid system of
speech, which sent it back into limbo, a state it was well used to. Within its views,
as in the rhythm according to which these views related to one another, film had
lost some of its fundamental originality, its primordial quality, its ability to create
or follow a very swift movement of thought.
Certainly, speech could not be excluded from film, nor should it be. But some-
one had to curb this laziness in which one no longer sought to express oneself
faster and more finely than through words and beyond them; in which one sub-
scribed to the pretension of saying everything and being the only one able to do
so. For some years now cinema has heeded the call for this reform, producing
fewer films that are perpetual, falsely brilliant dialogues in order to also put out
works in which speech is gradually reduced to the place it occupies in real life.
Unquestionably important, this place is still limited, very limited even: that of
moderate subtitling in an old silent film.
With a few directors, a trend towards a return to the outright supremacy of the
image may even be observed. However, one can no longer support this image
being silent or continuously accompanied by the flow of music: the artifice and
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deception of these are shocking. Films with very little dialogue thus rely more on
atmospheres based on noises to fill their silences. Still clumsily or tentatively
used, this resource deserves to be fully exploited, as it belongs in the essentially
cinematographic domain, like the image. Just as a view, a noise is addressed at
the imagination with a speed and directness that neither require nor allow setting
critical reason into motion. If critical reason comes into play, it is only after the
fact, and generally too late. Having already resonated in memory and aroused an
emotion, it is also based on an already formed representation. Images and noises
act synchronously and reach their mental representation simultaneously, whereas
speech – when it is not treated only as intonation, which in practice happens
more often than is thought – is still going through the mechanism of logical
deciphering; without the play of this mechanism, it cannot represent anything
nor move anyone.
In its great role as the discoverer of mobility, the cinematographic instrument
is as capable of revealing sound movements as visual movements. If we tend to
show more interest in the latter, it is because, on the one hand, the cinemato-
graph is still better equipped to describe them in detail at this point; and on the
other hand, because sight generally prevails over all other human senses. Yet the
domain of pure cinema embraces both the image and the soundtrack, which
share the same stumbling block: the word, written or uttered, because it is in
itself a form of thought which, if not completely solidified, is very viscous, at the
very least.
* * *
Seeing and Hearing Thought
Translated by Franck Le Gac
[Jean Epstein, “Voir et entendre penser,” Esprit de cinéma (Genève: Éditions Jehe-
ber, 1955), pp. 142-145.]
For some twenty years, production has been dominated by a misunderstanding
whereby a film is held to be a means, not to express thought, but to reproduce
speech. This mistake derives from another one, still to this day spread by college
regents, many of whom claim that there is no thought without words. A share of
our thoughts does indeed result in interior monologues which, in moments of
confusion, we may go as far as to mutter. Still, beneath this verbal thought, which
is all the more coherent logically because it is closer to consciousness and its oral
or graphic realization, there exists a more intimate, less conscious, but extremely
active mental life in which images play a very important part. The moving mem-
ories of a friend, of a day of vacation, of a loss are thus first and foremost a gallery
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of tableaux vivants, portraits and landscapes, preserved by memory, touched up by
oblivion. Only later do words attach to these visual elements, whose affective cli-
mate they very imperfectly manage to render. Thought in images is therefore not
reserved for dreaming, reverie, or delirium; it is part of the ordinary life of the
soul, during the day and at night, and in such a continuous manner that some
attention is required to glimpse it and identify it as the foundation of verbal
thought.
When silent cinema sought to refine the psychology of the characters in its
fictions, it initially used and abused subtitles, then resorted to close-ups, and at
last discovered that it was quite naturally capable of representing, through the
images of the screen, the images of this profound thought that underpins words.
The first flashbacks,8 or views representing memories, which appeared in a few
American films, were characterized by a soft focus which, like italics, indicated
that these shots did not belong to the same level of objectivity as the rest of the
sequence. At the opera, for instance, Faust sees Marguerite through tulle. In La
Roue, Gance, in an analogous search for an inner truth, showed shapes gradually
growing darker and then disappearing in the sight of a man becoming blind.
With some directors, harmonizing the shooting technique with the state of mind
of the character supposedly seeing what the audience saw became a permanent
concern. The process was quite legitimate, so legitimate in fact that it became
commonplace.
However, the real problem – that of putting on the screen, in their authentic
illogicality, associations of thought through visual images – had until then been
barely touched upon. Suddenly, under the influence of Surrealism, a few authors
were able to direct four or five films in which they claimed to describe a purely
mental spectacle and drama. Images no longer had to tell what a hero did or said,
but what he thought, everything he thought, respecting the apparent disorder of
this psychic activity. Yet the public, saturated with verbal logic, demanded that a
drama or a comedy be built in every detail as a succession of theorems, and that
the arrest of the assassin or the engagement of the fiancés be deducible point by
point, with the rigor of a demonstration. And the screenings of the last Surrealist
film were stopped by order of the police headquarters on the pretence of obscen-
ity. In truth, the issue was to put an end to an offence, not so much to morals as
to one of its old parents, dating back to Aristotle: formal logic. Shortly before the
triumph of the talkie, verbal rationalism thus already scored a first victory and,
already, put a ban on the romanticism of purely visual discourse.
For long our ancestors, who invented speaking, remained in awe at the power
of the word. It was enough to utter: “Do!” “Give!” “Carry!” for a thing to be done,
given, carried. It was magic, undoubtedly. When, around the age of thirty, film
found itself cured of its silence, it also started believing in the bewitchment of
words and their power to create everything: the setting and the fact and the soul
of characters. Why labor so much trying to express a few snatches of visual
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thought when verbal thought seemed to flow on its own in a dialogue or mono-
logue? And why linger over the uncertain search for a new optical language when
the old verbal languages presented the moving image with their safest commod-
ities?
However, we think aloud quite rarely if our thoughts are not meant to be com-
municated immediately to some interlocutor. And the typical monologue, that of
the actor taking the stage alone or speaking in an aside, constitutes a shocking
artifice, even in theatrical conventions. Cinematographic dramaturgy, which is
not without conventions but still follows psychological reality more closely, soon
reckoned that on the screen that kind of monologue amounted to a comic scan-
dal.
Other films featured a more interior form of monologue, closer to truth. Here,
it is a doctor doing a morning round in his neighborhood, with commonplace
remarks coming to mind: “For God’s sake, why did I tie a knot in my handkerch-
ief? Another kid who doesn’t find life to his taste… in a way, I would tend to agree
with him… Ah, there I am, I had to remember little Colter’s birthday… That’s it…
buy him a little present… a toy…” Yet these thoughts, if the attitude and the ex-
pression of the doctor match them, are not uttered through his mouth. The audi-
ence can hear them whispered by the very muted voice of the walker, by a voice
barely spoken and which may give the illusion of a voiced-only thought. Else-
where, the same technique makes the entreaties of a woman heard very softly;
her whole face is praying, but her lips are not moving. This is certainly an artifice,
but the artifice of a plausible effect. And should not the scene from Jean de la Lune,
in which the rumble of a train turns into a rhythm, be taken as the origin of this
system, as the ear deciphers a few words ceaselessly on the traveler’s mind?9
This old example from Jean de la Lune shows perhaps the best and the most
delicate use of the technique. For here the danger is of wanting to have verbal
thought say too much, and on the model of spoken discourse. Though more logi-
cal than thought in images, thought organized in words remains even further
removed from the order of oral language than oral language is removed from the
perfect geometrical rectitude of the written sentence. Always hedging about its
goals; directly linked to the fancy of its genitor, visual thought; time and again
modified, diverted, enriched by the interferences of its outsides and of coenaes-
thesia,10 the interior verb follows a much more convoluted, intermittent, disparate
progression than, for instance, the thoughts of the doctor mentioned previously
might lead one to believe. In Le Jour se lève, the monologue of the murderer com-
bines snippets related to his crime which he mechanically scans in an old news-
paper.11 Though uttered in a hushed voice, the monologue represents more truth-
fully a real arrangement of words coming to mind.
Between the logical order of the speech composed in order to be given or read
and the pre-logical relation of a spontaneous series of images, there is an infinity
of intermediate forms of thought that are more or less verbalized and rationalized
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at the same time that they are more or less visualized and sentimentalized.
Thought really exists only in this mixed state of images and words, reasoning
and emotion. In its chimerical ambition of translating everything through images,
silent film had the excuse of not being able to speak, of not being equipped with
the instrument necessary in the expression of the spirit of geometry. However,
sound film would be unforgivable if it lost its way claiming to convert all the life
of the soul into words – if it forgot that it has retained the means to express,
through the image, the spirit of subtlety.
* * *
The Counterpoint of Sound
Translated by Franck Le Gac
[Jean Epstein, “Le contrepoint du son,” Esprit de cinéma (Genève: Éditions Jeheber,
1955), pp. 146-149.]
In current shooting scripts, one may note that the right-hand column, used for
the notation of sound, often features a much more developed text than the left
side of the page, reserved for the description of the image. This may lead some to
believe that the arrangement of all the sound elements of a film is usually pre-
established with the greatest care and in the greatest detail.
In fact, however, of the three means to produce sound – noise, music, speech –
the last one almost single-handedly fills the provisions of the shooting script by
its importance. In this flow of dialogue, one rarely comes across even a scant
indication of the sound of a door being closed or a car starting, or a vague sug-
gestion of some musical accompaniment. And the asset value of speech, as it
appeared in cinema some twenty years ago and as it still rules today in many
films, undercuts all the other values of image and sound, forcing its own ap-
proach on them – an approach which even in the most skillfully disorderly texts
remains set by grammatical logic. It may thus have looked as though the talkie
had made any construction by the shooting script irrelevant, other than giving
places for cuts based on lines of dialogue and sentences. If, nevertheless, it is
admitted that there should sometimes be alterations to the regularity of these
syntactic caesuras, these are oddities which, according to this system, should be
left to a later occurrence of chance, that of editing.
Still, this double use, synchronous and equivalent, of image and speech neces-
sarily produces an impression of dullness, boredom, emptiness in the minds of
the spectators-auditors who are neither so distracted nor so narrow-minded that
they need simultaneously to see what they hear and hear what they see in order to
understand it. For the eye and the ear not to result in a vicious pleonasm when
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they contribute to putting a datum together, the work assigned to every sense
should be quite different. In his memoirs, Casanova considers as an instance of
the most serious stupidity the fact of a lover saying “I love you” to the woman
loved. Yet this is a mistake nine films out of ten make in nine shots out of ten.
No more understandable would be a piano player continuously hitting exactly
the same notes with both hands, one or two octaves apart. The play of image and
sound, of sight and hearing, may and should also achieve a sort of two-part coun-
terpoint, in the harmony of more complex significations, which evidently consti-
tute the true art of a language involving two registers of expression. It is useless
for a man shown arriving to say “I’m coming.” But if, while hearing him say that
he is arriving, the same character is shown putting some effort into not coming,
or coming only with specific intentions – restricting or amplifying or changing
the meaning of the words “I’m coming” – then the audience is puzzled, busy
trying to understand, forced, as in real life, to combine and reconcile inconsistent
meanings into a worthy lesson. A certain degree of contradiction between image
and speech, of falsehood between the eye and the ear, thus seems necessary for a
shooting script to offer the opportunity for an intellectual exercise captivating en-
ough, and for an illusion of reality convincing and moving enough. The rule does
not only hold true for the public, in fact: all actors know that the sincerity of a
character, the pleonasm of synonymous words and gestures, make parts difficult,
flat, unrewarding, whereas the deception within a character whose action, face,
and voice find themselves perpetually diverging makes for “golden parts.”
On the screen, a door shown closing without the noise of this shutting seems
like negligence, an error. On the other hand, if the noise faithfully accompanies
the image, the effect, too simple and unnecessary, is found to look naive, silly
almost. An acceptable solution consists in providing the noise alone over another
image, for instance that of the dialogue continuing after the departure of one of
the participants. Like speech, noise thus must often be dissociated from the visual
aspect of the phenomenon it depends on, when it does not add any particular
signification to it. In the end, aesthetic judgments, though they are often believed
to be disinterested, are actually always founded on a criterion of usefulness.
This is also why this door noise, which stupidly doubles the image, can become
prodigiously interesting and eloquent if an inflection is given to it that adds to
dramatic tension. This dramatization of a sound may be simply obtained through
the conspicuous place where it is located in the action, or through an acoustic
interpretation, a distortion of the sound itself. Either technique amounts to en-
dowing the element of sound with a given character of unreality or, to put it
better, of a superior reality, mental and poetic: of surreality. A trend has thus
been manifested – for little time and still feebly, in fact – towards personalizing
the representation of sound, making it capable of subjective fidelity, of psycholo-
gical truth, in a manner analogous to that (much more successful) which forced
the image to be, if necessary, a thought image.
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Films are beginning to appear in which one discovers the murmur of an idea,
the whisper of memories-words, the strange reach of sentences one could swear
were heard but which were never uttered. The voice of cinema strives with diffi-
culty, slowly, to become a human voice altogether, whose resonance would not
only depend on the setting but on the soul as well, where cathedral-like echoes
and crypt-like muted sounds also exist. Much more important, and imminent: all
beings, all objects will be able to speak. It is the task of scriptwriters to goad
sound technicians into capturing the voice – which exists – of a passing cloud, a
rejoicing house, grass growing.
Certainly, this inarticulate language of things is, most of the time, but a neutral
or irritating noise for our ears, composite and confusing, sometimes barely per-
ceptible. Like our sight, our hearing enjoys only a limited power of separation.
The indentations of the soundtrack sing too many cries at once, entangled, com-
pressed, squeezed against one another in an undecipherable hubbub. The eye too
can read, but in a superficial and uncertain way, a quick expression on a distant
face, transformed by countless movements of muscles and the skin, commanded
by a complex emotion. This sum of small gestures needs to appear magnified
according to dimensions of space and time, in close-up and semi-slow motion,
for its complete signification and deep harmony to be discoverable. However, this
technique of analysis seemed so far exclusively reserved for visual elements, and
no shooting script provided for sound close-ups in slow motion.
In its spatial dimension alone, as a mere increase in volume set by the potentio-
meter, the close-up of sound had admittedly existed for ages. But if the plastic
form always plays an essential part in visual aspects, in auditory appearances it is
their kinetic state, their measures of movement and duration which mainly char-
acterize the phenomenon – whose other, geometric figure, wave-like or spindle-
like, generally remains hidden. This explains why musicians have been able to
spread the myth of a music existing outside of space, in time alone. This is also
why the most interesting enlargement of sound is not obtained by artificially get-
ting closer to the sound source, but by stretching, slowing down vibrations
spread over a longer duration. This is why, at last, the sound – which only in-
volves, by way of stillness, the invisible balance of stationary waves – has to lend
itself to cinematographic interpretation, which everywhere opts for mobility, bet-
ter even than the image, where the essential movement is much more caught up
in the rigidity of a largely solid world.
* * *
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The Close-up of Sound
Translated by Franck Le Gac
[Jean Epstein, “Le Gros plan du son,” Esprit de cinéma (Genève: Éditions Jeheber,
1955), pp. 150-160.]
The real fate of cinema is not to make us laugh or cry over the same old tales,
which an eminent theater critic once calculated as numbering at most three doz-
en types. The essential generosity of the cinematographic instrument – like that
of all noble instruments, which transform and multiply the power of our senses –
consists in enriching and renewing our conception of the universe, making its
ways of being accessible to us, that looking and listening cannot directly perceive.
And it is not only that the lens makes us familiar with faraway countries we will
never set foot on; that it turns us into witnesses, across time and through walls, of
events and lives we would otherwise know as only a date and a name; that it
introduces us into the very thought, the way of feeling and understanding of illus-
trious figures and admired heroes, whose presence and confidence seemed to us
like wishes that could never come true. It is also and above all that the screen
shows us things, magnified and detailed, in perspectives, relations, movements
unknown until then, which force our attention, contradict our patterns of
thought, and compel us to revise most of our judgments.
For instance, slow and accelerated motion in particular reveal to us a world
suddenly deprived of one of its most evident material qualities: solidity. It be-
comes a thoroughly fluid world, where the permanence of forms has vanished
into a space that no longer knows any symmetry and a time that has ceased to be
uniform. This being the case, all the great laws of reason, even the principles of
identity and non-contradiction, all of our physics and philosophy appear as local,
fortuitous arrangements, relating to a given state of movement – itself quite ran-
dom, and stabilized around us only in exceptional cases.
In the domain of sound, there has been very little attempt to seek out the in-
novative interpretations of which film recording is capable. The huge majority of
technicians do not concern themselves at all with what the instrument they han-
dle may reveal as uncommon, or never heard before, in the noises it is exposed to.
Or, when they do concern themselves with it, they react in horror, with the view
of removing like quitch grass any strange novelty, any mysterious disobedience
towards which the machine may have found itself pushed by its own nature.
How many directors, when they need a horse’s gallop, will ask themselves: let
us listen to how cinema translates this sound? And the same who go to this trou-
ble often exclaim afterwards: This is not it at all! Then they will fabricate or buy
ready-made a mock gallop, produced by knocking walnut shell halves or suction
pads on an ironing board. The general trend thus consists, not in probing the
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microphone on its personal talent for expressing the music of nature and increas-
ing this whole part of our knowledge that comes from hearing but, on the con-
trary, to force the mechanical ear and voice to rehash all the old timbres we al-
ready know by heart. These efforts in the wrong direction and their imperfect
achievements prove, at any rate, that sound cinema is in itself organized also for
something else than these parroting exercises; that besides this imitative vocabu-
lary imposed by sound-effects engineers, it involves spontaneous, new, wild ac-
cents which will sooner or later entail a transformation of the art of film.
Besides their dramatic and poetic usefulness, will the new sound forms, which
cinema would keenly put within range of our hearing, have the power to alter our
representation of the universe, down to our most deeply rooted intuitions – as
much as did the new visible aspects born on the screen? Probably not. The intelli-
gence of our species is more visual than auditory. In our individual and social life,
in the whole development of our civilization, sight has played the part of a con-
ductive sense whose data are the most numerous, the most precise, the most
memorable, the easiest to rethink. Even speech, as long as we have not read or
seen the words, does not appear to us as something we can get a firm grasp on,
and in fact, at least three-quarters of our vocabulary translates mostly retinal im-
pressions. Except in a small minority of particularly gifted individuals, hearing
only represents the second outer sense. From the moment an auditory impression
calls for a somewhat finer expression, even musicographers find themselves at a
loss for adequate words, go on borrowing epithets and metaphors from the lan-
guage of the eye, or even that of touch, of muscular sense, with the result that
writings of this kind present a typical confusion.
The thing is, the ordinary data we receive from hearing are themselves con-
fused, unstable, fleeting, and do not lend themselves to logical examination, defi-
nition, or ordered signification. While it is often ineffable, a mere noise may still
directly cause a psycho-physiological shock which puts the subject in a state of
instantaneous, intense, thoughtless emotion. Sight thus appears, not at all as a
sense necessarily and exclusively devoted to intelligence, but as the sense whose
information is also subject to the operations of reason, whereas hearing picks up
messages that for the most part trigger purely sentimental reflexes. Even in a
speech listened to, and as rational as the text might be, what the listeners show
themselves most sensitive to, what touches them most vividly and convinces them
the most swiftly, is not the intelligible meaning of words but the timbre of the
orator, the quality of the sound of the voice. The tone makes the tune, as the
proverb goes.
If, therefore, the extension by means of cinema of what is already known of the
realm of sound, the harvest of not-yet-heard noises do not seem on first examina-
tion to be set to provide great opportunities for ideological renewal, we may on
the other hand expect to find important resources there to renew the moving
power of films, to bring variety and development to the dramaturgy of the screen.
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And on reflection, we have to reckon that this enriched sensibility cannot but
eventually entail a certain general evolution of the mind as well.
Since the techniques of slow and accelerated motion best emphasize the ori-
ginality of the cinematographic vision by creating, through film, forms and move-
ments indiscernible to the naked eye, it was only natural to try and apply the same
processes to sound recording in the hope of also putting into play, at once and as
much as possible, the interpretive and revelatory power of the machine in the
domain of hearing. If accelerated and slow motion bring so much novelty into
visible appearances, it is precisely because they reproduce things in a system of
relations where, for the first time in the entire history of techniques of representa-
tion, the fourth dimension – time – plays the role of a variable, one not any less
important than that of the three dimensions of space, and where duration may be
figured with the same freedom of interpretation, magnification, or compression
as spatial distances. From this perspective, no longer does any form exist seperate
from movement; no longer are there any objects to speak of, only events. Similar-
ly, varying measurements of time – of the speed at which sound phenomena suc-
ceed one another – bring qualities to these phenomena that we would never know
about without the modification in the frequency of vibrations.
Whether one decided to begin with acceleration or deceleration, to which a
greater number of natural sounds lend themselves, the instrument had at any
rate to be modified in its most sacred principle: synchronism at constant inter-
vals. Even though the problem amounted in fact and very simply to ensuring that
during a re-recording the track already printed at normal speed and the track to
be printed could run at different speeds – one being the double, triple, or quad-
ruple of the other – from the outset the eminently traditionalist tribe of techni-
cians deemed the endeavor, if not impossible, at least adventurous, complicated,
and carrying enormous costs. However, engineer Léon Vareille carried it out per-
fectly by having a joiner calibrate a block of pulleys, at a total cost of seven hun-
dred francs. Rather than using the roundabout means of re-recording, which is
advantageous only economically, one might just as well make direct sound re-
cordings at variable speed, devoting a little resourcefulness, time, and expense to
transform a device and synchronize it with a low-speed camera.
If, before it was achieved, the slowing down of sound met with the skepticism
of some cameramen, afterwards it was strangely denied outright by a physicist
specializing in sensitometry. The scientist, who had just been listening to slo-
wed-down sounds for half an hour, declared right out of the blue that he would
not believe his ears; that a priori, before and against any experience, the slowing
down of sound already constituted an absurdity, excluded in advance from any
condition of possibility. The argumentation started from the cliché according to
which music in particular and sound in general consisted in phenomena of pure
duration. Surprising deductions followed from this, demonstrating that noises
were neither shrinkable nor extensible, as God had made them once and for all.
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Accordingly, the deceleration of sound could involve neither deceleration nor
sound, but perhaps something else, and what exactly no one really knew.
That music is a phenomenon of pure duration (and any noise, any speech act,
any organized series of sound waves are also kinds of music) is an axiom very
much in favor with musicians, at the same time that it is an obvious untruth. First
of all, because space and time are our two indispensable and inseparable means
of thinking whatever may be thought, and without whose cooperation there may
be no knowledge of anything. For instance, can we imagine as physically possible
a music to whose vibrations no elastic volume of medium would be available –
that is, no space to form and propagate?12 Frequency is not the only way to char-
acterize the shock of sound; there are also amplitude and wavelength, which are
spatial measures. Do a score, an orchestration not take into account different
sound planes, that is to say, various spatial distances, real or fictitious, at which
this or that type of timbre should be located? The interdependency of space and
time, their unity, their spiritual consubstantiality have become commonplaces to
such a degree that no one should have to argue for them any longer. Let us note,
however, that cinematographic deceleration provides yet another striking material
experience of it, since the increase in the temporal dimension of a wave necessari-
ly comes as the result of the proportional increase in the spatial inscription of the
phenomenon on film. A double or triple expansion in duration is absolutely
linked to a double or triple extension of the length of film. Here, time and space
are covariant factors.
It is by acting upon the factor of space – and more specifically on one of the
elements of this spatial factor, length – that cinema as an instrument causes a
corresponding modification in the temporal value of the wave. Thus whenever
duration doubles, the frequency of the vibration is obviously divided by two,
which is to say that the produced sound has gone an octave lower. By lengthening
film footage and time again, a new decrease in frequency is obtained, and with it
a new shift towards lower sounds. And so on. One of the effects of deceleration
thus lies in sounds becoming lower and, when this is pushed far enough, in their
getting lost in the inaudible domain of infrasonic vibrations. There, the vibrations
of air are so slowed down and spaced out that the ear will remain insensitive to a
movement that sounds to it like immobility, that is, like silence, just as in a visual
slow motion taken to the limit the eye stops perceiving the roughness of the sea,
for instance, which appears as a solid, frozen surface.
In any case, the transposition of natural noises in (at least) the four perfectly
audible lower octaves already makes it possible for a musician to compose a rich
and varied sound score for a film. Instead of having at his disposal just two or
three sea noises, for example, all roughly in the same tone, the composer will be
able to play on a keyboard of twelve or twenty-four or thirty-six or forty-eight
different tonalities (with transposition at fractions of an octave), whose combina-
tion at the premixing stage will also allow him to diversify the resource infinitely.
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It thus becomes possible to create chords and dissonances, melodies and sym-
phonies of noises, which are a new, specifically cinematographic music.
On the one hand, the eye and the ear are insensitive to a very slow movement;
they prove incapable of perceiving a difference between the two successive posi-
tions of a mobile being when, from one to the other, the spatial distance is very
small relative to the time used to cover it. On the other hand, sight and hearing
also turn out to be insensitive to a very fast movement; they are powerless when it
comes to distinguishing two positions of a mobile being separated by a minimal
time interval with relation to the path traveled. For example, the pendulum of a
metronome with a short period of swing will not appear moving back and forth
around the position of equilibrium. Instead, a hazy grayness occupying the whole
space of oscillation will appear. And from a busy street at rush hour, nothing will
be made out of human voices, the shuffle of the crowd, the exhaust of engines:
only a muted hum will be heard. Too many different tones succeed one another
too quickly for listeners to register them one by one and to recognize them; to
these listeners, they form an indivisible and undecipherable mixture.
If, however, through a slowed-down recording or re-recording, the frequency
at which these vibrations of the air follow one another is reduced, and if the
intervals of time between the nodes of wave trains are thereby increased, many of
these tones will cease to appear as overlapping one another, as superimposed in
our perception, and will become distinctly audible and knowable, just as, through
the slow motion of the image, some positions of the swing of the metronome will
be made clearly visible and definable. Deceleration therefore increases the natu-
rally limited power of separation available to the organs of vision and audition; it
makes the spreading of phenomena in duration possible; it constitutes a sort of
microscope of time.
A second effect of deceleration thus enables the ear to analyze auditory impres-
sions more finely. Yet this analytical effect finds itself modified by the first effect:
lower sounds. While deceleration may break up a complex sonority into its com-
ponent parts, it cannot do so without at the same time distorting them, transpos-
ing them into a lower tessitura in which they may not always be recognized as
what they represent or would represent to regular hearing. A general constraint
of the experiment is thus that it alters its object to some degree. This alteration –
whose usefulness will appear in other respects – may be remedied only by isolat-
ing the elements obtained and by bringing them back to their original cadence
through a speeded-up re-recording.
Yet for the poetic or dramatic film, the most interesting result of analysis
through deceleration is precisely the creation of sounds whose unusual character
may renew and reinforce a moving atmosphere. The great natural sounds – wind,
sea, thunderstorm, rock fall, blazing fire – precisely comprise tangled wave pack-
ets emitted by very different sources and complex compressions of infinitely par-
ticular and numerous tones. These symphonies, which happen too close together
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in time, represent the perfect material for a work of deceleration by cinema. If, in
an artificial noise (skis sliding on snow, for instance), deceleration can detect but
the means of the trick (a brush against a silky fabric), in a natural sound (the
wind, for example), an analysis reveals not only a gripping transposition of iden-
tifiable elements (the rustle of branches, the modulations of telegraphic wires and
posts, the song of an air stream in a chimney, shutters banging, etc.), but also
many other mysterious timbres which do not even have a name in language. In-
troduced in a world of unknown tones where the markers of the already heard are
rare, hearing leads to an experience of dizziness as well as anxiety, which parallel
the astonishment, originating in the look, of images of the world photographed
with infrared. These noises as well as these landscapes, until then unknown to
man, appear fraught with insecurity, charged with who knows what expectation,
what threat.
Such arbitrary dramatic expression – dramatic in itself – which all sounds as-
sume even when their origin remains recognizable, constitutes the third remark-
able effect of the deceleration of sound. Indeed, deceleration also performs such
dramatization on the image, where the simplest gestures gain added significance,
seem to be more thought through, loaded with intentions, hidden meanings, se-
crets. The dramatizing effect of the deceleration of sound also proceeds from a
surprise on the part of listeners, whose attention finds itself awakened and held
by something strange. Then and mainly, the lowering of tones triggers a psycho-
physiological reaction, according to which we interpret low sounds as messen-
gers of sadness or, at least, as news of importance, to such an extent that the
word that conveys the lowness of a musical note and the seriousness of an event
is the same (gravité).
Thus dramatized, noises become all the better able to constitute a moving
sound score, and they may also give a voice to parts played by inhuman or super-
human characters which film dramaturgy has more and more frequently partici-
pate in an action. The mere noise of a door being closed, recorded in real life,
may already, if suitably placed at the editing stage, assume more dramatic impor-
tance than the most clever line of dialogue. Yet this same noise, made lower,
extended, dramatized, interpreted by a more or less accented deceleration, will
produce a much more striking impression on the audience, one much more pre-
cisely geared towards the desired effect.
The transformation of instrumental music and dialogue through deceleration
is also of great interest, but their use is more sensitive. Musical instruments and
the human voice adjust their vibrations in the perfect proportion needed for un-
derstanding their harmonies, the excessive distortion of which would risk de-
stroying their charm and intelligibility. On speech, the dramatizing effect of de-
celeration is particularly clear, but when it is pushed a little, the space between
vibrations also translates as quaver. Slowed-down voices are also old voices,
370 jean epstein
mournful, agonizing, sorrowful; slowed-down cries reach phenomenal intensities
in the expression of suffering or dread.
Accelerated sound is no more difficult to obtain than decelerated sound, but its
application appears more limited. The effects of acceleration are analogous to
those of slowed motion, but in reverse: increase in the frequency of vibrations
and consequently higher tonalities, transposition of sounds in the higher octaves.
Pushed far enough, acceleration has in principle the consequence of making all
the tones vanish in an inaudibly high pitch, in the domain of ultrasounds. Instead
of a dramatization of noises, one notes their cheerfulness; they tend to produce
an impression of arbitrary comicality, to trigger a reflex of hilarity, which burl-
esque comedies may advantageously use.
Still, the most intriguing result of acceleration as well as deceleration is without
a doubt the creation of original tones. Deceleration produces these by lowering
and analyzing vibrations which are too high-pitched, too quick, too close to one
another, whereas acceleration obtains them through the elevation and compres-
sion of waves which are too slow or too spread out. If deceleration draws periodic
movements from the silence of the highest pitches to introduce them into audible
reality, acceleration also takes rhythms of air from mute infrasonic vibrations,
also turning them into sound entities. We need speeded-up motion to see that a
dune crawls, that a crystal reproduces, that a vegetal stem raises its tip in a spiral,
that everything moves. We need speeded-up sound to discover that every thing
has a living voice, to hear stones and trees speak their true language, the moun-
tain thunder its avalanche, rust eating into iron, ruins complaining of their decre-
pitude.
Let us note that these important analogies between the accelerations and decel-
erations of image and sound conceal a deep difference. With the image, neither
slow nor accelerated motion modifies the velocity of propagation and the fre-
quency of light waves; they come into play only to change the rhythm by which
fixed and complex sets of visible forms succeed one another – sets where the
organization of elementary optical phenomena remains constant. With sound,
slowing down and speeding up do not change the velocity of propagation of
waves either, but they do modify its frequency; they make each audible form vary,
directly treating the acoustic phenomenon itself as a variable. By contrast, visual
slow and accelerated motion exert their action through indirect means, lengthen-
ing or shortening only the intervals between images, between the clusters of
countless vibrations which for their part remain unaffected. What is changed is
the succession of these clusters; it is a (variable) frequency of (invariable) fre-
quencies. One thus understands what the learned sensitometer did not: that the
most extreme acceleration and deceleration, which make any noise disappear into
ultrasounds or infrasonic vibrations, may not cause an image to disappear in ul-
traviolet or infrared, since these processes are capable of distorting individual
sound waves, but not individual light waves. Slowed-down sound, which in effect
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slows down the frequency of the sonic vibration, deserves its name, though it
does not slow down the propagation of sound waves. The inaccuracy would be to
speak of slowed-down light rather than slowed-down images, since slowing
down has no bearing on light vibrations themselves.
* * *
The Delirium of a Machine
Translated by Christophe Wall-Romana
[Jean Epstein, “Le Délire d’une machine,” in Esprit de cinéma (Paris: Éditions Jehe-
ber, 1955), pp. 168-179.]
Remarkable is the coincidence in time between the first great flowering of cine-
ma, still silent, and the movement of ideas that was labeled the Surrealist Revolu-
tion. What representations could, better than animated images, assemble that
language emancipated from the logical rigor of grammatical construction – a lan-
guage nonetheless universally comprehensible, which Apollinaire had prided
himself on forging? What figures of the universe could teach more persuasively
than the figures on screen, the ubiquitous life, the perpetual fluidity, the funda-
mental incommensurability, the absolute singularity, the minute irrationality, the
“uninterrupted becoming of any object” which Breton endeavored to reveal from
beneath the rational stabilization and simplification of appearances?
However, the Surrealists were slow to recognize that the instrument of de-ra-
tionalization of which they dreamt was fully at the disposal of their practice; and,
when they finally noticed cinema, they used it against its grain in such a literary
and pictorial – in such an artistic – way that their attempts were instantly choked
by esotericism.
The fact is that on its own account and without anyone paying great notice, the
cinematographic machine was undertaking, in a wholly original way, to renovate
and reinvigorate the delirium of interpretation, freeing it from the syllogistic
yoke, so as to teach or remind people to use their poetic faculty.13 Since no philo-
sophy, no science, no discourse, no judgment, no understanding, no narrative, no
memory, no sensation exists that is not essentially paranoid; since interpretation
is the universal mode of knowledge; since paranoia typifies the function of the
mind and the senses, the true genius that cinema makes manifest is its own
authentic capacity for surrealization, in a system of unconscious and automatic
interpretation inherent to the apparatus itself.
Indeed, cinema provides the wholly automatic recording of a thought – as in-
human and as unconscious as can be supposed – through images whose pro-
foundly unusual, uncanny, and surrealist character begs to be recognized. Only
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the cinematographic machine by its very action is able to disclose and publish this
marvelousness [merveilleux-là].
[…]
What, indeed, are the wonders that cinema manufactures by itself out of ob-
jects that have long ceased to surprise us?
These wonders may be, first of all, microscopic aspects. Most likely, when we
talk to someone, we notice their eyes, but rarely do we devote to them a pro-
longed and acute attention, rarely do we feel moved, and more rarely yet do we
try to consider and understand them as such rather than as integrated within the
whole signification of the face. However, an eye that occupies the entire screen
suddenly reveals itself to be a monster: a wet and shiny beast with its own move-
ments like those of any animal; which, with its shadowy mouth, projects a force
unlike any other form of life; which unveils itself and hides itself, in between two
tremulous valves, planted with a long and graceful vegetation of curved darts
whose venom we cannot fathom. Or else, the retina – is it a captive planet, a star
of living crystal, streaked with blood and oiled with luminous secretions, holding
at the center of its brightness, set in the mosaic of the iris, a pole of dark fascina-
tion, a crater of never-extinguished night, so heavy with questions and answers,
and yet so thoroughly enclosed in its translucent but insuperable envelope? A soul
is in there which, from within, moves and lights up this lamp, haunts this well, a
few millimeters under the cornea, at a distance no one can measure or cross.
What an adventure is such an encounter with the eye of whomever, surrealized
by a close-up! The very mystery of body and soul, the very plot of thought and
matter, the very knot of the plurality and unity of the self, the very quid pro quo of
the real and the unreal, the very play of subjectivity and objectivity are sprawled on
the screen to be touched, palpated, traversed, searched, dissected by the gaze –
perfectly inextricable and insoluble. In lieu of strangeness, this is – close to the
naked eye – the true grand illusion, the true everlasting lure which, already, puz-
zles children who break their first watch whose tick-tock they had yearned to hold
in their hand.
Every close-up or scaling-down of any interest, every slightly exceptional shot
angle, every moving image recorded when the camera is in motion, insofar as it
brings us unusual – that is, strange – aspects of things and beings, forces us to
pause before such appearances and judge them; placing us again in front of the
perpetual mystery of the universe which we realize, in the end, has never been
elucidated, as we only became weary of it and forgot it, because of its very perpe-
tuity, because of what we see of it everyday.
The dilation, contraction, and inversion of the course of phenomena in the
vectorial dimension of time – of which only cinema allows a visual figuration in
temporal terms – provide aspects of the world that are more original and more
rare, more unusual and surrealized, and remind us more intensely of the forgot-
ten miracle of the universe, by revealing some of its forms until then unsuspected.
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And it is remarkable to notice to what extent the mind is sensitive to such a no-
velty. It would seem, for instance, rather trivial to see billiard balls roll and hit
each other in various directions. However, when the screen shows a billiard shot
filmed in reverse, even if the cue hitting the ball is not shown, most movie-view-
ers, even if they know next to nothing of this game, will note, through minute
details, a vicious uncanniness in the motion of the balls or experience a vague
discomfort, an intimidation, an anxiety, whose source they cannot locate.
Consciously perceived or not, discrete or overt, such an opportunity that re-
verse, slow, or accelerated motion images offer to human anxiety essentially
devolves from their irrationality. A film showing examples of mineral biology,
vegetal intelligence, mechanical nonsense, mixed states of matter, or logical prin-
ciples made relative presents the apparatus and order of reason as a system of
local and temporary conventions in which everything cannot always exactly fit. In
front of crystals whose wounds heal or replicate methodically, in front of plants
moving their limbs through conditioned reflexes, in front of persons whose awk-
wardly cerebral gestures fall back on instinctive grace, in front of the acceleration
of gravity that has now become the slowing down of lightness, in front of the
liquefaction of the universe into unidentifiable and incommensurable forms and
movements, today’s movie viewers are thrown back into the awful perplexity
which, twenty centuries ago, caused Pythagoricians to shiver in front of the incal-
culability of the square root of two.
All such irrational aspects have the effect, on the one hand, of shaking the
credence of reason which they eschew or belie, and, on the other hand, of awa-
kening a plentiful kinship of analogical concepts having the same uncanny char-
acter and more or less dormant within the unconscious. Thus, the experience of
the cinema fulfills the Surrealist wish to call upon the fecundity of intuitive
thought that may be called genius-like since it provides intelligence with fresh
data to be logically assimilated and since it points to the insufficiencies, excesses,
and errors of the deductive method, at the same time as it points to the qualifica-
tions and correctives that hold up to it.
However, the surrealism of cinematographic images may not result only from
their concrete character, in isolated shots or in those of the simplest documen-
taries as lightly dramatic as can be. Whether a form is utterly banal or quite odd,
it can either acquire a powerful strangeness or considerably increase its sur-
prising effect if the context gives it, in and of itself and indeed often in an unfore-
seen way, a special transcendental interpretation, a symbolic signification that is
broader or suggests a transfer of feelings.
Everyone knows how easily – too easily – a revolver, a stack of old letters, an
empty bottle, or a calendar acquire in a movie the status of symbols, even alle-
gories, and how they can act on the mind, having become surrealist objects, cata-
lysts of wide affective complexes, materializations of the mind partly unexpressed
and partly inexpressible. This ease conveys the natural tendency of the language
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of animated images to surrealize emotionally all appearances. This is because the
signs of this language are those of visual thought, always emoted and emoting,
always interwoven with subconscious correspondences; a thought in itself natu-
rally surrealist and surrealizing.
[…]
The raw and unusual surrealism that reverse, slow, and accelerated motions
produce is also reinforced by dramatic signification. And we note that such inter-
pretations added to images are almost always comical for reverse and accelerated
motion, and tragic for slow motion.
Seen in accelerated or reverse motion, gestures become unexpected for the
spectator, either because there is not enough time to anticipate them, or because
no correct anticipation is possible for illogical consequences. In either case, here
a gesture appears to be or is more or less absurd. Now, an absurdity initially
provokes laughter, the vulgar form of surprise.
To the contrary, the conclusion of a gesture in slow motion is long awaited by
the spectator who, meanwhile, reflects more than is usual on the motivations and
consequences of this gesture, bringing to it a vast field of dramatic hypotheses.
To obtain such an effect of psychological deepening of a protagonist’s move-
ments, a slight slow motion suffices, which is not perceivable in itself but only
through the small paranoia of interpretation that this slackness occasions.
An actor lifts up his head from the book he was reading and gazes towards the
lens, that is to say, towards an out-of-frame door through which someone is to
enter. In normal-speed footage, as soon as the man’s gaze leaves the book, the
spectator sees the next shot: the door opening with the second protagonist enter-
ing. There is no time for doubt or wondering; everything is plain, immediate,
logical, clear and ordinary. But in slow motion the lifting of the reader’s gaze lasts
a few seconds, during which the spectator does not know and wonders who will
enter, the same way that the reader on the screen wonders himself: friend or foe,
bearer of good or bad news, unimportant or unknown person? An expectation is
thereby created – an enigma, a mystery, a dramatic suspension.
Such dramatic surrealizing of acting through carefully measured slow motion
can and should be used as a regular device in filmmaking, especially in poetic or
fantasy films, but also in the many films that now rely on non-professional actors
who tend naturally to move too quickly and do not know how to slow down, how
to decompose their pantomime so as to render it more legible or, when they try,
do so awkwardly and compromise its veracity.
As in the case of images, there exists a surrealism of cinematographic sounds,
but it is only now being discovered and few dare use it. The calls of conscience,
the injunctions of duty, the obsessive criticisms of remorse, the refrains that hum
in memory, the secret din of dreams, the tumults of nightmares – the soundtrack
is timidly trying to let them be heard.
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Yet in this domain, too, early research in the heyday of sound cinema took the
wrong path and, until very recently, aimed almost exclusively at perfecting the
reproduction of falsified sounds, of the most servile imitations of the most banal
aural data, of a whole simulated and gaudy hurly-burly. No one bothered to learn
how the microphone, the film strip, the loudspeaker could in themselves, by vir-
tue of their nature and mode of working, interpret the true sound of true wind,
the true gallop of a horse. And, whenever by chance such an experiment was
made, viewers were naively upset that the aural result did not conform to the
most ordinary data of hearing. For, what sound engineers, directors, producers,
and viewers all wanted was to hear again for the thousandth time the wind and
the gallop exactly the way they had heard it a thousand times with their naked ear.
It did not matter to them that bellows and whistles, flutes and combs wrapped in
tissue paper, walnut shells and suction cups and spoons were needed to fabricate
a false wind or a false horse gallop, so long as they seemed truer than the real
thing to the standards of the human ear!
Such heresy – similar to wanting to stop telescopes from getting closer and
magnifying glasses from making bigger – has not yet ended: still, it is countered
by the direct tendency that seeks to know and publish the original sonic represen-
tation that the cinematographic apparatus might compose with natural sounds.
The aim, for the sound as for the image, is to leave maximum freedom for, and to
stimulate and highlight, the authentically singular surrealizing and automatic
function of cinema. The aim is to seek occasions for such recordings which ama-
teurs of flat sound hold in contempt, and to cultivate supposedly counterfeit
sounds as cinema’s personal creation: deformation through resonance or varia-
tion of distance, echoes, ambient interferences, distortions and atonalities, mur-
murs and shouts yet unheard of that resemble nothing else, and acoustic forms
whose existence can only be revealed by the microphone.
True, in general, in the current state of technics, the results of sound recording
remain far less reliable, less finely perceptible, than those of optical recording.
Moreover, the public remains indifferent and as if deaf to the language of noises
and only lends its trained and attentive ear to receive speech, to the point of being
dissatisfied with blends of music and voice, needing to hear distinctly every word
of a song. Finally, the audible universe, since it is less abundant in its diversity of
attributes than the visible universe, offers poorer prospects for development and a
poorer foothold for an interpretive apparatus.
In view of the relative poverty of the audible elements of representation, the
realization of sonic slow motion with its forceful surrealization analogous to vi-
sual slow motion, takes on a considerable importance. By lengthening the dura-
tion of a noise, the action of slow motion consists in increasing the discriminat-
ing powers of hearing. It thereby acquires a capacity for analyzing more finely a
sonic set, to distinguish in it otherwise imperceptible components, and to dis-
cover timbres until then truly unheard of. Hence, through micro-audition, cine-
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matographic interpretation invents sounds, true sounds, as true and surrealized
as images of a nebula, a protozoa, or a bone structure invented by telescopy,
microscopy, and radioscopy. Within a tempestuous sea, which to the human ear
is merely monotone and confused roaring, rerecording in slow motion reveals a
polyphony of such strange and new noises that most of them have no name yet in
any language. Every second, the sea creates another cry.
Moreover, this kind of sonic close-up lowers the tonality of sound by slowing
down its vibrating frequency. Lengthened to twice its original duration, every
sound lowers by an octave. The same noise can then be rerecorded at several
octaves or fractions of octaves lower, or else a more or less accelerated replay can
displace the sonority towards a higher pitch. Thus, out of real ambient sound,
sufficiently interpreted sonic elements can be constituted to compose a sequence
of consonances or dissonances, a score, a symphonic or cacophonic music of
noises truer than in nature.
The Futurists, poor cousins of the Surrealists, had been the first to guess that
the sound domain too could produce the marvelous and the unusual. They ven-
tured out a few experiments of noise music that proved inexpressive because they
relied on no instrument – not even a phonograph – capable of powerfully inter-
preting noises, defamiliarizing them to make them surprising and uncanny. Yet
cinema represents a means of surrealizing sound much more broadly and deeply
than can the phonograph or the radio which, itself, depends on recordings. Cine-
ma opens the way to the sonic materializations of the fantastic directly extracted
from reality.
Slowing, accelerating, or reversing sound is no longer technically utopian nor
even difficult. Even speech and music can be processed this way, either in mod-
eration or to the point of complete denaturalization. By lowering voices, slow
motion bestows on them the timbre of another personality that we cannot ascer-
tain to be entirely human, with a pained, anxious, and tragic intonation. This
dramatization of sound is also perceptible in the most common noises that ac-
quire an extremely moving signification. For example, the trivial creaking of a
door replayed in more or less pronounced slow motion becomes an inhuman
groan, the mysterious moaning of things, the singular warning of one knows not
what disorder, what suffering of matter. Acceleration, on the other hand, by shar-
pening sonorities infantilizes and feminizes them, interpreting them towards the
comical.
The surrealization of sounds through slow or accelerated motion hence moves
the auditor in the same manner as the analogous surrealization of images does
the spectator. To the psychological explanation of this phenomenon that we have
proposed must be added the fact that, through the generalization of our everyday
visual and aural experience, we accord to bass tones [sons graves] – as the figura-
tive meaning of the word “grave” indicates – a sentimental prejudice of force and
sadness as easily as we tend to overestimate slow gestures as laden with impor-
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tance and suffering. To perfect the expressivity of protagonists in a movie, slow
and accelerated sound, as with images, allow for innumerable effects: discrete
and barely perceptible; taken to the extreme of quavering, Punch-and-Judy exag-
geration; monstrous rumblings, or that of a trill; a torrent of words ejected as in a
spasm, melted in a single piercing cry.
Through such a power of spontaneous interpretation, such a faculty of automa-
tically creating unusual appearances, cinema acts like a paranoid robot coming to
the aid of weak, paranoid persons insufficiently able to note or compose strange
aspects that can trigger their genius of delirium. But the strong poets too, avid of
surreality, whose subconscious manifests its life at the slightest impulsion, will
find in the delirium of the machine the stimulant allowing them to dream more
intensely and diversely. Whether with minds so deeply and docilely rationalized
that they can no longer act on their own, or with minds so rebellious against the
dominant rationalization that they seek constantly and everywhere the means to
escape it – everyone needs the original poetry that cinema offers.
This brand new marvelousness [merveilleux], it is indeed the cinematographic
machine that produces it through its very working. Man only triggers it, at times
unaware of its poetic value which may or may not appear on the screen, at other
times as a result of a more or less empirical and random forecasting derived by
analogy from past surprises. A marvelousness that is automatic because produced
through a minimum of human critical intervention. A marvelousness that can be
said to be true, real, and objective because it is obtained mechanically out of these
sole and selfsame natural and concrete elements that constitute for us the acme of
the real, objective, and veridical world; also because this marvelousness is a sen-
sible datum a movie can reproduce a thousand times before a thousand wit-
nesses, always identical to itself.
In cinematographic poetry, the function that in other species of the poetic de-
volves more from the human subconscious, is in part pre-accomplished by a ma-
chine. It combines unexpected interpretations, delivers resemblances foreign to
and stronger than logical relations, and creates visual metaphors having the for-
cible status of objects and engines for daydreaming. The originality, diversity, and
the kind of freedom of these representations would not allow us to consider them
as other than the acts of a sort of soul, were we not so thoroughly subjected to the
egocentric prejudice according to which we cannot understand thoughts other
than consciously – and consciousness other than living in an organism – and
above all a human one. Yet, truly, do we actually know more about the conscious-
ness of a crystal, an orchid, an ant, a city, a labor union, or a nation than of a
machine or factory of the slightest complexity? Objectively, we are wont to sup-
pose a consciousness just as soon as we observe a sensibility that organizes selec-
tive choices. Practically, man now knows that he contains within himself a huge
part of unconscious psyche. Consciousness is a pure symptom, like a migraine,
which may appear when one thinks a lot, but without which we can think not-
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withstanding, and perhaps just as well. It would be absurd to speak of a camera’s
headache, but it is plain that this device experiences cold and heat because then it
does not work well.
As unforeseeable as its poetic effects may be and as irrational as its proposi-
tions may seem, the delirium of cinematographic images is, nonetheless, the end
result of a mechanical work and structure that have their own laws, that is to say,
their own reason. All the fantasy of the aspects created by the camera results from
the application of a system for disorganizing commensurability in both space and
time. A principle of anarchy, to be sure, but whose realization is logically an-
nounced, inscribed, developed, perfected, through the planning, construction,
conduct, and oversight of a mechanical being, rationally organized in itself. Is it
but a fortuitous oddity that an apparatus of such highly rational structure should
generate, as the product of its working, remarkably irrational products? That it
should make manifest a kind of thought that escapes and contradicts reason? It
would seem not. It would seem that, in all domains and all cases, in the inorganic
as in the organic realm, in matter as in the mind, and in matter as it appears to
the mind, the absolutely general rule of rational complication is to tend towards
the irrational, the indeterminate, the ungraspable aspects of personality and soul
– towards the illusion of freedom. Always, it is with its own plenty that reason
ends up strangling itself.
Notes
1. Claude Favre de Vaugelas was an important seventeenth century French grammarian.
Émile Littré was author of the massive Dictionnaire de la langue française, completed in
1873.
2. See Zeno’s paradox of motion of the arrow in flight:
If everything when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if that which is in locomotion is
always occupying such a space at any moment, the flying arrow is therefore motionless. (Aris-
totle, Physics)
As Epstein and others (e.g., Henri Bergson) have shown, this paradox has impor-
tant implications for theories of movement and duration. Epstein makes frequent
reference to Zeno as well as the Eleatics, with whom Zeno is associated, throughout
Ésprit de cinéma and his later works.
3. The Eleatics were a group of pre-Socratic philosophers who held the view that
although the senses cannot recognize the essential unity of being, such a unity exists:
only appearances change. Zeno, whose paradoxes Epstein mentions earlier in the text,
is part of this group.
4. A tachyon is a hypothetical particle that travels faster than the speed of light. German
physicist Arnold Sommerfeld first introduced the concept in 1926.
5. Planisme, often described as a proto-fascist program, developed first in Belgium and
exerted an influence in France during the inter-war years; it was a social democratic
economic ideology intended to contend with the depression-era economy. An auto-
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planisme suggests that, living in a regime characterized by the diffusion of ideologies,
the citizens monitor themselves and one another without feeling that their freedoms
have been curtailed.
6. Alexi Stakhanov was something like a poster child for socialist labor in Soviet Russia
in the 1930s: a highly proficient coal miner, he represented the ideal of worker pro-
ductivity and was held up as a model for the socialist economic system embraced in
the USSR at the time. It was reported that Stakhanov repeatedly mined in excess of the
expected daily quota, including at one point sixteen times that quota. Stakhanovism
more generally upholds such ideals of efficiency and hard work effected by laborers.
7. In English in the original French text.
8. The author uses the English term “backshot” in the French text.
9. Jean de la Lune: directed by Jean Choux in 1931, it received a good deal of press about its
sound sequences. See Philippe Soupault’s “Jean de la Lune or Cinema on the Wrong
Track,” Abel2, pp. 75-77.
10. Coenaesthesia is the sense of conscious existence.
11. Le Jour se lève: directed by Marcel Carné in 1939, often cited as a classic of French
“poetic realism.”
12. Epstein refers to volume being the space that serves as a medium for the sound to
propagate, so that if that volume were fixed and invariable, music would become un-
thinkable.
13. “Délire d’interprétation,” is a symptom of paranoia that artists such as Salvador Dalí
transformed into an artistic method. See Paul Sérieux and Joseph Capgras, Les Folies
raisonnantes: le délire d’interprétation (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1909).
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Late Articles
The Slow Motion of Sound
Translated by Franck Le Gac
[Jean Epstein, “Le Ralenti du son,” Livre d’or du cinéma francais (Paris: Agence d’in-
formation cinégraphique, 1948).]
In the fascination that comes down from a close-up and weighs on a thousand
faces tense with the same rapture, on a thousand souls magnetized by the same
emotion; in the wonderment that ties the look to the slow motion of a runner
soaring at every stride or to the accelerated motion of a sprout swelling up into
an oak tree; in images which the eye cannot form as large, as close, as lasting, or
as fleeting: there the essence of the cinematographic mystery, the secret of the
hypnotizing machine are revealed – a new knowledge, a new love, a new posses-
sion of the world through the eyes.
Until the very last few years and almost until the very last few months, the
soundtrack, assigned to the old forms of speech and music, would reveal nothing
to us of the acoustic world but what the ear had itself been used to hearing for as
long as one could remember. Drowned in this overabundant triteness, the fore-
runner – the hum of the wheels on the train that took Jean de la Lune away – did
not have any successors for a long time.1 These days, however, several foreign
films attest to research that moves us towards improvements in sound recording
– just as image recording improved over fifty years – in the direction of a genuine
psychological and dramatic high fidelity, of a deeper and more accurate realism
than that of an omnibus hearing, taken to be totally reliable. Already, it is no longer
about hearing just speech, but thought and dreams as well. Already, the micro-
phone has passed the threshold of the lips and slipped into the inner world of
man, on the lookout for the voices of consciousness, the old repeated melodies
of memory, the screams of nightmares and the words no one ever uttered. Al-
ready, echo chambers convey not just the space of a set, but distances in the soul.
In this refinement of sound cinema, it obviously seemed necessary to experi-
ment with what could be added by the process of deceleration, which keeps en-
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riching the visual reign with so many aspects not yet seen. I raised the issue from
a technical standpoint with a sound engineer, M. Léon Vareille, who became in-
terested in it and solved it simply and elegantly, as the mathematicians say.
Throughout Le Tempestaire, I was thus able to use wind and sea noises re-recorded
at variable speeds, up to four times as slow.
The effect of this slowed-down sound, of acoustic vibrations stretched in time,
is twofold. On the one hand, lowering the frequency of vibrations results in lower
tonalities, going down one octave each time sound is slowed down a unit. The
same noise may thus be recorded in several different tessituras. This allows,
through editing and mixing, the creation of a genuine, purely sonorous score.
Yves Baudrier, who composed this score with great intelligence, also had the ta-
lent to thread just an extremely simple instrumental melodic line through this
natural music, which allows the sound experience to keep its own importance
and does not skew the audience’s judgment of it.
The other effect of the slowing down of sound is an analytical effect with com-
plex sounds. Like the eye, the ear has only a very limited power of separation.
The eye has to resort to a closer position and to spatial magnification with a
telescope to realize that a fence, which seemed like a continuous surface, is in fact
made of posts fixed at intervals. The eye has to use deceleration, that is, a magni-
fication in time, to see that the jab of a boxer, which looked like a simple, recti-
linear movement, is in actuality a combination of multiple muscular movements,
with infinite variations. Likewise, the ear needs a magnifying glass for sound in
time – that is, slowed-down sound – to find out for instance that in a finer reality
the monotonous and confusing howling of a storm is made up of a host of very
different sounds never heard before: an apocalypse of screams, cooing, rumble,
cheeping, detonations, tones and accents, most of which do not even have a
name. One may just as well take a more modest example, the noise of a door
opening or closing. Slowed down, this humble, ordinary noise reveals its compli-
cated nature, its individual characters, its possibilities for dramatic, comic, poetic,
musical signification.
Certainly, most of the time, this inarticulate language of things is merely a
neutral or irritating noise to our ears, sometimes barely perceptible. The standard
grooves of the soundtrack declaim too many discourses in too little time – entan-
gling, compressing, squeezing them against one another in an undecipherable
hubbub. In detailing and separating noises, creating a sort of close-up of sound,
sonic deceleration may make it possible for all beings, all objects to speak. The
mistranslation of Latin scholars, who had Lucretius say that things cry, will thus
become an audible truth. We can already see, we will soon hear the grass grow.
* * *
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The Fluid World of the Screen
Translated by Sarah Keller
[Jean Epstein, “Le monde fluide de l’écran,” Les Temps modernes, no. 56 (June
1950). Reprinted in ESC2, pp. 145-158.]
When some filmmakers contrived to push or drag the camera on its wheels – to
raise it up or lower it, to tilt, carry, swing, or turn it around – most of these
experimenters thought only of seeking out a more artistic, amusing, and ornate
descriptive style; they did not dream that they had started to embark upon habitu-
ating themselves, of habituating the film and the public, on how best to nullify
movement, how to choose it and outline it, how to develop a new awareness of it.
In this, the fondness of cinema for mobile aspects of the universe quickly came to
transmute nearly all the stable forms into the unstable. The animated image – as
animated as the lens, objects, or light make it so – demonstrated throughout its
diversity, transition, and inconstancy.
In fact the camera accomplishes all of its movements, hidden or apparent, on
behalf of the human eye. This eye sometimes becomes like a multifaceted fixed
eye; sometimes like a multiplicity of eyes, each of which possesses a unique per-
spective; sometimes like a mobile snail eye, an eye mounted on an extendable and
retractable stem. It is an eye that can collect data, which happens not always at a
more or less fixed distance, a more or less important distance, but also at the
nearest point of visibility, almost in contact with the object, and able to maintain
this contact if the object moves. The variety and mobility thus granted to the spec-
tator’s perspective come to multiply the variety and mobility proper to cinemato-
graphic objects. The result is a world on screen where the spectator’s attention is
called for more frequently and more deeply in terms of a sense of diversity and
change than in the real world.
Howsoever mobile and mobilistic the lived and living world has become, cine-
matographic expression surpasses it with its own universe whose fleetingness it
must check, whose metamorphoses it must limit, and whose virulence it must
filter, so as not to go against the conventions by which a large part of the public
wants to continue to see, hear, imagine, understand. The most original percep-
tions in films can only be introduced progressively, and can only be accepted in
meager doses. Of these instants of surprise, spectators however also experience
the appeal, at least vaguely, like a brush with a danger that then becomes domes-
ticated, of making it through a vertigo that is soon mastered. But a number of
purely cinematographic expressions remain unused, not even tried – forbidden
because they are charged with scandalous surprises.
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Mobilization and Decentralization of Space
Here we have a table, which the lens – jumping, sliding, flying – approaches,
moves away from, magnifies, shrinks, spreads out, tilts, stoops, raises, broadens,
elongates, makes lighter, makes darker, reforms, and retransforms each time that
the object presents itself in the shot and through the flow of shots. Without tak-
ing into account here other evolutions that the specimen of a table could undergo
in recommending itself for a dramatic role, and without wanting to consider
more than the variety of accidental aspects that this piece of furniture accrues on
the screen, one already often comes to question whether it is a single table, to
doubt that one actually knows it, to feel unable to define it, and to wonder
whether it isn’t actually two or three different tables.
This uncertainty surprises us, since in our experience and usual conception of
space, most notable forms seem to be considered equal to themselves. In this
space, designed mainly for the use of solids, a single order can always moderate
all measures that a spectator brings back in the end to himself, considered the
unique center and consistent standard. Space thus employed permanently pre-
sents everywhere the same virtues; it is homogeneous and egocentric. Identity is
rigorously demonstrable and finds itself with credence to serve as the great prin-
ciple of all logical development.
In the universe taken up on screen, it is otherwise. The size and the position of
the spectator no longer absolutely rate as the benchmark of evaluation and bear-
ings, because this observer finds himself incapable of relating, directly and ex-
actly to this center and to this standard, the situation and dimension of objects
that cinematographic reproduction has taken for its models. Indeed, between the
human eye and the real object interposes the result of another visual act: preli-
minary vision through a device whose situation, in relation with the object, is not
sufficiently defined in a way to allow constituting a precise comparative system
through this intermediary. For that matter, each new position of the apparatus,
each shot, raises another ordination of space, always imperfectly determined, of-
ten complicated by an arbitrary evolution, due to the movement – poorly under-
stood itself! – of the lens during recording.
If one considers this cinematographic space, varied and variable, in the discon-
tinuous multiplicity of its fixed frames or in the continuity of one of its mobile
frames, one sees that the majority of forms do not remain equal to themselves,
neither in their transposition from one cell to another in discontinuity, nor in the
course of their passage from one moment to another in a constantly evolving
perspective. Exterior to objects and invisible, the movement of the observatory
apparatus is translated into the figures of objects, where it becomes visible as
proper mobility, animating each form and allowing it to change itself. These in-
constant figures, non-superimposable, are objects in the filmed world: secondary
objects to a second reality. But this is truly all the perceptible reality from the
spectator’s standpoint. Such objects indicate a non-homogenous, non-symmetri-
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cal space where common egocentrism, in its human proportion, finds itself dis-
rupted. Among these ghosts, as evasive in their reciprocal relationships as in their
individual structure (as though viscous), no identity can be entirely established.
Diversification of time
The mobility that we read in the world of the screen does not arise only from the
mobilization of spatial dimensions and directions, but also from a particular
variability in the temporal dimension. In the real world, we are able to modify the
speed and thereby the duration of only certain kinds of movement in a limited
zone of influence and in restrained proportions; and we feel ourselves incapable
of altering any part of the cadences of an immense majority of phenomena which
we perceive outside of and within ourselves. Among these cadences that appear to
us to be very stable, if not immutable, we have located several time scales of
which the ones most commodious in measuring the speed and duration of our
own actions are at a premium. In the secondary reality of the screen, the organi-
zation of speeds and durations is much more tractable; we can vary movement of
the near totality of phenomena produced, and this variation can be in certain
cases much more pronounced than the one we may chance to impose upon mod-
el phenomena. This proliferation of rhythms is not without confusion when it
comes to the comparisons of previously understood speeds and temporal rules
previously elaborated, but it also brings with it a host of previously unknown
appearances.
Thus in the telescopic and microscopic equipment that distinguish objects that
are very far away or spatially very tiny and that spark the blossoming of knowl-
edge, cinema adds the means of discerning, in the very slow or very rapid, that
which is temporally separate or too close together for our vision, by tightening it
or widening it for our sight. Thanks to acceleration (that is to say tightening), in a
year’s worth of changes, contracted into three minutes of projection, the observer
may form a collective view, grasp a consequence, a harmony, a rule that otherwise
would not be discovered. Thanks to slow motion (that is to say widening), where-
by sixty seconds of projection stretch out, break down and analyze one second of
real movement, the spectator can name and enumerate phenomenal content that
otherwise would not be manifested. This tachyonscopy and this bradyscopy,
which are just starting to be used methodically, allow an enormous enrichment
of visual experience, and the auditory experience would benefit from a similar
extension if one were to decide to use the acceleration and deceleration of sound
as well, as cinematographic technique easily allows it.2
But the popularization of such images and sounds runs into an obstacle in light
of public opinion. Indeed, if spectators who are more or less used to changes in
latitude, longitude, and altitude will permit, without balking too much, great spa-
tial flexibility in cinematic representations, then they show themselves to be much
more suspicious about the generous suppleness afforded by the film world to its
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durations, of which the natural world offers few examples. Only on the screen can
one observe a stone fall from the same height that in natural time would take a
second, consuming in this enlargement of temporal nature ten or a hundred sec-
onds. In the earthbound construction of space-time, such information seems
contradictory inwardly, contradictory outwardly: misleading, ridiculous, dreadful,
unbelievable. This confusion contrasts with the serene confidence we bring –
without seeing any injury to reality – to the image of a flea magnified spatially ten
or a hundred times.
However, everyone has experienced this confusion in front of images that mix
up the categories of stationary and mobile, constant and inconstant, sluggish and
lively, according to the three states of matter, the three rules of nature, the three
categories of animated beings. The dunes crawl away; minerals blossom and re-
produce; animals get caught in lime and become petrified; plants move and strain
toward the sun; water gets stuck; clouds break. In addition, film can change a real
movement by reversing it, thereby giving it an even more troubling and totally
abnormal aspect, to which even the least experienced audience is acutely sensi-
tive. It seems, for example, that there shouldn’t be much difference in which
direction billiard balls roll and collide. However, when the screen shows a stage
in the game filmed in reverse (even if the break isn’t shown), most spectators
(even if they were never really interested in the game) notice in the tiniest details
a repugnant strangeness in the movement of the balls, or vaguely perceive a ma-
laise, an intimidation, which they cannot explain.
Also the change of temporal perspective may be achieved (albeit in a more
perfunctory way) through simple editing effects, the principle being the same as
that of accelerated projection, but where the constriction of time, rather than
being evenly distributed across all passages from one image to another, is re-
served irregularly for certain joints between groups of images regularly filmed
and printed otherwise. One finds examples of this process in most films and
even in amateur cinema, which allows families to collect moving portraits of their
members, filmed at reunions, a place where they are also gladly projected. So it
appears to be that little Paul, playing with hoops, doesn’t have a lot in common
with baby Paul, who sucks on his bottle; and that Paul, on his first bike, is again
another boy, who would have been renamed Jack or Peter in order to distinguish
him from the others; that this Paul or Jack or Peter, as bachelor, soldier, fiancé,
have not truly been Paul, nor Jack, nor Peter; that they were also distinct individ-
uals, whom the so-called Paul (who now is welcoming the birth of his first
daughter) does not resemble any more than he resembles one or the other of his
second cousins. What characterizes the Paul appearing on the birth certificate?
Does he even exist in this constant changeability?
Doubtless, with the aid of memory, the human look can also constitute a series
of the transformations undergone by a person, but it cannot do so with such
meticulous accuracy, concrete evidence, and shocking continuity as film. Without
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a doubt, we know a thousand ways – commonplace, legal, scientific – by which,
year after year, a man self-identifies, but then all of a sudden this statement of the
obvious becomes a prodigious, barely comprehensible certainty: a barely altered
revelation of a meaning.
Through accelerated projection, slow-motion, reverse direction, through the
discontinuities and interpolations possible through editing, cinema delineates a
world where durations do not necessarily reproduce the durations of the real
world – neither in terms of natural size nor in connection with the constant trans-
formation of that size. In such a sequence of a film, characters’ movements occu-
py and define an ensemble of durations, with time roughly identifiable as the
same as that which the spectator recognizes himself to occupy and define in his
own movements. In another sequence, dancers move by consuming three or four
times more time than that which is needed normally to complete the same ges-
tures in real life. The prevailing time on screen is manifestly no more homoge-
neous than the space configured on screen. Time here is varied and variable, and,
when united with a varied and variable space, it reveals a continuity whose four
dimensions, in continual evolution, represent, in our usual system of reference, a
sort of caricature by liquefaction. Let us here introduce a standard indifferent to
size, and it will itself be reshaped from image to image, deprived of its form and
endowed with a hundred forms, incapable of retaining its own measure and pro-
viding exact comparisons.
Logic of the melting point
Of dense and extraordinary phenomena, one often hears: that’s like cinema! The
public associates the screen with a world of overabundant chance encounters and
almost unlimited possibilities, where a decapitated person can walk about while
single-handedly carrying his head (which continues to hurl invectives). Basic
paralogisms contribute to this big dramatic fantasy as well as to their own appear-
ance as a group. They result from the stubborn resistance of filmed objects to the
geometrical and mechanical rules viable in reality. In a space-time different from
that which fashions the general use of solids that are constricted in their move-
ments, a different logic is also constructed.
The most decisive of the symptoms that mark the resistance of the filmed
world to a purely rational construction is the difficulty the spectator experiences
in defining the permanent characteristics of an object or a person on screen. The
film shows so many particularities and changes among which the spectator must
so quickly find his bearings, that he has little choice but to content himself with
approximate matches, of summarily hazarded recognitions. The careful applica-
tion of the principle of identity is a scholarly privilege, and the person who parti-
cipates mentally in a filmed action can afford it even less than someone busy with
his daily occupations. Logically, cinematographic space-time seems first of all like
a field with a very virtual and conjectural frame for identity, where identification
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depends squarely on analogies, through a sequence of temporary hypotheses al-
ways subject to re-doing, like the creation of an always-relative truth menaced by
incompletion and that involves a degree of incertitude greater than that of obser-
vations in the real world.
By the associative paths of logic itself, this play in the application of the princi-
ple of identity spreads to corollary principles and deductions. When neither Pe-
ter’s nor Paul’s height can be measured – each of them being arbitrarily shown in
close or long shot, emphasized or not by the mise-en-scène – one hesitates to deter-
mine which of the two is taller. Symptomatic in this regard are the questions that
numerous fans pose to editors at magazines about the nature and build of famous
actors. These, on screen, appear in a haze of incommensurability, in which all
comparisons lose their edge and founder. Contradiction or non-contradiction of
a vague identity can only be vague itself, and the effect of an excluded third term
can no longer take place, or takes place only within an approximate probability.
Again logically, the slackening of the principle of non-contradiction is passed
on to its derivative: the rule of non-ubiquity and non-simultaneity. The three-step
test of what’s possible can no longer function except in a loose manner. Thus, the
spectators allow – under the same, existing scheme of a visible and audible reality
– for actions that immediately answer one another, even as they occur from all
ends of the earth; for events that come together, having abolished years and cen-
turies; for characters that cross space and time more quickly than light (a young
man opens the door to exit his student room in Paris and, crossing the threshold,
an acclaimed old man enters a conference room in Edinburgh). These liberties
with respect to the logical convention that regulates the occurrence, the duration,
and the circulation of directly seen and heard phenomena constitute another con-
vention that gives phenomena on screen a dispersed and amassed presence, an
advanced and delayed existence, a leaping and stumbling course. And this exten-
sion of the possible fills consciousness in a more confused manner, but more
densely as well.
In a field of concurrent events, notably overstretched and cluttered, successions
find a place to occur with an ambiguity that can compromise their rational valid-
ity. A spectator enters the cinema at the moment when on screen there are images
of an automobile, then a train at a dead run chugging along quickly in the same
direction; then again the auto, then the train, etc., in one of these chase effects
that, dealt with in speedy and rough simultaneous succession, used to be the dra-
matic climax of many films. But the chase after whom, by whom? The spectator
who hasn’t seen the beginning of the sequence can attribute its outcome either to
images of the locomotive, or of the automobile, etc., with the unaccountable vir-
tue that attaches to seniority when it comes to explaining or even inventing the
younger images. For some seconds or minutes, the automobile drivers in the film
are sometimes the chased, sometimes the chasers; as characters they are some-
times logically ambivalent or contradictory, sometimes null and void, waiting to
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assume a sufficient motive for being and acting, depending on whether or not
precedence is granted or denied to them in the end.
In one direction of an edited sequence, we see a man training in a stadium,
then the same man, stretched out on a chaise lounge in a clinic, and we under-
stand that the practice of sport has caused burnout or an accident. Reversing the
order of the images, we figure: the illness is the cause for taking up a regenerative
sport. In these two cases, we allow that the facts follow on the screen in the
direction of a progressive discovery of the future, which is also the resulting direc-
tion for the majority of real circumstances. Elsewhere, the film proposes to show
us actions in a reverse order: that of an exploration of the past, starting from the
most recent actions and going back to the most ancient facts. Thus, one sees a
man at the penal colony, then tried, then arrested after his crime, then jealous of
his rival, then in love with the sought-after woman, etc. More or less, the mind of
the spectator is thereby shared between two awarenesses of time going in oppo-
site directions: the time lived and the time seen and heard in the film. And, if only
intermittently, the spectator must disassociate the meaning of the effect or the
cause of observed facts from the order in which they appear. In the seen-heard
time of film, the effects of lived time remain effects, only they are foreseen; and
the causes remain causes, only delayed. To this day, the greater public gets lost in
this sort of representation which, however, is often symbolized schematically –
read, thought, but which had until now rarely been achieved in a sufficiently con-
crete way to be able to trouble consciousness with two competing presences,
equal in power but ordered differently. Another public appreciates these mixings-
up of one temporal perspective with another, through particularly cinemato-
graphic effects.
When we arrive at the inversion, no longer by the interpolation of a few group-
ings of images in the editing stage, but by reversing the order of succession of all
the images between the shooting and the screening, the effects of reality come to
occupy the position of causes in a very tight series, whose turnabout clashes even
more strongly with the routines of logic. The spectator may well know that he can
turn to a finalist explanation by assigning the decisive power to phenomena that
have appeared last; he may well have understood that smoke will compel fire,
seen that the smoke precedes an explosion on the screen; still, he can’t quite give
up the scientific interpretation that smoke is caused by combustion. All the same,
he ends up allowing that there are two possible determinations for this smoke
and fire: by the causes of momentum from behind and by the necessities of trac-
tion from the front. When a reversed film shows the rubble of a house fly away
and regroup in the form of the exploded building, as absurd as this spectacle
looks, it only parodies another logical mode, according to which Cuvier rediscov-
ered lost species by starting with their fossil remains,3 or according to which
detectives in novels reconstitute the crime by starting with clues.
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After this moment of confusion, the spectator rediscovers his habitual, logical
construction by carefully separating the learned meaning that involves the cause
or result of each image’s content from the purely ordinal value of these images as
their sequence unwinds on film. Since this value does not directly arise from real
world successions, reassuring logic advises that we not attribute actual and direct
determining authority to it. And the spectator finds himself cured of his slight
vertigo.
It remains, however, that the film tends – and would tend all the more if one
left it alone – to popularize this incertitude in which we are in relation to the
chicken and the egg, in which we don’t know which is the effect or origin of the
other, nor even if there is an origin or an effect. It is evidently not in calling upon
a gymnastics of dissociation of causal relationships and the relationships of pre-
cedence that the film makes the givens of the problem as simple and clear as
verbal logic frequently presents them to us. In cinematographic representation,
causality no longer appears so inherent – neither within nature nor in the order
of things. To both of these, instead, cinematographic representation appears to
bring meaning: sometimes more, sometimes less, sometimes in one way, some-
times in another, and sometimes without success. Unobtrusively, discretely, films
habituate the public to thinking of the universe as looser, watched over from
farther away and more distractedly, more inviting to statistical neutrality.
Second reality, but overqualified
In its uncoordinated and non-egalitarian position, in its unsynchronized tempor-
ality, in its approximation of logic, it seems that film must produce mixed and
vague imitations of reality, themselves mixed and vague, and therefore only mea-
gerly convincing. However, the ultimate decline of the popular theater, the fact
that the middle-brow theater and music halls are losing ground, coinciding with
the tenfold proliferation of cinemas, show that the public takes the film for the
vehicle of fiction whose dramatic and poetic yield is the best: that the public finds
in cinema substitute realities most capable of moving and distracting it from lived
reality. And it’s this way even though the screen offers no real, direct presence,
while on stage, real beings are acting.
The paradoxical realism of the cinematographic spectacle comes first from the
fact that there, the word does not constitute the exclusive, nor even the most pre-
dominant, means of expression. Images bring a mass of information that directly
strikes the eyesight (the most active of the cultural senses) without being obliged
to pass information via the long, slow, complex path of neurons that encrypt the
concrete into the abstract, and disencrypt from the abstract back into the con-
crete: the logical symbolism of words and their more or less literary assemblage.
At the theater, a walk-on part must recount a fire, a hero give a monologue of his
past behavior, a heroine declare her trouble in an aside. On screen, the spectator
observes for himself the fire, the behaviors, and, upon a face fifteen times en-
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larged, the least emotion. In fact, at the cinema, word play is well heard and
appreciated for its surplus performative value, not for giving information or using
persuasion. As for the dramatic sense of words, it comes a bit too late; it only
confirms comprehension already established by ocular testimony. This observa-
tion with the naked eye, this proof via evidence, has the decisive force of convic-
tion in all trials and also in this debate where the spectator is at the same time
witness and judge – where, if there is disagreement between image and word, the
document seen is trusted over the commentary, the facial expression over the
speech of a character.
If, at the cinema, the word has only the secondary role of making visual infor-
mation explicit, still the film generally gives this explanation more abundantly
than the occasions of real life do. As the theater, very visually limited, is altogether
talky; as the cinema, extremely visual, speaks less than the theater; as life, moder-
ately visible, speaks even less than the cinema – of these, it’s the cinema that, all
in all, usually supplies the representation of the world signified concurrently by
the greatest number of means, visuals as well as spokens: the most richly descrip-
tive representation, the most accomplished, and also the most feasible for the
public.
Owing to its very abundance and diversity, the visual information provided by
cinema probably cobbles together its reality out of rather diffuse and confused
beings, of thick and cloudy things that recall the monstrous plates printed over
several times instead of one, in which moreover the confusion is always astir with
improvements. But the imprecision of such forms does not derive from what little
one knows about them; it derives from what we know too well about them. It is
true that an object that holds a durationless position or a time of appearance
without height or width more or less escapes logical conception, but a phenom-
enon that presents numerous and different space-time references – not reduced
(or not reducible) to a unique group of measurements in four dimensions – also
resists its installation in the system of classical knowledge. This therefore comes
about only at a certain degree – as with a distinct focus – of determination, be-
neath and beyond which there is all that exists without having yet been (or with-
out the ability to be) rationalized, on the grounds of being either unqualified or
overqualified. It is because moving images find themselves overqualified by the
multiplicity of their visible (and, secondarily, audible) interpretations of brute rea-
lity that these images do not admit logical structure without dislocating it in pro-
portion to their overload of concrete associations. It is because this overload es-
tablishes a luxurious world of differences on screen that the film produces a
stronger impression of reality, in proportion to its refusal to allow rational typify-
ing as schemas of perfect resemblance.
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Re-education by the absurd
To the degree that people are obliged to have an existence more and more full of
reasoning, they feel all the more the need to grant moments of relative repose to
their cerebral machinery of rational coordination. And this relaxation of cortical
control is more likely to allow thought to give in to sentimental and instinctive
influences. A thought of dulled reasoning, a thought of awakened passion, of
poetry, then arises. Supporting this effect of chronic intellectual fatigue, the sus-
tained influence of alcohol over civilized man fosters the occurrence of mental
activities of a dreamlike character, where the visual abounds and where the possi-
bilities of association flourish. To the bouts of sleepiness of the civilized, film
responds with prefabricated mental images, a digest of ready-made dreams.
Numbed but not removed, rational control finds itself alerted, however, as
soon as the screen telegraphs some remarkable exception to the routine of verb-
ally exorcised, logically domesticated phenomena: a gigantic eye that takes after
an oyster and the moon; a flower that goes back into its bud. Quickly, the insult
must be washed away by laughter, nullified for its absurdity. Because, when direc-
tors and camera or sound operators do not keep watch carefully enough, despite
all of their precautions, cinema by itself snags a lot of discrete or striking non-
sense in a reality unseen and unheard, and brings it to a visible and audible rea-
lity, just as from the marine depths the nets of oceanographers pull a flock of
monsters whose forms at first look fantastical. The more deeply one fishes, the
more miraculous the catch is. The more the cinematographic instrument suc-
ceeds in liberating itself from the egocentricism of the directly human point of
view, to move away from the CGS zone4 of the human scale, the more it can
encounter and reveal figures not yet hewn into classes and subclasses, provision-
ally without name (or definitively un-nameable), stupid and marvelous.
The mobilism of judgment in the cinema, the photogénie of movement (without
forgetting acoustic movement) lead to these eruptions of absurdity that come out
of reality’s limbo, through the weakened logic of the world on screen. Without a
doubt, the majority of this strangeness is destined to be more or less quickly
domesticated by the rational, as have been the wonders revealed by microscopes
and telescopes. However, thanks to its exceptional ability to disrupt the anthropo-
morphic standardization of space and time, cinema can choose aspects that are
inaccessible to any other experience and are particularly difficult to standardize
according to the fixed standards of common experience. Sometimes the effort to
standardize succeeds above all to weaken the rules of the inflexible world.
Whatever the scenario, each meter of each film teaches first, implicitly, esoteri-
cally, this experience of a renewed and still savage reality: a reality from beneath
and beyond the right view and the proper time; in fact, past the center which is
anywhere and past an inertia now deprived of a system, from before names and
before the law of words. The development of educational film confirms that this
constitutes a very powerful means of culture. But this cinematic culture is not
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above contradicting classical culture. The invention of the printing press brought
nothing profoundly revolutionary with respect to the mentality of its time. What-
ever its subject, every reading is first a grammatical exercise in reasoning, and the
book has only greatly assisted the spread of a way of thinking and knowing, verb-
ally and logically, which had already been ascendant for thousands of years and
whose triumph was perfectly assured. The invention of cinema introduces a more
dramatic character because it contains a threat against a rationalism that has be-
come totalitarian. Rationalism has known and still knows many dissidences,
probably, but here it meets a weapon for irrational propaganda with a very power-
ful capacity for the popularization of thought and knowledge.
In reading “Peter took the knife from Paul,” a child only learns a rather empty
compartmentalization, from which he does not receive the means to imagine any-
thing. All the knives in the world look enough alike to be Paul’s knife, and mil-
lions of boys could equally be called by any first name. But, if it’s the screen that
announces a schoolboy taking a knife from a classmate, then it is a knife-with-a-
horn-handle-and-a-nicked-blade-etc. which differs from all other knives; and one
child is a fair-haired-kid-with-freckles-and-a-falsetto-voice-etc. and the other a
swarthy-kid-with-a-turned-up-nose-and-a-Marseilles-accent-etc.: two boys whose
names we’ll never know, but each of whom is a completely unique being, and
cannot possibly be confused with the other. The book above all teaches abstract
categories; the film above all concrete individual beings. At the cinema, children,
teens, and adults continually learn and relearn geography, history, professional
skills, morals, physics, sociology, etc. – starting or not starting over – not back-
wards, through syllogisms and theorems in which typography presents the final
result of a long and laborious transposition of the facts, but in a natural way,
through the facts themselves, presented in a rather unlearned state and thus of-
fered to an illiterate knowledge more rapid, richer, and often more practical than
abstract knowledge. Many of these facts are taken in only with trouble and at the
risk of a loss in the boxes and lines of their elaboration as scientific facts, and
shall end as flawed syllogisms and precarious theorems – all the more flawed
and precarious as a fact on screen may have been purged less of its strong, con-
crete burden of particularity, distilled less carefully into an entity. Reality can be-
come rational only once it has taken, in relation to itself, a certain distance in the
mind. The film disrupts this perspective by bringing (or bringing back), all of a
sudden, from the farthest to the closest plane of attention, a reality raw enough to
have retained its original taste of absurdity. Thus, in the abrupt comparison that
can be made between images of a rockslide and the algebraic expression of New-
ton’s laws, there reemerges with strength the particular arbitrariness of the law
and the general arbitrariness and absolute absurdity that there is a law. On the
strength of etymologies, reminiscences, figurative meanings, and works of art,
the amorous crowds embark each day for Cythera. On screen, Cythera is a dry
rock. Of course, the action of the book demands the reaction of the film.
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Notes
1. Infra, p. 380 n9.
2. Tachyon: see infra, p. 379 n4.
3. Georges Cuvier, French naturalist and zoologist, and author of Le Règne Animal (1817).
4. The CGS system is a system of physical measures with the centimeter, the gram, and
the second (CGS) as its basic units.
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Alcool et cinéma
Logic of Fluidity
Translated by Thao Nguyen
[Jean Epstein, “Logique du fluide,” Alcool et cinéma (unpublished in Epstein’s life-
time), in ESC2, pp. 210-215.]
Spoken language, verbal thought, and their logic have been formed by and for
man’s relationship with his fellow human beings and his surroundings in order
to rule the outside world, and also under the rule and after the model of this
world as we perceive it through our naked senses. Depending on circumstances,
either immobile or changing figures could predominate among aspects of this
physical world, but the human mind gave precedence, a special attention, to di-
versified forms that with more or less speed appear constant or rigid, as if they
were signs and means of safety, markers of exploration and study. Up to this day,
we are left, from such esteem for permanence, with an atavistic habit. We always
particularly enjoy the most resistant constructions, the hardest materials, un-
changeable measurements, obstinate characters, immutable divinities and ideals.
We despise fragility, softness, and fickleness. Not only is it our empirical practice
and our science, but it is also our religion, our philosophy, and our morals that
have been first conceived according to the primacy of solid elements.
Without doubt, Heraclitus reacted against this with his doctrine of universal
conflict and universal movement, but, against this Ionian school, Parmenides
and Zeno of Elea championed the cult of what always remains equal to itself, the
faith in a permanent identity, foundation of the entire rational system.1 This Elea-
ticism so profoundly influenced thought that twenty centuries went by before
Heraclitus’ conceptions could find credibility with a rather wide audience – before
Bruno, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Bergson, Engels, et al. succeed in rehabilitating
becomingness, change, and flux as essential aspects of being. These new philoso-
phies of mobility found matching and supporting theory in certain sciences that
we are beginning to interpret any material, any energy, any life, as a result of the
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incessant moving of atoms, of a perpetual molecular agitation, of an absolutely
general evolution.
But this philosophy as well as this science, neither of which had much visibility
and were reserved to a limited audience, could only have an indirect and practi-
cally insignificant influence on the masses’ mentality. Even when the discovery of
faster means of locomotion started bringing celebrity and prestige to speed by
drawing attention to all kinds of moving objects and by offering newly moving
landscapes to the eye, all this aggrandizement of the mobile experience was rele-
gated to a corner of memory, like a set of information, admittedly precious but
exceptional, definitely worth being kept as curiosities, but incapable of rivalry
with old and strong static notions.
The customs of cinematographic spectacle, even sooner than with the memor-
abilia of travel or vertigo, at last earned it the power to popularize a more mobile
representation of the world. Perhaps cinema too became static – not to dare make
the faintest adjustment of the lens, to struggle to conform to the still powerful
principles of Eleaticism and its aesthetic corollary of immobility. However, in a
club, some started talking about the photogenic quality of movement and some
directors came up with the idea of pushing or pulling the camera on casters, of
raising it, of lowering it, of tipping it, of carrying it, of swinging it, of making it
turn in a circle. These militants of the cinematographic avant-garde thought that,
in doing so, they were creating a new (specifically cinematographic) descriptive
style, but they did not realize that they were launching, at the same time and more
profoundly, a philosophical enterprise; little did they know that the appearances
that their lenses captured, in a way that the eye cannot see well enough or at all,
would surprise and little by little prepare countless spectators. This audience, fi-
nally, would find itself forced, unbeknownst to it, to fundamentally reform its way
of feeling, of imagining, of understanding; it was forced to rip its model of reality
from the petrifying spells of the perfect order, from the dream of the exact mea-
sure, from the illusion of complete intelligibility.
Saying that the cinematograph is essentially meant to record and reproduce
movement is a truism; a truism that we held for a while – even if we do not hold
it still – as literally insignificant from an industrial, commercial, or even artistic
standpoint. But the gaze of the lens, in and of itself, obeying its organic law,
perceives and shows us the mobile aspects of the world, emphasizes them, favors
them with a predilection that transmutes even stable elements into unstable ones,
solids into fluids. Thus, in the world seen on screen, the spectator, whether he
likes it or not, whether he understands it or not, sees his attention drawn, against
his classical habits of mind, toward change, malleability, and the fluidity of
forms. Even completely still shots that follow each other in the same scene with
the same characters and the same décor are shots that were taken from different
angles (here lies an elementary rule of cinematographic continuity), which means
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that these images are the result of camera movements and that they demonstrate
the results of such movements.
[…] The animated image, when it is as animated as much as its nature compels
it to be, thus shows that everything is diversity and evolution and that no state
exists because there is no equation, apart from the state and equation of move-
ments, which is to say rhythm.
For the needs of our outside activity, the relative constancy of human scale,
taken as a central marker in relation to forms in the surrounding world that are
remarkable for their ample fixity or rigidity, has enabled us to establish a system
of reciprocal localization for getting at objects, a system of orientation and assess-
ment of our own movements and of those observed outside of us. This system
constitutes our usual configuration of space, whose ideally precise, perfectly ra-
tionalized aspect is given by Euclidean geometry.
This entire empirical configuration and its geometric theory rest on the fact
that forms seem to remain the same when we transport them from one place to
another because they are solid. If the said figures, whatever their motions be,
conserve at all times and everywhere their geometric properties, it is – we think –
because the imagined space possesses too, at all times and everywhere, the same
qualities; in other words it is homogeneous. In this spatial homogeneity, we can
slide a figure onto another one without distortion, and that they exactly coincide
is proof of their perfect similitude. Identity is thus rigorously demonstrable and is
licensed to serve as the great principle to the entire logical development. Without
any distortion, we can rotate a figure around an axis or a point in order to super-
impose it to another figure, as a proof of a somewhat particular kind of identity:
symmetry. We thus say that space – at least space related to solids – is not only
homogeneous, but also symmetrical.
Truth be told, that which is likely to show similitude, identity, and symmetry
are the bodies put into play that through their performance create a notion of
space and which, by their rigidity, characterize that which in turn describes the
idea of space as being a certain aspect of this play. But the human mind, just as it
personified and materialized space, personifies and materializes the qualities as-
cribed to this phantasm. Let us remember that homogeneity and symmetry are
allegories.
In the world depicted on screen, things are different: the size and position of
the spectator do not absolutely hold as a benchmark and a place to get one’s
bearings, because – as has already been stated – the observer finds himself incap-
able of bringing the location and dimension of objects as they appear on the
cinematographic image intact to this center and benchmark. The situation of the
camera is neither sufficiently definable nor sufficiently fixed to base a compara-
tive system common to all of a film’s shots on it. So, not only does the configura-
tion of cinematographic space elude the rigorous egocentrism of the Euclidean
configuration, not only does it refuse to accept an exclusively human proportion-
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ality, but it also accepts no unique center of perspective, no unique standard,
whatever it might be.
In fact, with every change of camera position, with every shot, the spectator is
offered a new kind of space, which is always partially indeterminate. We are thus
dealing with a composite space, of a multiple of spaces, and each space could
perhaps be expressed in Euclidean terms, but the grouping suggests the concep-
tion of another continuum with very different characteristics. And considering
this new space as a simple juxtaposition of ill-assorted Euclidean cells would not
be enough to remove its special properties. It would be as erroneous as confusing
differential elements with the result of their integration. Indeed, if the shot was
taken in motion, we obtain on screen an integration of cinematic space, summon-
ing all the fragments of this space that evolve from image to image into a visual
impression of continuity. And this integration does not obey the Euclidian law.
Whether we think about the cinematographic space according to its disconti-
nuity, from cell to cell, or according to its continuous evolution, the visual data –
which is, here, the sole information – indicates that most forms do not remain
equal to themselves, neither in their transposition from one frame of discontinu-
ity to another, nor during their passage from one moment of continuity to an-
other. Two figures of one and the same object, taken in two different fixed shots
or at two different moments of a moving shot, hardly ever conserve their geo-
metric properties, can hardly ever be perfectly superimposed. The relationship
between physical sizes has changed; their dimensions behave like variables. The
exterior movement of the camera has, in some way, spread to the object, which it
has endowed with an interior movement expressed through transformations.
Since configurative relations do not remain everywhere nor at all times the
same, the cinematographic space does not appear as a homogeneous space.
Neither does it necessarily accept symmetry. It does not possess homogeneity nor
symmetry because it represents a space in motion or, to express it better, a space
no longer generated (as is Euclidean space) by well-determined positions of the
stable shapes of solids, but generated by badly-defined movements of apparitions
that are also mobile in their shapes and that behave like fluids.
No geometrician, no physicist can match exactly two clouds, two ocean waves.
In the fluidity of the world shown on screen, it is also difficult to establish a
perfect identity; there, the principle of identity maintains only a value of approx-
imation – a value that is both more uncertain and larger than the role the princi-
ple plays in the representation of the world, which we understand to be reliable.
This vagueness of the fundamental experience of similarity and this fuzziness of
the primordial axiom of reasoning drag into themselves the entire apparatus of
classical logic, as we have seen. What is there to say but that this entire, old
rational system relies on the conception of Euclidean space and only works within
a certain geometry’s limits of validity? When the experience of space changes,
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geometry changes too, and we need to reason, to philosophize, to moralize, to
think differently, according to this other geometry.
Sure, one will say, but Euclidean space is the truest geometry, and the only
natural one. Well, what is true is that imagining a Euclidean space satisfies the
most frequent needs of our ordinary activity, just like our conception of the meter
– which is neither an absolute nor a natural truth – solves many practical prob-
lems. What is also true is that, as cinema shows, if we lived on a less firm Earth
with fewer fixed markers, or if we were organized to better perceive the mobility
of this so-called firm Earth and these so-called fixed markers, we would have to
think about a non-Euclidean space.
Within the same package – a room setting – fifteen different shots, fixed and
mobile, show us fifteen different spaces, some Euclidean and some non-Eucli-
dean, each being two- or three-dimensional, ordered in relation to different axis
systems, accepting different scales. Does this prove that the room really contains
fifteen kinds of spaces, just like it could contain thirty-six or a hundred kinds?
And which one of these spaces is truer than others? Or does the real space add
up to fifteen times three, or one hundred times two, dimensions?
Such diversity of shots instead tends to prove that there is no more a uniquely
true space than there is a uniquely accurate perspective: it proves that there are as
many spaces and perspectives as we can conceive and that all spaces, as well as all
perspectives, belong to the realm of optical illusions. As far as space in general is
concerned, only one possibility exists: that of situating, in an infinite number of
ways, phenomena considered to coexist; that of thinking, in innumerable ways,
about events considered simultaneous. Perhaps we could more easily purge the
spatial conception of reality by reappropriating the Cartesian term of extension
that, after falling into desuetude, distanced itself a bit from the baggage with
which it was loaded by the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century usage and for
which it was reformed and replaced by the (at first purely) idealistic Kantian des-
ignation.
If there is a truth, it lies in the absence of the truth of space and in the lack of
specific form of extension, where each new aspect of the contents creates the struc-
ture for a new phantom container. Thus, through its spatial polymorphism and
through the mobility of its extension, cinematographic representation is, after all,
truer than the classical conception of an immovable geometric frame, unique and
universal, underlying all localizations. Slowly, carefully, insinuatingly, cinema ef-
fects a great change in mentalities, even those not accustomed to abstraction, by
freeing them of fixity fetishism. This fetishism that worshipped five polyhedra as
doubly sacred, because they were remarkably solid, remarkably regular, and that
saw (and still sees) in nature the work of genius geometricians and architects:
that’s Euclidian geometricians and architects.
It is said that Euclid used to trace his figures in the sand of Alexandrian bea-
ches, and that he was not concerned that the wind could skew his theorems.
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However, a world that is intrinsically animated, like an image on a screen, needs a
kind of geometry that remains valid on quicksand. And this geometry of the un-
stable governs a logic, a philosophy, a common sense, a religion, an aesthetics
based on instability.
* * *
Logic of Variable Time
Translated by Thao Nguyen
[Jean Epstein, “Logique de temps variable,” Alcool et cinéma (unpublished in Ep-
stein’s lifetime), in ESC2, pp. 216-221.]
Furthermore, we need to ask if the theory of space, proposed and demanded by
cinematographic representation, can still accept a geometry or a kinematics, since
the movement that reigns in this space is so different from geometric and me-
chanical displacement.
Cinema is one of those very rare instruments that is not only capable but forced
to represent a succession by a succession, a duration by a duration. On screen,
any phenomenon finds itself inevitably set not only with a length, a width, and a
height, but also with a fourth dimension, that of time, which geometry com-
pletely neglects in its translations, rotations, and projections, all of which are al-
ways supposed to be instantaneous. The animated image can never constitute
a purely spatial representation, but, necessarily, a time-space representation to
which a geometry of four dimensions (three of space and one of duration) must
correspond: a time geometry. The animated image reproduces and demonstrates
through evidence the truly inviolable unity of space-time, which, through our ha-
bit of Euclidean analysis, seemed like a relativist mystery to us, if not a relativist
myth.
Since any movement is a succession, according to the Eleatics themselves, and
since any succession can only occur in time, it goes without saying that nothing
in an essentially mobile world can exist without occupying a place both in time
and in space. The Euclidean trick had succeeded in having us forget this notion,
full of elementary realism, or to find it very subtle. Here again, cinema, refusing
to confirm an abusive analysis, leads to an understanding, whatever its unknow-
able or non-existent absolute truth or absolute falseness may be, that better em-
braces the generality of the phenomenon.
There is more. The dimension of time that we believed was subjected abso-
lutely to the constant rhythm of our standard clocks, the duration of phenomena
whose more or less speedy succession we found impossible to see, are shown to
us in a varying state by the screen, just like it shows variable spatial data. Without
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doubt, measured in general at twenty-three images per second, projections adjust,
in theory, the passage of time in the cinematographic field to the passage of time
in the earthly field, where the recording was made at the same rate. But all we
need on screen is to show an old tape, recorded at a slightly slower rhythm, to
discover a world living more rapidly, a hurried world so bustling as to be comical.
Besides, even in films produced and reproduced at today’s normal speed, specta-
cular time is, in fact, hardly ever in tune with historical time. Whether it be a shot,
a scene where characters engage in successive actions while avoiding any pause
detrimental to the spectator’s interest, or an entire montage that elides days, sea-
sons, or centuries as it pleases, cinematographic transposition almost always ac-
celerates the course of events.
Theatrical time is variable as well, but in a much more moderate way and in a
much clumsier fashion. Alone, cinema can represent, through a real, sensible
continuity, a course through the universe – not only accelerated but also slowed
down at will, in a duration compressible and extensible in relation to our own
consumption of time. Alone, cinema can show us a life that is twenty times
slower or fifty thousand times faster, in which we discover minerals crawling,
crystals blossoming, the elasticity and solidity of water, the viscosity of conti-
nents, the gesticulation of plants, the rigidity of clouds flying across the sky like
arrows, or the petrifaction of man himself, becoming his own statue.
These remarkable aspects make the fundamental principles of our classifica-
tions – which distinguish the immobile from the mobile, the inconstant from the
constant, the being from the becoming, the inert from the living, the three states
of matter, the three kingdoms of nature, the three categories of living organisms
– look precarious. To merge these categories, to unmask the convention of a
supposed order in creation, we only need to vary duration sufficiently, to rally the
temporal dimension, to add a temporal movement to spatial movement. Making
the effects of a superior mobility visible for the first time, combining spatial and
temporal changes, is the very special power of the cinematographic tool, whereas,
until cinema, all movements that we were accustomed to see took place at a un-
ique and constant speed. Placed in this mobility, which is in a way raised to the
second power, all forms are affected and made pliable, remelted or rehardened or
reliquefied, proving that they are nothing more than forms of movement. Such a
result becomes especially obvious when we vary the speed of shots during the
same recording.
One may object that it is an artificial result. But is there an experiment or even
an advanced observation that does not employ a device and that does not more or
less disrupt natural phenomenon while at the same time communicating new
appearances? And yet, we do not consider those to be false.
Today, astronomers tell us that if the Moon does not turn faster around the
Earth, it is the Earth that, probably, slows down its movement; that our solar
time is unstable. Biologists and psychologists affirm, on the other hand, that or-
alcool et cinéma 401
ganic time flows more slowly in a young being than it does in an older being. But,
these small or unclear variations that are difficult to see or are elusive for our
senses still remain unknown to most people, who cannot even fathom the possi-
bility of time differentiations because they have not experienced them visually,
because they never had the opportunity to compare the diversity of aspects that a
phenomenon undergoes during two or several unequal durations. The imagina-
tion of the cinematographic instrument alone makes possible this comparison of
visible effects of plurality, mobility, relativity, of the frame where successions are
ordered and measured.
In cinema’s favor, we need to add that the almost microscopic technique of
slow-motion and the almost telescopic technique of time-lapse cinematography
help us abandon our simplistic faith in a quasi-material existence of a unique and
rigid time, merged with earthly or sidereal time. Like space, time has no other
reality except from one perspective through which we no longer see approxi-
mately simultaneous phenomena creating spatial perspective but distinct events
that appear successive. Depending on the duration given to these events and to
their intervals, temporal perspective accepts all shortcuts, all elongations. All
forms of this perspective can be equally exact, commensurately, but none of
them is absolutely true. Asking if terrestrial time is truer or less true than biologi-
cal time makes barely any more sense than asking if the pink sky at sunset is truer
or less true than noon’s azure. Declaring that aspects of a scene of germination
shown on screen in slow motion are more false than the appearances of the same
germination seen in the calendar time, amounts to declaring that a stamp, seen
through a magnifying glass, becomes a fake stamp.
Perhaps if the magnificent resources – not only documentary but also dramatic
– of slow motion and time-lapse were not used in such a regrettably exceptional
manner in films aimed at the general public, spectators would more quickly allay
their suspicion about the most original representation that cinema may have
shown us to date: the representation of a scaled-up or down universe ad libitum in
its time dimension.
However, even spectacular films use, more or less discretely and unknowingly,
the cinematographic ability to modify duration. If not every shot, then almost
each sequence possesses its own rhythm. Images do not represent the same time
that reigns in all the shot cells of different spaces. If not every cell, at least several
cell groups are presented like as many particularities not only of space, but also of
time. As soon as the camera has moved or moves, spatial perspective changes,
and as we carefully observe it, rarely does time perspective not also undergo
some kind of modification.
We do not always see a temporal variation accompanying each spatial variation,
because the camera movements can only occur within restricted limits of time or
speed. And temporal variation remains unnoticeable. On the other hand, the lati-
tude of ratios of acceleration or slowing down proves sufficient to show that cine-
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matographic time consumes space, directly due to its speed, if we examine it
within its own time-space system, and inversely, if we inscribe it in terrestrial
space, in the length of recorded tape. Thus, there exist relations of equivalence
between temporal and spatial values. Astronomers, who routinely compute dis-
tances in years, are accustomed to this commutativity where time becomes space
and vice versa, where time is absorbed by space and space by time, where time-
space no longer exists. Cinema affords us an experience which, though it hardly
explains the mystery of this unity, summarizes the mystery in this trajectory that
needs to be three times shorter and in this film tape that needs to be three times
longer, to produce a time that is three times slower.
Time is no more uniform on screen than space is homogeneous, and the pro-
jection of any film offers a series of time-spaces that, at first, differ from one
another in a discontinuous fashion, but each of them can also continuously vary
within its own limits. Cinematographic time-space is thus an irregular complex,
made of numerous, juxtaposed little continuities, but the jump between those
continuities from one set of references to another rarely occurs without a hiatus.
It is a functionally discontinuous group that, through this character, essentially
contrasts with the deep-rooted conception that space and time must absolutely
be continuous, by virtue of their function which defines their sole nature.
Yet, physicists’ works have recently conveyed a new orientation to scientific
philosophy, which now accepts the notion of a non-homogeneous time-space, of
granular or cellular structure – that is to say, a discontinuous orientation. In the
eyes of classical philosophy, there is the abstraction of everyday experience; in the
eyes of common sense, these are the atavistic remains and origins of an old phi-
losophy, and such heterogeneous division of time-space can only seem to be an
absurd chimera since it does not correspond to any current observation, to any
practical use. However, cinema suddenly brings images that enable us to see what
things can look like in an irregular and fragmented time-space, one that does not
claim to represent faithfully relativists’ and microphysicists’ time-spaces, but one
that makes this type of spatial-temporal frame conceivable. Not only can we now
fathom such a frame, but we are forced to reckon that it is endowed with a more
subtle realism, that it adapts in a more precise manner to movements of all exter-
ior and interior life.
Perhaps the public is not generally aware of the radical transformation that
cinema proposes for the two fundamental instruments – the idea of space and
the idea of time – that allow all the other ideas to be thought up. Cinema teaches
in a manner that is never really dogmatic and that, here, remains especially im-
plicit. Film only provides another visual experience of nature; the spectator simply
needs to collect suggestions from this experience, just like he does by directly
viewing the world, from which it took him a long time to sort out and construct a
mechanism. But, through repeated suggestions of this second vision, it is quite
improbable that the human mind will not end up – unconsciously at first – soft-
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ening and complicating its diagram of the universe, by synthesizing time-space
and by analyzing it as multiple time-spaces with differentiated values – variable
and relative ones.
Thus, underneath the level of great logical axioms, the influence of animated
images reaches the most deeply-rooted, rational categorizations, which it intends
to patiently and almost treacherously repair. […]
Note
1. See infra, p. 379, n2-3.
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Afterword: Reclaiming Jean Epstein
Richard Abel
Do we sense a “historical turn” or return to Jean Epstein as both a major theorist
and filmmaker? The April 2008 symposium organized by the Department of Cine-
ma and Media Studies at the University of Chicago certainly awakened that expec-
tation – first, by inviting half a dozen scholars from North America and Europe to
present new research on Epstein’s theoretical writing and several of his films and,
second, by screening a relatively unseen 35mm print of Finis terrae (1929), which
coincided closely with Pathé’s unexpected DVD release of Coeur fidèle (1923). This
collection of newly translated texts and critical essays should mark a further ad-
vance in the “turn” to reclaim Jean Epstein for film theory and film history. My
own modest contribution aims to offer a series of notes on Coeur fidèle and Finis
terrae, prompted by the unique opportunity to re-see both films – nearly thirty
years after Marie Epstein allowed me to view them at the Cinémathèque française
– and by the astute remarks of several scholars during the Chicago symposium.
Coeur fidèle
Coeur fidèle opens with an unusual series of eight shots that I described long ago as
follows:
1. High-angle close-up of a table surface as a hand clears it of a plate and a
cigarette and then wipes it with a rag.
2. Extreme close-up of Marie’s face (45o angle).
3. Medium close-up of a hand picking up a glass and bottle while another hand
wipes the edge of the table.
4. Close-up of Marie’s face (straight on).
5. Medium close-up of wine being poured from a bottle into a glass, beside
which a hand rests on the table.
6. Close-up of Marie’s face looking down.
7. Medium shot of Marie pouring wine for a man seated at the table; she corks
the bottle, and he lights a cigarette; he begins talking to her.
8. Long shot of the bistro interior: Marie and the man are at the table in the
right background, behind a couple at another table, while the edge of the bar
is in the left foreground. The bistro owner pushes Marie toward the man at
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the table and then exits (foreground left); his wife enters (foreground left)
and shakes her head at Marie, who comes over to the bar with a paper in her
hand.1
There are a number of refinements that could be made in this shot description:
for instance, the rough surface of the table in shots 1, 3, and 5 is suggestive of the
interior space eventually revealed in shots 7 and 8; the hands in the same shots
extend from frame left and seem to belong to the same person. The sequence of
shots reverses the recently standardized pattern of American continuity editing,
which would begin with an establishing shot defining the diegetic space and
then cut in to closer shots. The disorienting reverse order has the effect of calling
attention to the close-ups of Marie’s face and her assumed hands moving among
the objects on the bistro table’s surface – and accentuates their potential impor-
tance.
This brief opening sequence makes an instructive contrast to one of Lev Kule-
shov’s re-editing experiments created just a few years prior to Epstein’s film for
the newly formed Moscow Film Committee in the Soviet Union. Those experi-
ments, which he described as “making new subjects from old films,” made Kule-
shov acutely aware of how one could organize disparate shots, even from differ-
ent sources, into a meaningful, rhythmic sequence.2 The relationship of shot to
shot could be more significant than an actor’s performance, for instance, and
engender associations or emotions beyond those evoked by a single shot. Most
germane here is the montage experiment often cited as the “Kuleshov effect,” in
which a long-take close-up of Ivan Mosjoukine’s expressionless face was intercut
with various shots from other films: “a steaming bowl of soup, a woman in a
coffin, a child playing with a toy bear.”3 Projecting the “new subject” for specta-
tors, Kuleshov discovered that the same shot of Mosjoukine seemed to convey a
different emotional effect, depending on its relation to one shot versus another.4
Although similar textually, Epstein’s “experiment” in the opening of Coeur fidèle
produces an equally startling but different effect. Rather than emphasize a con-
junction of shots in which each image seems to transform the sense of the same
actor’s expressionless face, his sequence creates an unexpected disjunction in
which the three-shot series of Marie’s face seems disconnected from the alternat-
ing three-shot series of hands moving about the rough table surface. Rather than
being bound together through the intercutting, the two series seem almost sepa-
rate, and Marie’s face remains unchanged in its lack of expression. It is as if her
character already exists in a space or world distinct from that eventually revealed
as the bistro milieu.
Most striking in this opening sequence, however, is the immobility of Marie’s
face in close-up, which contrasts sharply with the movement of her hands in the
alternating medium close-ups.5 The relatively quick alternation of stasis and
movement (the close-ups of her face each last no more than a second) is some-
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what reminiscent of another famous sequence in a much later film, Hitchcock’s
The Birds (1963) where medium close-ups of Melanie’s stilled face (looking down
left foreground, down straight on, down right foreground, and then right) are
intercut with point-of-view shots of a flaming trail of gasoline that races from
right to left in shorter and shorter shots, ending in a long shot of a car exploding
– after which, again in medium close-up, she reacts in shock. In the Hitchcock
film, the accelerating combined rhythm of the rushing flame and the cutting in-
tensify the suspense, but the differing “frozen” images of Melanie create a para-
doxical sense of knowledge and helplessness: as if in a trance, she realizes what is
about to happen yet is powerless to act – much like the film’s spectator. The puz-
zling, if more regular, alternation of stasis and movement in Epstein’s film has a
very different effect of discontinuity. Marie’s gaze seems disassociated from either
the objects on the table or her active hands; she is looking yet not looking, her
gaze “frozen” into an unchanging blank stare (wherever directed) that accentu-
ates not only her separateness from her environs but also her alienation and the
suggestion of a possible “desire for something else.”
The print of Coeur fidèle that I viewed at the Cinémathèque française years ago, first
in a small screening room and then on Marie Epstein’s hand-cranked moviola,
left me even more puzzled about the film’s ending.6 Although the re-mastered
print recently made available on DVD resolves some of that puzzlement, Katie
Kirtland’s essay (in this volume) offers an ingenious analysis of the epilogue that
impels me to reframe my own reading of the film’s ending. Especially striking is
her deft tracing of the numerous “layers of cliché” that undermine the conven-
tional melodrama narrative and ultimately accumulate into a deeply “ironic take”
on the for ever of lasting love. Let me first accentuate that “ironic take” by noting
the structural rhyme between one moment in the fête foraine sequence concluding
the film’s first half – often cited for the intoxicating complexity of its rapid mon-
tage – and another similar moment in the epilogue. The first presents a sharp
contrast between Marie and her brutal lover Paul (in medium close-ups and
close-ups), swiftly circling above the fairground crowds in an amusement ride
airplane: while Paul grins with delight, Marie’s face remains expressionless, even
sullen, and her look closely parallels that of the film’s opening, evoking her un-
ending sense of entrapment. The other recapitulates this moment, with Marie and
Jean seated together (in medium close-ups and close-ups) in the same circling
airplane: now, however, it is Marie who smiles and snuggles close to Jean, while
he assumes the mask of immobility, the “frozen” lack of expression, that once
defined her. The ironic “role reversal” of this recapitulation strongly suggests
that, for reasons that Kirtland has outlined, it is Jean now who feels disengaged,
entrapped.
In the midst of this structural rhyme, however, there is an enigmatic insert shot
whose potential significance can be traced back to the confrontation that cli-
maxes in Paul’s death just prior to the epilogue. This is a high-angle full shot of
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the crippled woman (played by Marie Epstein) who is cradling Marie and Paul’s
infant at the bottom of her apartment building’s rough wooden stairs. The shot is
linked to Jean’s look, as if the image were emerging from within, and the crippled
woman’s equally expressionless face seems to mirror his. The puzzling relation-
ship among these three characters is set in a series of moves marking the film’s
climactic sequence. The first has Jean very slowly edging Marie toward the door of
her apartment and away from her infant’s cradle, an action that gains emphasis
through a short montage of images, linked by dissolves, in which the cradle
seems about to disappear into a distant darkness. The second occurs after the
crippled woman shoots Paul, as his body slumps down and comes to rest leaning
against the infant’s cradle. That this image of Paul and the infant concludes the
sequence and is followed immediately by the epilogue creates an inextricable
bond between the two, excluding Marie, and that exclusion is recapitulated in the
later enigmatic insert. The image of the crippled woman and the infant, as if seen
or imagined by Jean, deepens the uncertainty marking the film’s resolution. Is it
guilt for killing Paul that Jean now shares with the crippled woman (anticipating
Hitchcock once more), or does the existence of the infant uncannily conjure up,
like a return of the repressed, an involuntary memory of Paul that will continue to
haunt these two characters, as well as the spectator. The startling ambiguity of
this nexus of images opens up a mise-en-abyme in Jean and Marie’s romantic rela-
tionship.
Finis terrae
During the Chicago symposium, Ludovic Cortade’s essay on Epstein’s theoretical
writings (in this volume) provoked considerable discussion about his late 1920s
conception of slow motion and its effect on the screened experience of a film,
whether 1) evoking a sense of transparency or non-transparency or 2) accentuat-
ing a sense of movement or immobility. Rather than extend the theoretical trajec-
tory of that discussion, let me tease out some implications of how the frequent,
consistent use of slow motion seems to function in several sequences in Finis
terrae, which I still consider one of his very best films.7 Before leaving Paris for
the most western reaches of Brittany, in the early summer of 1928, Epstein pub-
lished a short piece, “Fragments of Sky,” in which he sought to set himself apart
from those critics and filmmakers promoting one form or another of pure cinema
as well as those flaunting “avant-garde” techniques for their own sake. Assuming
that the film image is “a sign, complex and precise,” characteristically he invokes
a palimpsest of analogies to advocate something close to the ideal of transparency
that would later become central to André Bazin. With language: “To allow time to
admire the sign is to distract the spectator from the meaning of the text and turn
his interest to its typography.” With painting: “Pleasure in plasticity is a means,
never an end.” And with spirituality: “Images have only to channel their semi-
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spontaneous charge just as cathedral spires conduct thought into the heavens.”8
Yet the film he shot off the coast of Brittany, edited as Finis terrae in Paris and first
screened at a specialized cinema, L’Oeil de Paris, in May 1929, is hardly devoid of
“avant-garde” techniques, and especially slow motion.
In late 1928, while apparently still editing the film, Epstein published another
essay, “Approaches to Truth,” in which he explained that he went to Brittany to
discover a kind of “authenticity,” a “quality of sincerity,” among the men gather-
ing kelp on the isolated islands of Bannec and Balenec.9 Only on his second trip
did he believe he succeeded, and, in an unusual admission, he sought to justify
his extensive use of slow motion, especially in recording the islanders he chose as
actors and specifically the two boys playing Ambroise and Jean-Marie. “Sincerity
in expression and natural gestures . . .[are] too fast, too illegible at normal speeds
of shooting and projection: only filming at 30 or 40 frames per second can do
away with the basically untruthful quality in an actor’s performance.”10 Even if
Epstein believed he had captured a sense of authenticity in the production pro-
cess, how would the edited film create a similar sense in projection? What would
keep spectators, especially cinéphiles, from being distracted and taking more
pleasure in the film’s “plasticity”?11 An answer may lie in the opening scene, in
the “staging” of the incident that generates the film’s narrative. As Ambroise, in a
rush, hands a last bottle of wine to Jean-Marie, it slips out of their grasp and
breaks on the rocks; the shattered bottle provokes an argument but also cuts
Ambroise’s thumb – and the festering wound will force Jean-Marie to set out,
with his delirious friend, in a small sailboat for the mainland. This scene is com-
posed almost entirely of close shots (faces, hands, running feet, a bottle, glass
fragments, rocks, and sand), some accentuated by fast tracks and dollies but all
of relatively short length and marked by slightly slowed motion. Although the
subsequent shots lengthen and movement within the frame decreases, the slow
motion continues until it becomes almost imperceptible, even “natural.” That im-
perceptibility gives the images an unusual degree of “transparency” that even-
tually allows a subtle sense of the uncanny to emerge.
Initially, the world of Finis terrae is confined to the island of Bannec, where
Ambroise’s condition worsens and Jean-Marie’s animosity grows (he also believes
Ambroise has stolen his knife). Not only are the boys’ actions and interactions
presented in slight slow motion, so are the sea waves that break on rock outcrop-
pings and wash up on a sandy beach, as is the men’s work of gathering the kelp
into piles for burning. A simple moment of synecdoche, also accentuated by slow
motion, first suggests that the sea is more than a source of subsistence and may
threaten the men: an empty wooden bowl (once containing their cooked pota-
toes) gradually is caught in the incoming tide, tilted, overturned, and submerged.
As the film shifts near midpoint to the coastal village of Ouessant on the main-
land, a lighthouse keeper notices a lack of activity on Bannec and the two boys’
mothers persuade the local doctor, Lesenin, and several fishermen to venture out
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in a rowboat to find out what could be wrong. A lengthy, suspenseful sequence of
alternation, marked consistently by slow motion, first climaxes when the two
boats meet miraculously in a dense fog, while the two mothers keep watch on
the high rocks above a narrow harbor cove. And it climaxes a second time when,
after the mothers’ long night vigil huddled together under a single shawl, the
overcrowded rowboat finally emerges out of the fog and maneuvers through a
turbulent sea to reach the harbor dock in safety. Here, slow motion remains so
imperceptible – except perhaps when one mother drops a handkerchief and huge
waves repeatedly crash against the rocks – that its apparent transparency accent-
uates the uncanny alignment of these alternating spaces and underscores the
bond that, despite distance and difference, links the boys, their rescuers, and
their mothers in a community of caritas.
This imagined community in Finis terrae deserves a final observation. If the sea,
as a force of nature, separates men and women and even threatens their exis-
tence, it also acts as a mysterious agent of deliverance. In this fable of near death
and “resurrection,” it is striking that, despite the presence of a village church and
the tolling bell that gathers people together, the human agents of that deliverance
are secular rather than religious.12 Two lighthouse keepers, separately, notice that
something is wrong on Bannec, but it is the doctor who plays a crucial mediating
role, returning the boys to their mothers and saving Ambroise from blood poison-
ing. Lesenin is a strangely “modern” figure who not only uses proven medical
practices to minister to this marginal community but also acts as a benevolent
“father” to the village children.13 The mothers’ gratitude is conveyed near the end
in a long shot of the doctor sleeping at a kitchen table with several women in
quiet attendance, the glowing interior framed by a darkened doorway. How apt
too is the film’s final low-angle long shot in which a young boy leads the doctor
over a grassy hill (to attend to a sick old man), silhouetted against an immense
white sky. It is tempting to imagine Lesenin as a fictional surrogate for the film-
maker himself. Both may be outsiders in this pre-modern world, on screen and
off, yet they work in respectful collaboration with the villagers and, in Epstein’s
case, with the kelp gatherers as well. If Lesenin’s function is to serve as a “healer”
who cares for the sick and wounded, Epstein’s is more like that of an ethnogra-
pher quite aware that he and his camera are hardly neutral observers but rather
provocative participants in the islanders and villagers’ confrontation with moder-
nity. One of his aims in editing and screening the film in Paris, as Rachel Moore
suggests (in another essay included in this volume), may have been to reverse this
confrontation and force Parisians to encounter “the material and spiritual reality”
of an “other” culture (however collaboratively captured) within the very borders of
France.14 Yet the point of the encounter was to provoke an understanding – one
that recurs repeatedly in his writings – not so much of the “other” but rather of
oneself.15 What the encounter – the “healing” experience of filmmaking in Brit-
410 richard abel
tany – may have meant personally for Epstein remains one of several gaps in our
knowledge about this incredibly poetic French filmmaker.
* * *
This timely collection of critical essays and newly translated texts aims to initiate
what we all hope will become an ongoing project to reclaim Jean Epstein for both
film history and film theory. At stake is the recovery and resituating of his writ-
ings as the most original, erudite, and poetic of French theoretical texts in the
1920s, the most sophisticated prior to that of André Bazin, whose own writings
owe an often unacknowledged debt to his precursor. Also at stake is the recovery
of an early model for what it means to work as both a film theorist and film-
maker: not only do Epstein’s theoretical writings and films illuminate one an-
other, the films themselves often do intense theoretical work, extending and com-
plicating his thinking through the continuity and discontinuity of streams of
images. This project now depends on a joint effort between scholars and archi-
vists to make more of Epstein’s films available on DVD, struck from high quality
positive prints, most of them deposited by Marie Epstein at the Cinémathèque
française – from La Belle Nivernaise (1924), Six et demi onze (1927), and La Glace à trois
faces (1927) to Mor–Vran (1930), L’Or des mers (1933), and Les Batisseurs (1938). And,
of course, the marvelous Finis terrae!
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Filmography
Silent films
Pasteur (1922). Made on the occasion of the centennial of Pasteur’s birth. Directed by Jean
Epstein. General supervision by Jean Benoit-Levy. Script by Edouard Epardaud. Camera
by Edmond Floury. Interiors shot at Nadal studios, at Joinville-le-Pont, Exteriors on
location at Arbois, Dole, Strasbourg, Alias, Pouilly-lo-Fort, at the Pasteur Institutes of
Paris and Lille, at the Auguste Lumiere laboratories at Lyons, at the public schools
(Écoles Normales Superieurs) in Paris and the Alsace region. Produced by L’Edition
Française Cinématographique, Distributed by Pathé-Consortium-Cinéma. First shown
at the Gaumont-Palace, Paris, in April 1923. Length: app. 1200 meters.
Les Vendanges (1922). (The Wine Harvest). Documentary of the Narbonne Region. Camera:
Edmond Floury, Produced by Édition Française Cinématographique.
L’Auberge rouge (1923). (The Red Inn). Adapted from the tale by Honoré de Balzac. Adapted
and directed by Jean Epstein. Artistic Supervision: Louis Nalpas. Interiors shot at Quenn
Studio Pathe, sets by Studio des Vignerons at Vincennes; Exteriors at the castle of Vin-
cennes. Camera: Raoul Aubourdier, assisted by Roger Hubert and Robert Lefebvre. Pro-
duced and distributed by Pathé-Consortium-Cinéma. Length: app. 1800 meters.
Cœur fidèle (1923). (The Faithful Heart). Written and directed by Jean Epstein. Camera by Paul
Guichard, Leon Donnot. Interior shots at the Pathé Studio in Vincennes. Exteriors in
Marseilles (the old port of Monosquo). Produced and distributed by Pathé-Consortium-
Cinéma. Length: app. 2000 meters.
La Montagne infidèle (1923). (The Faithless Mountain). Lost. Documentary on the eruption of
Mount Etna in June 1923. Directed by Jean Epstein. Camera: Paul Guichard. Produced
and distributed by Pathé-Consortium-Cinéma. Length: app. 600 meters.
La Belle Nivernaise (1923). (The Beauty from Nivernais). From the short novel by Alphonse Dau-
det. Adapted and directed by Jean Epstein. Camera: Paul Guichard, assisted by Leon
Donnot. Edited by Jean Epstein, assisted by R. Allinat. Interiors shot at the Pathé Studio
of the Vignerons at Vincennes. Exteriors on the Seine between Paris and Rouen, and at
Vincennes. Produced and distributed by Pathé-Consortium-Cinéma. Length: app. 1800
meters.
La Goutte de sang (1924). (A Drop of Blood). From the story by J. Mary. Partial direction by Jean
Epstein. Camera: Paul Guichard, Leon Donnot. Interiors at the Pathé Studio in Vin-
cennes, exteriors at Gorges de l’Herault, Nice. As a result of Epstein’s difficulties with
the Société des Cinéromans, it was completed under the direction of Maurice Mariaud.
Most of the scenes taken by Epstein were not used in the final version.
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Le Lion des mogols. (1924). (The Lion of the Moguls). Scenario by Ivan Mosjoukine. Directed and
edited by Jean Epstein. Camera: Joseph-Louis Mundwiller, Fedor Bourjoukine, Nicolas
Roudakoff. Sets by Lachakoff. Costumes designed by B. Bilinsky. Interiors shot at the
Albatros studios in Montreuil and at Menchen d’Epinay. Exteriors in Algeria and the
port of Marseilles. Produced by Albatros Films. Distributed by Armor Films. Length:
app. 2000 meters.
L’Affiche (1924). (The Poster). Scenario by Marie Epstein. Directed by Jean Epstein. Camera:
Maurice Desfassiaux. Sets by B. Bilinsky. Interiors shot at Albatros Studio in Montreuil.
Exteriors at Bougival and in Paris. Produced by Albatros Films. Distributed by Armor
Films. Length: app. 2000 meters.
Photogénies (1925). Film edited from stock-footage at the request of the Théâtre de Vieux
Colombier. Improvised rapidly with the use of out-takes and newsreel material. This
film was later destroyed.
Le Double amour (1925). (Double Love). Scenario by Marie Epstein. Directed by Jean Epstein.
Camera by Maurice Desfassiaux, assisted by Nicolas Roudakoff. Sets designed by Pierre
Kefer. Interiors shot at the Studio Albatros in Montreuil. Exteriors at Nice and on the
French Riviera. Produced by Albatros Films. Distributed by Armor Films. Length app.
2000 meters.
Les Aventures de Robert Macaire (1925). (The Adventures of Robert Macaire). Five episodes. Scenario
by Charles Vayre from L’AUBERGE DES ADRETS (Play by Benjamin Antier, 1832). Di-
rected by Jean Epstein. Camera: Paul Guichard, assisted by Jehan Fouquet, Nicolas Rou-
dakoff. Sets designed by J. Mercier. Interiors shot at Albatros studios in Montreuil. Ex-
teriors at Dauphine, Grenoble, Vizille castle. Produced by Albatros Films. Distributed by
Armor Films. Original length: 4500 meters. Short version: 3000 meters.
Mauprat (1926). From the novel by George Sand. Directed by Jean Epstein. Assistant direc-
tor: Luis Buñuel. Camera: Albert Duverger. Sets designed by Pierre Kefer. Constumes by
the Souplet company. Wigs by the Chanteau company. Interiors at the Menchen Studio
in Epinay. Exteriors at the valley of the Creuze. Produced by Jean Epstein Films. Distrib-
uted by Selections Maurice Roubier. Length: app. 2000 meters.
Au Pays de George Sand (1926). (In the Country of George Sand). Documentary on the castle of
Nohan. Camera: Porinal. Produced by Jean Epstein Films.
Six et demi, onze (1927). (Six and a Half, Eleven) Scenario by Marie Epstein. Directed by Jean
Epstein. Camera by Georges Perinal. Sets designed by Pierre Kefer. Interiors at the Stu-
dio Nouilly (Roudes) and at the Théâtre des Champs Elysées. Exteriors in Paris, Fontai-
nebleau, Antibes, and the Alps. Produced by Jean Epstein Films. Distributed by Compa-
nie Universelle Cinématographique. Length: app. 2000 meters.
La Glace à trois faces (1927). (The Three-Sided Mirror). From the short novel by Paul Morand.
Directed by Jean Epstein. Camera: Eiwinger. Sets designed by Pierre Kefer. Interiors at
the Roudes studio in Neuilly. Exteriors in Paris, L’Isle-Adam. Produced by Jean Epstein
Films. Distributed by Studio des Ursulines. Length: app. 900 meters.
La Chute de la Maison Usher (1928). (The Fall of the House of Usher). After Edgar Allan Poe.
Adapted from Poe’s “Fall of the House of Usher” and “The Oval Portrait.” Directed by
Jean Epstein. Assistant: Luis Buñuel. Camera: Georges Lucas, assisted by Jean Lucas.
Sets designed by Pierre Kefer. Interiors at Studio Menchen at Epinay. Exteriors at
Magny-en-Vexin, at swamps of Sologne, and on the Breton coast. Assistant set de-
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signer: Ferdinand Ochse. Produced by Jean Epstein Films. Distributed by Exclusivités
Seyta. Length: app. 1500 meters.
Finis Terrae (1929). Directed by Jean Epstein. Camera: Joseph Barth and Joseph Kottula,
assisted by Louis Neo and Raymond Tulle. Produced by Societé Générale des Films.
Distributed by Mappemonde-Films. Length: app. 2400 meters.
Sa Tête (1929). (His Head). Scenario by Jean Epstein. Directed by Jean Epstein. Camera: Al-
bert Bres, assisted by Fred Alric. Assistant director: Marcel Cohen. Interiors at Studio
Roudes in Neuilly. Exteriors in the region of Seine-et-Oise. Produced by Gaston
Roudes. Distributed by Exclusivites Seyta. Talking version with narration by Bernard
Zimmer. Length: app. 900 meters.
Le Pas de la mule (1930). (The Mule’s Pace). Documentary. Directed by Jean Epstein. Camera: A.
Bres. Production: Vieux Colombier.
Sound films
Mor’Vran (1930). (The Sea of Ravens). Directed by Jean Epstein. Acted by the fishermen of the
Île de Sein, near Brest. Camera: Alfred Guichard, Albert Bros and Marcel Rebière. As-
sistant cameraman: Henri Chauffier. Natural sets and exteriors photographed on the
Île-de-Sein and in the bay of Finistère. Music by A. Tansman and Alexis Archangelsky.
Post-synchronized with original Breton music. Produced and distributed by Compagnic
Universelle Cinématoqraphique. Length: app. 900 meters.
Notre-Dame de Paris. Documentary. Directed by Jean Epstein. Camera: Emile Monnoit. Pro-
duced and distributed by Synchro-Ciné. Post-synchronized. Length: app. 300 meters.
La Chanson des peupliers (1931). (The Song of the Poplars). A filmed song. Directed by Jean Ep-
stein. Camera: Christian Matras. Produced and distributed by Synchro-Ciné. Post-syn-
chronized. Length: app. 300 meters.
Le Cor (1931) (The Horn). Based on a poem by Alfred de Vigny. Directed by Jean Epstein.
Camera: Christian Matras. Produced and distributed by Synchro-Ciné. Post-synchro-
nized.
L’Or des mers (1932). (Gold from the Sea). Directed by Jean Epstein. Produced as silent. “Acted”
by the inhabitant-fishermen of the Island Hoedick. Camera: Christian Matras. Assistant
cameramen: Albert Bres and Joseph Braun. Music by Devaux and Kross-Hertman. Nat-
ural sets and exteriors on the islands of Houat and Hoëdick. Produced and distributed
by Synchro-Ciné. Length: app. 2000 meters.
Les berceaux (1932). (The Cradles). A filmed song. Directed by Jean Epstein. Camera: Joseph
Barth. Exteriors shot at Saint-Malo and Cancale. Produced and distributed by Synchro-
Ciné. Post-synchronized. Length: app. 300 meters.
La Villanelle des rubans (1932). (The Villanelle of Ribbons). A filmed song. Directed by Jean Ep-
stein. Camera: Joseph Barth. Produced and distributed by Synchro-Ciné. Post-synchro-
nized. Length: app. 300 meters.
Le Vieux chaland (1932). (The Old Barge). A filmed song. Directed by Jean Epstein. Camera:
Joseph Barth. Produced and distributed by Synchro-Ciné. Post-synchronized. Length:
app. 300 meters.
L’Homme à Hispano (1932). (The Man with the “Hispanic” Car). From the novel by Pierre Fron-
daie. Written and directed by Jean Epstein. Camera: Armand Thirard and Joseph Barth,
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assisted by Phillipe Agostini and Arthur. Assistant directors: Louis Delapree and Robert
de Knyff. Music by Jean Weiner, conducted by Roger Desormiere. Second recording by
Courmes and Gernolle. Sets designed by Lauer & Co. Edited by Marthe Bassi. Interiors
at the Braunberger-Richebe Studio in Billancourt. Exteriors at Cannes, in the Provence,
at Biarritz, and in the Basque country. Produced by Vandal and Delac. Distributed by
Films P. J. de Venloo. Length: app. 2000 meters.
La Châtelaine du liban (1933). (The Lady of the Lebanese Manor). From the novel by Pierre Benoit.
Written and directed by Jean Epstein. Dialogue by Pierre Benoit. Camera: Armand Thir-
ard, Joseph Barth, and Christian Matras. Assistant directors: Ary Sadoul and Pierre Du-
val. Sets designed by Aguettand and Bouxin. Music by Alexander Tansman. Sound re-
cording by Bauge. Interiors at Studio Pathé-Francoeur. Exteriors in Beyrouth (Lebanon),
Palmyra (Syria), and at Avignon. Produced by Vandal and Delac. Distributed by Films P.
J. de Venloo. Length: app. 2400 meters.
Chanson d’Ar-Mor (1934). (Song of Ar-Mor). After Jean des Cognets. Adapted and directed by
Jean Epstein. Ballad-type documentary, spoken in Breton language. Camera: Jean Lu-
cas, assisted by Georges Lucas and Raymond Raynal. Assistant director: Pierre Duval.
Music by Jacques Larmanjat, conducted by Roger Desormiere. Choirs and dances ar-
ranged by Emile Cueff, assisted by Suscinio. Sound recording by Behrens. Edited by
Marthe Poncin. Breton Dialogue by Fanch Gourvil. Natural settings and exteriors in
Brittany. Produced by Ouest-Eclair at Rennes. Distributed by Pathé. Length: app. 1200
meters.
La vie d’un grand journal (1934). (The Life of the Great Newspaper). Documentary. Directed by
Jean Epstein. Camera: Jean and Georges Lucas. Produced by Ouest-Eclair.
Marius et Olive à Paris (1935). (Marius and Olive in Paris). Scenario by Pages. Directed by Jean
Epstein. Assistant director: Pierre Duval. Camera: Joseph Barth and Philippe Agostini.
Music by Jean Wiener. Interiors at Studio Photosonor. Exteriors in Marseilles. Produced
by Cinemonde. Due to disputes, Epstein withdrew his name from the title credits.
Cœur de gueux (Cuore di vagabondo) (1936). (Heart of the Vagabonds). Scenario by G. B. Seyta,
after A. Machard. Adaptated and directed by Jean Epstein. Dialogue and Lyrics by Ca-
mille Francois. Camera: Mario Albertelli, Tielzi, assisted by Angarelli. Assistant direc-
tor: Pierre Duval. Music by Jean Lenoir and J. Dallin. Assistant for the Italian version:
Giacomo Forzano. Sets by Lucca. Director of production: G. B. Seyta. Interiors at the
Forzano Studio and the Studio Tirrenia in Marina di Pisa. Exteriors in the environments
of Pisa, Florence, and Livorna. Produced by Seyta and Forzano Films. Distributed by
Compagnie Universelle Cinematographique. Length: app. 2400 meters.
La Bretagne (1936). (Brittany). Documentary for the exposition of Art and Techniques. Direc-
ted by Jean Epstein. Narration by Leandre Valliat. Camera: Georges Lucas, assisted by
Robert Ruth. Music by Henri Casadessues. Songs performed by Yvon Le Mar’Hadour.
Dances arranged by Emile Cueff. Sound recording by Behrens. Produced by Jean Be-
noit-Levy and Grands Reseaux Francais. Distributed by Atlantic Films. Length: app.
1200 meters.
La Bourgogne (1936). (Burgundy). Documentary for the exposition of Art and Techniques.
Directed by Jean Epstein. Narration by Leandre Valliat. Camera: Georges Lucas, assisted
by Robert Ruth. Assistant director: Pierre Duval. Music by Henri Casadessus. Sound
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recording by Behrens. Production and distribution: Grands Reseaux Francais and
Atlantic Films. Length: app. 900 meters.
Vive la vie (1937). (Long Live Life!). Scenario by Marie Epstein and Jean Benoit-Levy. Directed
by Jean Epstein. Documentary produced for the French Youth Hostel Association. As-
sistant director: Pierre Duval. Music by Jean Wiener. Sound recording by Behrens. Inte-
riors at the Billancourt studio. Natural settings and exteriors at the youth hostels of Aix
en Provence, Aubagne, Apt, and in the valley of Loups. Produced by Jean Benoit-Levy.
Distributed by the ministry of Public Entertainment. Length: app. 1200 meters.
La Femme du bout du monde (1937). (The Woman from the End of the World). From the novel by
Alain Serdac. Adapted and directed by Jean Epstein. Camera: Enzo Riccioni and Paul
Cotteret. Assistant director: Pierre Duval. Director of Production: Jean Rossi. Music by
Jean Wiener. Sound recording by Behrens. Sets designed by Roger Berteux at Courbe-
voie studio. Interiors at Studio Francois Premier. Exteriors on the island of Ouessant.
This film was released under the occupation without giving credit to Epstein. Length:
app. 2400 meters.
Les Bâtisseurs (1938). (The Builders). Documentary. Scenario by Jeander. Directed by Jean Ep-
stein. Camera: Georges Lucas and Robert Ruth. Assistant director: Pierre Duval. Sets:
Roger Berteaux. Music by Hoeree and Honegger. Sound recording by Behrens, assisted
by Maxime Bachellerie. Interiors at La Garenne Studio. Exteriors at Paris, Chartres, St.-
Cloud, etc. Produced by the National Federation of Construction. Distributed by Ciné-
Liberte and the Maison des Techniques. Length: app. 900 meters.
La Relève (1938). (The Relief). Documentary. Camera: Georges Lucas, Robert Ruth. Produced
by Ciné-Liberte.
Eau-Vive (1938). (Spring Water). Documentary. Written and directed by Jean Epstein. Camera:
Georges Lucas and Pierre Bachelet. Assistant directors: Pierre Duval and Jacques Bro-
chard. Interiors at the La Garenne studios. Exteriors at Rochefort en Yveline. Produced
by Jean Benoit-Levy. Distributed privately. Length: app. 1200 meters.
Artères de France (1939). (Arteries of France). Documentary produced for the French section of
the International Exposition in New York. Scenario by Henri Champly. Directed by Jean
Epstein, in collaboration with Rene Lucot. Camera: Georges and Jean Lucas. Assistant
director: Pierre Duval. Cooperative production of Les Artisans D’Art du Cinéma. Dis-
tributed by Robert de Nesles. Music by Heni Casadessus. Sound recording by Behrens.
Length: app. 600 meters.
Le Tempestaire (1947). (The Storm Master). Directed by Jean Epstein. Camera: A.S. Militon,
assisted by Schneider. Score by Yves Baudrier. Sound recording by Leon Vareille and
Frankiel, assisted by Dumont. Director of production: Nino Constantini. Produced by
Filmagazine. Distributed in the USA by Martin Lewis. Length: app. 600 meters.
Les Feux de la mer (1948). (The Fires of the Sea). Directed by Jean Epstein. Camera: Pierre Bache-
let, assisted by Andre Bernard. Assistant directors: Pierre Duval and Jacques Duchateau.
Musical score by Yves Baudrier. Sound recording by Leon Vareille. Produced by Films
Etienne Lallier for the United Nations. Distributed by the UN. Length: app. 600 meters.
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